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Abstract 
This thesis examines the perfonnance of the intelligence collection 
organisations of the anned services of New Zealand during the Second 
World War. It considers the intelligence bodies of the Navy, the Anny and 
the Air Force and looks at their growth, development and demise, and 
assesses their effectiveness as intelligence organisations. The question of 
how much New Zealand could be expected to achieve in the field of 
intelligence arises, not least because New Zealand was demographically 
small, had a long coastline and was geographically relatively remote. How 
much could New Zealand contribute to the Allied cause in intelligence tenns 
is another issue, and what forms did any participation take? Were there 
lessons to be learned from the wartime experience (there were, but they went 
for the most part largely unheeded)? 
New Zealand, like other countries, had a fragmented approach to 
intelligence collection, making for a degree of complexity over a range of 
activity, despite the intelligence organisations being of modest size. The 
examination of the organisations in this thesis includes multi-service and 
multi -departmental dimensions along with the production of useful 
intelligence. Whether good use was made of intelligence collected is another 
matter. There was a substantial amount of liaison, contact and practice 
between departments of state as to vanous aspects of intelligence, the 
Organization for National Security and coastwatching being two notable 
areas. The overarching role and limitations of the Organization for National 
Security with regard to intelligence is explored, and the development of a 
combined intelligence centre examined, The participation of New Zealand 
signals intelligence organisations in the great Allied interception offensive is 
detailed, along with the mundane but fundamental task of coastal 
surveillance. The establishment and spectacular decline of the :flIst local 
independent security service is traced. Both the intelligence and security 
aspects of the Army's operationally deployed units are covered, along with 
the growth of RNZAF air intelligence. 
The effectiveness of all of these organisations could hardly be 
expected to be unifonn, and indeed it was not. Some bodies succeeded in 
their collection roles beyond expectations, others were reasonably effective, 
and two organisations failed dismally in different ways, for a number of 
reasons. If a pattern emerges at all, it is that small single service component-
type intelligence sections collecting operational intelligence were the most 
effective New Zealand intelligence organisations. Operational focus and. 
operational requirements underlay the drive for successful collection. Most 
significant within the Allied context were the signals intelligence bodies. At 
the other end of the scale, larger co-operative interdepartmental New 
Zealand intelligence ventures failed to deliver projected results. 
New Zealand's armed forces had an interesting variety of intelligence 
contributions during the Second World War. Of these, the most effective 
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During the Second World War, New Zealand had a surprising amount of 
involvement in the intelligence field, despite its small size of population and remote 
location. Yet neither demography nor geography prevented the development of strong 
links with intelligence organisations of larger powers. The roots of certain of these 
linkages were quite deep, partly an imperial legacy and partly the product of changing 
times. The increasing independence of the Dominions, the prospect of war with Germany 
for the second time in the century, and above all the expected conflict with imperial Japan 
had considerable influence on the range of intelligence collection activity engaged in by 
New Zealand's armed services. This thesis concerns those service intelligence collection 
organisations during the war, and assesses the degree of success of their operation. 
Intelligence in general during the Second World War was even more important 
than it had ever been, not least because of the communications revolution that had taken 
place with short wave radio and established cable links. The ability to get inside the 
enemy's deliberations, orders, instructions and routines, to read his intentions, follow his 
movements, assess his capabilities and materially assist in causing him great operational 
discomfort were all components of the proffered prize in the interception and evaluation 
of his communications. Yet the possibilities connected with the interception of enemy 
signals traffic at the outset of hostilities were rendered that much more difficult with the 
introduction of machine codes which in manual mathematical terms might take years to 
break. These difficulties were overcome sufficiently to make interception operationally 
useful, and the Allied signals intelligence offensive was arguably the most important 
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dimension of the intelligence war. Two small New Zealand intelligence organisations, the 
Navy's 'Y' Room and the Army's Special Section, played a minor and largely unsung 
part in that offensive.1 
The New Zealand intelligence scene was fragmented, but this was the case for all 
the major powers. Most countries' intelligence services were divided a number of ways. 
For larger powers, there was a civil/military split and an intelligence collection/security 
intelligence separation. The classic espionage activity is intelligence gathering, and the 
activities associated with preventing espionage by other powers is security intelligence or 
counterintelligence. If we look at a number of countries, this fragmentation of effort 
becomes clear. The Russians, for example, were divided in their intelligence collection 
between the military intelligence arm, the GRU, and part of the civilian overarching 
agency, the NKVD? Germany had the Abwehr for military intelligence and the 
Sicherheitsdienst or SD, the Nazi Party intelligence organisation.3 The NKVD in Russia 
also looked after border security and internal security, while the SD in Germany was part 
of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt - the Reich Security Main Office or RHSA - an SS 
organisation. The RHSA also contained the Gestapo, the Nazi security service which had 
criminal apprehension as another of its tasks.4 The intelligence collection agencies of the 
United States were divided between the Army and the Navy in the military, the Army 
having the Signal Intelligence Service and the Navy OP-20-G or naval intelligence.s 
Security in the United States was the responsibility of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
or FBI.6 In Britain, the divisions were even more complex. 
Espionage in Britain was conducted by a shadowy organisation, the Secret 
Intelligence Service or MI6. MI6 worked off-shore for the most part.7 Security 
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intelligence or counterintelligence was carried out by MIS.8 A branch of MI6 with the 
innocuous sounding covemame of the Government Code and Cypher School or GC&CS 
was engaged in codebreaking (and changed its name during the war to Government Code 
Headquarters or GCHQ). Before the outbreak of war MI6, MIS and GC&CS were grossly 
understaffed.9 All of these bodies nominally came under the War Office, although they 
were not Army organisations at all. The Royal Navy had the Naval Intelligence Division, 
the Army had Military Intelligence. lO Security in the Army was carried out by Field 
Security units. 1 I The Royal Air Force had its own intelligence organisation. A sabotage 
body was created early in the war for operations on the Continent and elsewhere: this was 
the Special Operations Executive or SOE.12 There were a variety of offshoots from a 
number of these organisations.13 
In Australia, the intelligence scene was similarly fragmented. Naval intelligence 
was operationally focussed and covered a wide range of intelligence, including signals 
intelligence and the setting up of a coastwatching system. Military Intelligence was small, 
and the expansion of the intelligence staff made difficult with the raising of 2nd Australian 
Imperial Force (2 AlF) for overseas service. The Army was also involved in signals 
intelligence. RAAF intelligence had a security rather than an operational focus at the 
outset of the war. This changed, and later on Australian cryptanalytic capability involved 
AIF, RAN and RAAF personnel. Internal security was looked after by the 
Commonwealth Investigation Bureau (CIB), a body succeeded by the Commonwealth 
Security Service in early 1941.14 Intelligence in Australia was to be much more 
complicated by the expansion of the war with Japan and the arrival of United States 
forces. The setting up of the American-Australian Central Bureau, the Australian-British 
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Allied Intelligence Bureau and US Navy's FRUMEL (itself a branch of OP-20-G) added 
to a complex intelligence picture. 
Between intelligence and security organisations there existed natural friction, for 
those collecting intelligence (like MI6) were engaged in a different kind of activity than 
organisations set up to catch spies and close off leaks (like MIS). There was also inter-
service rivalry, and the conflict between the US Army Signals Intelligence Service and 
the US Navy's OP-20-G ran very deep indeed. IS As well as the plethora of intelligence 
agencies, there were also police forces. Some of these had branches of their own 
engaged in security work, like the British Special Branch.16 The FBI's main work was 
catching criminals, although it had national counterintelligence responsibilities.17 
Friction, division and fragmentation were normal, if potentially deleterious, constituents 
of a state's intelligence arrangements. It is unsurprising then that a number of different 
intelligence organisations developed in New Zealand having different, and on occasion, 
overlapping functions. 
* * * * 
The literature on intelligence in during the Second World War and the Cold War 
has expanded enormously since the 1960s, the largest increase occurring in the last two 
decades. The increasing distance from the 1939-1945 war and the technological 
revolution of the last thirty years has meant that much of the secret technology used for 
the gathering of signals intelligence during the war has long been overtaken by later 
developments. This is not to say that all can be revealed, by any means. I8 The literature 
explosion is also in part simply the routine historical process, where at least some matters 
previously concealed impact upon interpretations of campaigns, operations, commanders, 
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politicalleaderships and intelligence bodies. More releases of documentary intelligence 
material to archival collections in the United Kingdom, the United States and 
Commonwealth countries have greatly widened the scope for research. With regard to 
signals intelligence, for instance, more recent releases at the Public Record Office have 
provided fertile ground for researchers. 19 The same goes for the amount of signals 
intelligence material released by the National Security Agency to the United States 
National Archives, but on a larger scale.2o The end of the Cold War has not only assisted 
this process, but has brought about some access to small selections of certain Soviet 
intelligence files. The writing of intelligence histories and memoirs by former 
intelligence personnel has supplemented the efforts of intelligence historians?l This 
process has greatly altered interpretations of intelligence history over the last four 
decades. 
With regard to the Second World War, the greatest focus of interest has been 
without doubt in the earlier well-concealed role of signals intelligence in general, 
particularly what has commonly become known as Ultra, that is, intelligence derived 
from certain enemy signals traffic. The interception of enemy radio and cable traffic had 
long been important,22 and this more common form of signals intelligence known as 'Y' 
intelligence underpinned, supplemented and at times substituted for Ultra in most 
important ways?3 Ultra was the term used first to refer to intelligence obtained from 
German Enigma traffic,24 which was then extended by both the British and the Americans 
to refer to selected Japanese signal traffic?5 Signals intelligence in general terms was the 
most important intelligence enterprise successfully engaged in over the course of the war. 
Its value lay in that it revealed a huge range of information about the Axis enemies, based 
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on German and Japanese internal communications, including intentions, operations, 
strengths, support available, identity, and copious background information.26 
The signals intelligence offensive made further intelligence exploitation 
possible. ISOS and ISK,27 the reading of the Abwehr's hand and machine cipher traffic, 
for instance, permitted the pulling inside out of the German agent offensive against 
Britain through the capture and turning (or execution) of most Abwehr agents landed in 
Britain.28 Enough agents turned and played back against the enemy were regarded as 
reliable enough by the Germans to enable, for example, certain crucial deception 
operations to be successfully mounted in support of the D-Day landings.29 Signals 
intelligence was vital in the outcome of the U-Boat guerre de course, the Battle of the 
Atlantic, the desert campaign in North Africa, and at Normandy.3o While the German 
intelligence effort was largely although not entirely negated,31 the Japanese in the Pacific 
were to suffer equally serious reverses as a result of the Allied intelligence offensive?2 
Indeed, it might be argued that part of the Japanese failure to obtain sufficient success to 
break the Allied resistance in 1942 lay in an unmatched intelligence advantage, although 
the Allies were very much on the defensive. While the Japanese were successful in their 
offensive operations this was not critical, but from the battles of the Coral Sea and 
Midway onwards the Allied intelligence offensive spear-headed by signals intelligence 
materially assisted the wearing down of the Japanese war machine. 
At the same time, it needs to be recognised that undetected problems posed by 
Russian intelligence organisations against their Anglo-American allies had an unnoticed 
but alarming potential. For the first period of the war, the Russians were, if not allies of 
the Germans, at least rendered neutral by way of the Non-Aggression Pact and the carve-
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up of Poland. Agents of the NKVD, and probably the GRU, were successful in 
penetrating useful positions of the wartime British government bureaucracy from the 
mid-1930s onwards.33 During the war these included the Foreign Office, the Treasury, 
Lord Hankey's office, the Government Code and Cypher School at Bletchley Park, MI6, 
MIS, SOE and other departments.34 There were enough of these agents in useful positions 
to cumulatively reveal almost all of the intelligence advantage possessed by the Allies. 
Whether the intelligence obtained was well used is another question.35 These were long-
term agent penetrations and a fair number of these sources remained in place for more 
than a decade, that is far beyond the end of the war.36 Whereas the GRU's famous Rate 
Kapelle (the Red Orchestra) was largely destroyed by the Germans on the Continent, the 
British sources were to be of considerable utility for Moscow Centre. There was similar, 
though it appears not as extensive, penetration of the United States government 
machinery?7 Just how successful the Soviet intelligence organisations were in the long 
run is a question still very much up in the air for intelligence historians, for it is possible 
(indeed, most likely) there are still quite well concealed aspects of this wartime and 
postwar struggle?8 What is undeniable is that just as the Allies were enjoying a great 
intelligence advantage over the Axis enemy, so the Russians had managed at least to 
obtain perspectives on the extent of that advantage. Clearly some benefits were reaped 
from it (timely signals intelligence courtesy of Cairncross before the Battle of Kursk 
being an outstanding example).39 If the British intelligence organisations were well 
penetrated, then it was entirely logical that the administrative bureaucracies of the British 
Commonwealth Dominions should be seen as useful for the Russians. This might be only 
to get hold of British and American material circulated to the Australian, Canadian and 
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New Zealand governments, simply as a litmus test of Allied material already supplied. 
As Australian, New Zealand and Canadian security was quite lax, this was an attractive 
proposition.4o 
Against this on the other side of the ledger was the Allied resumption of 
intelligence interest in the Soviet Union. Although the prewar intelligence interest in the 
Russians by the British had extended through to June 1941, this seems to have been put 
in abeyance for a period.41 Towards the end of the war, the British intelligence 
organisations resumed their interest (the Russians, be it noted, had never suspended their 
efforts in this area) in the interception of Russian communications.42 This interception 
naturally continued in peacetime, when renewed attempts were made to decipher 
accumulated intercepts of encoded Soviet signal traffic. This was the so-called Venona 
traffic, or Operation Bride, and inroads were made: some traffic was broken into 
retrospectively, and some other cables seem to have been read with little delay.43 Venona 
dealt with only a fraction of Soviet traffic, yet was sufficient to assist in exposing a 
number of the Soviet agent-based penetrations in Britain, Australia, Canada and the 
United States. The release of a large amount of decrypted Venona traffic by the US 
National Security Agency to the US National Archives from 1996 onwards has proved 
most fruitful as Desmond Ball and David Horner have demonstrated by careful analysis 
of Canberra-Moscow intercepts, and Nigel West on Venona overall.44 Recent light 
thrown on Soviet intelligence by the collaborative efforts of Christopher Andrew and 
Oleg Gordievsky, John Costello and Oleg Tsarev, Nigel West and Oleg Tsarev, Genrikh 
Borovik and Phillip Knightley and the unique perspectives from Andrew and Vasili 
Mitrokhin have enriched this picture. The Mitrokhin Archive (1999)which refers to one 
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New Zealand spy was merely a first volume, and at least a further volume dealing in part 
with Soviet espionage in both Australia and New Zealand is promised. My personal 
enquiries on the New Zealand material have elicited nothing as yet. Reliability questions 
on Soviet-sourced material are being raised and assessed by reviewers as diverse as the 
late Robert Cecil, Frank Cain and Sheila Kerr.45 
The history of intelligence during the Second World War has been dramatically 
altered, particularly by documentary material that might have never been expected never 
to see the light of day. Intelligence memoirs have also become more useful, if treated 
with some caution, as former personnel have been more forthcoming with the passage of 
time.46 If we consider just how these developments have been treated in intelligence 
literature, the pace of changing perspectives can be discerned. 
The 1960s and 1970s signalled the beginning of the flood. David Kahn's seminal 
work on communications interception,47 came out around the same time as Kim Philby's 
Russian-sponsored memoir of his penetration of MI6,48 and the first of a long series of 
Philby biographies and works on the Cambridge spies.49 The official history on SOE in 
France 50 had been published, signalling a partial beginning to the British official 
histories on intelligence. In 1972, the former chairman of the celebrated Twenty 
Committee published his previously classified report on the Double-Cross system, lifting 
the veil on the turning of German agents in Britain.51 A lengthy account of the Abwehr 
came out the same year, 52 and one of the double agents published his memoirs in 1974.53 
But the greatest stir was caused with the publication of F.W. Winterbotham's The Ultra 
Secret 54 in 1974, an account riddled with inaccuracies, although not immediately 
apparent. Until this point, Ultra had remained a closed book to the outside world, in spite 
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of the fact that several thousand intelligence personnel had worked in this area during the 
war. Three years later the first Ultra material was released to the Public Record Office.55 
This was immediately mined for works on intelligence, from Patrick Beesly's 
authoritative account of the Admiralty's Operational Intelligence Centre to Ronald 
Lewin's appreciation of Ultra on the battlefield. 56 
The first volume of the comprehensive British official history on intelligence 
during the Second World WarS7 by a team of ex-intelligence officers led by F.R. Hinsley, 
followed in 1979, the last two volumes being published in 1990.58 These were written 
with access to extensive collections of secret files. Quite a proportion of those files still 
remain classified, although more have emerged recently. The official histories threw new 
light on the overall intelligence picture, the main deficiency being the deliberate omission 
of substantial material relating to war in the Far East and the Pacific.59 A continuing 
stream of books and articles on the intelligence war followed throughout the 1980s and 
1990s. Nigel West has produced a large number of books on the British intelligence 
organisations, one of the last being a semi-official release of the file history of British 
Security Co-ordination in the United States.60 Former intelligence officers like Ralph 
Bennett, Peter Calvocoressi, Gordon Welchman, Alan Stripp and F.H. Hinsley produced 
accounts centring on their wartime experiences at Bletchley Park and elsewhere.61 
Further accounts of Ultra in the Far East came from Ronald Lewin and John Winton, with 
Arthur Marder's Old Friends, New Enemies breaking new ground on the Far East 
Combined Bureau, while Bradley F.Smith explored Ultra in the context of the Anglo-
American relationship in greater depth.62 More recently, John Prados, Peter Elphick and 
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Alan H. Bath have provided more detailed studies of the intelligence war in the Pacific in 
the light of the 1990s document declassifications, Prados and Bath being most valuable.63 
The Australian intelligence literature has followed the growth pattern over the last 
twenty five years, since David Horner's article on 'Special Intelligence in the South-West 
Pacific in World War II' in 1978 64 and Richard Hall's book on Australia's secret state.65 
Horner's High Command: Australia and Allied Strategy, 1939-1945 66 revealed more on 
the complex Australian-American-British intelligence picture in wartime Australia. Frank 
Cain's work on pre-ASIO political surveillance 67 followed, and a number of other 
publications on the Anglo-Australian connection, like articles by John Chapman 68 and 
Christopher Andrew, 69 and James Rusbridger and Eric Nave's flawed book on the 
background to Pearl Harbor.7o Geoffrey Ballard's On ULTRA Active Service 71 and Jack 
Bleakley's The Eavesdroppers 72 shed further light on Australian signals intelligence. 
Barbara Winter's The Intrigue Master: Commander Long and Naval Intelligence in 
Australia 1913-1945 73 covered a great deal more ground than simply naval intelligence. 
Books by Manne and Bialoguski74 on the Petrov affair, Hall's biography of Milner,75 
McKnight on Australia's spies,76 and Ball and Horner's77 work on Venona had wartime 
implications for security. Desmond Ball's prolific output on intelligence has touched on 
the war period quite usefully, as for example, his article on signals intelligence in Hong 
Kong.78 
New Zealand literature on intelligence is quite limited. While a number of the 
official historians of New Zealand's role in the Second World War were ex-intelligence 
personnel of one sort or another, like W.D.Stevens, O.S.Gillespie, D.M.Davin and 
S.D.Waters, no official history on intelligence was produced and this remains a gap. 
12 
Gillespie's The Pacific/9 Davin's Crete80 touch on intelligence a little more than other 
campaign histories, and Waters covers aspects of naval intelligence in Royal New 
Zealand Navy.81 Waters wrote an unpublished 'History of Naval Intelligence 
Organisation in New Zealand', which was used as a basis for the New Zealand section of 
ADM 223/494, the history of the Admiralty's Naval Intelligence Division, now held at 
the Public Record Office.82 Michael Parker's book on the postwar security service,83 the 
NZSIS, refers anecdotally to the wartime security service and its demise. More recently, 
Nicky Hager's monograph on signals intelligence and Appendix D of Secret Power have 
sketched outlines of New Zealand's wartime signals intelligence operations.84 Malcolm 
Templeton'S book on the Moscow Legation refers quite extensively to the mainstay of 
that post, the New Zealand intelligence officer Paddy Costello,85 while Ian McGibbon's 
Undiplomatic Dialogue contains very interesting correspondence between Berendsen and 
Mclntosh.86 Laurie Barber and Cliff Lord's Swift and Sure contains material on the 
army's 'Y' section in wartime. 
The sources used for this thesis are documentary for the most part, supplemented 
by correspondence, interviews, privately held papers and secondary sources. For the most 
part the documentary sources come from the New Zealand National Archives along with 
very useful Canadian, Australian, British and American material. National Archives in 
Wellington contain intelligence documents in a range of government file collections. 
These include the Army Department(AD), the Air Force (AIR), the Navy (N), World War 
I and II (W A), External Affairs (EA), Customs Department(C), Marine Department (M) 
and the Governors' (G) files. Material most difficult to locate were on certain aspects of 
the war in the ether, like the 'Y' organisation, its Special Intelligence Section and 
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involvement in minor cryptographic work and diplomatic interception, evidence of the 
army's Special Section interceptions, and matters to do with radio fingerprinting. Some 
documentary material relating to the security service was held elsewhere, but has been 
made available. Waters' draft naval intelligence history referred to above, was a fuller 
account than the PRO adaption. The Hanson Papers consist of privately held material 
collected by the first head of the Government Communications Security Bureau, Group 
Captain Colin Hanson OBE. It included collections of papers like the de la Perelle 
collection not located in archives. His perspectives on intelligence were extremely useful 
in filling in gaps, and the Hanson MSS referred to was a helpful but incomplete draft. 
Interviews and correspondence with a range of ex-intelligence personnel were conducted 
or obtained, including the 'Y' Room, the Combined Operational Intelligence Centre, the 
H/F D/F stations, the radio fingerprinting station, coastwatchers and the security service. 
The intelligence collection organisations of New Zealand's armed forces 
developed and operated according to requirements for intelligence from within the 
government structure, or from those states with which there were shared strategic 
interests, based on historical experience and constitutional ties. There was no grand 
design about New Zealand intelligence collection, and the attempt to co-ordinate 
intelligence collection between the services was to remain a pallid shadow. Where the 
intelligence requirements were clear-cut, straightforwardly functional at the tactical level, 
success was achieved by small-sized, single-service component-type intelligence 
sections. The larger the New Zealand intelligence organisation and the greater reliance on 
multi-departmental and multi-service co-operation in intelligence collection, the greater 
the prospects for weakness, lack of cohesion and failure. 
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This thesis is an examination of that experience and the conclusions that can be 
drawn. These will go some way towards answering four questions. Could a small country 
like New Zealand be expected to achieve more in the intelligence field? How important 
was New Zealand in the Allied intelligence efforts against the Axis powers? Were there 
any lessons to be learned about the difficulties of operating an intelligence organisation in 
a small country? Can a small country like New Zealand compensate for its limited 
military strength with a focussed intelligence effort? 
There was a certain amount of friction between the New Zealand intelligence 
bodies, although this varied. The intelligence and security intelligence organisations 
were small, and a number did not exist on the outbreak of hostilities in 1939. Intelligence 
activities inevitably crossed over into civilian departments of state. An umbrella body, the 
Organization for National Security, had pretentions towards co-ordinating intelligence 
like other government activities. This was inevitable as the Chiefs of Staff Committee 
was one of its most important bodies, and all service intelligence developments came 
from them in one form or another. Alongside this were departments of state with long 
and varied associations to do with intelligence and security, like the Marine Department, 
the Customs Department, the Post & Telegraph (P&T) Department and the Police 
Department. 
The purpose here is to consider the New Zealand armed services intelligence 
organisations from the point of view of the effectiveness of their collection activities, 
whether they were single or multi-service or multi-department, and who controlled their 
activities. The most important structures are dealt with first, moving onto to the more 
self-contained bodies. The Organization for National Security, combined intelligence, 
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naval intelligence and 'Y', coastwatching, the security service, army intelligence and air 
force intelligence are considered in tum. The effectiveness of the intelligence 
organisations was uneven, so the order of importance does not mean those treated last 
were less effective as intelligence organisations. The intelligence organisations of New 
Zealand's armed services were not subject to central control for operational reasons, 
served either single service interests or clusters of interests, some of which by their very 
nature lay within an Allied rather than merely New Zealand context. It is argued that the 
Navy dominated the New Zealand intelligence scene in general terms over the course of 
the war, but that there were significant limitations placed on this prevailing position by 
the other services and other departments. The Army and the Air Force separated off their 
respective main intelligence activities. In the first case this was facilitated by the nature 
of the Army's main contribution to the war, the raising of expeditionary forces for service 
overseas. Those formations by their absence far away developed self-contained 
intelligence sections for operational purposes. The Air Force by contrast dragged its feet 
on intelligence up until the end of 1942, and then deliberately moved away from linkage 
with the Navy in the second combined intelligence organisation. This had to do with the 
nature of the RNZAF's most important focus: the provision of operational intelligence for 
the squadrons committed to the Pacific islands. The Naval ascendancy on the local 
intelligence scene occurred by default on the part of the other two services. 
The Navy's venture into the technological cutting edge of intelligence collection, 
assisted by a tiny separate yet symbiotic Army initiative, made the difference with regard 
to New Zealand being perceived as a useful ally in the intelligence field. In the provision 
of technical equipment, services and personnel, this effort was underwritten by the Post 
fNfVEf<SfTl' Of ?lI\~_ 
U8itAln' 
16 
& Telegraph Department. The P&T Department along with the Customs Department, 
were of considerable assistance to the service intelligence organisations overall. By 
contrast, the Police Department had an adverse effect, perhaps strategically deleterious, 
on the development of security intelligence within New Zealand. 
This thesis on New Zealand's service intelligence organisations is divided into 
five parts, a total of fourteen chapters in all. Part I, 'The Centre', deals with the moves 
towards the co-ordination of intelligence during the war and assesses the extent to which 
this was successful. Chapter One attends to the centralising tendencies of the 
Organization for National Security, which had a contingent rather than a necessary 
influence in the area of intelligence. It provided a framework within which committees 
oversaw a variety of intelligence activities, including the co-ordination of intelligence, 
among other things. The members of the ONS's most powerful committee, the Chiefs of 
Staff, had central roles in policy decisions on intelligence. Chapter Two considers prewar 
preparations, such as they were, while the third chapter attends to the outbreak of 
hostilities and the setting up of the first combined intelligence organisation, the 
Combined Intelligence Bureau. The fourth chapter deals with the establishment and 
running of the more useful successor organisation, the Combined Operational 
Intelligence Centre. It also scrutinizes the run down of the cOle and examines the 
nature of the achievements of New Zealand combined intelligence during the war. This 
assessment deals with the lack of effectiveness of the COle in co-ordinating the 
intelligence interests of the three services. 
Part II, 'The War in the Ether', surveys the most significant New Zealand 
intelligence collection activity both before and during the war. It traces the history of 
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both the naval and army interception organisations (there was no air force signals 
intelligence capability), and measures their effectiveness. Chapter Five covers the main 
preoccupations of the naval 'Y' organisation, its Special Intelligence sub-section and the 
shore-based high-frequency direction-finding stations. The increasing operational 
effectiveness of 'Y' intelligence and the changing nature of the business is outlined. 
Chapter Six sets out the establishment and operation of the radio-fingerprinting station 
near Blenheim, a tiny organisation at the cutting edge of contemporary technical 
intelligence. Chapter Seven concerns the small Army 'Y' unit at Nairnville Park, its links 
with the Navy's 'Y' section, and its particular contribution to the Allied 'Y' offensive. 
Part II argues that New Zealand signals intelligence had a much more solid foundation 
than New Zealand's foray into combined intelligence, and that signals intelligence 
beyond New Zealand within a British and later Anglo-American intelligence context 
brought new and significant capabilities. 
Coastwatching is the focus of attention for Part III, consisting of two chapters, 
one on the coastal surveillance from New Zealand's shores; the other to do with the 
watch maintained by New Zealand coastwatchers on a great variety of offshore islands, 
comprising either New Zealand or British possessions. Coastwatching being a basic 
intelligence activity, Chapters Eight and Nine assess how well or how poorly the watch 
on the various coasts was kept. This entailed more co-operation between the services and 
other government departments than any other New Zealand intelligence activity. The 
poor performance of the watch on the New Zealand coast turned out to be the greatest 
New Zealand intelligence failure of the war and contrasts with the surveillance carried 
out elsewhere, in the Gilbert & Ellice Islands, for instance. 
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Internal security was a basic security intelligence task. Part IV deals in effect with 
a power struggle between the advocates and opponents within the government of an 
independent security service. The Police Department, the armed services and the Prime 
Minister were all caught up in an unseemly wrangle in the middle of the war. The body at 
the heart of the furore was the first separate New Zealand security service, the Security 
Intelligence Bureau (the SIB), established under the auspices of the Army. It was fated to 
slide under the control of a civilian department of state, although remaining nominally an 
army intelligence organisation until the end of the war. The three chapters respectively 
examine the development of the SIB through to 1942 (Chapter Ten), the sea-change 
signalled by the Ross affair (Chapter Eleven), and finally the consequences and 
implications for internal security for the rest of the war (Chapter Twelve). The role of the 
Police Department throughout was highly significant, while questions remain as to 
whether New Zealand was blind to the prospect of the penetration of parts of the New 
Zealand government machinery by the intelligence services of at least one foreign power. 
Had the police been less hostile to the new security service, there might have been an 
opportunity for some really useful work. If the Police Department had adequately carried 
out the internal security role that it so jealously guarded in the first place, a competing 
security body may not have got off the ground. 
Part V deals with army and air force operational intelligence. The commitment of 
the Army's field formations to service overseas produced a requirement for an 
operational intelligence collection capability and operational field security. Chapter 
Thirteen investigates the intelligence collection and field security organisations of the 
army both in New Zealand and deployed overseas. Chapter Fourteen examines the 
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RNZAF air intelligence organisation, from the extremely slow start in the opening years 
of the war through to the highly operationally-focussed body by the end of hostilities. It 
underlines the independent direction eventually taken by the Air Force's air intelligence 
organisation and the move away from tri-service co-operation in this field. 
The first four Parts of this thesis have to do with functions that overrode single 
service interests: the co-ordination of intelligence and the matter of combined 
intelligence, the signals intelligence offensive, coastal surveillance, and internal security. 
Naval intelligence prevailed in combined intelligence, signals intelligence and coastal 
surveillance, all areas intimately connected with the Navy's intelligence interests. Internal 
security was of significance for the civilian departments of state and the armed services, 
posing the question as to whether a separate security service was necessary, and if so, 
should it be a military or civilian organisation. Part V, by contrast, is single service 
focussed, because of the particular and very different requirements dictated by 




The Secretary and the ONS 
The moves in the direction of centralising defence matters in New Zealand in the 
1930s were to result in the establishment of an umbrella organisation inside the 
government bureaucracy. This body was in tum to have some influence in certain 
respects on the subsequent setting up of a combined services intelligence centre. It is 
necessary to ou tIine the workings of the umbrella construction because, for a period at 
least, it was to serve as a conduit between a number of intelligence bodies and the War 
Cabinet. The evolving role of two significant and increasingly powerful officials in this 
process was to be of some moment, namely the provision of intelligence to the higher 
levels of government. 
While the Organization for National Security (or ONS) may appear to have been 
in a pivotal position under the Cabinet with regard to intelligence, it is important not to 
exaggerate its significance. Although standing apparently at the top of the intelligence 
tree the Organization for National Security had wider responsibilities. Intelligence 
should not be seen out of focus inside what seems to have been essentially an umbrella 
organisation, concerned with defence in the widest sense, a veritable collection of 
committees on national security matters. It is germane here to consider the development 
and functions of the ONS, and to set in context the important role which its most 
significant official, the Secretary of the ONS, would play in intelligence matters on the 
New Zealand scene. It needs to be noted that part way through the war the ONS was 
succeeded by a body called the War Cabinet Secretariat (or WCS), although the Secretary 
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ONS simply was translated into the WCS as the Assistant Secretary to the War Cabinet 
(see below). If the ONS and the WCS were to appear to have some oversight role in 
intelligence matters, this was more image than substance. Both the ONS and the later 
WCS were at something of a remove from intelligence matters in the day-to-day 
operational sense, in spite of the pervasive role of the Secretary. What does need to be 
constantly remembered is that the Secretary ONS/Assistant Secretary to the War Cabinet 
was an official in the Prime Minister's Department. As the war went on, the significance 
of the ONS as an umbrella organisation declined somewhat. However, the Assistant 
Secretary to the Cabinet in his role as Secretary to the Chiefs of Staff Committee had an 
enduring influence as a conduit between the War Cabinet and the service chiefs. The 
connection between the Assistant Secretary to the War Cabinet and the Cabinet Secretary 
from 1943 onwards was the continuing development of a strong working relationship. 
These two individuals became even more influential in important positions at the heart of 
the government bureaucracy in the postwar period. This included matters connected with 
intelligence. 
In 1920 an Advisory Committee on Defence was fanned to look at defence policy 
questions, consisting of the two heads of the armed services (ie the Chief of the General 
Staff and the Chief Naval Adviser, there being no air force at this time), and other 
experts. This Committee met only once, in July 1920, and in fact there was no single 
body responsible for the co-ordination of defence activities until the 1930s.1 
From 1930 to 1933 there was discussion about forming a New Zealand branch of 
the Committee of Imperial Defence, and on 15 November 1933 a meeting held at General 
Headquarters in Wellington gave approval for such a body to be formed. This meeting, 
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chaired by the Prime Minister, was attended by the service chiefs and interested parties 
from other government departments.2 
The New Zealand Committee of Imperial Defence (or NZCID) had nine standing 
committees: the Chiefs of Staff Committee, Joint Overseas and Home Defence, Imperial 
Communications and Censorship, Manpower, Principal Supply Officers, Shipping, War 
Emergency Legislation, Control of Civilian Population, and the Co-ordination and War 
Book Committee. In spite of this impressive list, the work of the NZCID, while said to 
be efficient, remained rather rudimentary? In November 1936, the name was altered 
from the New Zealand Committee of Imperial Defence to the more neutral 'Organization 
for National Security', in part to mollify concerns with the term 'Imperial' by the new 
Labour administration.4 
Since the opening discussions in 1930, the secretarial work of first the NZCID 
and then the ONS had been carried out by Major W.G. Stevens and Captain G.H. Clifton 
from Army GHQ. Cabinet approved Stevens' appointment as fulltime Secretary of the 
ONS from 23 March 1937. Stevens also became Secretary of the new Defence Council. 
The Secretary of the ONS was based in the Prime Minister'S Department, so direction 
and control of the ONS was located there.5 The post of the Secretary of the ONS was 
destined to become the most senior intelligence position in the Government (albeit de 
facto). The first incumbent perceived his duties thus. 
As it is an essential pre-requisite for the discharge of the duties of 
Secretary .... that the individual chosen should have an intimate knowledge of all 
secret matters which may be proceeding, and of political intelligence which would 
indicate that a particular class of activity requires priority in treatment above 
others, the Secretary was located ... in the Prime Minister's Office. It was also 
desirable that the Secretary should be located in the Prime Minister's Department 
in order that he would be readily accessible to the Prime Minister.6 
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This access to the Prime Minister was fundamental. The position of the Secretary 
was to turn out to be a linchpin between the Prime Minister and other senior officials on 
intelligence and other matters. How the Secretary carried out his role can be seen 
through a substantial portion of this thesis. In another context later on in wartime, the 
Secretary's access to the Prime Minister did not go unchallenged, although the 
significance of this should not be overstated (see Part IV). The official concerned was 
the director of the new security service. 
Within a year the increasing workload of the ONS required the appointment of an 
Assistant Secretary to the Secretary ONS, and Mr. Foss Shanahan LLM (late of the 
Customs Department) took up this position on 1 March 1938. He would succeed Stevens 
as Secretary ONS on 10 January 1940, when the latter left for the Middle East with the 
First Echelon of the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force. 
The co-ordination of defence by the ONS was effected by means of 
interdepartmental committees. In these, officials representing different departments met 
to consider particular problems, and including the implementation of plans to do with the 
possible outbreak of hostilities.7 The committees of the ONS reported upwards to the 
Council of Defence, which was formed in 1937. The Council comprised the Prime 
Minister, the Head of the Prime Minister's Department, the Secretary of the Treasury, the 
Chief of Naval Staff (or CNS), the Chief of the General Staff (or CGS), the new Chief of 
Air Staff (or CAS), the Minister of Defence and other ministers appointed by the Prime 
Minister, plus the Secretary ONS.8 
All reports of the various ONS committees, including the powerful Chiefs of Staff 
Committee, were referred to the Council of Defence. Some 153 papers were produced by 
24 
the ONS committees between 1937 and June 1940, of which 39 had come from the 
Chiefs of Staff Committee. Reports and recommendations were then considered by 
Cabinet for approval, and the formation of a Cabinet Defence Committee sharpened this 
focus. Reports were compiled by the ONS committees, despatched to the Council of 
Defence, and on to the Cabinet Defence Committee. Finally, they might be referred to 
the full Cabinet. Between 1937 and mid-1940 the Council of Defence had twenty-seven 
meetings, while the Cabinet Defence Committee met on nine occasions.9 
Such a cumbersome process did not make for quick progress on matters raised in 
ONS papers. Regardless of this, the Secretary ONS himself was in a central position, for 
he was also Secretary to the Council of Defence, the Chiefs of Staff Committee and the 
other ONS committees. As Secretary of the Chiefs of Staff Committee 
the knowledge which he gains as a result of his association with other ONS 
committees is of considerable assistance to this committee. Instances occur, not 
infrequently, where particular aspects of a problem have already been or are 
considered by some ONS committee, and it is valuable to the Chiefs of Staff to 
know the conclusions already arrived at or proposed.lO 
Along with access to the Prime Minister and the Head of the Prime Minister's 
Department, this put Stevens, and subsequently Shanahan, in a very useful position, 
literally a junction node for defence information and intelligence. The Secretary's 
position provided a clear and direct conduit for intelligence into the Prime Minister's 
Department and therefore to the top level of the government. 
The handiness of the position held by the Secretary ONS notwithstanding, it is 
worth noting that representation by the armed services on the various committees of the 
ONS was high. In June 1938 there were already over twenty committees. These were: 
the Chiefs of Staff Committee, Combined Intelligence, Action in Emergency, Aliens, 
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Censorship and Publicity, Combined Communications and Meteorological, Emergency 
Precautions, Joint Planning, Manpower, Mapping, Medical, National Supply, Official 
Correspondence, Oil Board, Service Supply Board, Supply Advisory, Shipping, War 
Book, War Emergency Legislation, Wireless Telegraphy, and War Watching. l1 Of those, 
sixteen had Army and Air Force members, one had an Army member (Aliens), and the 
sole committee without any armed services representation was the War Legislation 
Committee. The armed services had more representation on the ONS than any other 
department apart from the Prime Minister's Department (with the Secretary ONS). 
With the outbreak of war, the primacy of the Prime Minister's Department in co-
ordinating action was underlined in a memorandum on 18 September 1939. From Peter 
Fraser to 'All Ministers', it asserted that the Prime Minister's Department: 
1. ... must have early advice of all measures prepared in connection with the 
war. 
2. When a concrete problem arises as a course of action is proposed departments 
must inform the Prime Minister's Department, in order to ensure that co-
ordination is observed from the outset, and that all interested parties are kept 
informed and have the opportunities of stating their views ... 12 
The memo noted use should still be made of the ONS with the existing committees being 
used for advisory purposes. Thus: 
6. In general the Prime Minister's Department must be looked on as the central 
co-ordinating department for all war activities. 
7. The initial approach to the Prime Minister's Department should in general be 
through the Secretary, Organization for National Security.13 
By December 1940 there had been a sizeable increase in the number of 
interdepartmental standing committees. Along with twenty-six ONS committees, there 
were at least another ten' Ad Hoc' committees to co-ordinate the war effort. 
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There were thirteen ONS committees that had a direct or partial connection with 
intelligence matters. These were: the Chiefs of Staff Committee, Intelligence, 
Coastwatching, Guards Vital Points, Control of Navigational Aids, Meteorology, Aliens, 
Treatment of Consuls, Overseas Passenger Traffic, Enemy Property and Trading with the 
Enemy, Censorship and Publicity, Mapping, and Communication in Emergency.14 The 
work of these committees varied. Clearly, the deliberations of the service chiefs 
incorporated intelligence and security matters, and reference will be made to those 
aspects later. 
Physical security of what were regarded as installations critical to New Zealand, 
such as oil storage tanks and so forth, came under the Guards Vital Points Committee. 
This comprised representatives of the armed services and the Police Department. The 
GYP detachments provided by the Army took on their role with the outbreak of hostilities 
on a twenty-four hour basis. This was a matter of simple physical security. The GYP 
Committee met four times before the war - by December 1940, this figure had increased 
to nineteen occasions. IS The Committee made recommendations 'regarding the increase 
or diminution of guards on certain establishments as well as commenting upon the 
necessity for guarding other points of importance.' 16 Some sixteen papers had been 
produced by 1940. One GYP detachment would guard New Zealand's most secret 
intelligence establishment later in the war, the REB station at Blenheim (see Chapter 
Seven). 
The Coastwatching Committee of the ONS consisted of members drawn from the 
armed services, the Post and Telegraph Department, and the Marine Department. A 
coastwatching scheme was prepared and the committee recommended 'for the 
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establishment of coastwatching stations on certain strategic parts of the coast.' Ironically, 
Shanahan noted in his account of the ONS on 7 June 1940 that not only had the 
coastwatching scheme been approved by the Government, but also that the 'strategic 
situation' now permitted a reduction in coastwatching posts and the substitution of air 
reconnaissance. The Coastwatching Committee had only needed to meet once since the 
outbreak of hostilities. 17 
Six days later an undetected enemy raider laid mines across the approaches to 
Auckland's Waitemata Harbour, one of which accounted for the outward bound SS. 
Niagara on 19 June. By 20 August there had been three further meetings of the 
Coastwatching Committee, with more advice with regard to the extent of precautions 
needed to stop coastal waters being used by enemy vessels.18 
The security of trade, the movements of enemy vessels and timely intelligence 
concerning the menace posed by raiders lay at the heart of local coastwatching. This 
aspect of security was a theme that was to run through much of the intelligence effort in 
New Zealand in wartime. Coastwatching was an important intelligence task and is 
considered more closely later, and its effectiveness assessed (see Part III). 
Whatever the shortcomings of particular committees, the structure of the ONS 
was considered favourably by the service chiefs. On 23 January 1940, a Chiefs of Staff 
Committee minute revealed that 
The Chiefs of Staff considered whether or not the Organization for National 
Security should continue as a separate organization under the control of the Prime 
Minister's Department. They considered that in view of the role which the 
Organization for National Security had been performing and its co-ordination of 
war activities, and in view also of its function of keeping the Chiefs of Staff 
informed on matters on which they should received information, that it was 
evidently desirable that it should continue. It was emphasised also that the 
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Organization for National Security was a well recopized co-ordinating body and 
that it would be unfortunate if it were to disappear.1 
The Secretary ONS continued to have an oversight of intelligence developments 
within New Zealand, perhaps the most important of which was the establishment of a 
combined intelligence organisation. There was to be a long lead time to get this body set 
up, complicated by a number of factors. The Secretary ONS was nonetheless one of the 
central figures in the push for this initiative. 
In 1943, changes within the Prime Minister's Department saw the demise of the 
ONS. Jeffery replaced C.Berendsen as Head of the Prime Minister's Department. The 
latter became the New Zealand High Commissioner in Canberra. As part of the 
reorganisation at this time, a War Cabinet decision noted the appointment on 19 March of 
A.D.McIntosh as Secretary of the War Cabinet, with Foss Shanahan becoming Assistant 
Secretary to the War Cabinet. Shanahan remained as Secretary of the Chiefs of Staff 
Committee, and it was decided that in line with the reorganisation of the Prime Minister's 
Department, the War Cabinet Secretariat should take over the functions of the ONS and 
the latter be disbanded?O Shanahan was pleased with this outcome, welcoming the end of 
what he termed' a rather anomalous position. ,21 
A memorandum from the Under-Secretary of Internal Affairs to Permanent Heads 
outlined the situation early in April. The duties on the business of the War Cabinet and 
the communications of the Government by cablegrams and telegrams were being carried 
out by the War Cabinet Secretariat. All communications should be addressed to the 
Secretary of the War Cabinet, and all questions formerly directed to the ONS would be 
dealt with by the WCS. 22 The memorandum noted that Shanahan as Secretary ONS was 
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now Assistant Secretary to the War Cabinet and that communications for fonner ONS 
matters should go to him.23 
McIntosh had been in the Prime Minister's Department since 1935. On 11 June 
1943 the· Department of External Affairs was fonnally established,24 with McIntosh 
becoming the Permanent Hea<L while remaining Secretary to the War Cabinet. Jeffery, 
the Permanent Head of the Prime Minister's Department had suffered head injuries from 
a car accident, leaving him partially incapacitated. McIntosh undertook all the 
substantive work of the Permanent Head of the Prime Minister's Department.25 McIntosh 
subsequently became Pennanent Head of the Prime Minister's Department in 1945, as 
well as retaining his position as Permanent Head of External Affairs. He occupied both 
posts until 1966, making him one of the most powerful and enduring civil servants.26 
Shanahan became Deputy Head of External Affairs in 1949 (and Cabinet Secretary from 
1948 to 1955).27 
The linkage between McIntosh and Shanahan was most significant in terms of the 
evolution of top level policy, and indeed of the oversight of intelligence matters in 
general terms. When Frank Comer first worked for McIntosh in 1943, his first daily task 
was to prepare material based on the latest incoming intelligence signals, to be used by 
McIntosh to brief the Prime Minister and the War Cabinet on the war situation. 28 As 
Permanent Head of External Affairs, McIntosh also had oversight of diplomatic mail 
coming through. 
At the time the correspondence contained in each "diplomatic bag" would 
be sent first to Mr McIntosh who would read or skim it as necessary and inscribe 
on each item the name of the person who would be responsible for taking action 
upon it. The folders would then go through the Registry, where file numbers 
would be assigned, to Miss Hussey who would note on the schedule of the 
contents of the diplomatic bag precisely where each paper was being sent. 29 
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Collectively, the responsibilities to the War Cabinet, the Prime Minister~s 
Department, External Affairs and defence (via the COS Committee) put both McIntosh 
and Shanahan coincidentally in very convenient positions with regard to all sorts of 
matters relating to Government policy, including intelligence. 
George Laking (also from the Customs Department) who came to succeed 
Shanahan as Assistant Secretary to the War Cabinet, described the intersection of 
interests between McIntosh and Shanahan in this way: 
An organisational chart which I drew up in a moment of exasperation 
showed two intersecting circles, one centred on McIntosh, the other on Shanahan. 
Round the circumference of each were three or four acolytes chasing their tails. 
Most appeared on both. The lines of accountability were in the form of a triangle 
- the base line connecting McIntosh and Shanahan while the diagonals connected 
each with the Prime Minister .... Within the composite structure were two separate 
streams of activity. One, in which Shanahan was the dominant figure, was the 
War Cabinet Secretariat and the network of activities which flowed from that. 
Under his influence and guidance it led eventually to the kind of Cabinet 
Secretariat which exists today. The other was the newly born External Affairs 
Department and the creation of a different network of external relationships. Here 
McIntosh had the primary responsibility and interest. Moreover, as Secretary of 
the War Cabinet and also External Affairs his position and authority were central 
to the whole enterprise. They were reinforced by his relationship with the Prime 
Minister. He and Shanahan were not necessarily compatible roersonalities to be 
placed in such a close and to some extent competitive situation. 0 
The post of Secretary ONS, and later that of Assistant Secretary to the War 
Cabinet, was important with regard to intelligence in New Zealand insofar as it was a 
conduit between the military and the top level of government. The Secretary ONS had a 
hand in the pulling together of various intelligence strings in concert with the three Chiefs 
of Staff of the armed services. The combined intelligence organisation, coastwatching, 
the establishment of a security service (and the subsequent complications that arose) and 
the dissemination of some of the products of those intelligence bodies were areas in 
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which the Secretary was involvecL to a greater or lesser extent. If the ONS itself provided 
an umbrella for the co-ordination of defence matters., the contribution of the Secretary 
ONS to do with intelligence was wide-ranging, in terms of being part of, or facilitating 
decision making. This was a sometimes delicate job, and on at least one occasion had the 
Secretary party to deliberations that were contrary to the Prime Minister's wishes - a 
conflict over certain intelligence summaries. Many years later, it is said that the one 
piece of advice given by Prime Minister Fraser to the incoming Holland was to "watch 
Shanahan! ,31 The very close working relationship with the three Chiefs of Staff of the 
armed services was fundamental. The first incumbent as Secretary was an army officer, 
so it was probably natural that this closeness should evolve. His civilian assistant who 
succeeded him followed the established practice, with arguably more talent and over a 
longer period. Nowhere, in terms of intelligence, was this more obviously displayed than 
with the development of a combined intelligence organisation. 
Chapter Two 
Prewar Preparations 
The development of a tri -service intelligence organisation during the Second 
World War was the most significant New Zealand intelligence initiative for the period. 
Whether it was well utilised once established, to what extent it became truly tri-service, 
or if its significance was less appreciated than might have been expected are matters for 
later consideration. Such an organisation could only come about if there was a perceived 
requirement for it. Indeed, the question of its continued existence and the limits placed 
upon its functioning was predicated upon perceptions connected with assumed 
intelligence requirements. The 'Centre' that was eventually established did not come 
about as the result of haste, even though the rate of progress to that end fluctuated 
considerably. This chapter considers the prewar preparations for intelligence co-
ordination. Chapter Three looks at the outbreak of war and the establishment of the first 
combined intelligence centre, the Combined Intelligence Bureau (the CIB). The 
Combined Operational Intelligence Centre (COIC), the successor to the CIB, is the 
subject of Chapter Four, and an assessment is made of the effectiveness of New Zealand 
combined intelligence during the war. 
The prewar preparations in the direction of the co-ordination of intelligence can 
be described as rudimentary. Not much was done prior to the outbreak of hostilities. Two 
strands provide the substance to the prewar preparations. The two successive combined 
intelligence. organisations that evolved in wartime were largely outgrowths of naval 
intelligence, owing much to the New Zealand Division of the Royal Navy which in 
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October 1941 formally became the Royal New Zealand Navy. It is worth tracing the 
development of New Zealand naval intelligence from 1914 through to 1939. The second 
strand was the moves in the late 1930s groping towards intelligence co-ordination under 
the aegis of the ONS. From these strands some conclusions may be drawn about the 
effectiveness of intelligence collection in the prewar period. 
It is clear that without the Navy, no combined intelligence organisation would 
have eventuated. The Army's involvement in combined intelligence initially had to do 
with the post occupied by Major Stevens as Secretary of the ONS - a strategic post 
passed on to his civilian Assistant Secretary, Foss Shanahan of the Prime Minister's 
Department. Apart from deliberations at the Chiefs of Staff level, the Army's 
contribution can only be described as meagre. As the Air Force did not come into 
existence as a separate service until 1936, air intelligence was quite literally a one-man 
band, there being one intelligence officer extant. 
Naval intelligence in New Zealand between the 1920s and the outbreak of 
hostilities in 1939 centred on the person of the naval intelligence officer in Wellington. 
He presided over an agent-reporting network, although developments in radio location 
technology were a concurrent dimension of increasing importance. The naval intelligence 
effort eventually led to an expansion of intelligence activities with a maritime focus. 
These included further extension of already established technical methods of signals 
interception (for example, in direction-finding), increasing numbers of coastwatching 
posts and close co-operation with Allied intelligence organisations. Co-operation pointed 
up the need for the centralised analysis and dissemination of collected intelligence (from 
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both allied and local sources). This lay at the heart of the requirements of combined 
intelligence. 
The taking up of naval intelligence duties on the New Zealand Station was 
inaugurated on 4 August 1914 with the appointment of Commander R.A.Newton RN as 
Naval Intelligence Officer. Two days later, Newton reporting on the interception of 
German and Dutch wireless telegrams, noted the Naval Intelligence Officer, Sydney, had 
sent surmised position reports for two warships of the German armoured cruiser squadron 
in the Far East. Assistant-Paymaster W.J.A.Brown succeeded Newton as Naval 
Intelligence Officer in September 1914. There was a good deal of monitoring by New 
Zealand stations aimed at the interception of enemy signals, and a proper reporting 
system set up. An 'Admiralty Intelligence Centre' was established in Wellington in 
September 1914 and the 'six New Zealand Reporting Officers' reported to the Centre. 
The Naval Adviser, Captain P.H. Hall-Thompson RN, had jurisdiction over the Naval 
Intelligence Officer (Brown) and the 'Admiralty Intelligence Centre'. Hall-Thompson in 
1917 circulated 'intelligence to the Commander-in-Chief, China, Commander-in-Chief, 
Cape of Good Hope, Navy Office, Melbourne, Esquimalt, Panama and Callao', and he 
proposed an extension of this exchange to the naval staff officer in Suva.1 The pattern of 
exchange of intelligence between the Admiralty authorities in the Far East and the 
Pacific, and Australia and Canada laid the foundations of co-operation on a grander scale 
in the Second World War. 
After the First World War, Captain M.R.Yeo was appointed District Intelligence 
Officer, Wellington on 5 September 1921.2 The District Intelligence Officer, Wellington, 
was the only Royal Navy officer employed ashore in New Zealand not lent for duty to the 
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New Zealand Government. Yeo was succeeded on 18 September 1922 by Paymaster 
Lieutenant Commander J.T.V.Webster, and he in tum, was followed by Lieutenant 
Commander F.Lumb on 1 February 1926? 
In June 1925 the Admiralty enquired whether the New Zealand Government 
would be prepared to assume responsibility for a Naval Intelligence Centre in 
Wellington, noting that this was being done in Australia and Canada, with close liaison 
between those centres and the Director of Naval Intelligence at the Admiralty.4 In 
August the Commodore Commanding the New Zealand Station (CCNZS) put before the 
New Zealand Naval Board a proposal to take responsibility for a naval intelligence 
officer, on the grounds that although a Staff Officer (Intelligence) might not be so useful 
in peacetime, his role in the event of an outbreak of hostilities would be of real value to 
New Zealand.5 Commodore Beal noted the Staff Officer (I) worked directly for the 
Director of Naval Intelligence at the Admiralty, and although the SO(I)'s reports went 
through Beal to London, the SO(1) was not on Beal's staff and was not responsible to the 
Commodore or to the Navy Office in Wellington. It was suggested if New Zealand took 
financial responsibility for the SO(1), then he would be able to be used in wartime by 
New Zealand. A Cabinet decision was deferred until after the general election.6 
The subject was revisited in early 1927 by the next CCNZS, Commodore 
G.T.C.P.Swabey. He suggested that the post of SO(I) could be amalgamated with that of 
Staff Officer (Operations),7 the arguments being put to the Minister of Defence on 8 
April 1927.8 The 15 March memorandum, from the 'Chief Staff Officer', noted that thus 
far the Government had not assumed fiscal responsibility for either the 'Naval 
Intelligence Centre' or the 'Staff Officer (Intelligence)' .Observing that the Admiralty had 
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previously asked the Navy Board if a Staff Officer (Operations) should be allocated to the 
New Zealand Station in June 1926,9 the Chief Staff Officer commented that an 
appropriate time had arrived to link the two posts in one appointment, that of a Staff 
Officer (Operations and Intelligence). It was noted on the intelligence side that New 
Zealand was so remote from important trade routes and 'Foreign Territory' that it was 
unlikely that there was scope for the employment of a fulltime intelligence officer in 
peacetime. In wartime, on the other hand, a Staff Officer (Intelligence) would be very 
busy with a variety of duties, including liaison with merchant shipping, the routeing of 
. individual ships, the organisation of convoys, censorship, contraband measures, 
involvement with the Royal Naval ReselVe and the Military, and local defence questions. 
Similarly, the Staff Officer (Operations) would not have much to do on the flagship in 
peacetime, but in wartime would come ashore when the Commodore moved into the 
Navy Office. It was suggested that a new SO(O&I) be appointed at the rank of lieutenant 
commander to work either aboard the flagship or in the Navy Office. It was envisaged 
that the SO(O&I) would not only work on matters affecting the New Zealand Squadron, 
but also assist the Chief Staff Officer with running the Royal Naval Reserve, base 
development and port defence, combined exercises with the Army, the revising of Station 
Orders and a number matters to do with war orders. It was argued that the intelligence 
gathered by the Staff Officer (Intelligence) was only used 'in England' and that the 
intelligence centre was thus of little local value in peacetime, whereas in time of war the 
intelligence centre was important to New Zealand. lO This was making a case to use the 
SO(O&I) for the Chief Staff Officer's purposes in peacetime, yet implied the Intelligence 
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Centre could immediately become operationally useful on the outbreak of war, despite 
his assertion that information useful to London was of little local application. 
In late April 1927, the Government accepted responsibility for the 'Naval 
Intelligence Centre' in Wellington from 1 April 1928, on the proviso that the Admiralty 
could loan an officer to undertake the combined duties of Staff Officer (Operations & 
Intelligence) for a period of three years. 1 1 The Admiralty through the Secretary of State 
for Dominion Affairs acknowledged its appreciation of the New Zealand Government's 
decision. The Admiralty was prepared to 'lend' Lieutenant Commander C.J.M.Lang for 
three years as SO(I), and there was no objection to using him for operations tasks in 
peacetime, provided this was not to the detriment of his role as intelligence officer.12 The 
revised Naval Intelligence Manual was quoted to underline the point. Each naval station 
had an intelligence centre responsible to the Commander in Chief, and the Staff Officer 
(Intelligence) could be employed on other work by the local Senior Naval Officer while 
still carrying out his intelligence tasks. The visits of the Staff Officer (Intelligence) to 
Reporting Officers in his area was emphasized, and local commanders were to facilitate 
this in co-ordination with routine warship cruises.13 
The Admiralty qualified the use of the SO(l) as an operations officer. At times of 
increased international tension the SO(I) should be ashore to carry out the duties 
associated with his post, and it was essential to avoid a situation where the SO(l) was 
required as an operations officer afloat, thus leaving his intelligence duties in the hands of 
an officer 'not equally well versed in the duties of the post.' 14 The dangers in 
compromising the wartime intelligence role were to be in New Zealand's case, somewhat 
prophetic. The New Zealand Government accepted of the loan of a Staff Officer 
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(Operations & Intelligence), and accordingly, Lieutenant Commander Lang took up his 
post under the new arrangement on 3 April 1928.15 He was followed by Lieutenant 
Commanders W.H.Bremner (on 15 August 1930), G.St.A.Alcock (on 10 February 1933), 
1.S.Head (on 8 August 1935), T.Ellis (on 4 February 1938) and E.K.H.SLAubyn (in 
August 1939).16 The last mentioned was not a regular rotation. 
The SO(O&I) ran an intelligence organisation during the thirties consisting for the 
most part of a variety of what were really part-time official agents scattered around the 
Pacific. These Reporting Officers held nonnal official posts which put them in useful 
posi tions for obtaining intelligence. The Collectors of Customs at the ports of Auckland, 
Wellington, Lyttelton, Dunedin, Bluff and Napier along with the Postmaster on the 
Chatham Islands were Reporting Officers in New Zealand. 17 There were Reporting 
Officers scattered through a number of island territories in the Pacific, viz. Rarotonga, 
Ocean Island, Fanning Island, Apia, Suva, Nukualofa, Papeete and Honolulu. The 
SO(O&I) travelled from time to time to these more remote locations on warship cruises 
in the South Pacific18 and communication took place using post and cable links where 
these existed. This was working quite well by April 1938, for example, when it was 
noted that valuable monthly reports were being received from the Reporting Officers at 
Suva, Ocean Island, Nukualofa and other places.19 
In late 1934 the Admiralty had taken steps to strengthen the naval intelligence 
capability in the Far East. Since the 1920s there had been signals intelligence work done 
on 1 apanese naval and military ciphers by collaboration between the Admiralty and the 
Government Code and Cypher School (at this time GC&CS came under the Secret 
Intelligence Service or MI6). In 1934 Paymaster Captain Arthur Shaw was sent out to 
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Hong Kong to establish the Far East Combined Bureau (FECB). Shaw was appointed to 
the staff of the Commander-in-Chief China Station with the title of Chief of the 
Intelligence Staff (CGIS) The COIS would also be known as the 'Captain on the 
Intelligence Staff' or simply as the 'Captain on the Staff'. Under the Captain on the Staff, 
the Far East Combined Bureau was formed to co-ordinate, collate and evaluate all 
intelligence in the Far East as a whole, with particular regard to Japan. Based initially in 
Hong Kong, it oversaw intelligence collection and developed operational co-ordination of 
signals interception and code-breaking in the Far East. Captain Shaw was succeeded as 
Captain on the Staff by Captain FJ.Wylie in 1938, who was in turn replaced by Captain 
K.L.Harkness in 1940. Wylie and Harkness had close liaison with the SO(O&I) in 
Wellington. Indeed, the New Zealand high frequency direction-finding station in Fiji in 
1941 was under the direct operational control of FECB, and the other three New Zealand 
H/F D/F stations were to be part of a wider Pacific network. In 1939 the Far East 
Combined Bureau relocated to Singapore, with a small support staff left on Stonecutters 
Island in Hong Kong.zo 
For the co-ordination of naval intelligence to work, the Admiralty took the view 
that it was essential that the various naval intelligence officers on the East Indies Station, 
the South American Division, the North American and West Indies Station, and those in 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand, should have a very close liaison with the Captain on 
the Intelligence Staff. It was intended that the whole organisation should be known as the 
Pacific Naval Intelligence Organisation (PNIO). This came under the direction of Far 
East Combined Bureau until the end of 1941. The New Zealand Naval Board agreed to 
co-operate with regard to the collection of intelligence on J apan.21 There was an 
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established pattern of practical co-operation between the naval intelligence officers in 
Canada, Hong Kong, Australia and New Zealand in the circulation of operational 
intelligence during the First World War.22 
In March 1939, the Director of Naval Intelligence of the Naval Intelligence 
Division in London intimated that it was intended to introduce measures for co-operation 
between Staff Officers (Intelligence) abroad and French intelligence in their overseas 
territories. The exchange of intelligence was to be limited to emergency operational 
information and naval movements affecting British and French warships.23 The SO(O&I) 
in Wellington was asked to meet French officials in Papeete, and in May the SO(O&I) 
was instructed that measures for the protection of trade and naval dispositions could be 
fully discussed. On 3 July, Lieutenant Commander Ellis attended a meeting in Papeete 
aboard the French sloop Durmont D 'Urville. The SO(O&I) was accompanied by his 
Reporting Officer in Tahiti, Ernest Edmonds (the British consul), while the French were 
represented by Captain Azur of the Durmont D 'Urville and the Marine Commandant, 
Oceania, Lieutenant Commander Brachet. The SO(O&I) in his report of this meeting 
came to the conclusion that the potential for useful co-operation in the event of the 
outbreak of hostilities was virtually nil, because of deficiencies on the French side. The 
Dumont D' Urville was the only French warship in the South Pacific. There was only one 
French Reporting Officer in the French possessions, Brachet at Papeete, with no-one at 
Noumea or in the New Hebrides. Furthermore, Brachet could only contact the sloop at 
certain times, and then not in cipher. Brachet's only means of obtaining information 
locally was via the masters of native trading schooners who reported to the harbourmaster 
at Makatea Island, who passed on material to Brachet.24 
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The arrival of Lieutenant Commander E.K.H.St.Aubyn in July 1939 to take up the 
post of Staff Officer (Operations) potentially allowed Ellis to function as SO(I) and 
concentrate on intelligence duties. This was short-lived as Ellis was recalled to London 
in August owing to a shortage of intelligence officers in the Naval Intelligence Division. 
The problems envisaged earlier by the Admiralty in a 'time of strained relations' were 
now compounded, as the newly arrived St.Aubyn had to pick up the intelligence role. 
Once more the post was operations and intelligence. With hostilities only a few short 
weeks away, the new SO(O&I) was to have his hands full. His staff at this time consisted 
of two Royal Navy Volunteer Reserve officers for operations and intelligence, the 
Merchant Shipping Officer, plus clerical staff. As might be expected in deteriorating 
circumstances, the SO(O&I) quite rapidly attracted a number of other functions on top of 
operations and intelligence, leaving him in the words of the Official Historian, as 'Staff 
Officer (Everything)' .25 
With the commencement of hostilities there was some reorganisation of the 
Reporting Officers in New Zealand. The Naval staffs at Auckland, Lyttelton and 
Dunedin took over the roles of Reporting Officers from the Collectors of Customs. The 
Collectors of Customs at Napier and Bluff were retained. At other New Zealand ports the 
Collectors of Customs worked to the Comptroller of Customs in Wellington for both 
shipping control and intelligence duties.26 
The Reporting Officers in the various island groups in the South Pacific continued 
their work, although with varying degrees of success. Only two of the eight Reporting 
Officers in the Pacific Islands had cable communication with New Zealand, namely Suva 
and Fanning Island. When codes were considered to be compromised it became hard to 
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send secret messages to other posts using commercial W rr. The lack of adequate postal 
links and long distances often precluded the use of postal services for communication. 
Communication with Ocean Island usually took several weeks and the only regular calls 
at Fanning Island were made by the Dickenson, a US cable vessel. The United States was 
not in the war at this time, and it was considered that unless there was 'a reliable British 
subject' on passage on the Dickenson, the Reporting Officer (the British conSUl) at 
Honolulu could not forward confidential documents.27 
The Consul in Honolulu was experiencing difficulty in tracking the locations of 
US warships following the US Navy Department's imposition of secrecy on naval 
movements. The Consul in Papeete had difficulty trying to report on the intentions of the 
Governor of Tahiti and the movements of the Dumont D'UrviZZe. The Consul and Agent 
at Nukualofa, Armstrong, was assiduous in his Reporting Officer role and 'prompt' in his 
investigations. The able Comptroller of Customs in Suva, Martin, was extremely useful, 
not merely because of his previous experience at Freetown, but also because his was a 
b · 28 lisler port. 
The naval intelligence organisation in New Zealand up to the outbreak of war was 
a very slender body. Some work had been done in further developing signals interception 
capability through the use of high-frequency direction-finding stations and the collation 
of that and other operational wireless intelligence. This was a natural extension of the 
First World War interception experience which had not completely died away during the 
'twenties and 'thirties. This can be described as 'Y' intelligence and lay at the heart of 
New Zealand's technical intelligence capability. The 'Y' organisation's contribution 
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crops up repeatedly In the operation of the two successive combined intelligence 
organisations. 
If the dimensions of the naval intelligence effort up to the outbreak of war seem 
rather slight, the moves taken in the direction of co-ordinating intelligence in New 
Zealand were even less substantial in the prewar period. Slow and unrealistic, they 
consisted initially of little more than the establishment of a document-shelving service of 
slender means. It was the Organization for National Security that provided the umbrella 
for any developments in this area. The commentary of the first Secretary of the ONS, 
Lieutenant-Colonel W.G.Stevens, is apposite. 
During the lean years Operations and Intelligence for all its high sounding 
name, was a phantom branch as far as the constructive work was concerned. 
There were no operations of any conceivable kind in which New Zealand troops 
were likely to playa part - that is, if there were any troops. If I had suggested 
preparing plans for the formation of an expeditionary force, I would have been 
stopped dead because of the political implications; and in any case one officer and 
his one clerk could not do much. 'Intelligence' was entirely dependent on 
material sent to us from the United Kingdom - even intelligence about the Pacific 
at our very doors. Papers came not only from the War Office but also from the 
Committee of Imperial Defence including reports on many countries which might 
be - and were - our enemies in a future war, but all we could do was file them, 
for there was no staff available to analyse them or think about how we might be 
affected.29 
The first effective move towards some form of combined intelligence organisation 
originated in the Chiefs of Staff Committee of the ONS. On 17 March 1938, it proposed 
that the Secretary ONS should contact the three service intelligence officers to prepare a 
plan for combined peacetime and wartime intelligence activities, including the production 
of 'a combined intelligence summary. ,30 
The Combined Intelligence Committee of the ONS duly convened under its 
Secretary, W.G.Stevens, for the first meeting on 29 March 1938. It consisted of five 
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members from the defence establishment: two from the Army (both long associated with 
the ONS); two from the New Zealand Division of the Royal Navy (the departing and 
incoming naval intelligence officers); and an Army officer seconded to the Air 
Department. At this initial meeting31 there was general agreement that compiling a 
combined intelligence summary presented no difficulties. Air and naval intelligence 
material should go to the 'Naval Intelligence Officer' around the twenty-fifth of each 
month. He would then put the summary together in 'some coherent order.' If the typing 
and duplication of the summary was beyond the capabilities of the Navy Office, the 
office of the Secretary ONS would do it. The prospects for war were discussed. As an 
aside on the matter of censorship, it was decided to co-opt Detective A.M.Harding of the 
Police Department onto the Committee. The arrival of a police representative was 
something of a portent of things to come pertaining to that Department's attitude towards 
intelligence and security. 
The next meeting of the Combined Intelligence Committee took place on 28 April 
1938, attended by Stevens and Clifton (Army), Ellis (Navy), Free (Air Department) and 
Harding. Typing and duplication of the proposed combined intelligence summary would 
be done by the ONS. After discussion on the scope of the intelligence material for the 
combined summary, it there agreed it would consist of internal intelligence only, and not 
substitute any summary of external intelligence put out by any of the services.32 To what 
extent this limitation of the scope of the combined summary to internal intelligence 
matters was attributable to the police representative remains unclear, although the rest of 
the minuted discussion implies the expression of strongly held police views. Detective 
Harding noted, on internal security that 'At present the Police were carrying on with 
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certain work, but never had any instructions regarding it.' It was agreed the police had 
two security responsibilities: first to keep a record of arrivals and departures of 'aliens', 
particularly certain nationalities; second, to keep a watch on bodies or individuals who 
might be likely to engage in sabotage or antiwar agitation. On surveillance, it was noted 
that there was no system of hotel registration reporting to the police in place. Harding 
also raised the question of the distribution of intelligence information between the armed 
services and the Police Department. However, no decisions were taken on this matter?3 
The question of access to service intelligence by a civilian department was to become a 
minor but recurrent feature of the Police Department's attitude towards armed forces' 
intelligence. 
The third meeting of the committtee was only a few days later. Harding 
asserted34 that the police had arrangements in hand for a register of arrivals and 
departures of 'aliens' to be drawn up with the assistance of the Customs Department and 
the Census and Statistics Department. The police admitted they had experienced 
difficulties in keeping track of Japanese nationals in New Zealand, but were aware of the 
desirabili ty of collecting all possible information on them. The meeting also resolved that 
the distribution of intelligence should be a matter for each originating department. This 
meant no general routine circulation of intelligence. It seems likely that this reflected the 
influence of the Navy. Although independent in many respects, the New Zealand 
Division of the Royal Navy was closely tied operationally to the Admiralty in London. 
There would have been a considerable reluctance to consider, even in principle, the 
notion of circulating sensitive operational intelligence to a civilian department of another 
government. On the other hand, the Committee was 'happy' with the 'now satisfactory' 
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situation on internal security intelligence.35 The subject of wartime intelligence was held 
over for further discussion. 
An ONS minute of 5 May on the combined intelligence summaries outlined what 
was thought to be useful for inclusion and the extent of the circulation envisaged: 
1. Information to be provided by each branch of the service about its own 
activities. Much information of this type which is useful and interesting to other 
branches is not passed on under present arrangements. 
2. Intelligence of local interest should be included by the branch which collects it, 
if it is likely to be of interest to other branches. Intelligence of general interest 
received from foreign sources peculiar to one service only, should be included. 
3. Intelligence Reports or Summaries received by any branch should be recorded 
as 'Received' in the Combined Summary, in order that all branches may refer to 
them for special information if such should be required. 
4. Reporting to external authorities and circulation of reports will still be done by 
branches as before. 
S. Question - Should the combined summary be issued to Government 
Departments? 36 
The idea of giving wide circulation to 'Government Departments' was naIve In the 
extreme from a security angle, and was not what had been agreed to the day before. The 
issue of the extent of the distribution of intelligence was to become another irritant. 
The rather credulous approach to security was further demonstrated in the 
Combined Intelligence Committee's deliberations between June and August 1938. The 
meeting on 16 June concerned the security of prohibited areas. Noting that it was 
difficult to police the air, the Committee observed that no cameras could be taken up in 
aircraft in wartime without a permit from the Air Department. Prohibited sea areas could 
be promulgated from time to time, and there were sufficient powers at present to prevent 
people from entering those areas. Essentially, security was to be a collaborative effort 
between departments.37 On Vital Points, Detective Harding noted that the Police 
Commissioner was in agreement with the present principles, although some changes in 
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detail might be required. The Secretary ONS was to elicit the views of the Public Works 
and the Railways Departments.38 The Committee met in mid-July with representatives 
from those Departments along with the National Broadcasting Service and the P& T 
Department to discuss Vital Points.39 Shortly after this the Committee reflected on the 
security of Army, Air Force and Naval establishments.4o 
Another aspect of combined intelligence was the possibility of a regional focus. 
Stevens noted the intelligence committee thought a lot of information would come into 
Auckland from aerial reconnaissance, coastwatching and public spirited citizens. This 
should be sifted in Auckland by service personnel and not just passed to Wellington. The 
committee considered a combined intelligence office was required in Auckland and 
Lyttelton (or Christchurch).41 Stevens observed that the organisation of the proposed 
operations room in Wellington remained unc1ear.42 The regional focus was returned to in 
another memorandum from the Secretary ONS on 14 September. He asserted the armed 
forces had arranged that all incoming coastwatching reports were to go to the District 
Naval Intelligence Officer, and he would pass the reports to the services' local 
intelligence officers as well as to Navy Office. Again, the suggestion was made that local 
information reported to local intelligence officers be locally exchanged by telephone, and 
be sifted and tested before being passed to Wellington. It was agreed that the three 
intelligence officers in Wellington assisted by a police officer should form an intelligence 
centre. Similar intelligence centres should be set up in fortress areas.43 Regionalism was 
returned to by the Chiefs of Staff. A combined intelligence centre was to be located at the 
headquarters of each military district, and local information sorted before forwarding to 
Wellington.44 
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While sounding nicely co-operative in principle, establishing a plethora of 
intelligence centres might be less easy to implement in practice. There was an attendant 
risk that important intelligence which might fill the gaps in a larger picture might not be 
passed to Wellington, simply because the significance might not be appreciated at the 
local level. 
The larger question was to make a start on a combined intelligence organisation. 
In January 1939 the Chiefs of Staff decided to set up a committee to look at the concept 
of a Combined Headquarters Operations Room.45 Lieutenant Commander Ellis was to 
convene a meeting with Major Clifton and Squadron Leader Grundy to sketch the layout 
and communications requirement for an operations room. The outline that emerged from 
this sub-committee was comprehensive in its scope. The operations room was to have 
situation map displays with the latest plotted operational information to enable the three 
Chiefs of Staff to make appreciations and take appropriate action. All other relevant 
intelligence was to be available in some convenient manner.46 
The sub-committee considered there were five sources of intelligence: the three 
services, the Meteorological Office, and the public. Certain information would need 
'sifting', but some intelligence of an imperative nature and from an 'unimpeachable 
source' should be made available as quickly as possible. Naval intelligence sources were 
the Admiralty, warships at sea, merchant shipping, the coastwatching organization, the 
District Naval Intelligence Officers, and the Post and Telegraph Department W rr 
Stations. The intelligence picture would be built up from the positions of friendly 
warships and merchantmen, enemy warships and merchantmen and neutral shipping. 
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The information should be delivered by the 'Naval Intelligence Officer' by the 'quickest 
possible channel' .47 
The sub-committee considered that most Army intelligence would be of no 
practical use, coming from each Military District's forces. The most useful would be 
reports of landings and locations of enemy forces in particular places. Army intelligence 
would need to be sorted by the Combined Intelligence Staff (composed of service and 
police personnel), and the small useful portion passed to the operations room. The police 
and the public would provide large amounts of information which would require lots of 
sifting. Air intelligence was thought likely to be useful, and consist of reports from 
RNZAF stations and aircraft on patrol. These could be sent directly by wireless to the 
operations room. Meteorological Office information should go direct. Secure 
communications were to be by wrr landline and direct phone links between intelligence 
. d h . 48 sectIOns an t e operatlons room. 
The main requirement was for timely and accurate intelligence for the service 
chiefs to assist operational decision-making. This was more easily said than done, for it 
could be assumed that the service chiefs were likely to be remote from any scene of 
action unless it was local. The amount of information needing to be 'sifted' implied a 
looming bottleneck unless handled very carefully. Even more fundamentally, the time, 
distance and resource problems might prove insurmountable, given the country was 
slightly larger than the United Kingdom, yet possessed a small population and very 
flimsy maritime defence forces. 
There was, however, a lack of urgency about actually establishing a combined 
intelligence organisation, for in June the Police Commissioner requested clarification 
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from Stevens on possible wartime intelligence arrangements. He wished to know if a 
police officer was required for fulltime duty at the 'Combined Intelligence Office' on 
receipt of the Precautionary Message.49 Stevens replied on 5 July that while the services 
were agreed on forming a combined intelligence organisation, and while close police 
liaison was essential, a full time police officer was not necessary.50 The situation was 
more prosaic. Nothing effective had been done, and no moves made to set up a combined 
intelligence organisation. The recommendations of Ellis, Clifton and Grundy went no 
further, and more than a year would pass before any further steps were taken. Combined 
intelligence was accorded a low priority and threats from outside New Zealand were not 
regarded as sufficiently dangerous to require action. In tenns of the provision of useful 
operational intelligence, the slender intelligence resources of the Navy were left to fill the 
gap. The war had arrived, but the establishment of a combined intelligence centre 
remained as distant as ever. 
Chapter Three 
The Outbreak of War and the Combined 
Intelligence Bureau 
The outbreak of war did not result in any priority being given to establishing a 
combined intelligence centre. Further moves were made very slowly, prompted only by a 
sudden shock administered by the enemy in June 1940. The Navy provided operational 
intelligence to fill the gap, and continued to do so. Steps eventually followed leading to 
the establishment of the first combined intelligence body, the Combined Intelligence 
Bureau (CIB). The CIB was hampered by a lack of resources and had hesitant, 
inauspicious beginnings. These shortcomings led to the re-engineering of the combined 
intelligence organisation in late 1941, when it was translated into the Combined 
Operational Intelligence Centre (COlC). It had taken from September 1939 to December 
1941 to develop anything resembling a useful combined intelligence centre. 
When hostilities opened, naval intelligence was the principal source of 
operational intelligence for the Chiefs of Staff. New Zealand naval intelligence was, 
however, disrupted by the departure of the SO(l), Lieutenant Commander Ellis, in July 
1939. The recently arrived Lieutenant Commander St.Aubyn took over operations and 
intelligence, but was saddled with additional duties. 1 He had just three officers plus 
clerical staff to cover operations, intelligence and merchant shipping control, so the 
production of intelligence was meagre? Naval personnel had taken over the Reporting 
Officer roles at the larger New Zealand ports from customs officials (who nevertheless 
retained their intelligence function at minor ports). Communications delays materialised 
between some Pacific Islands Reporting Officers and the Navy Office? Signals 
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intelligence was a little brighter. Although it was early days for the naval 'Y' 
organisation, taking up the wartime interception role was a matter of working up from 
past practice. The exploitation of the potential of the high-frequency direction-finding 
stations from as early as 1938, was central to this effort. Indications that commerce 
raiding would commence on distant trade routes were noted by the Chiefs of Staff at this 
time.4 It was to payoff immediately with the Graf Spee search (see Chapter Five). 
The Navy took the initiative in the production of an intelligence summary, the 
first of which was issued in October 1939. As the format and content provided the pattern 
for intelligence summaries issued later by the combined organisations, it is worth 
considering a couple of examples. The main focus of interest for the naval intelligence 
summaries was the location and movements of enemy naval units. Issued by the 
SO(O&I), the weekly naval intelligence summaries had limited distribution within New 
Zealand.5 They went to six recipients within New Zealand and two outside destinations, 
Australia and Fiji.6 
The reports were divided into two sections, one on Allied shipping and one 
headed Intelligence Summary. The 'Report of Progress in Naval Defence' for 8 October 
19397 discussed under Part I the movements of HMS Leander, the mobilisation of further 
naval reservists, the arming of merchantmen, the commissioning of the first of three 
minesweepers, and the on-going conversion of the Monowai as an armed merchant 
cruiser. Part II was sub-divided into four sections. Under the heading Allied Warships a 
number of observations were made. These included the retention of a small force in 
Hong Kong, the redeployment of some Yangtse gunboats, and the presence of British and 
French warships in the Singapore area. Patrol and search duties were being carried out in 
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the Indian Ocean; HMS Achilles was on the west coast of South America en route to the 
South Atlantic; the appearance of an enemy surface raider near Pernambaco had led to a 
strengthening of British forces; and the RAAF now had a reconnaissance squadron 
located at Port Moresby. The German Warships section noted the sinking of the steamer 
Clement on 30 September had been carried out by the pocket battleship Admiral Scheer 
(later this turned out to be the Admiral Graf Spee). A South American report indicated 
that German submarines were operating off off Peru and Chile and British merchantmen 
heading for Panama should give the Galapagos Islands a wide berth. The section German 
Merchant Vessels noted reports indicated that several German disguised merchant raiders 
or supply ships were about to sail, and noted the arrival of the Erlangen at Punta Arenas 
in Chile (the only German vessel in New Zealand waters on the outbreak of war).8 Other 
German merchantmen were in the Dutch East Indies. The section United States Warships 
noted the strengthening of the US Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor. 
The weekly summary for 17 December noted the Graf Spee engagement already 
'fully reported' in the press,9 the crippling of the Leipzig in the North Sea and the 
suspected presence of another raider in the South Atlantic. An intercept of a Japanese 
message was mentioned,) 0 and it was noted that wireless searches for signals traffic from 
commerce raiders, submarines and merchant ships were being conducted. I1 This referred 
to the signals intelligence work of the 'Y' organisation. Naval intelligence continued to 
issue its intelligence summaries, the only routine useful supply of operational intelligence 
for the service chiefs. Matters to do with combined intelligence had slid into abeyance. 
The German commerce raider Orion laid 228 mines in the approaches to 
Waitemata Harbour during the night of 13/14 June 1940. This operation began at 7.26 
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pm, took seven hours to complete, and was punctuated by pauses as inbound vessels 
passed by. Two of these were the armed merchant cruiser, HMS Hector and the cruiser 
HMS Achilles. The mines were only revealed six days later when an outward bound 
Canadian-Australian mail steamer, the Niagara, struck one of them and sank in the early 
hours of 19 June. The Government and the new Prime Minister, Peter Fraser, had 
received a sizeable shock, and recriminations followed. This was not merely because the 
unknown raider had been able to go about its business undetected, but because the Prime 
Minister now learned there were no really useful anti-submarine defences in New 
Zealand ports,12 the product of a lack of foresight and defence spending. A contingent 
result was some renewal of interest in the matter of combined intelligence. 
Circumstances compounded the problems for naval intelligence at this point. The 
Admiralty's shortage of naval intelligence officers led to the SO(O&I), St.Aubyn, being 
posted to Singapore. He departed on 19 July, and operations and intelligence duties 
devolved upon the Squadron Signals Officer from Achilles, Lieutenant Commander 
E.A.Nicholson, pending the arrival of a replacement, Commander G.F.Hannay, from 
Britain. 13 The Chief of Naval Staff, Captain W.E.Parry, was concerned about the 
overloading of the SO(0&1) and the need to separate operations and intelligence.14 
Technical and material duties were eliminated from the SO(O&I)'s burden, reducing it 
slightly. Commander Hannay assumed his post in September,15 but still faced the 
continuing difficulties of combining operations and intelligence. These remained 
problematical until the second half of 1941. 
In the Orion's wake, yet another Intelligence Committee was convened on 16 
August 1940 to consider a combined intelligence centre.16 It comprised the Secretary 
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ONS, Foss Shanahan, Lieutenant-Commander G.E.L.A1derton, Lieutenant-Colonel 
D.G.S. Urmson and Wing Commander E.M.F.Grundy. Grundy was the only survivor 
from the previous committee nearly eighteen months earlier, as Ellis, Clifton and Stevens 
had departed overseas. The August committee assessed the usefulness of the available 
sources of intelligence. 17 These were grouped under Naval Intelligence, Local 
Intelligence, Air Intelligence, Army Intelligence and Combined Intelligence. There were 
seven external sources of naval intelligence consisting of the Admiralty's Weekly 
Intelligence Report, NATELS, the Far East Combined Bureau, Shanghai Intelligence, 
Hong Kong, the Australian Naval Intelligence Summary and Pacific Islands 
Intelligence. 18 
The Weekly Intelligence Report took six weeks to arrive. The NATELS or Naval 
Telegrams were current operational intelligence. Far East Combined Bureau reports 
received from Singapore, Hong Kong and Shanghai (not to be confused with operational 
signals from FECB) were two months old.The Australian Naval Intelligence Summary 
was more current. 19 Intelligence from the Reporting Officers in the Pacific Islands was 
'unsatisfactory and erratic', although efforts were being made to improve regularity and 
frequency,z° The NATELS, the Weekly Intelligence Report and the Australian Naval 
Intelligence Summary were the most useful as a combination of depth and timing. The 
delayed WIR and FECB material provided interesting background reading. NATELS 
(and other signals) gave a stream of operational intelligence. 
Local sources for naval intelligence were poor. Little was obtained from the 
police, and small amounts came from the Customs Department, the Censorship 
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organisation and the Air Department.21 The naval 'Y' organisation, a concealed local 
source with outside connections, was not listed. 
The Air Force's sources of intelligence consisted of a daily signal from the Air 
Ministry in London, plus a delayed weekly summary. The Air Department had some 
information from the police, and anything else came from the Navy.22 
The Army's external intelligence sources were the War Office weekly intelligence 
summary, plus summaries from army headquarters in South Africa, Australia, Hong 
Kong, Shanghai and Malaya, all delayed. The Army's local intelligence sources were 
meagre, with little from Censorship, the Navy, the Air Force or the police?3 
Remote geographical location, mail delays and lack of local resources drew a 
bleak picture for the committee. Only the daily signals from the Admiralty and the Air 
Ministry and the RAN summary could be described as timely. A system of local 
reporting officers was suggested?4 The Navy, of course, already had one. The Customs 
Department was part of this network, and any reduction was because of the Navy's 
reorganisation of the system. The P&T Department's listeners' surveillance was in its 
early stages. The Police Commissioner provided intelligence summaries on internal 
security to the Secretary ONS.25 
Obstacles to obtaining more timely operational intelligence needed to be 
overcome. The committee insisted an intelligence centre should have all available 
intelligence. It commented on the withal ding of intelligence by senior officers and 
department heads. Recognising the need for distribution restrictions for certain 
intelligence, the committee accepted that it was impossible to run an intelligence centre if 
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it was denied sources. Collection, collation and rapid distribution of intelligence was the 
centre's role.26 
Recommendations followed. A combined intelligence centre needed to be set up 
speedily to process and distribute intelligence received.27 The plans for a Combined 
Operations Room and a Combined Intelligence Centre should be put into effect. The 
Centre would be small, with one fulltime officer to run it, administer its records and 
distribute intelligence. Accumulated information on aliens, the disaffected, subversive 
and suspicious activities plus information from the services and the censorship authorities 
would provide internal intelligence. External intelligence would come from the armed 
services, Singapore, Australia, the Pacific islands and other places, and from the Prime 
Minister's Department. A weekly intelligence bulletin was to be produced from all this 
by the intelligence centre.28 This was a tall order for one fulltime officer, even with other 
assistance. Such a centre could not be run around the clock, yet to be 'fully efficient' it 
would need to do just that. 
The Committee deliberated on the role of the police. They were crucial for 
internal security information but reservations were raised about the effectiveness of local 
police reporting. 29 Small fragments of larger pictures might be missed. A police liaison 
officer should be appointed for each Military District to remedy this concern, plus a 
further office for the Combined Intelligence Centre.30 The Navy was not happy with the 
laid back attitude of the police, who wanted 'gingering up. ,31 Three additional 
suggestions were added. The three service intelligence officers appointed to the centre 
should be co-located. The Army needed a reporting system. A full time senior officer was 
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required to command the centre and be able to make immediate decisions on the receipt 
and distribution of intelligence.32 
The Intelligence Committee's report of 6 September 1940 set out succinctly the 
main requirements for the Combined Intelligence Centre. The Centre should be speedily 
established, and the three service intelligence officers accommodated therein, ensuring 
the expeditious handling of incoming intelligence, and thorough inter-service intelligence 
liaison. Clerical staff were needed for record keeping. Internal intelligence was expected 
from Customs, Marine, Publicity and Prime Minister's Departments, plus close liaison 
with the police. A police liaison officer was to be appointed to each Military District. If 
the police proved unwilling to go along with the proposals, it was considered that a 
system of reporting officers under military control should be set up. There was a hint here 
of a proposal for a separate security service. Within two months the concept of a separate 
security service under Army auspices, was being actively considered, in the face of police 
opposition. The report underlined the fact that delays in sending intelligence from 
government departments needed to be avoided.33 The Centre's initial product was to be a 
weekly intelligence summary. 
The Chiefs of Staff Committee approved the report's recommendations on 12 
September and agreed to meet the Police Commissioner the next day. The Secretary ONS 
was to consult the Police Commissioner on the police role.34 Having carefully delineated 
the police role on internal security, but omitted reference to the measures contemplated if 
the police demurred, Shanahan'S memorandum to the Commissioner concluded by saying 
a quick decision was necessary.35 A meeting between the Chiefs of Staff and the 
Commissioner was brought forward to the following day. It was however cancelled 
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abruptly 'by order of the p.M.,36 The Police Commissioner was unwilling to 
accommodate the proposals,37 and had the ear of the Prime Minister. 
Commander Hannay's takeover as SO(O&I) in early September had permitted a 
small reorganisation of naval intelligence. He presided over two sections - the Merchant 
Shipping Office with Lieutenant Commander Cornelius and Lieutenant Brackenridge; 
and an Intelligence Section with Lieutenant Commander Alderton and a clerical 
assistant.38 
On the instructions of the Chiefs of Staff a Central War Room and a Combined 
Intelligence Bureau were set up in the Navy Office in September.39 The Central War 
Room was for the Chiefs of Staff for operational purposes, and run by the Combined 
Intelligence Bureau. The Bureau was under Hannay's command. By the end of 
September, draft operating orders for the Central War Room were in place, and the main 
focus was on enemy commerce raiders. 4o 
The draft orders of the Central War Room were set out in three sections: General 
Policy, Procedures for Operations in the Tasman Sea and Internal Procedure.41 The 
Central War Room was to be a central directing room for the Chiefs of Staff and 
(possibly) the War Cabinet for conducting operations around New Zealand. It envisaged 
operational co-operation with the RAN Central War Room in Melbourne and the C.-in-C. 
Far East. The operations room was to be supplied with intelligence by the Combined 
Intelligence Bureau.42 The intelligence centre was to receive and analyse intelligence, 
generating useable operational information. Tactical co-operation across the Tasman was 
sketched out. Operations in the Tasman Sea beyond the range of shore-based aircraft, 
would come under the direction of the Central War Room in Melbourne. The Wellington 
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CWR would have the right to modify or disregard Melbourne's instructions, but would 
inform Melbourne immediately. Both CWRs were to exchange intelligence. The Internal 
Procedure section outlined how an alert situation was to be handled and intelligence 
channelled. Once there was a requirement to deploy New Zealand warships and aircraft, 
the Navy Duty Officer (or the SO(O&I) if present) was to notify the relevant personnel in 
the naval and air staffs and the army if considered necessary. 43 
The SOC 0&1) was to file all naval and aircraft signals during the operation. All 
signals were to be seen by the service chief conducting the operation. The Duty Signals 
Officer was to sort messages. The Navy's 'Y' organisation would accumulate and 
distribute intelligence obtained by signals interception, and report any signals intelligence 
relevant to the operation.44 Positions of shipping would be displayed on the CWR's main 
Shipping Plot, along with plots on other charts. The Naval Duty Officers were to be 
responsible for current intelligence on the location and strength of enemy units, available 
friendly forces, merchant shipping positions and the plot displays. The Procedure for 
Operations outlined operational co-ordination of ships, aircraft and listening watches 
mounted once a raider was detected. 45 The Naval Secretary forwarded to the Secretary 
ONS the Draft Orders for the CWR to issue as a Chiefs of Staff paper, but the Chiefs of 
Staff considered that a paper could be better issued later after operational experience.46 
The Prime Minister's comments to his Australian counterpart on 4 October 1940 
acknowledged a larger Australian role and the potential of using Suva and Port Moresby 
for exchanges of operational intelligence. Further consultations between respective 
service chiefs were expected to cover contingency arrangements if Japan entered the 
war.47 The New Zealand CNS received a response from the RAN eNS on 12 October 
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which threw cold water on the trans-Tasman proposals. The CWR and Combined 
Operational Intelligence Centre in Melbourne were not complete. He indicated the 
RAN's co-ordination measures on operational intelligence but implied some interservice 
friction on the CWR/COIC concept.48 
Within a month of setting up, problems arose for the Combined Intelligence 
Bureau from an unexpected quarter. It had to do with the CIB's weekly intelligence 
summary. Summary No.2 was suppressed on direction of the Prime Minister.49 On 
Monday 21 October, the Prime Minister held a meeeting with the Minister of Defence, 
three naval officers (Captain Fanshawe, Lieutenant-Commander Alderton and 
Lieutenant-Commander Nicholson), two army officers (Colonel Goss and Captain 
Williams), two air force officers (Flight Lieutenant Canning and Group Captain Neville), 
a police officer (Madden) and the Secretary ONS. Opening the meeting, the Prime 
Minister stated that publication of CIB reports was suspended by the Ministry of Defence 
until members of the Government had discussed their contents with the service chiefs and 
the intelligence officers.5o Noting that the intelligence summaries were to be distributed 
overseas, Fraser 
'" .stated that he was unhappy over the reporting, in the two reports published to 
date, of internal security topics, and particularly stated that it was undesirable to 
quote opinions, even when they came from the most eminent quarters, and that 
the reporting of labour disputes and stop-work meetings should be in such a way 
as not to convey a misleading impression, i.e. they must be related to the whole 
general situation.51 
Calling into question the accuracy of sections of the reports, the Prime Minister 
emphasised the importance of the Bureau obtaining internal security information from the 
police, and he directed the police should provide this information.52 There was some 




However, Colonel Goss pointed out that the service chiefs had written to the 
police with proposals for 'co-ordination between the Services and the Police Department 
in this connection', with those to be discussed at a proposed meeting.54 This was a most 
pointed reminder of the 13 September meeting which the Prime Minister had cancelled. 
In the face of Goss's objections the Prime Minister agreed to discussions on co-operation 
between the Chiefs of Staff and the Police Commissioner.55 
Whatever the Prime Minister's objections about the intelligence summary, this 
scarcely justified stopping production of a long overdue document distributed to a 
relatively limited audience. Problems persisted, and further delays in production and 
circulation ensued because of hold-ups at the Prime Minister's office. Delays in 
circulating even weekly intelligence summaries diminished their usefulness. The Chiefs 
of Staff returned to these difficulties on 15 November. 
The Chiefs of Staff took note of a direction given by the Rt. Han. the 
Prime Minister that before any further reports were published by the Bureau they 
should be submitted to him for approval. It was further noted that the Rt. Han. 
the Prime Minister had indicated at a conference, held on the 21st October to 
discuss the issue of reports by the Bureau, that a section of the report on internal 
security should be compiled by the Police Department. It was decided, therefore, 
that the Chiefs of Staff should approach the Rt. Han. the Prime Minister 
reminding him of his previous direction, and enquire whether, if this course were 
followed for the fu ture, he would be prepared to allow of the reports being issued 
without prior reference to him. If he was unwilling to accept this arrangement, 
the Chiefs of Staff were of the opinion that the report should in future be 
published with no reference to internal security, so avoiding the necessity for 
reference to the Rt. Han. the Prime Minister for prior approva1.56 
This underlined the lack of value the Chiefs of Staff attached to any contributions by the 
police on internal security. The Chiefs of Staff were carefully circumventing the need to 
comply with the Prime Ministerial direction, with the collaboration of the Secretary ONS. 
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This issue arose once more on 23 November in the presence of Lieutenant-
Colonel Mawhood from the War Office, who was in Wellington to advise the 
Government on establishing a security service. Following Mawhood's address on 
security measures in Britain, 
The position in New Zealand was outlined to Lt.Col. Mawhood, particular 
reference being made to the fact that reports of the Bureau could not be published 
until such time as they had been approved by the Prime Minister. In view of the 
discussions [ sic] it was decided to rescind the previous agreement .... and to defer 
further consideration of the matter until after Lt.Col. Mawhood had finished his 
discussions with War Cabinet and officers of the Combined Intelligence Bureau.57 
It would have been clear to Mawhood that the stumbling block was the internal security 
section of the intelligence summaries. At the same meeting the Secretary ONS was 
directed to contact the Commissioner of Police to inform him of CIB-police liaison 
arrangements and of the service chiefs' intention to meet with him.58 
This was an interesting ploy in the light of moves to set up a separate security 
service. Internal security was about to be reorganised without police co-operation. 
Despite the Police Commissioner submitting a regular intelligence summary on internal 
security to the Secretary ONS,59 the service chiefs' dissatisfaction with the police was 
sufficient to continue them moving in the direction of an independent security service. 
This was not an auspicious climate for police liaison with either the CIB or a proposed 
security service. 
On 5 January 1941, the departing head of the Far Eastern Combined Bureau 
arrived in Wellington on a liaison tour to Australia and New Zealand, visiting the CIB the 
next day. Captain FJ .Wylie RN had been the 'Captain on the Staff' of the Commander-
in-Chief, China Station, since 1938. He briefed the Chiefs of Staff on the FECB on 7 
January, then spent time with Lieutenant Commander Nicholson discussing WIT and D/F 
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intelligence. The following day he addressed four members of the War Cabinet on the 
FECB, namely the Prime Minister, the Ministers of Defence and Finance, and J.G. Coates 
of the Opposition.6o 
Wylie outlined his views on a combined intelligence organisation. Intelligent and 
broadminded officers were required in sufficient numbers to prevent overloading, along 
with clerical staff. Service officers should not be employed on clerical duties, and an 
official was needed to keep an efficient registry. All intelligence, except for that of 
technical interest to one service only, had to be pooled. There should be direct contact 
between the combined intelligence officer and his own service, but the combined view 
should always be put on matters affecting more than one service. Interservice jealousies 
should be recognised and circumvented. Each officer should be able professionally to 
evaluate his own service's intelligence. Wylie observed that the Naval directing officers 
in Australia and New Zealand were overloaded. He noted that a start had been made on 
combined intelligence and that a constant watch was maintained on the shipping plotS.61 
Matters to do with overloading the CIB were coming to a head. The SO(O&I) was 
so fully occupied with convoy organisation, the routeing of merchant shipping and other 
matters that intelligence was pushed aside. The Merchant Shipping Section of the CrB 
had become increasingly focussed on the commerce raider threat. Shipping intelligence 
was passed on to other naval authorities and the FECB in Singapore (which was the 
controlling authority for shipping intelligence in the Pacific and East Asia) as a matter of 
course. Before November 1940 the average number of merchantmen plotted by the 
Merchant Shipping Section averaged 107 per day, including 35 coastal vessels. After 
November this rose to an average of 136 per day, with 36 coasters. Additionally, an 
65 
average of 40 ships per day, mostly foreign vessels, passed through the area to the north 
of New Zealand, but were not plotted because of a lack of personnel and time. Beyond 
this, the dispositions of enemy and Allied warships needed to be plotted on the main wall 
chart in the CWR. Intelligence and Merchant Shipping staff amounted to four officers 
plus typists, and the intelligence personnel were absorbed in the safe passage of merchant 
shipping. In Melbourne, with three times the merchant traffic, there were four times the 
number of staff in the merchant shipping section alone.62 
In March 1941 the CNS raised the issue of his overloaded SO(O&I) with the 
Admiralty. A full-time Staff Officer (Intelligence) in Wellington was required. If an 
SO(I) was appointed, Hannay could concentrate on the operations role.63 On 4 April the 
Admiralty replied that Lieutenant Commander F.M.Beasley had been appointed as SO(l). 
The CNS suggested Beasley visit the FECB at Singapore en route, and the Admiralty 
concurred.64 
Hannay outlined the shortcomings of the CIB. Although reports could be sent 
quickly from any part of New Zealand to Wellington (an advantage over Australia) the 
problem was a lack of resources and staff to handle them. Port security, including the 
Naval Base, would be better left to the new security service (set up in February). The 
'Staff Officer (Intelligence )' [sic] had no time to sight suspiciously worded mail or cables 
drawn to his attention by the P.&T. Department's censorship staff, and thus only sporadic 
attention was paid to such traffic.65 No use had been made for propaganda purposes of 
liaison with the Publicity Department. Contact with customs officers was limited through 
lack of staff. Little background information was coming in from District Naval 
Intelligence Officers or Intelligence Officers in warships because of lack of knowledge or 
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other duties. Intelligence from the Pacific Islands was poor, although important events 
were reported by signal and other information came by mail. Coastwatching reports were 
frequently of little value with vague descriptions of shipping. Lieutenant Brackenridge 
was fully occupied on collecting and distributing raider intelligence, editing the 
Admiralty's Weekly Intelligence Reports, and sorting intelligence from the Pacific 
islands. The War Diary required writing up, but there was no-one spare for it. Even the 
weekly intelligence summaries could not be sustained, with only about eight in all being 
issued by mid-1941. Although this was a bleak catalogue of deficiencies, Hannay 
. preferred reorganisation of the CIB to wait until Beasley arrived.66 
On 22 July the CNS outlined preliminary measures for the CIB's reorganisation 
which were approved by the Chiefs of Staff. Beasley had arrived and a start could be 
made. The CNS suggested the elB prepare a periodical summary of 'hot' intelligence to 
be distributed only to the services, the DNI in Melbourne and FECB in Singapore. The 
three service intelligence officers should pool their latest information. Intelligence 
relating to the enemy and the Japanese should be confined to the immediate situation in 
the New Zealand area as far as possible. Although the first summary might be difficult to 
produce, further production could be supplements to the first. 67 
In the meantime a comprehensive overhaul of the CIB was contemplated. On 26 
July, Beasley wrote to the DNI in Melbourne requesting the loan of his Civil Assistant, 
W.H.Brooksbank, to critically assess the state of the CIB. Brooksbank had been Civil 
Assistant to the DNI since 1922 and helped lay the foundation of the Australian Naval 
Intelligence Division. He had a comprehensive knowledge of the combined intelligence 
set-up in Australia. The DNI assented to Beasley's request.68 
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The CNS and the new SO(l) clearly intended that sweeping changes should be 
made. Between 8 and 16 August two meetings and three memoranda fundamentally 
altered the shape and scope of the combined intelligence organisation. On 8 August yet 
another committee met to look at the CIB, consisting of Beasley, Lieutenant-Colonel 
Donaldson, Major Stevenson, Squadron Leader Hunter and Flight Lieutenant Canning. 
They set out a number of proposals for change.69 There would be a name change from the 
CIB to the 'Combined Operational Intelligence Centre' (COlC) to reflect the 
organisation's function. 7o The main task was to provide operational intelligence for the 
Chiefs of Staff for the conduct of operations within the New Zealand area. Operational 
intelligence on enemy and friendly forces, with an emphasis on Japan and the Pacific, 
was to be collected, collated and analysed. A central record system was to be maintained. 
Current intelligence summaries with restricted distribution were to be issued, plus a 
general summary once a fortnight. Specific intelligence recommendations could be made 
by the COIC to the service chiefs. The COIC should have no responsibility for security, 
instead receiving regular reports from the new security service. The COlC would be 
commanded by a Director appointed and responsible to the Chiefs of Staff. The COIC 
must be split into three sections, one for each service. However, service personnel had to 
appreciate they were in a combined organisation responsible to all three services. This 
still permitted retention of their own service expertise on operations and intelligence. The 
COIC required copies of all operational orders, instructions, memoranda, location and 
intelligence reports from each service. Reference publications urgently needed should be 
purchased. The Director was to assess office accommodation requirements. The COle 
was to be staffed by one officer from each service, but increased to four naval officers, 
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two army officers and two air force officers for 'active operations' in the New Zealand 
area. COIC intelligence staff would have no outside responsibilities, and the same went 
for clerical staff. Clerical staff amounted to a typist, a clerk and a messenger, although 
two more typists and a clerk could be added when operations were imminent. These 
staffing levels were extremely flimsy and short-sighted for a combined intelligence 
centre. Raider activity was a continuing problem, and a developing operational situation 
was hardly conducive for introducing new clerical staff to the typing and filing 
procedures for an intelligence centre. However, staff numbers were to be left to the 
Director's discretion. 71 
The next day, 9 August, the CNS set forth comprehensive 'notes' as a basis for 
discussion of the CIB and CWR reorganisation by the Chiefs of Staff. These were drafted 
by Beasley and subsequently appeared as an enclosure, 'New Zealand Naval Intelligence 
Organisation', in a letter from the Naval Secretary to the Minister of Defence on 16 
August. 72 The CNS argued that substantial alteration to the CIB and the CWR were 
necessary. The CWR worked as a naval operational intelligence room, keeping track of 
merchant shipping and warship movements and there was nothing combined about it. He 
noted that use of the adjoining air operations room by the combined staff was not the best 
arrangement. The CIB itself appeared to be mainly an appendage to Major Folkes' 
(Director, Security Intelligence Bureau) new security service and a naval and air 
intelligence respository. 73 It failed to supply rapid intelligence appreciations for the 
Chiefs of Staff. It was adequate for immediate naval operational requirements, but an 
increased tempo of operations around New Zealand would reveal the serious deficiencies. 
Too much attention centred on the merchant shipping section. The CWR and a Combined 
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Operational Intelligence Centre needed operational intelligence from the three services 
and should be distanced from the Merchant Shipping Section. Operational intelligence 
required a stream of signals, operations orders and messages for up to date information at 
all times. Operational intelligence was best displayed on maps, with files in a central 
filing system or single service files in adjoining rooms. A Convoy Room could be set up 
comprising the Merchant Shipping Section, with the Staff Officer (Operations) in close 
proximity. The SO(l) was to be located next to the CWR, with the 'Y' organisation by the 
COIC. The name change to COIC signalled the change in function to other departments, 
and time taken up with peripheral matters like censorship, publicity and security were to 
be eliminated. The CNS recommended four junior naval officers be trained as 
watchkeepers for the COle and air plotters be made available.74 
On 11 August the Chiefs of Staff Committee considered the intelligence 
committee report and the CNS's 'notes'. The recommendations were to be implemented. 
The CIB was to be renamed the Combined Operational Intelligence Centre. The COIC 
was to provide the Chiefs of Staff with intelligence for New Zealand area operations. The 
COIC's Director would be appointed by, and be responsible to, the service chiefs. His 
role was to control, organise and direct the centre. Beasley was made Director. The COle 
was to be split into three sections, one for each service, but personnel were collectively 
responsible to all three services. At least one officer from each service was to be 
appointed to the COIC, and personnel numbers could be increased if operations around 
New Zealand were imminent. 75 
Following the deliberations of the Chiefs of Staff, the Naval Secretary sent a 
memorandum to the Minister of Defence on 16 Auguse6 putting the proposals into a 
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strong maritime context. An extensive enclosure prepared by Beasley gave much more 
detail on the naval intelligence organisation, and its reorganisation. 
According to the Naval Secretary, the CNS considered naval intelligence should 
be overhauled, and this was underlined by his visits to Melbourne and Singapore and had 
led to the appointment of the new SO(I). The officer appointed had experience in naval 
intelligence and so alterations to the local organisation had been deferred until his 
arrival. 77 The Naval Secretary noted that the changes for the 'Combined War Room' [sic] 
and the 'Combined Operational Intelligence Centre' approved by the service chiefs 
followed the United Kingdom model and were similar to those being adopted in 
Singapore and Melbourne.78 The Naval Secretary outlined a list of recommendations for 
the Minister to approve. These were that the CIB be abolished and a COIC be formed 
with the SO(1) as the Director; and that the cOle should be completely separate from 
security matters. A general intelligence section was to be formed to look after 'all non-
operational intelligence'. Ten additional personnel were required: two Lieutenants 
(RNVR) as Intelligence Officers for the 'Combined Intelligence Section', one Civil 
Assistant to the SO(I) and one typist, one clerk and one messenger, plus four junior 
officers as watchkeepers. 
Beasley's enclosure outlined his solutions, for an organisation deemed ' .. to be 
seriously inadequate in many respects ... ' 79 The SO(I) should be in charge of naval 
intelligence and be 'directly responsible' for liaising with overseas intelligence 
organisations, for the 'reporting officers and reporting organisation', and for the 
coastwatching organisation. He was also to be Director of the CalC. The intelligence 
organisation should comprise three components: Section 1, the Combined Operational 
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Intelligence Centre; Section 2 the General Intelligence Centre; and Section 3 the 'Y' 
organisation.8o 
Section 1, the COIC, was to be staffed with three officers under the Director for 
the initial establishment, with numbers being increased when necessary, along with three 
clerical staff. In addition, if operations were under way, there would need to be a 
'constant watch in the C.O.I.C.', and for this four junior naval officers should train as 
COIC watchkeepers 'now'. The three officers for the COlC would be one from each 
Service, with Lieutenant W.W.Brackenridge as the naval member. Collecting 
intelligence, preparing appreciations and intelligence summaries, and having operational 
intelligence ready at all times for the Chiefs of Staff was the role of the COlC.81 
Operational intelligence was to be displayed on maps, with other material in the central 
filing system. It was necessary that Section 3, the 'Y' section, be located close at hand. 
The second arm of the restructured intelligence organisation, Section 2 - General 
Intelligence, was headed by Lieutenant-Commander Barker, who was to be responsible 
for naval security matters.82 'General Intelligence' was interpreted as security 
intelligence. It was proposed that two other officers would be needed to look after a wide 
variety of tasks 'which are seriously neglected at present.' While in broad tenns these 
two officers' purview included naval censorship and naval publicity, close collaboration 
between them and Barker was expected, for they must also cope with 'numerous other 
duties.' 83 
The three General Intelligence officers were to liaise with 'Major Folkes' Security 
service' [sic], the Police Department, Army and Air Force security organisations, and 
with the District Naval Intelligence Officers on security matters. To do this, the officers 
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would need to have knowledge of regulations pertaining to security (including the powers 
of arrest and detention by the Police). They would need to be involved in the vetting of 
naval recruits and personnel rejoining the Navy (this meant the checking of names 
against Police records, Security Intelligence Bureau records and 'records of subversive 
activities'). A card index of suspicious persons, both civilian and military service 
personnel was to be maintained. The security of vital points was of interest, and in 
particular the security of naval establishments like the Navy Office in Wellington, HM 
Dockyard in Auckland, and HM Ships of the New Zealand Station. The security of the 
. waterfront in harbours and wharves and shipping would be 'in collaboration with 
Harbour Board and [the] Waterfront Control Commission.' Permits for photographs and 
visits to ships, and the issuing of all passes including entry to Defence Headquarters came 
under the orbit of the General Intelligence Section. A watch was to be kept on suspicious 
activities including yacht movements, trouble on board warships and merchantmen, 
strikes, the sabotage of work, delays affecting shipping in ports, the activities of foreign 
seamen and deserters from HM Ships.84 
In the area of censorship, all questions to do with the leakage of information 
required attention. The censorship of private W rr messages would include delays 
imposed on certain information, along with the censorship of broadcasts and a watch for 
word codes in public debates. There needed to be close collaboration with the Controller 
of Censorship on the censoring of letter mail, parcels and cables leaving New Zealand, 
and on statements to the press.85 Decisions might be made on whether news published in 
Australia could be published in New Zealand. The press should also be scanned for 
breaches of censorship regulations, and for the coverage of strikes. 'Word Codes and 
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Security generally' needed attention, with 'Items of interest' being brought to notice. 
The finding of 'dangerous material' could be taken up with the Censorship Department. 
There should also be a close working relationship with the Controller of Customs and 
customs officials which would include the inspection of baggage. These would need to 
work closely with the head of the General Intelligence Section on the requirement 'for 
secrecy for [the] departure of convoys and movements of merchant shipping generally. ,86 
The two officers would have a number of other tasks. They would compile 
statistics on 'services', 'supply', on steaming, distances and days at sea. There would be 
preparation of statements for the Minister of Defence. They would write up the 
Periodical Intelligence Summaries and also the War Diary. Liaison would be carried out 
not only with Censorship, Publicity and Customs, but also with the masters of 
merchantmen, with the District Naval Intelligence Officers and with the Intelligence 
Officers of HM Ships.87 
Section 3 of the new organisation had signals intelligence as its focus. This was 
the 'Y' organisation. Its list of tasks prescribed supplying intelligence to the Captain on 
the Staff, Singapore, liaison with the Australian 'Y' organisation, supplying intelligence 
to the COIC, and liaison with the communications authorities.88 
Beasley suggested that it would be useful to appoint a Civil Assistant to the SO(I), 
following the RAN's example. The Civil Assistant would be 'a suitable Public Servant' 
who was to 'ensure continuity of policy for the Intelligence Organisation of New Zealand 
which has been sadly lacking in the past.' When the SOCI) was absent, the Intelligence 
Organisation would continue to function, and it would also prevent the SO(I) from being 
bogged down with routine work at the Navy Office.89 
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It was noted that the RAN's Director of Naval Intelligence in Melbourne had a 
Civil Assistant, a Deputy DNI, a Naval Secretary, a Naval Assistant to the Civil 
Assistant, three Intelligence clerks and a stenographer. The staff of the Australian 
combined intelligence organisation was approximately five times the size of that 
envisaged for New Zealand.90 There were six officers in the RAN's corc, the DNI's 
office had three staff, the DNI's Civil Assistant had three, while Security, Censorship and 
Publicity Sections had nine personnel (three each). There was one Commander (the 
DNI), five Lieutenant-Commanders, nine Lieutenants and nine civilians (including seven 
stenographers), making a total of twenty-four staff in all.91 
The RAN's Civil Assistant, Mr.W.H.Brooksbank arrived and rapidly compiled a 
report which he delivered on 13 September.92 Brooksbank's report took into account 
Beasley's proposals. He considered the proposals for increasing the numbers of 
intelligence personnel 'are not sufficiently far-reaching.' He observed that the RAN's 
Naval Intelligence Division consisted of some sixty-one officers. Sixteen were in the 
Central Organisation at Navy Office in Melbourne, another six in the COIC at the Navy 
Office under the DNI, thirty-five more were stationed at sub-centres around Australia, 
while four officers were on the COIC staffs at Area Combined Headquarters at 
Freemantle, Darwin and Townsville. He reflected that as New Zealand had more sea 
around it than Australia did, New Zealand's naval intelligence commitment should be 
around the same as Australia's.93 
The deteriorating political situation in the Pacific with the apparent decision of 
Japan to pursue a southwestern expansionist policy was the central element here. There 
was closer liaison between the RAN and the Netherlands Navy, with to a lesser extent, 
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the United States Navy. There was the Australian decision to establish forward 
Combined Operational Headquarters at Fremantle, Darwin and Townsville. Brooksbank 
assessed that in the event of hostilities with Japan, units of the Royal Navy, the US Navy 
and the Netherlands Navy might have to operate in local Australasian waters, and thereby 
impose strains on the local intelligence organisations.94 
Brooksbank questioned the need for a messenger, having regard to the highly 
secret work of the COlC. He suggested useful recruits for intelligence work would be 
officers with a public school background, as they would have a strong imperial outlook, 
'possess the necessary mental equipment', and have a corresponding understanding of 
d' '}' 9S ISClP Ine, . 
He considered the 'Combined War Room' [sic] should normally function only 
when major operational problems arose. Simplification should be the policy with regard 
to the room, which should contain a big map of the Pacific. The COIC itself should be 
readily accessible for the Chiefs of Staff for the supply of sectional maps and more 
detailed information. As to the COIC, the notion that it was there to simply provide 
intelligence was technically a misinterpretation. It was more correct for the COle to be 
seen as a pool for the collation and assessment of operational intelligence received from 
the three Services and to furnish the CWR the result of its combined appreciations.96 The 
COIC was regarded by Brooksbank essentially as an analytical organisation. He had 
reservations about not manning the COIC continuously. 
Security was said to be a 'difficult' subject that required a careful exercise of 
judgement. The processes of security were very slow by their very nature, as reference to 
other government departments and security organisations was necessary. Time needed to 
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be allocated for the consideration of a problem, and for re-assessment of it as well. It was 
too much to expect an officer engaged in security duties to undertake general intelligence 
work as well.97 Here Brooksbank was drawing a sharp distinction between 'general 
intelligence' and 'security', whereas we have already seen that under Beasley's scheme, 
the proposed Section 2 was to be the General Intelligence Section, which was a security 
section in terms of its scope. Brooksbank noted that in Melbourne, security was the task 
of the Assistant DNI: it was his sole role, and he was assisted in it by a barrister. 
Brooksbank noted that any idea of a Combined Security Bureau held particular hazards, 
for 
... .it is not quite clear to me where Major Folkes' [the head of the new Security 
Intelligence Bureau] responsibilities begin and where they end. If a Combined 
Security Bureau were to be established it seems to me that Major Folkes might 
advance claims to assume charge of it. This, from the Naval point of view, might 
not be altogether desirable.98 
It might give, Brooksbank noted, Army officers a say in internal security matters like the 
internal political welfare of the Royal New Zealand Navy, because the Security 
Intelligence Bureau was an Army organisation. Brooksbank's caution and implicit 
ambivalence regarding the Director of the SIB is intriguing. 
The Chiefs of Staff Committee noted on 22 October War Cabinet approval for 
additional staff for the combined intelligence organisation, and that the CGS would 
urgently consider the addition of 'a suitable Army officer' .99 The Chiefs of Staff declared 
that the CIB was abolished and the Combined Operational Intelligence Centre was 
established with Beasley as Director. lOO There was also a feeling of urgency for the 
provision of useful and timely intelligence. The Chiefs of Staff agreed that a summary of 
up-ta-date operational intelligence on the Pacific was essential, and 
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(a) That a telegram should be sent to the Intelligence Authorities, Singapore, 
requesting that information be supplied by telegraph as soon as possible 
showing the strengths and distribution of Japanese forces and that details of 
any change in these particulars should be indicated by telegraph at intervals of 
not less than one week. 
(b) That the Director of the Intelligence Bureau should arrange for a summary of 
this information to be furnished at weekly intervals to each Chief of Staff.-
For action by the Director of the Intelligence Bureau. [sic] 101 
Beasley observed that the 'present Weekly [Naval] Intelligence Summaries' were 
being too widely distributed. Instead, he suggested that there should be two summaries. 
One concerned future operational intelligence to be sent to about twelve addressees. The 
other general intelligence summary with 'interesting stories' could go to around fifty 
recipients. He suggested that the Army content of the summary could be reduced, and 
drew attention to the interest of the Police Commissioner wanting to get onto the 
distribution list for the present summary.102 
The outbreak of war in 1939 had overtaken the tentative deliberations on the 
subject of a combined intelligence centre. Naval intelligence was the only useful provider 
of operational intelligence as the army had no significant means of collection, while air 
intelligence was almost non-existent. The Navy's provision of operational intelligence 
summaries went a little way towards filling the gap, but not enough to give the Chiefs of 
Staff comprehensive intelligence of the situation in New Zealand waters or elsewhere. 
The first raider foray right into Auckland's approaches rekindled interest in the combined 
intelligence concept, and the immunity of the commerce raiders' further operations 
suggested effective intelligence measures should be put in place. The CIB was the first 
move in this direction, but got de-railed almost immediately because it was too small an 
organisation to be effective. There were not enough intelligence staff. Bickering over 
intelligence summaries and internal security between the Chiefs of Staff, the Prime 
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Minister and the Police Commissioner were beside the point and assisted in prolonging 
the intelligence hiatus. It was not until nearly mid-1941 that moves began to be made to 
rectify the position, driven by the CNS in the face of the threat of war with Japan. Even 
then, the new SO(I) did not arrive until July, and it was August before action was taken. 
The decisions for transforming the ClB, the Brooksbank report, and the setting up of the 
Combined Operational Intelligence Centre ran everything too close to the widening of the 
war. The new combined intelligence organisation was still in transition by early 
December. The DNI was about to travel to Pearl Harbor on 8 December, but was 
unavoidably delayed. It was not until late December that the COle began to produce 
useful summaries of intelligence as required by the Chiefs of Staff. The COle tumbled 
into war, understaffed and ill-prepared. Once again, time had run out for New Zealand 
combined intelligence. 
Chapter Four 
The Combined Operational Intelligence Centre 
December 1941 and January 1942 was chaotic for the new Combined Operational 
Intelligence Centre. The abrupt deterioration of the situation in the Pacific, and a 
concurrent increase in demand for operational intelligence precipitated by the Japanese 
landings in Malaya and the attack on Pearl Harbor, coincided with the translation of the 
ClB into the COIC. The move to a new building and the acquisition of extra staff made a 
measured transition impossible. After long delays and procrastination in addressing the 
shortcomings in combined intelligence, much needed to be done in a hurry. It was not 
until late December that the COlC began to produce useful summaries of intelligence as 
required by the Chiefs of Staff. 
Three days after Pearl Harbor, the Police Commissioner was on to the Secretary 
ONS about getting access to 'summaries of Operational Intelligence', on the basis that 
the police circulated their internal security intelligence summaries to the PM, the 
Secretary ONS, the COlC and the SIB.l The Chiefs of Staff decided not to pass 
intelligence summaries to the Commissioner and Shanahan diplomatically informed him 
that suitable relevant extracts would be sent to him by the DNI.2 
The DNI sent the first CalC Daily Summary dated 19 December 19413 to the 
service chiefs, the Secretary ONS and the US Naval Observer the following day. It 
consisted of a chronology of events in the New Zealand area between 7 and 17 
December, made up of coastwatching reports from the Pacific Island territories, the 
Gilbert and Ellice Islands particularly, relating Japanese air and naval movements. 
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Among these, the report of a landing on Tarawa at 1645Z 9 December (or 0445 10 
December local time) noted that one radio set had been destroyed and the other hidden; 
on 10 December further landings on Tarawa, Makin and Butaritari were reported from 
Ocean Island. Tarawa was still reporting on 16 December. The Gilbert stations were 
significant because New Zealand coastwatching teams had only been there four months at 
most. 
The COIC Daily Summary consisted of a one (or occasionally two) page 
compilation of operational intelligence. The 19 December Summary contained three 
coastwatching station reports - from Abaiang in the Gilberts, Neiafu in Tonga and the 
Kermadecs. The RNZN cruiser Leander was escorting a ship to Suva and Achilles was 
with an RAN squadron in the north Tasman. Two RNZAF flying-boats were en route to 
Suva from Singapore. 'Dusk perimeter patrols' by aircraft were conducted for North 
Cape, the Hauraki Gulf, both approaches to Cook Strait and to Lyttelton, all proving 
'negative.' 4 
The summaries for December 1941 were short, with distribution restricted to 
seven or eight customers. They reflected the serious situation facing the Allies even in the 
South Pacific. In the Daily Summary on 22 December, apart from noting the movements 
of the two New Zealand cruisers and local dusk patrols off ports, the focus was on 
information from the coastwatching stations in the islands. The garrison at Fanning 
Island was standing to with the approach of a tug and barge. Five reports of enemy 
aircraft over different islands in the Gilberts were noted, as was the chilling news that the 
'Japanese have detected presence of radio sets at Abemama, Maiana and Abaiang [sic].' 
A naval message from Suva indicated 'that since Japanese landing at Makin it is probable 
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that 4 soldiers of the N.Z.E.F. are prisoners-of-war.,5 By the end of December a weekly 
COle Intelligence Summary was also being produced, along with a fortnightly General 
Intelligence Summary. 
The COIC was to be located in the new building in Stout Street in the new year. 
Although not quite finished, the building had enough room to accommodate the COIC on 
the second floor. The set-up consisted of two rooms for the COIC itself, the Central War 
Room, a Cypher Room, a Teleprinter Room, two Coding Rooms, a small Merchant 
Shipping Office, plus a lobby and a 'Control Room,.6 The COIC was not large and 
occupied a corner of the second floor. On 10 December the strength of the COle and 
related fields at the Navy Office was listed as the DNI, six cOle officers, two calc 
typists, four Merchant Shipping officers, two Intelligence Officers, eight Wireless 
Intelligence Officers, five Cypher Branch personnel, eleven Coding staff, three RDF 
officers, plus five operations staff under the 50(0).7 Beasley's intelligence organisation 
had been caught short-handed, and there was an urgent request on 16 December for three 
more junior naval officers for watchkeeping and other duties in the COIC. These included 
keeping track of enemy surface units and submarines in the South Pacific and New 
Zealand areas, bombing and mining activities, friendly warship and merchant vessel 
movements, compilation of operational intelligence summaries and preparation of war 
communiques.s One of the new watchkeepers of the CalC, (the then) Temporary Sub-
Lieutenant (Special Branch) V.E. Jaynes, described his entry. 
I think at the very beginning when I joined we were still in the old army 
buildings in Featherston Street opposite the Railway S~ation (the ,old brick 
building) and these were temporary quarters. We were rapIdly expandmg at ~hat 
time because of the entry of Japan into the war and we were shortly to move Into 
the departmental building in Stout Street. The building hadn't been finished then, 
but enough of it was available for us .... on the second floor where we set up the 
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Combined Operational Intelligence Centre, also .... the Central War Room, right 
alongside the Merchant Shipping Office which controlled the movements of 
merchant ships through our particular area. But when I joined in '42 we were still 
in the old building .... Wally Brackenridge was the man I was immediately 
responsible to .... his boss was the Director of Naval Intelligence, Lieutenant 
Commander Beasley .... At that time there were several Air Force officers in the 
Combined Operational Intelligence Centre, and we had one Army officer who 
maintained liaison, a chap called Dawson .... We manned this Centre on a 24-hour 
basis, seven days a week, receiving reports from stations throughout the Pacific 
and through a variety of watching stations in New Zealand - coastal batteries, 
coaswatchers. And a lot of reports came through - nervous people who had seen 
something like an aircraft carrier off New Plymouth, that sort of thing. These 
reports were funnelled through to us.9 
He noted that along with reports from 'Y' intelligence, including the direction-finding 
stations in New Zealand and Australia, a stream of information came to the CalC 
watchkeepers throughout the day and night. 
On 26 January 1942 it was proposed that a daily meeting in the COIC would be 
introduced for the Chiefs of Staff and others approved by them, the first meeting to be on 
Wednesday 28 January 1942. It would consist of a verbal appreciation of the current 
situation. Io The intelligence obtained and updated in the last 24-hours was outlined, and 
dispositions of Allied and enemy forces were given 'as far as known.' General enemy 
intelligence and allied operations (except for the Australian and New Zealand Stations) 
would be dealt with by the DNI. W rr and Special Intelligence would be covered by the 
SO(Y) (Tel.Lieutenant H.Philpott), while intelligence on British and Allied operations on 
the Australian and New Zealand Stations and merchant shipping and convoys came from 
the SO(O) (Hannay). It was recommended that the Air Force and the Army should 
provide their own briefing officers. I I The daily meeting took place at 1000 hours in the 
Central War Room, except for Sundays.12 As time went on, daily briefing presentations 
fell to the junior officers of the COIC as Narrative Officers. 13 
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Following the morning meeting the Daily Intelligence Summary was compiled and 
despatched around noon. A precis was sent by signal- a 'GENSIT' (General Situation)-
to United States, Australian and British intelligence authorities in the Far East and the 
Pacific. 14 
The DNI accompanied the CNS to Hawaii, meeting Admiral Nimitz on 22 
January. Beasley observed Nimitz 'struck me as being an old man, slow and perhaps 
slightly deaf.' More importantly, from a professional viewpoint, Beasley met 
Commander Rochefort and Lieutenant Commander Layton, and W rr, 'Y' and direction-
finding intelligence were discussed. IS 
The assumption of command of the ANZAC AREA by Vice-Admiral H.F .Leary, 
USN, in Melbourne in February further disrupted the New Zealand combined intelligence 
reorganisation. Beasley went to Melbourne to join the staff of COMANZAC as New 
Zealand liaison officer. 16 He did not return to his post as DNI until ANZAC AREA 
ceased to exist two months later when the SOUTH-WEST PACIFIC AREA and the 
SOUTH PACIFIC AREA were formed. 
Perhaps an air of desperation can be perceived in mid-February in the Chiefs of 
Staff comments regarding intelligence inadequacies that began to take on potential 
operational significance. Noting that the possibility of invasion was the primary focus, 
the Chiefs of Staff lamented that the COIC was clearly insufficient for the purpose of 
effective operational co-ordination. No linkages existed at the tactical level, even though 
air and sea action had been activated from the centre on previous occasions.17 It was not 
practicable to put forces of the three services in anyone region under one commander. 
Co-ordination of operations did not depend on a single commander but more on common 
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objectives and rapid communications.18 The services chiefs suggested instead that three 
combined operational headquarters be established for the Northern, Central and Southern 
Military Districts, and that each district should include no less than four intelligence 
centres. 
A Naval Information Centre displaying disposition and movements of our 
own and enemy warships and shipping. 
A Military Information Centre showing the disposition and movements of 
our own and enemy land forces. 
An Air Information Centre in which the following information is visually 
displayed: 
(i) Location of our own air forces on the ground and in the air; 
(ii) Location of enemy air units and enemy air movements in progress, the 
latter being deduced from the following: 
H.M.ships, our own aircraft, coastwatching stations, observer posts and 
other sources. 
A Civil Information Centre for liaison with civil authorities. 
17.- These Information Centres must be in the one building and, if not in one 
room, they must be in adjoining rooms ... 19 
Just how all this was to be put into action when the COle in Wellington was still 
struggling with its restructuring, with the DNI absent in Melbourne and the relative lack 
of resources and staff is a good question. There would be no less than twelve intelligence 
centres plus the COIC/CWR set up in Wellington. There was the foolish assumption that 
operations could be neatly separated into sea, air and land, which implied little had been 
learned from the conduct of the war thus far. The proposals had a whiff of panic. 
The reality was a little more modest. By 17 May 1942, the DNI had thirteen 
intelligence personnel working in the COIC. There were four Air Force officers, one 
Army officer, and six naval officers and one civilian.2o There were minor teething 
problems. The DNI noted in May that persons in the opposite building could see through 
the Central War Room curtains and distinguish maps, and he asked that the windows be 
frosted. 21 
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Another isssue was access to the CWR, and the need to cut down on outsiders.22 
A quite large number of persons had 'the right of entry at any time' to the CWR. They 
included seven Army personnel, fourteen Air Force (Plus two civilian clerical staff), and 
nineteen Navy personnel (Plus three civilian clerical staff), a total of forty-four. Added to 
this were the UK High Commissioner, Sir Harry Batterbee; Lieutenant Commander 
Haitsma of the Netherlands Navy; Captain OIding, the US Naval Attache, and his 
assistant, Lieutenant-Commander Stephenson; and Colonel Nankivell, the US Military 
Attache. A temporary liaison officer of the US Marine Corps was approved later.23 
In early June, access to the daily briefings in the Central War Room was raised by 
the Naval Secretary, for 'At present certain people who have no connection with service 
operations' were allowed to attend, in his opinion, 'a most undesirable practice.,24 He 
suggested that only the Chiefs of Staff, staff officers connected with operations and 
intelligence, and the equivalent officers of the United States forces be permitted to attend, 
and that all liaison officers or civilians should have to apply to one of the services. The 
CAS noted his impression that the Dutch Consul General would be asking the Prime 
Minister's Department to allow the Netherlands naval attache to attend, and thought that 
it would be best to consult with the Head of the Prime Minister's Department before 
coming to a decision.25 
The Chiefs of Staff asserted that a 'vast amount of most secret material' 
was examined at the daily briefings, much of it from the Admiralty and 'other 
authorities', given on condition that circulation was restricted. The services chiefs 
decided that attendance should be limited to themselves and their deputies, officers 
concerned with operations and intelligence, Vice-Admiral Ghormley (Commander South 
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Pacific Area) and/or his representative, and members of the War Cabinet.26 It was an 
exaggeration that 'vast amounts of most secret material' was examined; nevertheless, an 
amount of extremely sensitive intelligence was considered. The War Cabinet on 30 June 
decided the matter was to be 'left entirely to the Chiefs of Staff, with security as the 
prime consideration.27 The position was 'explained' to the UK High Commissioner and 
the DCNS would be discussing it with the Netherlands Naval Liaison Officer.28 What had 
brought it all to a head was that the access 'question had been raised unofficially by Vice-
Admiral Ghormley,?9 
The Standing Orders for the Central War Room of 23 June 1942 set out in detail 
the refined duties and functions of the personnel involved in the operation of the COlC 
and CWR. The CWR and COlC were set up as a central directing room and an 
operational intelligence room.30 The central directing room was to be used by the Chiefs 
of Staff for the conduct of operations in and around New Zealand. The operational 
intelligence room (the COl C) displayed a plot of the disposition of Allied forces locally, 
and was used as a place where the operational and intelligence staffs could 'present to the 
Chiefs of Staff a daily summary of events. ,31 
The Duty Officers were to be familiar with the roles of the main sources of 
information like the coastwatching stations, the direction-finding stations and so on. A 
complete set of War Routine Orders was held and maintained in the CWR and staff were 
made aware of the relevant portions that applied to them. They would also have to be 
acquainted with information concerning ports' fixed defences and the positions of all 
coastwatching and direction-finding stations. Detailed information was located in a 
Videx binder maintained by Sub-Lieutenant Studholme?2 A roster of naval watchkeepers 
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at the time lists Whitmore, Williams and Reddell with back-up substitutes available, 
namely Studholme, Jaynes and Cheyne.33 
Watches were kept on a twenty-four hour basis, a shifting cycle being employed 
to allow for breaks and cover. In this, the first Naval Intelligence watchkeeper was on 
duty from 0800 hours until 1300 hours. The second watchkeeper came on at 1245 and 
went through to 1900. The first officer then returned at 1845 hours and stayed through 
the night until 0900 the following morning. He was relieved at 0830 by the second 
watchkeeper who worked through to 1300. The third watchkeeper came on at 1245 hours 
and went through to 1900 hours, and so on. The first watchkeeper having gone off at 
0900 was free until 1245 the next day. This system meant one duty officer on duty 
around the clock. Extra staff could be called in, although during the day these would be 
the normal CWR duty officers. The watchkeeping duty roster was under the direct control 
of the DNI and NI(l) (Whitmore).34 
Inward signals and messages would be dealt with by the Duty Officer, who would 
read the signal and initial it plus the time of receipt. Signals containing operational 
intelligence and the movements of Allied forces were received from: the Naval Senior 
Duty Officer, the Air SDO via Air Intelligence, the Army SDO via Military Intelligence, 
by telephone or secraphone from Groups, etc, and from the DIP plotting room. Of the 
signals coming in, the naval ones fell into a large number of categories, much larger than 
those for the Air Force or the Army?5 Given the numbers of stations and the naval 
dominance of special equipment, this might not be unexpected. 
Incoming signals were to be 10gged?6 
TOO From whom Short text Clip No. 
310126 ACNB Warship dispositions 3 
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They were then classified under one of thirty-four headings, the clip number being 
written on the bottom right hand comer of the signal. These headings with their clip 
numbers were listed as follows: 1 - New Zealand Warships; 2 - South West Pacific 
Warships; 3 - Other Allied Warships; 6 - CMSOPAC Bulletins; 7 - Digests; 8 -
Washops; 9 - Maoris; 10 - Arctics; 11 - Kiwis; 12 - Gensits; 13 - RNZAF Suva; 16 
to 22 were Japanese and Allied Operations (16: New Zealand Area; 17: Solomons; 18: 
Remainder South Pacific Area; 19: South West Pacific; 20: Central Pacific; 21 North 
West Pacific; 22: East Indies Station, Burma, China); 24 - Unidentified Aircraft; 25-
Unidentified Ships; 26 - Mines, Minefields, Sanctuaries, etc; 27 - Coastwatching 
Pacific Islands; 28 - Miscellaneous Signals; 31 - Enemy Weapons; 32 - Submarine 
Sightings, Attacks, etc; 33 - Raiders, Blockade Runners; 34 - DIP Fixes Submarine and 
Surface Units. Each category had separate wall clips?7 
After receipt, initialling and annotations, naval signals were placed on the Current 
Day Signal Pad which lay on the CWR Duty Desk, and was not to be removed. Only 
authorised personnel could examine the signals. At 0830 each day, the Duty Officer 
placed a card on top of the signals included in the Daily Summary, and subsequent 
signals were put on top?8 At 1700 hours, signals under the card were taken to the 
appropriate wall clip. Signals received by the Navy for the other services were passed 
immediately to the Air Operations Officer or an Air Force Intelligence Officer, or to the 
G Duty Officer at Anny Headquarters.39 
Some incoming naval signals received very careful treatment, as they were of 
operational importance, or from very sensitive sources. 'Natels' (Naval Telegrams) and 
Optels (Operational Telegrams) were listed along with Most Secret Sources as being 
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'Special Signals'. These were given by the Senior Duty Officer to the DNI and were to be 
filed by Whitmore.4o Most Secret Sources usually denoted signals intelligence obtained 
by codebreaking from Bletchley Park, the FECB, or the RAN. A whole section of the 
Standing Orders was devoted to the handling of this type of material. Codenamed 
ULTRA (which applied to both British and American intercept summaries) and 
ZYMOTIC (though not all ZYMOTIC signals were from codebreaking), these required 
great care as these were most significant sources in the Allied intelligence arsenal, the 
summaries of enemy signals traffic. The summaries paraphrased the content of the 
intercepted traffic. This was a basic security countermeasure in the event of enemy 
interception to prevent giving direct textual clues to the Germans or Japanese that their 
communications were being read. The precautions for Special Intelligence material are 
worth quoting in full. 
18. SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE. 
(a) Special intelligence is contained in signals commencing with the letters 
ZYMOTIC (ZYM) and ULTRA. These are normally only made out in the 
original and are given to S.O.(Y) who is responsible for showing them to 
officers concerned. During silent hours (1830-0900) when S.O.(Y) is not in 
the office, messages which bear an indication of priority and appear to require 
immediate action are to be taken to the C.W.R. Naval Intelligence Duty 
Officer. If they require such action, he is to ring S.O.(Y) or, in his absence, 
the Duty Senior Officer who is to be informed that "a special intelligence 
message has been received and requires immediate action." 
(b) On no account are any of the contents of these messages to be passed over the 
ordinary telephone or secraphone. 
(c) The message is to be handed to S.O.(Y) on his return to the building with the 
information as to who has seen it. 
(d) The contents of these messages are never to be included in any summaries or 
mentioned at daily meetings without the direct permission of D.N.!. 41 
A very limited circle existed for the actual receipt of Special Intelligence - the DNI 
(Beasley), the SO(Y) (Philpott), plus the naval intelligence watchkeepers on duty at the 
time. Handling instructions for Ultra had come from the Chief of Staff, Eastern Fleet, 
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and are set out in Appendix 1. The content of such messages could be (although not 
always) incorporated into the COIC's main operational intelligence products, if the DNI 
assented (that is, in the Daily Summaries, the GENS ITS and the Weekly Intelligence 
Summary - all with relatively restricted distribution). 
Signals were not to be destroyed by watchkeepers: old or unwanted signals were 
to go first to Whitmore.42 Categories other than naval signals were to be handled 
differently. Most Air Force signals 'of general interest' were to be placed on the Current 
Day's Signal Pad and later destroyed, unless they had 'useful or interesting information.' 
Air Force intelligence signals from Suva, on the other hand, were to be filed and retained. 
Army signals were of less interest, as most dealt with operational exercises. They were 
destroyed once the exercise was over. 43 Telephone or secraphone messages went into the 
Operations Book, with time of receipt and who sent the message. Action taken on any 
message or signal received was noted in the Operations Book.44 
Office space for the cOle posed obstacles that one might have assumed were 
eliminated in wartime. The COIC Air Force intelligence officers were short of office 
space, and it was suggested the Deputy Chiefs of Staff might move, or even the COS be 
shifted. Similarly, the CGS became annoyed because the DNI had put 'a girl' into Room 
228 which belonged to Anny.45 The Navy held their ground. 
The production of a weekly intelligence summary derived from the weekly 
summaries produced by naval intelligence in 1940. The CIB's summaries, however, had 
a stuttering beginning, being disrupted by the intervention of the Prime Minister with just 
twenty-eight CIB intelligence summaries produced between 23 September 1940 and 19 
October 1941. 46 The next two weekly summaries followed on the CIB series numbers, 
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being 29 and 30, but entitled 'Combined Operational Intelligence Centre Intelligence 
Summary'. A new series ofweeldy COIC Intelligence Summaries began with no.l on 31 
December 1941. This series went through until nO.l02 on 15 September 1944, although 
by then it had become a fortnightly bulletin. 
The COIC Daily Summaries from 28 January 1942 went out after the daily 
briefing. The shortened version was the 'GENSIT' signal. A further abbreviated version 
. known as a 'KIWI' signal, came into use during 1943. The weekly COlC Intelligence 
Summary was largely a weekly cumulation of operational intelligence, although it 
sometimes contained background information on non-operational issues; and there was a 
general fortnightly summary of non-operational intelligence. The weekly summary of 
operational intelligence, the daily summaries and the short signals went to a relatively 
restricted circle. All the operational intelligence summaries could contain intelligence 
from Most Secret Sources, which is not to say all did. The general fortnightly summary 
was on much wider distribution, and did not disclose operational information or highly 
sensitive intelligence. Apart from this, intelligence in the form of operational signal 
traffic was coming and going quite separately in many ways through the wireless 
intelligence or 'Y' organisation within the COIC. Although integral to the COIC and 
directly under the DNI, the operational role of the 'Y' Room added another dimension. 
Strict limitations were placed on 'Y' intelligence and Special Intelligence. 
The Daily Summaries were short, composed of intelligence notes on a variety of 
operational information received in the last twenty-four hours. The early summaries 
were divided into 'NAVAL' and 'AIR' intelligence with sub-headings, which lasted only 
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into the first two months of 1942; after this a variety of headings were used and this 
remained the pattern through to Daily Summary nO.l007 on 28 September 1944.47 
One section of the Summary in the first two and a half months was headed 'W rr 
and 'Y' Intelligence' or 'Wrr and D/F Intelligence'. This dealt with both high-frequency 
direction-finding and the analysis of signals traffic, trying to estimate strengths, 
movements of enemy units, and identify callsigns. This revealed matters that the 'Y' 
Room was interested in at this time, but having it labelled so explicitly in an intelligence 
summary was highly insecure. If the summary fell into enemy hands, what then? As will 
presently be seen with a related type of summary, this could inadvertently occur. The 
practice of drawing attention to 'Y' or 'w rr and D/F' intelligence ceased by March, 
probably as a precautionary measure. From then on, direction-finding fixes were referred 
to in the summaries, but without emphasis, and no particular attention was drawn to 
11 . l' 48 ca SIgn ana YSIS. 
In 1942 there was, as might be expected, a considerable amount of space in the 
Daily Summaries devoted to the local New Zealand area as the war came closer. 
Locating enemy warships or submarines assumed great importance, and the summaries 
are full of sighting reports from aircraft, ships and coastwatchers, direction-finding 
bearings on submarines and accounts of operations in progress.49 
Distribution of the Daily Summaries remained narrow. In 1942 it went to nine 
recipients: the Governor-General, the Prime Minister's Department, the three Chiefs of 
Staff, the Naval Secretary, the US Naval Attache, the GSOI (Operations and 
Intelligence) and the Naval Officer-in-Charge, Auckland (who was to pass it to 
COMSOPAC). Yet there could also be a widening of distribution when a copy went to a 
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department rather than a person. The Prime Minister's Department copy was seen by the 
Prime Minister, the Head of the Prime Minister's Department, McIntosh, Shanahan, and 
members of the War Cabinet. 50 
By early 1943, the Daily Summaries were more measured, dealing with local 
matters first, then describing events further away to the north. Thus, Daily Summary 
no.431 of 22/23 February 1943 for instance deals with local New Zealand warship and 
aircraft movements, and a strong D/F contact by 'four stations' of a submarine in Cook 
Strait, before turning to events elsewhere. This moved on to air activity around Fiji, 
coastwatcher reports from Penrhyn in the Line Islands, air strikes by Allied aircraft over 
New Georgia, coastwatcher reports from the New Hebrides and further air operations in 
the Solomons.51 
By August 1944 with the operational activity waged far away from New Zealand 
shores, apart from the occasional concerns about enemy submarines, the Daily 
Summaries were largely accounts of air and sea operations in the Solomons, the 
Bismarcks, the Carolines, New Guinea and the Dutch East Indies.52 In late 1944 the 
requirement for Daily Summaries was perceived to have passed. The COIC Daily 
Summaries were the staple intelligence product of the COIC, the end point for each 24-
hour period and the focus of all collection, collation and analysis undertaken by the 
COlC. They provided a useful operational focus, and their demise derived from a 
lessening of urgency in obtaining up-to-date intelligence. 
The GENSlT reported on the 'general situation' in the South Pacific over the last 
24 hours to 0830 hours on the day it was dispatched. An example of this process in 
action is as follows. The main points of COIC Daily Summary no.7S8 of 0830 15th to 
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0830 16 January 1943 were abbreviated in GENS IT no.696 16 January 1944, transmitted 
at 1250 hours that day.53 It went to the New Zealand Liaison Officer in Suva, the Tonga 
Defence Force, the Southern Military District, and the US Naval Attache. The few lines 
of each section of the Daily Summary were boiled down to one or two lines in the signal. 
The first entry on Daily Summary no.758 reads: 
NEW HEBRIDES 
1. SUBMARINE REPORTED 
An enemy submarine was reported in position 15 degrees 55'S 168 degrees 
57'E at 1910M 15th • 
At 2143M 15th a D/F fix placed a submarine within 100 miles of position 15 
degrees IS'S 171 degrees 30'E. 
The former position is approximately 100 miles East of ESPIRITU SANTO, 
while the D/F places the submarine in approximately the same position as the 
attack on the "GULF STAR" (refer Summary No.757, Para.2). 
In the GENSIT this became: 
SS reported 15 degrees 55'S 168 degrees 57'E at 1910M/15. D/F at 2143M/15 
Places SS within 100' of 15 degrees 15 'S 171 degrees 30'E. 
A section on light air activity over Torokina is omitted from the GENSIT. In the Daily 
Summary a Fijian reconnaissance patrol report is detailed: 
EAST BOUGAINVILLE 
2.The Fiji reconnaissance patrol has reported that the beach from TENEKAU 
north to INUS POINT, including the NUMA NUMA area, is only lightly held by 
the Japanese who are not patrolling inland. The only natives appear to favour the 
Allies and are being contacted daily. 
In the GENS IT, this was: 
FIJIAN recce patrol report E BOUGAINVILLE INUS POINT to TENEKAU 
only lightly held by Japs and natives friendly. 
The state of the aerodromes on New Britain as reported in the Daily Summary: 
NEW BRITAIN 
2. AIRFIELD STATE 
Photographs taken on 14/1 show: -
LAKUNAI: 94 fighters, 6 light and 3 medium bombers. 
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TOBERA: 54 fighters, 1 medium bomber. 
VUNAKANAU: 1 fighter, 9 light and 21 medium bombers. 
RAPOPO: 2 fighters, 3 light and 8 medium bombers. 
All the above runways serviceable. 
KERA VAT and DUKE OF YORK IS: Nil aircraft. 
Both runways unserviceable, with the latter runway being surfaced. 
The GENSIT noted: 
Photos 14/1 show LAKUNI, TOBERA, V ANAKANAU [sic], ROPOPO runways 
serviceable KERA V AT unserviceable. DUKE OF YORK Is. being surfaced. 
And so on. The GENS IT was an abstract of the COlC's daily intelligence output. On 5 
April 1943 another short summary was inaugurated. These were KIWIS.54 KIWI signals 
were to provide a brief operational intelligence summary on the South Pacific to British 
intelligence authorities. KIWI no.1 went to the Commander-in-ChiefEastern Fleet and to 
the ACNB, and in April the Admiralty and GHQ, New Delhi were added.55 An 
interesting KIWI was no.16 of 20 April 1943, reporting Allied air activity over 
Bougainville in the past four days. One observation was that 'Lightnings morning 18/4 
shot down 3 B[ombers], 3 F[ighters] for one.' This referred to the shooting down of 
Admiral Yamamoto.56 
An example of a KIWI generated from a Daily Summary was KIWI no.37, sent at 
1425 hours on 17 May 1943. The Daily Summary in question was no.514 of 0830M 16th 
to 0830M 1 i h May with over ten sections.57 These were reduced from several lines or a 
paragraph in the Daily Summary to a couple of lines in the KIWI signal, in the same way 
as the GENSIT. Items 2,3, and 4 in the Daily Summary were set out thus: 
2. MINE ON BEACH. 
A mine was found on 16/5 north of AUCKLAND on the west coast adjacent to 
HELENSVILLE. The matter has been referred to the Bomb Disposal Group for 
necessary action. 
3. FIJI AREA. 
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A Japanese submarine has been reported by DIP in position 20 degrees S 174 
degrees E at 1907M/16. This is approximately 200 miles S. W. of FIJI 
ISLANDS. 
At 0233M 1 i h a distress signal was received from the Liberty Ship "WILLIAM 
K. VANDERBILT" which reported having been torpedoed in position 18 degrees 
41'S 175 degrees 07'E. This is approximately 120 miles W.S.W. from FIJI 
ISLANDS. 
3. TONGA AREA. 
A Japanese submarine has been reported by D/F in position 21 degrees 30'S 178 
degrees W at 2007M 16th. This is approximately 160 miles east of 
TONGATABU. 
In KIWI nO.37 this reduced to: 
Mine stranded west coast near AUCKLAND N.Z. 16/5. 
SSSS from Liberty ship "WILLIAM K. VANDERBILT" 18 degrees 41 'So 175 
degrees 07'E. 17/5 D/F Japanese SS 21 degrees 30'S. 178 degrees W. 16/5. 
SS sighted 10 degrees 50'S. 163 degrees 05'E. 16/5. 
The KIWI was simply another fonn of exchange of intelligence between the New 
Zealand intelligence authorities and those of their allies. 
From time to time bizarre occurrences crop up in war, and the loss of certain New 
Zealand intelligence material to the enemy falls into that category. The material 
concerned might appear to have had the potential for disastrous consequences, and indeed 
arguments have been advanced to suggest just that. The intention here is to briefly 
examine those arguments, which still leave open a couple of interesting questions, and to 
look closely at the material involved. As it concerns a selection of weekly COIC 
Intelligence Summaries from the early part of 1942, this also serves as a useful place to 
consider these as yet another of the intelligence outputs. 
The weekly CalC Intelligence Summary began to be published to a limited 
audience at the end of 1941. Near the middle of 1942 a month's worth of these 
summaries fell into enemy hands. James Rusbridger, in an article in Encounter in May 
1985 entitled 'The Sinking of the "Automedon", the Capture of the "Nankin" - New 
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Light on Two Intelligence Disaster in World War II,58 outlined the circumstances 
surrounding the loss of these summaries. His claims seem to be a little astray in parts, 
and as they have been repeated subsequently, most recently in Peter Elphick's Far 
Eastern File, and Richard Aldrich's Intelligence and the War Against Japan 59 they 
require examination. 
The loss of the intelligence material occurred with the interception of the 
Australian steamer, the Nankin, by the German disguised merchant raider Thor on 10 
May 1942. Secret papers and codes were disposed of in the hour long engagement that 
preceded capture by the raider. There were quite a large number of mail sacks taken by 
the Germans, and in these were four weekly COIC Intelligence Summaries: no.12 (21 
March 1942), no.13 (30 March 1942), no.14 (6 April 1942) and nO.lS (13 April 1942). 
These were addressed to FECB in Colombo. Just how the COIC summaries got into the 
general mail is an interesting puzzle in itself, for this was an appalling breach of security. 
Somewhere along the line, perhaps at the start in Wellington, the secret material had got 
into the ordinary mail bags. One of the problems with port security in New Zealand was 
the handling of overseas mail, so it might not be so surprising that a blunder of this 
magnitude could occur. The captain of the Nankin was unaware that such sensitive 
material was aboard. 
The intelligence summaries were, according to Rusbridger, transferred to the 
German blockade runner, the Regensberg, although, as Elphick notes, he provides no 
authority for this statement. The Nankin was taken as a prize, and both she and the 
Regensberg made their way independently to Yokohama, with the latter docking on 18 
July.60 The COIC Intelligence Summaries were passed to Admiral Paul Wenneker, the 
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German Naval Attache in Tokyo. According to Rusbridger, Wenneker began to relay by 
signal to OKM in Berlin summaries of what had been found in the mail, and on 25 and 28 
July sent details of some of the COle materia1.61 It took a month for Wenneker to be 
given authority to show the COle summaries to the Japanese, which he obtained on 29 
August 1942.62 Elphick takes the view that the Japanese were probably told about the 
material before this date.63 Rusbridger notes that the Seekriegsleitung (SKL) War Diary 
at Gennan Naval Headquarters in Berlin referred to a meeting on 3 September 1942, 
and records that the Allied knowledge of the Japanese fleet dispositions showed 
that their communications were insecure, and that the Japanese requested the 
assistance of the German Navy in improving their cipher security. 64 
Rusbridger observes that a communications agreement between the two countries was 
prepared and signed on 11 September 1942, and in 1943 some 500 German Enigma 
machines were delivered to Japan, it not occurring to the Germans that their own signals 
. h b . d 65 mIg t e compromIse . 
Up until August the US Navy had been reading what Rusbridger describes as the 
Japanese 'JN25 fleet-cipher,.66 New codebooks were distributed and the new version, 
JN25c, was supposed to come into effect on 1 April; however, because of logistical 
problems getting the new cipher to widely scattered naval units, this did not occur until 
29 May. Elphick asserts that the 'naval code' changed to a new version JN25d on 14 
August 'and was followed shortly afterwards by a total change of ship call signs , , and 
there were indications that the Japanese were using radio deception techniques.
67 
Elphick notes that the abrupt change may have come about because the Japanese 
possibly became aware of an article in the Washington Times-Herald on 7 June 1942.
68 
In fact a series of remarkably indiscreet articles had emerged that day on the Battle of 
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Midway. The Chicago Tribune published a front page story under the headline 'Navy 
had Word of Jap Plan to Strike at Sea', saying, 
The strength of the Japanese forces with which the American Navy is 
battling somewhere west of Midway Island .... was well known in American naval 
circles, several days before the battle began, reliable sources in naval intelligence 
disclosed here tonight. 69 
The Washington Times-Herald that day headlined 'US Navy Knew in Advance All 
About Jap Fleet', also quoting 'reliable sources in naval intelligence'. 
The information in the hands of the Navy Department was so definite that 
a feint at some American base, to be accompanied by a serious effort to invade 
another base, was predicted. Guesses were even made that Dutch Harbor in the 
Aleutians and Midway ... might be targets ... by last Tuesday [2nd June] the 
Americans were able to conclude that a feint was to be made at Dutch Harbor.7o 
The story was also carried in the New York Daily News on 7 June.71 This, of course was 
a security lapse of monumental proportions. 
There is no doubt the Americans and other Allies were no longer able to read the 
main Japanese naval cipher, JN25, for a period of some months, during which a number 
of bitter engagements were waged around the Solomons. This meant Allied intelligence 
organisations (and operational commanders) had to rely on traffic analysis for this period, 
that is, direction-finding, 'Y' inference and identification techniques like radio 
fingerprinting, being shut out of the content of the signals. We will return to those 
aspects in the next chapter, but it is worth observing in passing that this loss of reading 
JN25 traffic did not leave the Allies quite as blind as might be implied. 
Rusbridger and Elphick note that the British never informed the Americans of the 
Nankin business and the loss of the New Zealand COIC Intelligence Summaries.72 They 
also note indications of a cover-up since the war, instancing the later retyping of the log 
of the raider Thor, and the fact that the incoming signal log at Naval headquarters in 
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Berlin for the relevant period is missing. Certainly, the parts of the diary of Admiral 
Wenneker, the German Naval Attache, for the period May to November 1942 are 
missing, although as Elphick reflects this may be coincidence (the diaries have been 
translated, edited and published by John Chapman as The Price of Admiralty). 73 
What, then of the COle Intelligence Summaries themselves. Rushridger alleges 
that each of the summaries, distributed to 22 named recipients including Nimitz, 'stated 
that the contents came from Most Secret Sources', and that this meant cryptanalysis. 
Each summary was divided into four parts, and he notes that 'Part Four gave a detailed 
list of the estimated disposition of Japanese naval vessels in the Indian and Pacific 
Oceans and their likely future movements.,74 Noting that some of the information would 
have come from normal sources like air reconnaissance, prisoner interrogation, 
coastwatchers, and analysis of radio traffic, he asserts, 
But it was equally obvious that much of the very detailed knowledge of 
the whereabouts of enemy ships and their intended movements could only have 
come from code-breaking; and it seems, therefore, that the corc was receiving a 
great deal of information from the US Navy's cryptanalysis organisation in 
Hawaii. 75 
Rusbridger contends that the intelligence contained in COlC Intelligence Summaries nos 
12, 13, 14 and 15 
clearly showed the increasing extent of the US Navy's knowledge of the Japanese 
battle fleet's movements in the weeks leading up to the Battle of Midway (3-5 
June), and this could only have come from reading the JN25 fleet-cipher. 76 
A closer perusal of the offending summaries, and the ones preceding the critical 
period, reveal the holes in some of the foregoing arguments. There was however, a 
further undisclosed potential danger with regard to the security of the intelligence 
summaries. 
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There was a good deal of intelligence in each of the summaries. COl C 
Intelligence Summary no.13 'for the week ending 30th March 1942' is typical of the 
four. 77 It was distributed to 22 customers. These included the three New Zealand Chiefs 
of Staff, the commanding officers of three RNZN warships, the OC's of three RNZAF 
squadrons, the OC's of the three military districts, the Naval Officer-in-Charge Auckland, 
the Naval Officer-in Charge Suva, the three New Zealand Liaison Officers in Honolulu, 
Melbourne, and at COMANZAC, and the Army's GSa 1 (Operations & Intelligence). 
There were four other recipients: the Captain on the Staff, Colombo (to whom the 
offending summaries had been addressed), the DNI Melbourne 'for Combined 
Operational Intelligence Centre, Melbourne', the Commander-in-Chief US Pacific Fleet, 
and the United States Naval Observer in Wellington. 
At the start of the Summary itself, there was a stricture. 
PARAGRAPHS MARKED WITH A MARGINAL LINE ARE FROM 
MOST SECRET SOURCES AND SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN A WIDER 
DISTRIBUTION THAN THAT SHOWN IN THE DISTRIBUTION LIST. 78 
This definitely was a convention for referring to the product of Special Intelligence like 
Ultra. However, the marginal lines were clearly only put physically on copies: they were 
not printed on them. Moreover, they were most probably applied to only certain copies, 
as the file archival copies 79 of these summaries do not contain marginal lines on material 
that comes from such sources. It is not possible to know if the captured summaries were 
marked with marginal lines. 
Part I was headed 'INTERNAL' and took up just over two pages, and this dealt 
with local matters in the South Pacific. Movements of New Zealand and Australian 
warships in the ANZAC area of operations were detailed. A probable mine explosion off 
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Great Barrier, the identification of a suspicious vessel was made b' . 
,0 servatlOns concernmg 
the Japanese looting Tarawa and bombing the Gilberts noted Sub . . h' 
. manne Sig tmgs were 
reported, plus a report from CINCPAC giving a submarine's position around 40 miles 
south of Savaii, Samoa. Various aircraft sightings were recorded, and a list of US aircraft 
in an out of Nandi compiled.8o 
Part II headed 'EXTERNAL' covered a wide variety of topics over seven pages. 
These included notes on movements and appointments of four naval officers, one of 
\vhich was Admiral Somerville'S assumption of command of the Eastern Fleet on 28 
M arch. Heavy naval casualties in recent times, the movement of US troops to Australia, 
matters to do with enemy raiders, depth charges, merchant ship recognition signals, the 
recent success of convoy protection, military and political administration in Japan, 
shipbuilding in Singapore and methods of delivering low level bomb and torpedo attacks 
were set out. A cruiser action in the Mediterranean on 22 March and Japanese radio 
broadcasts were reported. Under ARMY, operations in Burma, the Andaman Islands, 
and the Philippines were discussed, while enemy and Australian air operations over 
northern Australia and New Guinea and the position in New Caledonia were described.
81 
Part III was headed 'INFORMATION RE JAPANESE FORCES'. This section 
of three pages considered Japanese mines, Japan and the Solomon Islands, rice supplies 
for Japan, and Japan's trade and maritime warfare. It concluded with a break down of the 
Japanese Army's order of battle on 22 March, as estimated by the Commander-in-Chief, 
Ceylon.82 
Part IV was most interesting as it set out 'ESTIMATED DISPOSITIONS OF 
JAPANESE NAVAL UNITS IN THE PACIFIC AND INDIAN OCEANS', over four 
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pages. These were listed in particular localities, and names of units were given where 
possible. Units, part units or individual vessels were set out under the following sub-
headings: North Tasman (2), Samoa (1), North Pacific (4), Empire Waters (7), Marshall's 
Area (8), Trok Area (3), Rabaul Area(10-13), Netherlands East Indies (11 + groups of 
vessels off Timor), and Malaya (10). These were set out like the following example in 
the Netherlands East Indies. 
1.- Unit of 1st Carrier Division -
"AKAGI" (72 planes). 
2.- 2nd Carrier Division-
"SORYU" ) 
"HIRYU") 53 Planes each. 
3.- 5th Carrier Division-
"SHOKAKU" ) 
"ZUlKAKU") 60 planes each 
4.- 5th Destroyer Squadron -
"NATORI" (7 - 5.5") Flagship. 
12 Destroyers. 
5.- 4th Submarine Squadron. Composition unknown. 
6.- 6th Submarine Squadron -
"KINU" (7 - 5.5") Flagship. 
Four Minelaying submarines. 
7.- 23 rd Air Squadron, operating over North Australia from Koepang. 
8.- "T AKAO" Air Squadron. 
9.- 22nd Air Squadron. 
10.- 315t Air Squadron. 
11.- 32nd Air Squadron. 83 
This was a fair amount of detail in the positions and strengths, all of which was far 
beyond the capabilities of the Royal New Zealand Navy to collect for a weekly report. 
The inference was that the information for such estimates was coming from a variety of 
sources. We will return to the implications of this in a moment. 
Completing COIC Intelligence Summary no.13 was an appendix setting out the 
positions and states of all Allied warships in the ANZAC area, and the remainder 
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scattered about various localities in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The name, type of 
vessel and a small comment about each accompanied each entry on the list. 
This outline of the content of COlC Intelligence Summary no.13 for 30 March 
gives some idea of the kind of product being produced by the COIC, as well as the extent 
of the intelligence windfall for the enemy. This was quite a comprehensive intelligence 
survey, and while it contained much of what can simply be described as background 
interest, there was enough operational intelligence to provoke reflection. The listed 
deployment of Japan's naval forces, if accurate, implied that the RNZN (and thus the 
Allies) had a pretty good idea of the whereabouts of most Japanese units, if in fact the 
ships were where they were stated to be. The obvious question for the Japanese was how 
did they know? Over four COIC Intelligence Summaries there were clear implications. 
An interesting aspect of the issue of the four captured summaries is that they were 
not so indiscreet as the summaries produced weeks earlier. COIC Intelligence Summary 
no.3 of 14 January 194284 had a whole section on 'wrr and D/F Intelligence' to do with 
assessing Japanese strength in the Marshalls, at Truk and Palau. Intelligence Summary 
noA of 21 January85 went even further and specifically mentioned intelligence from the 
US Navy's intelligence unit in the 14th Naval District in Hawaii. Worse than this was the 
practice of listing the Japanese deployments. COIC Intelligence Summary no.5 for 29 
January86 was headed 'ESTIMATION OF THE DISPOSITION OF JAPANESE NAVAL 
FORCES IN THE PACIFIC FROM THE LATEST AVAILABLE INFORMATION.' 
Not only did it set out the units or vessels, but also it gave the source of the intelligence 
as well. For example, most units of the 4th Fleet, including two Japanese carriers, were 
said to be in the Mandated Islands on 21 January. The sources were C.I.B.6 at 0740Z/21 
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and C.O.S. Singapore 1146/0161. These were not spelled out but left an interesting 
puzzle. In fact they stood for Combat Intelligence Bulletin from the interception and 
codebreaking centre in Hawaii, and the Captain on the Staff of FECB in Singpore. 
Others were listed as c.o.I.e. DIP and W (f, as F.E.C.B.820, as A.C.N.B., etc. There 
were some 74 such attributions as sources, which suggested an extensive supply of 
information originating from different organisations, even if the new reader might be 
puzzled as to what these stood for. Fortunately, by COlC Intelligence Summary no.8 of 
20 February, these sources were deleted from the deployment list in the Summary, 
although there were still one or two comments about D/F and wrr. By CalC 
Intelligence Summary no.11 of 14 March, all the sources of intelligence in the Japanese 
naval dispositions were omitted.87 The main point of this is that had the captured 
summaries contained the source annotations, it is possible much worse consequences 
might have ensued. 
So what can be said about the debacle and the nature of this intelligence product? 
It seems unlikely that the Japanese realised the full implications of what they were 
reading when they saw the four summaries, although clearly allowing them to fall into 
enemy hands had been a considerable breach of New Zealand security. Rusbridger takes 
his case too far and ignores the press reports on Midway that for timing fit better with 
changes to JN25, than does the New Zealand intelligence. There were, of course, some 
logical problems for the prescient enemy reader with the New Zealand material. New 
Zealand was well known to have only small maritime forces of her own. The material 
collected was way beyond any conceivable New Zealand intelligence capability. Yet 
here was the New Zealand COle producing prolific intelligence reports. How was the 
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COIC getting its material? Did it show that the New Zealand intelligence effort was on 
the face of it quite prodigious? If it did, and New Zealand was one of the smaller 
Dominions, was it not logical to assume that Australia, Canada, Britain and the United 
States would be going to far greater lengths in securing up-to-date operational 
intelligence? What were the implications of that? These are all merely hypothetical 
questions, but they might suggest the lines along which the captured COIC Intelligence 
Summaries could be approached. It seems, in view of the success of the Allied signals 
intelligence effort, that those questions may not have been asked. 
As to the weekly COIC Intelligence Summaries as a product of a combined 
intelligence organisation, it may be confidently said that they comprised a useful 
cumulation of recent and current background and operational intelligence. Regarded 
within an intelligence package that contained Daily Summaries and GENSIT for a variety 
of customers here and abroad, the weekly summaries occupied a very useful place. Their 
extensiveness is all the more remarkable, given the adverse and rapidly deteriorating 
operational and strategic circumstances in which they were conceived. The Admiralty on 
6 October 1942 noted it had just received the War Office copy of the COIC Intelligence 
Summary No.24, observing that the reports were of great interest to the Naval 
Intelligence Division, and asking for previous reports to be sent.88 
There were changes afoot in the COIC. Brackenridge was sent to COMSOPAC's 
in Noumea to be the New Zealand Liaison Officer with the rank of Acting Lieutenant 
Commander. Beasley noted drily to Commander Long, the DNI in Melbourne,89 that as 
COMSOPAC disliked liaison officers, Brackenridge was actually on the staff as a 
working member. He later observed 90 that although Brackenridge had settled in well at 
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COMSOPAC'S headquarters, he was 'not allowed to send us any operational 
information.' Brackenridge returned later on to be DNI for a short period, before 
returning to a further liaison officer role till the end of the war. 
In his letter to Long on 12 February 1943, Beasley spoke of having reorganised 
the COle and the CWR to give the latter more operational significance, and to divide the 
CalC into separate service components. 'We have, however, retained a combined 
nucleus of one officer from each service.' This was said to be an improvement as ' ... we 
were too much in each other's pockets and the new arrangement should give the 
respective service more chance to get down to their proper intelligence work.,91 
This was the exit point for combined intelligence. As the air force increased its 
intelligence commitment, single service direction kicked in. This was because of the new 
focus for air intelligence. The Centre was to revert to the role of a naval operational 
intelligence centre, despite the space given to air intelligence in the Daily Summaries. 
The reorganisation involved rearranging the intelligence and operations rooms vis-a.-vis 
the CWR. The need to do this had arisen from the growth of the Air Intelligence side, the 
development of an Air Operations Room, and the fact that 
the present functions of the Central War Room are felt to have deteriorated into 
those of an intelligence display room and conference room. The operational and 
planning significance of the Central War Room has been largely lost. 92 
There was to be no alteration to the layout of the CWR itself. From an operational 
perspective the Air Operations Room was too far away from the CWR to be useful. On 
the other hand, the intelligence officers located next door to the CWR were distracted by 
noise, when the nature of their work required peace and quiet. Part of the Air Intelligence 
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component was accommodated on the floor above through lack of space. Piecemeal 
growth had resulted in 'much unnecessary running about.' 
The changes, according to the Air Force, demonstrated a more workable set-up. 
The Air Operations Room was to be next to the eWR, with the Air Intelligence and 
Naval Intelligence moved to separate rooms but quite close to a COle Room containing 
one intelligence officer from each service. The DNI was located by the COIC, while the 
Naval and Army watchkeepers were next to the Air Operations Room.93 What had 
occurred was a marked increase by the RNZAF in the number of air intelligence 
personnel compared with the previous year. There was a quiet revolution under way in 
air intelligence, with a focus on providing operational intelligence for squadrons 
deployed in the forward area. 
The personnel of the COIC/Naval Intelligence/Air Intelligence at this time 
reflected a balance between the Navy and the Air Force, with the Army in its minor role. 
There were approximately 28 personnel involved, without counting the staff of the 'Y' 
Room and the Merchant Shipping Office. The DNI's office contained the DNI and one 
civilian assistant. Lieutenants Williams, Newcombe and Sub-Lieutenant Reddell, an 
Army officer and Miss Brookman were in a 'Naval Intelligence and Operations' room. 
The cOle Room was occupied by three service intelligence officers, Lieutenant 
Whitmore, Lieutenant Dawson (Army) and Flying Officer Amodeo. A Naval 
Intelligence and 'Y' Room was to be occupied by Sub-Lieutenants Jaynes and Cheyne, 
Lydia Warnock and two 'Y' staff. Across the corridor were Squadron Leader Wright, 
Flying Officer Tyrer, Flying Officer Muir, Flying Officer Wells and Miss Wak~field of 
Air Intelligence. Next door to them were six COIC typists and two orderlies.94 
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At this time in change of direction, as air intelligence headed off wi th its northern focus, 
progress in naval technical intelligence collection gave more precision in the 
identification and location of enemy naval units at sea. The perceived increasing 
effectiveness of the direction-finding stations and the REB station in traffic analysis is 
reflected in an exchange of a series of minutes between senior naval staff officers in mid-
1943. On the subject of the PROTECTION OF TRADE FROM ENEMY 
SUBMARINES AND RAIDERS, the Staff Officer (Operations) recommended that 
certain changes be made to improve the security of shipping at sea. The SO(O) noted 
that as the CNS was to be Commander New Zealand Sea Frontier, responsible for the 
protection of trade in the southern half of the South Pacific Area, it was necessary to have 
a daily assessment of enemy submarine positions and their anticipated movements, if 
possible. The object of this was to re-foute merchant shipping away from submarines. 
Forecasting enemy movements as against direction-finding, sightings or sinkings had 
proved invaluable in preventing sinkings. He proposed that the daily assessment be in the 
form of a chart produced by midday. Co-ordination of intelligence by the submarine 
expert on the DNI's staff, and those from the SS(O) and SO(Y) was necessary.95 The 
DNI commented: 
I suggest that ODe officer only should be made responsible for the production of 
the chart to be given to S.O.O. by noon daily. Propose that this should be 
Lieutenant Cheyne who is already on the job of studying submarines. 
2.- Most Japanese submarine transmissions take place at night and if we can 
arrange rapid D/F and R.E.B. information together with all sightings, attacks, etc. 
to be supplied from Central War Room, I see no reason why we should not be 
able to produce an 0600 submarine situation chart by 1200 daily. 
3.- The above will require the collaboration of S.S.O., S.O.Y. and C.W.R. officers 
in order that full and rapid information from all the available sources can be 
supplied to Lieutenant Cheyne. Propose that he should work in the Naval 
Intelligence Room (236) where there is space available.96 
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REB was radio fingerprinting which was a form of interception and analysis of certain 
aspects of enemy wireless transmissions, and was done in conjunction with high 
frequency direction-finding. Beasley noted that to get the chart completed, all relevant 
information needed to be ready by 0830 hours. The SS(O) agreed that Lieutenant Cheyne 
should be responsible for producing the chart by midday. He went on: 
2.- I think details of the presentation of data should be arranged between D.N.l. 
and S.O.O. so that the responsibilities of Lts.Cheyne and Minshall may be defined 
exactly. Also that S.S.O. should arrange with S.O.O. that when signals are 
promulgated to N.[aval] O.[fficers] 1.[n] C.[harge] and N.[aval] C.[ontrol] 
S.[ ervice] O.[fficers] on certain aspects of the Submarine situation, there is no 
possibility of the secret source of the infonnation (e.g. REB, cryptography) being 
disclosed.97 
A different hand noted the information should be given on the lines of 'an area to be 
avoided. NO information giving the means of obtaining such information will be given.' 
Beasley set out arrangements for the submarine intelligence on 26 May. 
2.- The following information to be supplied to Lt.Cheyne, Room 236, by 
0830 daily:-
(a) By C.W.R. Duty Officer. 
(i) summarised list of [submarine sightings/attacks etc. in the last 24 
hours] ... 
(ii) subsequent information on the above to be supplied by C.W.R. 
[immediately on receiving it up to chart production time] ... 
(b) By D/F Plotting Room. 
(i) Complete summary of information received during the night from D/F 
and R.E.B. etc. 
(ii) Continue as in (a) (ii) above. 
(c) By S.O.(Y) 
All information received from special intelligence concerning submarines 
immediately on receipt. 
(d) By Signal Department. 
Copies of all signals referring to submarine attacks, sightings, etc [given 
promptly to CWR and Room 236] ... during working hours. After working 
hours to C.W.R. only. These for Room 236 to be retained till 0830. 
3.- Permission to be obtained for ZYM messages which may have any connection 
with submarine activities to be shown promptly to Lt.Cheyne. 
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4.- In order to provide a relief for Lt.Cheyne, N.I.(l), Lt.Whitmore and N.I.(20), 
LtJaynes, will understudy him sufficiently to be continuously in the picture and 
produce the chart on Sundays etc. 
5.- Agree with S.O.O. [that information to Naval Control Service Officers should 
be on the lines of an area to be avoided, without specific details - this 
responsibility to be SOO's]. 
6.- Lt.Cheyne to take the chart to S.O.O. daily at noon where it will be retained 
until 0830 of the following day [when it would be given to Room 236 to assist 
with compiling the new chart. Note that the old chart was then to go to the DIP 
plotting room for retention for record purposes about noon ].98 
An annotation by the SO(Y) (Lieutenant H.Philpott) suggested that the third paragraph be 
deleted as it was already covered by 2(c) 'and is undesirable for other reasons'. 
On 1 June, the eNS, Commodore Atwell Lake, sent out a memorandum99 with 
minor but significant alterations to the DNI's missive. The timing for information to get 
to Lt.Cheyne was put back an hour to 0930. All references to REB and ZYM had 
disappeared. The task of SO(Y) was to pass' All information of a secret or special nature 
concerning submarines.' The SO(O) was cautioned that 'The information passed [for the 
routeing of merchant shipping] to be of a general nature, no mention being made of the 
means by which it was received.' 
A memorandum from the SO(O) to the Merchant Shipping Officers (cc.DNI, 
SSO, SO(Y), Cypher Room) on 4 June on the promulgation of submarine intelligence 
asserted that 'With reference to N.A.08/l/18 of 1st June, 1943 (Daily Summary of 
Submarine Intelligence) the Merchant Shipping Department is responsible for 
promulgating to New Zealand fouteing authorities and Naval Operating Base, Auckland 
information received regarding enemy submarines and raiders [affecting the direction of 
ships' course from New Zealand]" and it noted that this was in addition to the Admiralty 
Messages to Ships at Sea. It listed as sources DIP (in New Zealand, Australia and the 
United States), Admiralty AF messages from Australia, War Warning messages from US 
112 
sources, sighting reports and attack reports, and finally '( e) Special intelligence from 
S.O.(Y)'s department, which is generally of forecasted movements. dOO 
The DNI instructed the CWR watchkeepers on 5 June that the CWR Duty Officer 
was to supply Lt.Cheyne of Room 236 at 0900 of all submarine reports since 1200 the 
previous day, plus any further information received between 0900 and 1200 this day. 
This included reports of attacks, Asdic contacts, airborne ASV contacts, sightings from 
ships or shore, or aircraft photo reconnaissance. lOl These reports were to be set out as 
follows: 




6 30 S 
Longitude 
174 20 E 
Nature of Report 






The officers running the daily intelligence briefings and compiling the chart were under 
some pressure from all this. Lieutenant Whitmore on 24 June questioned the desirability 
of continuing with the morning briefing, when a more comprehensive brief could be 
given on Tuesdays and Fridays. Attendance at the daily meetings had dropped off, as 
there was often little or nothing to report. Less frequent meetings meant it was possible to 
summarise operations and movements over a number of days for an improved 
perspective. 102 Latest intelligence received was compounding matters, as a lot of the 
briefing intelligence was received about two hours prior to meetings. This did not allow 
time for analysis, to connect it with earlier events or appreciate the consequences with 
regard to future operations. Narrative Officers did not get an opportunity to get together 
and discuss the significance of the incoming intelligence. It was suggested that 
furthermore, the Daily Summary adequately covered the day-ta-day events. The morning 
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meeting wasted time better spent on analysis, while daily submarine intelligence was 
covered with the chart. 
The DNI noted the issue as worthy of consideration, although 'hot' intelligence 
might be missed, and there would be no opportunity for the Chiefs of Staff to ask 
questions. If offensive operations developed in the New Zealand vicinity the daily 
meeting would have to be held.103 The CNS commented in forthright terms in ink on 26 
June, finnly putting his foot down. 
These meetings are to continue. They are not convened solely to listen to 
narratives; they constitute a reliable opportunity for the Chiefs of Staff, senior 
officers and Attaches to meet daily, maintain personal contact, and discuss 
matters great or small amongst principals.104 
And that was that. There were signs that things were beginning to wind down, however. 
KIWI No.102 of 26 July 1943 noted that the KIWI signals series sent to the RAN and 
British addressees would no longer be daily signals, but would be sent 'as warranted by 
the situation.' 105 By September, there was a perception of the lessening risks of the war 
to New Zealand. As the Deputy CAS noted on 23 September, the service chiefs took the 
view that six months warning of an impending attack could be anticipated, although a 
raider or a submarine must always be expected.106 This was a considerable shift from the 
near panic of early 1942. The Naval Secretary the same day suggested that, 
2.- In view of the present strategical situation and the general trend of t~e 
war in the South Pacific area it is considered that there is no longer any necessIty 
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to keep a permanent watch in the Central War Room. 
He went on to say he was not proposing to do away with the Central War Room, as the 
morning meeting would go on and the daily summaries continued to be produced and 
signals sent. The Chiefs of Staff on 1 October 1943 addressed the Naval Secretary's 
memorandum, confirming the proposal to wind down the permanent watch 
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except during working hours. It is added that after working hours the Merchant 
Shipping Officer will be responsible for dealing with all matters affecting the 
Central War Room. lOS . 
They decided to approve the reduction in watchkeeping, although because of the 
possibility of intrusion by a raider or submarine there should be trained personnel 
available for watchkeeping if needed.109 The DNI noted on 6 October the Chiefs of Staff 
had decided to discontinue night watchkeeping in the Central War Room, and 
watchkeeping hours were now 0800-1700 Monday to Friday, and 0800-1230 Saturday 
and Sunday.ll0 
Intelligence still continued to be promulgated, nonetheless. The contents of KIWI 
signal nO.106 of 12 October 1943111 was representative of these now occasional signals 
bringing British authorities up to date on recent operations in the South Pacific. It noted 
the American build up in the Ellice Islands, the appearance of an aircraft probably from a 
Japanese submarine over Fiji on the night of 8 October, and D/F bearings on 9 October of 
a Japanese submarine 15 deg.30' south 177 deg. 30'east. A US auxiliary had fired on a 
Japanese submarine not far from that position, while days earlier a US LST had sunk 
under tow following an enemy attack off Vella Lavella. Reporting on the progress of 
New Zealand ground forces in the Solomons in late September and early October: 
2 N.Z. patrols landed MUNDI MUNDI and PARASO N. VELLA 
LAVELLA 21/9 contacted enemy. Strength increased to 2 battalions by 22/9 
base established DOVELI COVE 24/9. By 28/9 N.Z.' troops had surrounded 300 
Japs resisting strongly. 
Brigade headquarters heavily bombed a.m. 2/10 but no material damage. 
Troops in contact with J aps with artillery assisting eliminating M/G positions. On 
7/l 0 remainder 500 J aps being attacked from north and south and all resistance 
eliminated by evening 9/10. Party 12 Japs contacted 8/10 N.E. NEW GEORGIA. 
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At this time of improving fortunes in the war, an old problem resurfaced. 
Towards the end of the year, the SO(O) was moved to raise concerns to do with security 
which came within his orbit and that of the DNI. He minuted on 23 November: 
For some weeks past I have noticed a considerable number of persons (officers 
and civilians) in the Merchant Shipping Office. On making enquiries ... .it has 
been apparent ... .in many cases, sufficient grounds did not exist for their entry into 
the room .... 
In view of the fact that the routeing policy and shipping lanes are clearly marked 
on the wall plot and only a few moments perusal can give an intelligent person a 
general idea of the policy at present in force, it is desired to restrict entry into the 
Merchant Shipping Office to a list of named persons only. [sic] 112 
He emphasised that there was no intention to reduce the amount or the time taken to 
distribute legitimate information to other departments, but he asserted that the interests 
of security compelled restriction of admittance to only officers and civilians whose duties 
concerned protection of trade. 113 
The arrival of 1944 brought the demise of the standard short signal of operational 
intelligence used since early 1942. GENSIT no.732 of 22 February 1944 addressed to the 
New Zealand Naval Liaison Officer, Suva was the last to be issued. After the summary 
of operational intelligence on air and naval operations in the Bismarcks and around New 
Guinea, it noted 
Unless you particularly require GENSIT it is proposed to discontinue regular 
transmission and substitute occasional signals when news of N.Z. interest occurs. 
Presume you are fully informed by U.S. authorities on S. and S.W.PACIFIC 
matters. Request your comments. 114 
The Naval Liaison Officer, Suva agreed, noting that the US authorities 'also agree with 
d'· fl·' ,115 lscontmuance 0 regu ar transmISSIons. 
The new year also saw Beasley step down as DNI, being replaced by Lieutenant-
Commander H.S. Barker, who had been his understudy for some time. Beasley was only 
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on a two year appointment and apparently a smooth transition was arranged. 116 There was 
a further reminder of times that should have been long past. It had taken a lot of effort to 
get a combined intelligence organisation in the form of a COlC and a central war room. 
On 29 May 1944 the Commissioner of Works had asked the Minister of Defence if the 
'Secret War Room' on the 2nd Floor of the Stout Street building was still required. 
G.R.Laking, now Assistant Secretary to the War Cabinet, passed this query on to the 
Chiefs of Staff on 8 June. The CGS replied the next day that he had no objection to 
closing the Central War Room, but noted that the other two services might take a 
different position. It was perhaps a not surprising short-sighted stance by the Army. The 
same day the CAS firmly asserted the Central War Room should be retained until the end 
of the war with Japan. The Naval Secretary sent a sharp response on 10 June, making a 
number of points. 
No space in this building can be spared by the Navy where 
accommodation is already heavily taxed. The War Room has recently been 
reduced to a somewhat inconvenient size to make additional room for the 
Communications Branch who urgently needed it. 
The Central War Room is necessary because it is the only place where 
maps, etc. may be conveniently displayed for the information of staff officers. All 
intelligence received by the three services is made available in the War Room, 
which is used as the daily meeting place for staff officers of the three services. 
From a security viewpoint, it would be extremely ill-advised to turn the 
War Room over to a civilian department. Thin walls separate it from the Naval 
signals office which is engaged in handling a large volume of the most highly 
secret material, and from the Merchant Shipping Office, which handles material 
no less important. 117 
He went on to say that both naval intelligence and air force intelligence and operations 
rooms were actually overcrowded. He noted the Navy had already withdrawn from 
another building in Wellington to make space for 'other purposes', and observed that the 
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Naval Board were surprised and concerned that the existence and location of the Central 
War Room was so widely known. U8 
The diminution of the COIC's intelligence function continued. On 7 August 1944 
it was noted that the COIC Daily Summary was no longer to be sent to the High 
Commissioner in Canberra, as they now had access to Allied 'West Pacific 
Communiques' and the' ... South Pacific Area has become operationally inactive ... ' 119 
On 28 September 1944, COIC Daily Summary nO.l007 was issued, containing eleven 
items of operational intelligence.12o Each of these was headed, as usual, with a 
geographical location, all dealing with Allied operations, mostly air attacks in the 
Solomons, Bismarck Archipalego and New Guinea. It was distributed to twelve 
recipients, all located within New Zealand. Attached to the Summary was a note 
indicating 
This will be the last issue of the c.o.I.e. Daily Summary. A digest of the 
operational information contained in the Daily Summary will be found in a 
Weekly summary which will replace it. 121 
Similarly, the weekly COIC Intelligence Summary nO.102 for 15 September was the last 
issue of this COIC product. 122 There were more changes. Lieutenant-Commander 
Brackenridge stood in for Barker as DNI when the latter became ill in September. Barker 
was discharged in early 1945. 123 The intelligence organisation still continued to function, 
although Air Intelligence had become a separate department outside the COIC. 
In October-November 1944 the COIC proper had been reduced once more to a 
naval intelligence body. This is reflected in the production of intelligence summaries. 
On 5 October 1944, the first of a series entitled 'Weekly Intelligence Summary' was 
produced by the vestigial intelligence body. These Weekly Intelligence Summaries ran 
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from October through to no.13 on 28 December 1944. The New Year opened with the 
next issue, no.14 on 4 January 1945, and the Weekly Intelligence Summaries then 
continued to run on through to August 1945.124 The Weekly Intelligence Summaries 
contained a mixture of operational and background intelligence. Thus, Part I of no.14 
contained eleven sections of varying length.125 The first three of these outlined the state 
and location of all RNZN vessels, while items four to six described operations around 
Mindoro, in the Bismarcks and Solomons, and the bombardment of Iwo Jima. Under 
'JAPANESE SHIPPING', there was another description of enemy activity in East Asian 
waters followed by a table that set out the particulars of reported sightings of enemy 
vessels off the Philippines, Iwo lima, in the South China Sea and the Dutch East Indies. 
This was quite detailed and mainly concerned small enemy vessels, from destroyers and 
patrol craft down as far as luggers and barges. The last item drew attention to a previous 
report (no.13 of 28 December 1944) of an enemy submarine's sinking of the US Liberty 
ship the Robert 1. Walker south of Jervis Bay on Christmas Day. Subsequent reports in 
January and February provided a similar spread of intelligence on the RNZN's naval 
units, and operations in East Asian waters. 126 Weekly Intelligence Summary no.21 of 21 
February 1945 had a small report which probably went almost unnoticed. It read: 
On the 6th February [the] United States Liberty Ship "Peter Silvester" 
(7,176 tons) bound from Melbourne to Calcutta was torpedoed 800 miles west of 
Fremantle. Reports say that survivors were picked Up.12 
There was a connection between the sinkings of the Robert 1. Walker in December and 
the Peter Silverster in February: that they were both sunk by the same submarine on the 
same patrol was perhaps unremarkable. That the submarine was the German U-Boat U-
862, and that in the intervening month she had circumnavigated New Zealand unnoticed, 
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was intriguing. That this would remain relatively unknown for decades after the war said 
something else: had there been a failure of intelligence? Weekly Intelligence Summary 
no.22 of 28 February128 gave an item not unconnected, as it turned out much later, with 
U-862. A two page section entitled 'GERMAN SUBMARINES IN SOUTH WEST 
PACIFIC' dealt with the sinking of U-168 in the Dutch East Indies by the Dutch 
submarine Zwaardvisch on 6 October 1944 and intelligence gleaned from the survivors. 
This included Japanese-German operational arrangements, technical innovations (the 
Schnorkel and the Submarine Bubble Target), the poor engine oil supplied by the 
Japanese, relations between Germans and Japanese, and operational procedure in the Far 
East. We will return to this last later, but suffice it to say that U-168 had inadvertently 
been the victim of a lapse in one of those aspects of operational procedure. It was also 
noted that the fleet submarine USS Flounder had also ambushed and sunk another U-
Boat on 10 November 1944 as it was about to pass through the Lombok Straits, heading 
south. This was not identified in the Summary, but was in fact U-537, also heading out 
on an Indian Ocean patrol. 129 
The Weekly Intelligence Summaries were naval intelligence summaries. They 
covered much the same range as their predecessors, although the detail of air operations 
of the latter COIC Daily Summaries now dropped out of the picture. The air intelligence 
organisation produced their own summaries. 
The naval intelligence organisation was headed by the DNI, with a small number 
of personnel under him (not counting the 'Y' Room staff and the Merchant Shipping 
Office). A lieutenant with a civilian assistant looked after Enemy Intelligence; what was 
termed 'Own Intelligence' was under a Lieutenant with a Wren assistant. Historical 
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Archives and Publicity was taken care of by a civilian historian, S.D. Waters, and 
Security Intelligence came under a lieutenant. In addition there were two typists and one 
Able Seaman messenger. 130 As the war had receded from New Zealand, all that was 
required from the organisation was to keep the service chiefs informed of the world 
situation and update the Admiralty publications on the Pacific islands. I3 } 
The COlC had shrunk back towards its shadowy beginnings. Under the 
circumstances, there was an irony in this situation. From 1940 to 1945, not a year passed 
without at least one enemy naval unit intruding within New Zealand's three-mile limit. 
Moreover, none of these vessels were in any danger while doing so, other than 
inadvertently running aground. It is paradoxical that having been surprised in 1940 by 
the Orion off Auckland, the precipitate reduction of operational intelligence capability in 
1944 coincided with the only visit by a German U-boat to the New Zealand coast. That 
U-862 should come here in January 1945 on a voyage exploring the potential for waging 
an undersea war in Australasian waters is interesting. Even this late in the war the 
Germans were prepared to explore new possibilities in the Antipodes. Korvetten-Kapitan 
Timme specially requested to do so because of his experience as a merchant captain in 
13") 
these waters. -
In March 1945 Brackenridge once more took up a naval intelligence liaison post, 
this time as British liaison officer to CINCPAC. His replacement was another long-
serving member of the COIC. Robert Cheyne had joined as a Sub-Lieutenant 
watchkeeper in the early days. As Lieutenant-Commander Cheyne he was to be the last 
DNI for the war, and remained long into the postwar period. 133 By June 1945 the COIC 
and the CWR had been run down to a small establishment, although provision remained 
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for expansion once more should the need arise. The COlC , the CWR and the MSO 
occupied a series of eight offices with a total staff of up to twenty-six personnel, not 
counting the Teleprinter Room, Coding Office or the Cypher Room. The DNI, Lieutenant 
Commander Cheyne, occupied Room 238 with one civilian assistant; Rooms 234,236, 
237 were occupied by Naval Intelligence with up to eight naval personnel, and Room 
233, the DIP Plotting Room, had two personnel (with up to nine in emergencies). Rooms 
239-240 now constituted the CWR, staffed by eight Air Force personnel (and could 
expand to twelve). The Teleprinter, Cypher, Coding Rooms and the Signals Distribution 
Office lay between the CWR and Room 245, the Merchant Shipping Office. The MSO 
had a staff of six (which could expand up to thirteen).134 It was left to Lieutenant-
Commander Cheyne to record the final extinguishing of the wartime operation, on 28 
August 1945. 
The Chiefs of Naval and Air Staffs have instructed that the Wednesday 
morning talk in the Central War Room is to be discontinued forthwith.135 
And that was the end of it. The British officer who came to look after 'Y' intelligence in 
1946 was surprised at what he found when he arrived. There was virtually nothing 
left. U6 
If the emergence of a combined intelligence organisation was the most significant 
New Zealand intelligence initiative during the war, its late materialisation and early 
decline is a commentary on the priority accorded it. It has been clearly demonstrated that 
naval intelligence played the central role in the development of a combined intelligence 
organisation in New Zealand. Yet even within the Navy, the job of the naval intelligence 
officer, the Staff Officer(Operations & Intelligence), was overloaded. It was not until the 
naval intelligence officer no longer had operations duties and Beasley was appointed as 
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Staff Officer(Intelligence), and subsequently Director of Naval Intelligence, that the 
combined intelligence organisation had a chance of functioning properly. 
The matter of changing personnel at the top of naval intelligence and combined 
intelligence throughout the war weakened the ClB and the COlC. The departures and 
complications of the roles of Ellis, St.Aubyn, Nicholson and Hannay disrupted movement 
in the direction of an effective combined intelligence body. Beasley, it is true, marked 
the period of stability from July 1941 to 1944, the time during which the COlC was most 
useful. Although Beasley's replacements had been in the corc - first Barker, then 
Brackenridge in September 1944, and Cheyne in March 1945 - they presided over an 
essentially truncated intelligence organisation. 
The slow evolution towards some form of combined intelligence organisation 
begun well before the outbreak of hostilities was a considerable impediment to 
effectiveness. Even the shattering of comfortable illusions of security, courtesy of the 
German Navy in June 1940, did little to stimulate developments, other than to convene 
yet another of the interminable committees on intelligence. The Combined Intelligence 
Bureau could not be effective with too few resources, too few staff and too many tasks. 
It was an entirely unsatisfactory temporary arrangement. Necessary reforms were delayed 
far too long, stretching out over eight months from late April to December 1941. The 
war with Japan compounded matters, even if it provided an urgent spur to get the COlC 
sorted out. Delays in properly establishing the process for the production of useful 
intelligence summaries may have been understandable, but not excusable.The ambivalent 
role of the Police Department, their internal security focus and the hampering of the CIB 
should not be forgotten. It was not until the police seized control of the new security 
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service In early 1943 that the attitude of the Police Commissioner ceased to be a 
problematical factor. 
The sudden albeit expected expansion of the war brought matters to a head and 
caught the combined intelligence organisation changing horses mid-stream. For the War 
Cabinet and the service chiefs, partially blind in terms of their own intelligence resources, 
the problem was compounded by the deteriorating operational circumstances to the north. 
It was only the Allied intelligence connections with Britain and Australia that prevented 
complete blackout, assisted by local proficiency in technical intelligence collection. It 
was the operational effectiveness of these connections, which included the development 
of the 'Y' Room's role, that gave useful insights as to the whereabouts of the enemy's 
main naval forces in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The entry of the United States into 
the war greatly assisted in transforming this adverse situation. 
The emergence of the Combined Operational Intelligence Centre was the high 
point of the combined intelligence initiative. The functions of intelligence and security 
became properly separated, John Prados has described the Royal Navy's celebrated 
Operational Intelligence Centre as 
a place where data regarding friendly and enemy forces could be pooled and put 
in focus for commanders to make operational decisions ... ,a fusion of 
information .... combining inputs from all the many sources available, and 
displaying the result to those making the decisions. 
The Royal Navy called its concrete application of this fusion concept an 
, I . II' t ['] 137 operatIona lnte 1gence cen er SIC .... 
This was what lay behind the concept of the Combined Operational Intelligence Centre. 
How far the New Zealand COIC made progress in the direction of fusion is something of 
a moot point. New Zealand's Chiefs of Staff seldom had to face situations where 
immediate action was required. In 1940 and 1941 with German raiders operating with 
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impunity in New Zealand waters, the CNS recognised he lacked the kind of combined 
organisation necessary to prosecute defensive maritime operations, which was what led to 
the appointment of a DNI and the establishment of a COIC. Even once this occurred, the 
relative fragility of resources and sources of intelligence in relation to geographical 
realities, presented an extremely fonnidable task. 
The establishment of the daily briefing sessions in the Central War Room, the 
institution of the COIC Daily Summary of intelligence and the weekly COIC Intelligence 
Summary, the GENS IT signals and later the KIWI signals marked the apex of the useful 
production of operational intelligence by the COIC. That four lengthy weekly 
Intelligence Summaries would get lost in the mail, to put it mildly, with the potential to 
cause more damage than they did, was an unfortunate accident that remained an isolated 
aberration. The production of the fortnightly General Intelligence Summary ameliorated 
to some extent the demand for access to information by parties who had no business 
perusing operational intelligence, like the Police Commissioner. 
The 'Y' Room, while an integral part of the COIC, had proceeded in its 
operational development from 1940, and provided a flow of useful operational 
intelligence in and out of New Zealand throughout the difficult period of transition from 
the CIB to the new COIC. Its contribution to the production of intelligence by the COIC 
was vital. 
It was the co-ordination of operational intelligence from a wide variety of sources, 
both local and external, that was most important. The operational intelligence provided 
to the War Cabinet and the Chiefs of Staff gave quite a comprehensive 'handle' on the 
South Pacific situation, from the low point in 1942, past the critical turning of the tide in 
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1943, through 1944 when an ultimate Allied victory became increasingly apparent. 
There were certain limitations: the relative immunity of enemy naval units in New 
Zealand waters was both a problem and a warning, and it is somewhat sobering to note 
that no enemy surface raider or submarine suffered any inconvenience whatsoever' 
operating this far south. 
The steady movement of the war northwards, the decline of urgency, and the 
increasing difficulties in remote intelligence collection, led to a perceived decline of the 
requirement for operational intelligence products like the COIC Daily Summaries, 
KIWIS, the GENSITS, and the weekly COIC Intelligence Summaries. The wind-down 
in September 1944 was understandable, although rather precipitate (given the experience 
of 1940), as running down the COIC entailed a lowering of intelligence capability. 
Maritime intelligence had been demonstrated to be of prime importance to a tiny state 
isolated in ocean wastes far larger than the North Atlantic. 
Behind the co-ordination of the collection and analysis of intelligence lay, as has 
been said already, the sources of intelligence. The next five chapters consider those 
sources as they related to New Zealand's combined intelligence effort, which were 
centred on the problem of obtaining timely information on the location of the enemy, 
through listening to him and watching for him. 
Part II 
The War in the Ether 
Chapter Five 
The Heart of the Matter: 
'V' and H/F Direction-Finding 
New Zealand's contribution to the signals intelligence war, the 'war in the ether' 
is considered in these three chapters of Part II. Chapter Five deals with the New Zealand 
naval 'Y' organisation, a Special Intelligence sub-section, and the development of the 
high frequency direction-finding (HIF DIF) stations at Awarua, Musick Point, 
Waipapakauri and Suva. Chapter Six details the interesting role of the REB station near 
Blenheim. Chapter Seven covers the small but significant interception operation 
conducted by the Army'Y' section at Nairnville Park. Although the interception of 
signals for intelligence purposes occurred long before 1937 to well beyond 1945, the 
peak of this activity in wartime New Zealand began in late 1941 and extended through to 
at least the middle of 1944. This period coincided to a large extent with what was the 
most productive period for the Combined Operational Intelligence Centre. 
The RNZAF did not get involved directly with the war in the ether; their 
burgeoning intelligence effort late in the war was primarily directed towards offensive 
operational intelligence in the Solomons. The naval and army 'Y'interception of enemy 
communications were separate but symbiotic, in the provision of intelligence to the 
Combined Operational Intelligence Centre, and the interception of military and 
diplomatic traffic. 
The two personalities at the centre of New Zealand 'Y' activity for the Navy and 
the Army were obscure junior officers. Both began the conflict at non-commissioned 
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officer level, were commissioned but remained low-ranking practitioners of their arcane 
art. They were both very different men from different backgrounds, but both served their 
country well in the back room world of wartime signals intelligence. 
The most important aspect of the intelligence war was the interception of enemy 
radio and cable communications, and the use that could be made of intercepted traffic. 
This communications intelligence conflict had been going since the inception of the use 
of cable and radio for communications. British success with the Admiralty's Room 40 
OB in the First World War pointed the way of the future in interception. After 1918, the 
efforts to obtain advantage by this means continued, although at less of a pace. The 
importance of reading other government's communications cannot be underestimated, for 
it promised an ongoing and convenient supply of information on intentions, decisions, 
operations, strengths, weaknesses and background. Accurate or not, it was an insight into 
what governments or military formations thought about themselves. It is understandable 
that the higher reaches of this form of intelligence were highly secret. The British term 
for the higher end of interception was Special Intelligence, which is often accepted as 
referring to Ultra during the Second World War. However, the term Special Intelligence 
was used at least as early as 1926, long before German Enigma figured in signals 
intelligence. 
One of the main difficul ties of the war at sea was the location and identification of 
enemy naval units, surface or sub-surface, in expanses of ocean often beyond the range of 
land based aerial reconnaissance. This was potentially a pressing problem for New 
Zealand, given the realities of its geographical location and the need for merchantmen 
and troopships to have safe passage to and from local ports. The only advantage was the 
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huge expanses of empty ocean, which made lone vessels difficult to find. The ability to 
locate and identify enemy warships at long range assisted the husbanding of scarce 
maritime defence resources (which in New Zealand's case were extremely slight, 
amounting effectively to two cruisers and a small number of aircraft), to be used where 
they might be effective. As the perceived level of threat from direct invasion rose and 
receded, the prospect of the enemy conducting a protracted guerre de course remained a 
durable menace. Perceptions to do with the magnitude of that menace varied over the 
course of the war. When Allied naval and airborne assets could not be used for one 
reason or other in the protection of distant trade (a basic problem dictated by both 
geography and resources in Australasian waters), the re-direction of merchant shipping 
away from located enemy units aided in frustrating enemy intentions. The derivative 
applications of certain methods of wireless interception showed promise to be used in this 
way. Interception of enemy communications however, was not just about the security of 
shipping. There were advantages in the greater Allied interest in other areas, including 
diplomatic traffic, for instance. 
The wireless war in New Zealand centred on the 'Y' organisation, and the high 
frequency direction-finding stations (H/F D/F) provided the most useful local means to 
gather location and identification intelligence, to begin with. They depended, however, 
on the interception of enemy radio traffic, and so if enemy units kept wireless silence or 
only transmitted occasionally or very briefly, their immunity in terms of position and 
identity could be preserved. One case in particular when wireless silence was kept 
clearly illustrates the point and the problems posed as late as 1945: the cruise of U.862. 
The high frequency direction-finding stations (H/F D/F), the REB station, and the Army's 
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'Y' section were to function as small components of a huge multi-faceted Allied effort in 
the collection of signals intelligence about the Axis powers. They represented the 
pinnacle of New Zealand signals interception and intelligence collection during the 
Second World War. This high technology effort was supplemented by coastwatching, 
aerial reconnaissance, the sightings from vessels at sea, and last but by no means least the 
exchange of intelligence with British, Australian, Canadian and American intelligence 
authorities. The New Zealand interception effort facilitated entree as a minor participant 
in the Allied signals intelligence offensive. 
A couple of terms stand in need of further general explanation. DfF and W rr 
intelligence and 'Y' crop up in any discourse on the signals intelligence war, although 
definitions are rather flexible. The British Official History on intelligence's definition of 
direction-finding or DfF is straightforward enough. 
A direction-finding station took a bearing on a transmission, and the 
intersection of the bearings from two or more stations - usually at least three were 
needed - indicated the whereabouts of the transmitter. 1 
This was the famous 'cocked hat' in which the triangle formed by the three bearings 
suggested (if they were accurate) that the location of the vessel was in the centre of the 
triangle. The triangle could be very large, of course, but the general location of a vessel 
might be thus established. This was useful if the vessel was to be intercepted by 
warships, or avoided by convoys or single merchantmen. 
On 'Y' intelligence, the British Official History notes: 
Before wireless messages could be decyphered they had to be intercepted 
(the process which came to be called Y). As well as providing material for 
cryptanalysis, their place of origin could be discovered by means of direction-
finding (DF) and they could be studied (by the process which came to be called 
Traffic Analysis) as the product of communications networks whose behaviour, 
procedures and techniques could yield further information. In the event of their 
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being decyphered, finally, their contents still called for interpretation by 
specialists if their significance was to be fully and accurately assessed; and the 
immediate or operational interpretation of individual messages might well depend 
on long-range research based on the analysis of many. 
It was not until the middle of the Second World War that a standard 
terminology was laid down for these activities.2 
There is, however, a certain flexibility about 'Y' matters. In a footnote, the 
British Official History explains that the above terminology is that as standardised in 
October 1943. It observed that while the 'Y' Service stood for the interception of signals, 
including the operation of direction-finding, and Traffic Analysis for the study of 
communication networks and of signals procedures, callsigns, low-grade codes and plain 
language, together with direction-finding and 'other technical aids' (like radio 
fingerprinting, for instance), 
Until 1943 these terms were used in different ways and others also existed, 
leading to much confusion. Thus for TA [Traffic Analysis] itself other tenns 
existed like W rr Intelligence, W rr Operational Intelligence, Wireless Network 
Research and even Operational Intelligence. Y, again, sometimes meant only 
interception and sometimes interception and Traffic Analysis and also came to 
cover the breaking and exploitation of low-grade signals in the field? 
Yet some light can still be shed by the earlier usage, as the declassified 'Notes on the 
History of Operational Intelligence Centre in Canada', illustrates: 
Operational Intelligence is based mainly on W rr Intelligence (known as 
W rr Procedure "Y") in all its phases. It is, of course, essential that this work be 
carried out in close conjunction with a Direction Finding organization. 
W rr Intelligence (as distinct from D/F) is a complicated problem to which 
a safe and satisfactory solution can only be obtained by laborious collection and 
analysis of data. The object of the analysis is to obtain identification of ships 
through their call signs, and an idea of their movements and operations from a 
study of the nature and volume of their W rr signals. Much has been learned in 
the past but there is very much more to learn of the art of extracting intelligence 
of operational value from wireless signals. 
"Y" work including H/F D/F remains the province of the highly trained 
and intelligent operator and its application, as a source of information, that of the 
skilled investigator and the painstaking and cautious intelligence officer. 
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Since its very inception, about 1918, "Y" work has been a bastard child 
whose ownership has been claimed by various great Departments at the 
Admiralty ... 
There are no textbooks on wrr procedure "Y". Throughout its history it 
has been considered as "Most Secret" and the majority of officers who have been 
exposed to this work have been trained either at Scarborough or Flowerdown and 
the Admiralty. In its early stage Signal Officers with a knowledge of Foreign 
Languages were chosen ... .In peacetime the number of fully trained "Y" Officers 
was limited. At the Admiralty a very small group of these Officers formed 
Section 9 in the Naval Intelligence Division, and the Technical side of "Y", i.e. 
D/F, "Y" Stations, etc., also Section 9 in Signal Division [sic].4 
In Britain, the 'Y' Service was an inter-service organisation with central control 
in the hands of a 'Y' Board, a 'Y' Committee and 'Y' Technical sub-committee. The 'Y' 
Board was made up of the Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service (CSS or 'C'), the Head 
of the Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS, later called Government Code 
Headquarters or GCHQ) and the Chairman of the 'Y' Committee. The 'Y' Committee 
was to co-ordinate wrr intelligence and direction-finding bearings and concealed 
messages in plain language traffic. There were five organisations with 'Y' interests: the 
Admiralty, the War Office, the Air Ministry, the Foreign Office and the Radio Security 
Service. The Foreign Office intercepted commercial and diplomatic messages.s 
'Y', or W rr procedure, was the interception of enemy signals traffic for the 
purpose of recording it and/or reading it (which if in code, or cipher, or a mixture of both 
required cryptanalysis), to understand the meaning of the messages, the identity of the 
originator, and to whom it was directed. The intention was to provide cryptographers 
with material as fast as possible.6 It went increasingly hand-in-hand with high frequency 
direction-finding, which functioned to take bearings of signals of other than 
cryptographic value. 
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A code can be defined as a system for concealing the meaning of a message by 
replacing each word or phrase in the original with another character or set of characters. 
A cipher is any general system for hiding the meaning of a message by replacing each 
letter in the original message with another letter, and should have some built-in alterable 
flexibility, known as the key. 7 
For the moment, it is useful to tum to the more straightforward matter of the 
development of New Zealand signals interception in the First World War and the 
continuing refinements in direction-finding and interception in the 'twenties and 'thirties. 
These direct connections with the past had a bearing on the establishment of the small 
wartime New Zealand naval 'Y' organisation in 1940. 
The interception of enemy wireless signals had been around for a considerable 
period in New Zealand. With the outbreak of the First World War, Commander Newton, 
the first Naval Intelligence Officer in Wellington, reported on 6 August 1914 that 
'Wireless Telegrams' in German and Dutch had been intercepted and 'are now being 
translated,.8 Apart from the elimination of the German Telefunken station in Samoa with 
New Zealand's occupation of Samoa, it was the movements of the powerful German 
cruiser squadron in the Far East in 1914 that caused the most concern and lent a degree of 
urgency to signals interception. Admiral Graf von Spee's East Asiatic Squadron's ability 
to range across the Pacific was particularly significant as troop convoys outward bound 
from both Australia and New Zealand might be vulnerable to attack.9 Between August 
and December 1914, interception of German signal traffic in the Antipodes attempted to 
keep abreast of von Spee's movements. It was assisted by the exchange of intelligence 
between British Empire posts in Ottawa or Esquimalt, Hong Kong, Melbourne and 
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Wellington. There was an early form of radio-fingerprinting, that is an attempt at 
recognition of the transmitter and/or the 'hand' of the operator. It was noted, for example, 
that the Scharnhorst had a thin Telefunken spark, with a double tone at times, while the 
operator sent each letter quickly but with greater spaces between letters than usual. lO 
Telegrams exchanged between the Naval Intelligence Officer in Wellington and the naval 
intelligence authorities in Melbourne in early October recorded the interception of the 
signals traffic from Von Spee's warships. For example, on 5 October, the Naval 
Intelligence Officer sent the following: 
Wellington radio [ sic] intercepted at 8.8. p.m., Sunday messages sent by 
DASV to DAFO --- strength 2, cipher, eight words. 
This is apparently same signal as heard by Suva. 
Awarua reports thirty-six minutes after midnight on Sunday high double -
toned telefunken sending separate letters/, numbers of times, strength two. 
In regard to this Wellington Radio states they are fairly certain it is 
"Scharnhorst's" note. 1 I 
Melbourne replied to this and other signals, at 0120 hours on 6 October: 
Urgent your 1825 call sign is "SCHARNHORST" to "DRESDEN". 
Please telegraph message and have careful watch kept to-night. 
Message heard by SUVA translated (Begin) 
"SCHARNHORST" on the way from MARQUESAS to EASTER ISLs. 
[sic] Waihu present position. (Ends)I2 
The RAN had captured the German Handelsverkehrsbuch (BVB) code used by the 
Admiralstab (German Admiralty) early in the war, along with its current key settings, so 
Melbourne was able to read the intercepts of Von Spee's signals. 13 
In May 1916 the P&T Department assessed the effectiveness of the New Zealand 
radio stations' interception work as follows. Awarua, near Invercargill, was able to 
maintain an almost continuous watch. Awanui, near Kaitaia, listened to enemy signals for 
a considerable period. Apia could have a fair amount of time for interception. 
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Wellington listened for the enemy continuously, but was not as important as Awarua or 
Awanui as the range of its equipment was not as good. The Chatham Islands kept a close 
watch for enemy signals over a wide area.14 Interception work was detailed, demanding 
close attention, as these instructions for Apia illustrate. 
In view of rumour of presence of Gennan raider in the Pacific a continuous watch 
should be kept at Apia for suspicious wireless signals: enemy signals possibly not 
in code but en clair in the fonn of messages between neutral stations. Record all 
work oveheard and carefully scrutinize for hidden meaning. Communicate 
suspicious messages with particulars as to call signs wave lengths and any other 
infonnation likely to be useful, to "Naval" Wellington who will report to me. I5 
The Naval Intelligence Officer in Wellington, Paymaster W.J.A. Brown, analysed 
incoming signals, and interesting ones were immediately sent to Melbourne. Intelligence 
was circulated to the Admiralty, the ACNB, the C.-in-C. China Station, the Director of 
the Naval Service in Canada and the Intelligence Officer in Montevideo. I6 This exchange 
was Pacific-wide co-operation, a feature to be repeated on a grander scale between 1939-
1 945. The operational connection between the Admiralty Intelligence Centre in 
Wellington and the P&T Department radio stations in Wellington, Awarua, Awanui, the 
Chathams and Apia also signified an internal pattern of co-operation. The passage of just 
two decades between the world wars also meant that junior personnel in the P&T 
Department stations in 1914-1918 were likely to be senior staff in 1939, with the 
advantage of previous (or even continuing) experience in interception work. 
The linkage between the Navy and the civilian shore radio stations continued in 
the 1920s. A memorandum to the Admiralty on 12 April 1924 gave details of radio 
equipment at Awanui, Awarua and Apia with a view to seeking advice on 
modernisation. 17 The Admiralty's reply advised the use of 'valve apparatus' for naval 
needs, observing this would be valuable for direct work with HM warships or 
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merchantmen, or for extending the interception area covered by Singapore, Rabaul and 
Darwin. 18 
Internally in New Zealand a continuing liaison between the Navy and civilian 
departments can be discerned with the Marine Department D/F station at Cape Maria Van 
Dieman. The SO(l) in Wellington requested details of this station in August 1926 from 
the Marine Department, and a direction-finding exercise was carried out with the station 
using HMS Diomede in July 1929.19 A routine letter in 1935 from the Naval Secretary to 
the Secretary, the Marine Department, which had jurisdiction over lighthouses, noted the 
lighthouse keepers at Puysegur Point were to send radio DIP signals to H.M. ships on 
request being made through Awarua Radio.2o 
The second half of the 1930s saw increasing requirements from the Admiralty for 
D/F stations. On 4 August 1936, the Admiralty communicated to Wellington that they 
were considering the requirements for more shore direction-finding stations working on 
the commercial wave located near focal areas of sea trade. These stations were to obtain 
bearings of distress messages, etc. from ships under attack from enemy naval units or 
aircraft, and also take bearings on enemy radio transmissions jamming distress reports. 
These wartime duties could be carried out by existing commercial D/F stations.21 The 
Admiralty listed a number of existing stations in the Empire: StJohns in Newfoundland, 
Bermuda, Malin Head, Demarara, Bombay, Calcutta and Karachi. The Royal Navy was 
investigating the possibilities of additional D/F stations in wartime, and while equipment 
need not be purchased in peace, useful work on site selection could be carried out. It was 
suggested that Auckland and Wellington were suitable places.22 
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Appended to this request were 'Site Qualifications' for D/F stations. 23 Noting 
there should be preferably landline or wrr communications from the D/F site to a 'Naval 
Centre', it suggested that good accommodation for personnel was necessary. Local power 
supply was important, and could only be substituted by petrol generators. The DfF 
station should be easy to protect against sabotage and attack. As to the equipment, 
The D/F sets to be used would employ rotating frame coils with pedestal 
mountings. The weight of the frame aerial is about 125 lbs. To install the D/F set 
in a room in an existing building it is very desirable that the room should have a 
flat roof on which to mount the Pedestal. Since the wheel for operating the 
rotating coil is normally fitted about 3ft. to 4ft. below the base of the Pedestal, for 
convenient operating the roof of the building should not be too high. The 
minimum dimensions of the D/F room are approximately 6 ft. by 6 ft. If however 
a flat roofed building is not available it would be possible to support the coil on a 
Pedestal inside the room provided that a height of 15 ft. was available. The DfF 
building must be non-metallic, e.g. brick or wood ... 24 
As to DfF requirements, the following criteria needed to be met: 
2. Local conditions. The centre of a large horizontal field is the ideal to 
be aimed at, no buildings other than that housing the set, masts, aerials; or 
overhead telegraph wires within 100 yards. 
3. General Geographical considerations. Experience shows that the path 
of the wave in travelling from transmitter to D/F station is liable to be deflected 
under the following circumstances:-
(a) D/F station on the coast, particularly when the coast line is rocky. [ sic] The 
D/F station should therefore be situated not less than one mile inland. 
(b) Where the wave passes over mountainous country. Low lying, flat land is 
therefore generally to be preferred. 
4. For a station which is expected to operate on all bearings, a general 
symmetry both local and geographical is desirable, but where, as is more 
frequently the case, the station is expected to work chiefly in certain arcs, it is 
important that the path of the wave in these arcs should be chiefly over sea at an 
angle of not less than 20 degrees to the general directions of the coastline, and be 
undeflected by large mountains or valleys?S 
The Naval Secretary in Wellington asked the P&T Department about site 
suitability, and the Department responded on 16 October, setting out the New Zealand 
potential, and noting that New Zealand was a difficult country for direction-finding. 
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In many cases the most desirable geographical position will not be suitable 
on account of the entire absence of flat sites, while in other cases, such as the 
North Auckland peninsula, severe coastal refraction must be anticipated unless 
more than one station is established in a particular area . 
. ... inosfar as trade routes to the north of New Zealand are important, the 
Admiralty should bear in mind the advantages in war of providing for a direction-
finding station on the North Auckland peninsula, rerhaps in the vicinity of 
Kaitaia, where suitable land is known to be available.2 
Awanui had been near Kaitaia. There would be no difficulty in locating a site in 
Auckland, possibly in Mangere or Papatoetoe, although there were limitations imposed 
by the peninsula to the north. Palmerston North had a good choice of sites, while north 
Taranaki and Hawke's Bay might be appropriate for 'auxiliary stations'. Observing that 
the Admiralty had not mentioned the South Island, it was pointed out 
added: 
.... there are certain advantages in having bearings available from 
comparatively remotely situated stations, and with a site so ideal for the purpose 
as Awarua, it is considered that the installation of equipment in a special hut on 
this Department's radio station site would be fully warranted as an adjunct to the 
position-finding service for the Tasman Sea?7 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, and not unconnected with Awarua, the memorandum 
Fortunately, the establishment of directional receiving equipment in 
connection with the Government's policy in providing radio aids for civil 
aviation, will result in information becoming available during the course of the 
next few years as to the accuracy which can be expected from the direction-
finding equipment .... 
Within two years, the usefulness of this would be borne out. High-frequency direction 
finding equipment was installed first at Awarua and later in 1939 at Musick Point in 
Auckland, to monitor the TEAL flying-boat flights crossing the Tasman Sea. The 
Awarua H/F D/F facility would demonstrate its usefulness to the Admiralty and the Navy 
in New Zealand in 1938. 
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Awarua Radio (callsign ZLB) was the oldest of the operational stations. Awarua 
had originally and ironically been built by the German Telefunken Company in 1913, 
along with the station at Awanui and the station in Apia. The head of Awarua in the late 
'thirties was Superintendent A.W. 'Hec' Head, who been at Awanui in the First World 
War. Awarua Radio carried out a number of other functions apart from high frequency 
direction-finding. These roles included the receipt of British Official Wireless messages, 
maintaining a Distress Watch on 500 Kc/s, a Small Ships Watch on 2162/2182 Kc/s and a 
loudspeaker watch to Campbell Island and the Auckland Islands on 5965 Kc/s (which 
was also an emergency frequency for Jacksons Bay and Milford Sound), and weather 
reporting to the Weather Office in Wellington (locally and from other stations like 
Puyseguer Point (ZMU), Milford Sound (ZMV) and Jacksons Bay (ZLQ) ).28 
Awarua's work as a marine radio station was important, but its most significant 
role for the Navy Office centred on the Marconi-Adcock high frequency direction-finding 
equipment. With the rising international tension in the late 'thirties, Awarua Radio 
slipped back into the pattern established in 1914. Tom Clarkson, who with George Searle 
oversaw the technical side of the P&T stations, recalled that in 1938 at the 
time of the Munich crisis they observed the call signs of German marine stations, 
indicating naval movements or intentions, a very significant item at the time and 
appreciated by the Admiralty .... 29 
The New Zealand Chiefs of Staff Committee noted on 16 December 1938 that 
The recent crisis has shown very clearly that operations by Armed 
Merchant Cruisers on our distant Trade Routes will probably commence 
immediately on the au tbreak of war. 30 
With the increased number of naval tasks carried out by Awarua as war 
approached, there was a requirement for more staff to give 24-hour coverage. A Creed 
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teleprinter link with Wellington was installed to cope with the flow of incoming signal 
traffic, and to pass this on securely.31 Awarua was linked by landline to Navy Office in 
Wellington and Musick Point Radio (ZLF) (and later to Waipapakauri (WPP) and a very 
different sort of wrr station at Rapaura (RNW», and, significantly, to the cable terminal 
of Cable & Wireless Ltd in Auckland. A senior officer of the Far East Combined Bureau 
(FECB) reflected that 
As expansion took place and additional H/F D/F Stations were erected, 
they were located at sites very easily accessible to cable stations in order that 
bearings obtained by such stations could be easily transmitted to the Far East 
intelligence centre [ie FECB] wherever it was located.32 
This was to prove both useful and prudent, for when the war expanded dramatically, 
FECB was compelled to relocate for operational reasons. 
In August 1939 the Admiralty requested an update on the state of the New 
Zealand direction-finding stations. The P&T Department's response to the Naval 
Secretary listed the following D/F stations as operational, or in the process of installation 
or calibration as at 25 August.3} Awarua's high frequency direction-finding equipment 
was a 
Marconi-Adcock short-wave direction finder 10 to 100 metres. High frequency 
channel on 6820 kc/s or 10650 kc/s with Musick Memorial station Auckland, for 
check bearings with similar direction-finding equipment at Auckland.34 
The Auckland Musick Point station had the identical equipment, which could be 
operationally linked with Awarua.35 There was also a series of M/F D/F installations 
being established: a medium-wave Marconi-Adcock direction finder (500 to 1053 metres) 
at Mangere airfield; and Bellini-Tosi crossed loop medium-wave direction finders (500 to 
1053 metres) under calibration at Wellington (linked to Wellington Radio), Nelson and 
Palmerston North.36 The function of the M/F D/F stations in wartime was to monitor the 
140 
distress frequencies of merchant vessels at sea?7 By October, the New Zealand H/F DIF 
stations working as part of the British direction-finding organisation were achieving good 
results, with their significance 'already apparent. ,38 
The first major naval engagement of the war, the Battle of the River Plate, was the 
occasion for local celebration with the role of the New Zealand cruiser HMS Achilles in 
company with HMS Ajax and HMS Exeter. Another New Zealand dimension remained 
undisclosed. Clarkson of the P&T Department recalled 
I was told at the time that Awarua and Bombay had a fix on the Graf Spee and 
had tracked her movements in the South Atlantic.39 
Indeed, on 17 November 1939, the Far East Direction-Finding Organisation (FEDO) had 
obtained bearings on the "GRAF SPEE" South of Madagascar, which shewed 
[sic] that she was proceeding southward after sinking the "AFRICA SHELL" and 
not continuing up the Mozambique Channel; this despite the fact that it was only 
safe to say she was within 200 miles of a certain position. The stations which 
fixed her were Kranji, Stonecutters and Awarua, the nearest one being 3800 miles 
from the D/F position.40 
This monitoring continued, assisted by the Royal Canadian Navy's very recently acquired 
H/F D/F stations of St.Hubert in Quebec, Shediac in New Brunswick and Botwood in 
Newfoundland, as the Graf Spee steamed into the South Atlantic. 
From about 29th November to 14th December, 1939, St.Hubert, Shediac 
and occasional bearings from Botwood gave fair indication of a German unit in 
the South Atlantic. 
Excellent localities were obtained by these bearings between these dates; 
for instance, bearings of 135 degrees from St.Hubert, 148 degrees Shediac, 153 
degrees Botwood, gradually increasing. These bearings, when plotted, gave a 
fairly good track of "Graf Spee" from the Cape [of Good Hope] toward 
Montevideo prior to the encounter off River Plate.41 
It is interesting to note that as early as 0144 hours on 3 December Commodore Harwood 
had been instructed 'to assume that the raider would not round the Cape [of Good Hope] 
a second time and there were clear indications that she was moving towards South 
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America .... ,42 The 'clear indications' suggest the correct inferences from the direction-
finding fIxes on Graf Spee' s signals were being made. 
The HIP D/F station at Awarua had proved its value in operational co-operation 
from stations in different countries. The First World War foundation of naval signals 
intelligence co-operation was repeating itself. The significance of the New Zealand 
stations was within a British Commonwealth rather than a local context. For Awarua 
there was some official, if discreet recognition. A message from the Admiralty to the 
Chief of Naval Staff was passed on to the Superintendent, Awarua Radio on 14 May 
1940. Under the heading 'Far Eastern D/F Organisations', it conveyed their Lordships' 
appreciation 'of the excellent service rendered by the New Zealand Government wrr 
Station at Awarua in connection with the special work that is being carried out. ,43 
There was one limitation about direction-finding, and it was exemplified in this 
case. It was assumed at the time of the search that the raider was the Admiral Scheer, not 
the Admiral Gra! Spee. This problem of the identification of enemy naval units at sea 
from their signals transmissions was to be addressed through something called REB by 
May 1941, a topic to be dealt with later. 
It is interesting to compare the Royal Canadian Navy's arrangements for signals 
interception at the start of the war with those of New Zealand. The RCN had no 'Y' 
organisation nor any H/F D/F stations prior to 1939. A 'Y' centre had been added to the 
RCN station at Esquimalt in the 1920s to provide raw intercepts for the Admiralty from 
the Pacific, and work was under way by 1939 to set up a 'Y' station and H/F D/F 
facilities at Gordon Head in British Columbia. The 'Y' staff at Esquimalt had mostly 
trained with the FECB in Singapore and at Stonecutters Island at Hong Kong with a full 
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course in Japanese Morse or Katakana.44 However, the RCN made arrangements on the 
outbreak of war to use the two Canadian Transport Department's H/F D/F stations at 
St.Hubert and Shediac for naval work. These had been in use for air traffic purposes (in 
the same way as Awarua and Musick Point). The RCN also secured the Air Ministry H/F 
D/F station at Botwood,45 and all three stations were involved with tracking the Graf 
Spee. More H/F D/F stations were under construction.46 
The New Zealand 'Y' and wrr intelligence organisation was established in 1940 
with four aims. It was to supply intelligence to the Captain on the Staff, Singapore, that 
. is, to the Far East Combined Bureau. It would liaise with the RAN 'Y' organisation. 
Intelligence was to be provided to the New Zealand Combined Intelligence Bureau. It 
was also to link the intelligence and communications establishments.47 The 'Y' Room 
was located to begin with in the naval intelligence quarters in Featherston Street. At this 
time, the H/F D/F effort rested on the two P & T Department stations at Awarua and 
Musick Point. In January 1940 it was decided that the New Zealand and Australian H/F 
D/F Stations should exchange bearings, in addition to supplying them to FECB.48 
The head of the New Zealand Naval 'Y' organisation was Warrant Telegraphist 
Halson Philpott. He had joined the Navy at the age of seventeen in February 1924, and 
had been involved with wireless telegraphy in the Royal Navy ever since. He returned to 
Phi/ornel in 1935 and on 14 August 1939 was posted to the Navy Office, where he would 
remain for most of the war. He had the reputation of being somewhat difficult to work 
with. In 1939 his position at Navy Office had to do with 'Wellington Wff', and the 
Navy List for 1940 described his post as Port WIT Officer, a convenient euphemism. A 
memorandum on 9 July 1940 on calibration tests on Awarua's equipment referred to 
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'Mr.Philpott of your office. ,49 His position as 'Wireless Intelligence Officer' is listed 
from 1 May 1941, and he was promoted to the rank of Telegraphist Lieutenant 
(Temporary) on 15 June 1941.50 Philpott was in charge of wireless intelligence ashore 
from the outbreak of hostilities. He would receive an MBE in 1943 for his wartime work 
on 'Y' and Special Intelligence, though, this was not officially acknowledged in the 
citation. 
Captain Wylie, the departing head of FECB, looked in on Philpott on his visit to 
Wellington in January 1941, noting, 
A "Y" room (Wrr and D/F Intelligence) is in operation, staffed by a Warrant 
Telegraphist and 3 telegraphist ratings. Excellent work is being carried out here, 
including maintaining a D/F etc. warship plot similar to that in the F.E.C.B.51 
Wylie suggested that there would be advantages if the 'Y' sections in Australia and New 
Zealand working on W rr and D/F intelligence and W rr interception were to work in 
close co-operation under general instructions from FECB.52 The New Zealand H/F D/F 
stations were already hard at work on Japanese call signs, as the 'Y' section was using 
. untransposed versions of call signs internally' .53 Awarua had been developing 
interception work on Japanese, Philippines and Dutch East Indies stations from as early 
as July 1939, and a report on W rr interception was submitted in February 1940. Japanese 
merchant shipping messages were being intercepted and copied at Awarua from March 
The possibility of extending H/F D/F facilities to Fiji was raised as a consequence 
of unforeseen circumstances. Nicholson, the Station Signals Officer (the SSO and 
Philpott's immediate superior) asked Wylie about the projected station in Suva whose 
staff had been lost when their ship was torpedoed en route. It was suggested New Zealand 
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naval personnel might man the station.55 Wylie informed him that the station was to be 
operated by the FECB and administered by the RNZN. Accordingly, four telegraphists 
were sent on a course in Wellington on Katakana or Japanese Morse. This was followed 
by practical familiarisation at Musick Point between 8 and 19 March 1941, also attended 
by one of the Awarua operators, Frank Barlow. 'From Awarua Radio we were trained [in 
Katakana] one at a time at the Navy Office .... Wellington on the top flOOr.,S6 The training 
of telegraphists in Kana was expanding rapidly. lG Williamson was on the 'Y' Room 
staff. 
. .. .in .... ' 41 I was suddenly drafted to Wellington. Interviewed by Warrant 
Telegraphist Philpotts [sic], three of us were given the task of learning Japanese 
morse and wrr procedure, ditto Russian and German. Japanese morse has an 
alphabet of sixty-two odd letters and symbols against our twenty-six letter 
alphabet, and is tenned Katakana or Kana for short. Learning the special 
characters took about a week, but getting up to speed, about thirty words per 
minute, took one to two weeks intensive tuition. We were to become instructors 
of a nucleus of senior Post Office operators to be incorporated into what was 
known as the 'Y' network, a world-wide net of direction-finding stations and 
monitoring stations. Some seventy odd were trained by us to man the high 
frequency D/F stations at Awarua, Musick Point, and Kaitaia [Waipapakauri], 
plus some twelve ex P&T RNR telegraphists for overseas stations, mainly Suva. 
The officers in charge of these stations had to be trained in 'Y' procedures.57 
Five telegraphists were sent to set up the new Suva H/F D/F station in a swamp 
site at Tamavua. They were led initially by a civilian with First World War experience, 
Mr.A.D.Hathaway, the other telegraphists being Leading Telegraphist D.T.Ingram and 
Telegraphists A.H.Packer, J.A.Kirkwood and C.J.Murphy. Ingram took over as the 
charge hand.58 They arrived in Suva in early April, but it was not until 14 May that the 
Suva H/F D/F station was ready for operation. Under operational direction of the Captain 
on the Staff, Singapore Suva D/F began duty on interception watch. The directing 
instructions read: 
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Request Suva D/F station assume D/F duty on German Series B .... Watch 
is to be changed for periods 15 to 20 minutes, 35 to 40 minutes, and 55 to 60 
minutes past each hour as follows: ... 
PERIOD FREQUENCY 
2000 to 0559 16,975 Kc/s 
0600 to 1159 12,700 Kc/s 
1200 to 1959 8,470 Kc/s 
All times G.M.T. The 3 periods in each hour are used by raider for 
communicating with NORDDEICH. These transmissions are additional to those 
on series B. In order that bearings transmission to NORDDEICH may be 
obtained accurately G.M.T. is essential. Bearings should be prefixed "important" 
and passed to C.O.S. Singapore (telegraphic address Ambition Singapore) and 
N.Z.N.B.59 
N orddeich, otherwise known as DAN, was a prewar commercial transmission that 
continued to be used throughout the war. Although not so popular with U-boats, 
Norddeich carried enough traffic to require monitoring. It was used by German blockade 
runners, although they were very careful with regard to WIT security. The raiders used 
DAN fequencies too on occasion, particularly when operating south of approximately 30 
degrees north, but were even more discreet. Series B was controlled by Kiel (JDU) and 
used unusually high frequencies, making it very useful for ships operating in distant 
waters. The German raiders by this time had become a persistent problem, with every 
effort being made to intercept their traffic, hence the targets for Suva HIP D/F. 
Suva put out its first monthly report to FECB on 12 June.60 Delays to the 
completion of the station were due to a hurricane and subsequent bad weather, including 
flooding preventing the erection of power lines. No modern equipment and only limited 
manpower was available. However, 
Watch [was] being kept on Japanese Naval units in the Japanese Mandated 
Islands and the Combined Fleets [ sic]. Callsigns, Frequencies and Times being 
logged for future reference. Check bearings were also taken during this period for 
l 'b . 61 ca 1 ratIOn purposes. 
As to German traffic 
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Kiel has been logged on all frequencies but reception ... for the greater part 
of the twenty four hours is not good. A lot of interference from American and 
Japanese shore stations is experienced during the hours at which Kiel's signals are 
received at their best. It is of the opinion here that Kiel does not transmit every 
hour. For example Kiel is very rarely heard between 1800 and 1900 but 
sometimes comes up about 1845 calling "All Stations" (CQ). At 1900 sharp he 
commences sending traffic. Similarly between 0001 and 0100 it is reasonable to 
expect to hear of him on 11,260 Kc/s but so far nothing has been heard of him on 
this frequency at this hour but between 0100 and 0200 has been located on 8,400 
Kc/s.62 
Alterations in transmitting power were noted as low for an "All Stations" call, but 
increased power was used when transmitting traffic. 
Norddeich is received here fairly well for the greater part of the twenty 
four hours. He is never received on 8,470 Kc/s except between 1800 and 1900. 
Only on one occasion has Gennan type traffic been heard during one of his Silent 
Periods. It was unfortunate that the strength of signals were so weak and 
interference so great that the prospect of obtaining a bearing was out of the 
. 63 questIon. 
The 'German type traffic' was probably a raider. As to that other area of interest, 
Japanese callsigns, 
Between 1500 and 1900 G.M.T. whilst listening on Norddeich Silent 
Periods on 8,470 Kc/s Figure Kana Kana Type Callsigns have been heard. Figure 
Letter Letter Type have also been heard calling the former type. No traffic has 
been received from these stations. Japanese traffic is received well for practically 
the whole of the twenty four hours.64 
How was the interception work carried out by the H/F D/F operators? At Awarua 
Radio in 1942 the Marconi DFG 12 Radio Direction Finder was used for H/F D/F work. 
The H/F D/F No.1 was located in a little hut on a track well away from the main 
transmitting station and accommodation. The H/F D/F No.2 post further along the track 
was equipped later on with a more powerful Marconi direction-finder, the DFG 24/2. 
The DFG 12 of H/F D/F No.1 post was 
designed on the Adcock principle, with [ten metre] vertical masts (aerials) at each 
cardinal compass point [about six metres apart]. The [flat-roofed weatherboard 
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little hut] installation was in an isolated area well away from any other buildings 
and sources of electrical interference.65 
Inside the hut, the operator with his headphones on, sat at a bench with his Post Office 
D/F pad prepared in triplicate to note the bearings, and a red Naval signal pad with ruled 
lines and five columns to copy the Katakana traffic. The operator faced twin tasks of 
obtaining bearings on the enemy transmission, and recording the enemy traffic. The 
receiving equipment sat in front of him. To his right was a large Morse key, 
a double current one on the long distance landline to Auckland [Musick Point] 
and Waipapakauri D/F stations. The line could be extended to [the] Suva DfF 
[station] when required by activating an alarm (long dash) at [the] Auckland 
Cable Station.66 
To the operator's left was the Goniometer unit connected to the four aerials and 
bearings were determined by rotating the pointer to find the null point of the 
signal and reading the relative degrees off the circular scale.67 
The interception of the Japanese Morse signals depended on the operator's 
ability to transcribe their "Katakana" Morse code, of around 57 different 
characters. This was done by quickly printing the characters from top to bottom 
of a ruled Naval signal pad. Later the characters would be transcribed into 
phonetics alongside to allow for transmission over a teleprinter. The Japanese 
operators were good, and as most of them used "sideswipers" [a type of Morse 
key], it was a struggle at times to keep up with them.68 
Apart from enemy units at sea, there was also selected shore station traffic to 
intercept. Frank Barlow recalled that signals from the Japanese base at Rabaul were 
intercepted round the clock at Awarua. As Rabaul was the same distance from Awarua as 
from Tokyo, the signal traffic was steady and consistent.69 It was time consuming work 
demanding a high standard of accuracy to be effective. 
By early 1941, the 'Y' Room's co-ordination of the interception attack by the H/F 
D/F stations on enemy transmissions was making progress. 
148 
.... the majority of 'flashes' were originated by Admiralty and concerned German 
U.Boat reports .... and German commerce raiders operating world wide. A 
'FLASH' originated a 'SNAP' from Navy Office which put all the Pacific net on 
to the frequency designated and the bearing obtained were passed into the Y 
office, encrypted and passed direct to [the] Admiralty. Although we were half a 
world away, weekly and monthly analysis reports from [the] Admiralty showed 
that the Pacific net was providing some very useful confirmation of the UK and 
Atlantic results. A very small portion of the 'flashes' concerned Russian activity. 
Towards mid-1941 and onwards our activity became more concentrated on 
Japanese activity, particularly in Micronesia and the Marshall Islands groups .... 
Since 'Barbarossa' had been launched against Russia in ... June '41, we 
had dropped monitoring traffic around Vladivostok which left more time to 
concentrate on the Japanese .... , particularly [on] laluit, the rapidly expanding 
Japanese naval base. Random reports and sightings from the island groups south 
of the Marshalls indicated a fair proportion of the build up was of submarine 
activity. These sightings plus HIFI D/F bearings plus stations controlling 
transmissions [sic] all added up to laluit wrr being in contro1.70 
In October 1941 a certain amount of Russian traffic was still being received from the 
New Zealand 'Y' Room by FECB.71 
The 'Y' co-operation with Far East Combined Bureau deepened. Lieutenant-
Commander S.W. Francis, Head of 'Y', D/F and Special Intercepts Organisation at FECB 
from November 1939 to September 1942, recalled the extent and function of the 
expanding interception activity in the Far East. 
The 17 H/F D/F stations known as Far East D/F organisation were 
grouped according to their geographical location in such a way the cross bearings 
of German and Japanese Naval transmissions [sic] were obtainable. In doing this 
one had to bear in mind ... all the relevant technicalities involved. The results 
from the HIF D/F stations were sent by the DIF station to the Far East Combined 
Bureau organisation by cable by means of the use of the cable FLASH system. 
Special gnomonic charts were used for the plotting of D/F bearings. All fixes of 
German units in detail were sent direct to D.N.I. London. Fixes of Japanese units 
were used in the F.E.C.B. daily summaries which were promulgated to all Far 
East intelligence authorities affected.72 
Four of those were New Zealand stations. This was a far and wide effort, for the RCN 
w rr Station at Gordon Head in British Columbia was, like Suva, operationally under the 
FECB. Intercepted traffic was cabled directly to the Captain on the Staff, Singapore. In 
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addition to direction-finding bearings, details of Japanese air and naval movements were 
sent to the Admiralty as well as FECB, using cable transmission for security. A close 
study of Japanese wireless traffic was made using all available methods to confirm 
movements including sighting reports. Along with callsign identification confinned by 
the use of radio-fingerprinting equipment, this enabled the FECB to warn the Admiralty 
of squadrons and ships leaving Japan for Indo-China and the South China Sea in late 
1941.73 A letter from Francis to Nicholson on 7 July 1941 indicated the extent of this 
practical collaboration between the New Zealand 'Y' Room, its four H/F D/F stations and 
the FECB. 
Your Special Shipping reports i.e. noon positions are of great value to us 
and we hope they will be continued. You need not send any Red forms of 
merchant shipping as, apart from your valuable Special Intelligence Signal, we 
onl y require merchant shipping information if it is in any way suspicious. 
I hope you will be able to make headway with the Special Consular 
. 1 d 74 matena we requeste . 
He had a number of technical questions to do with calibration corrections concerning the 
Awarua and Waipapakauri Marconi DFG 12 equipment, recalling earlier consultations 
about the Musick Point direction-finder. Suva's calibration report had just been 
completed and further information would follow. Another Callsign Summary, the 
monthly list of frequencies and the Far East Direction-finding Organisation Periodical 
Analysis 2100(8) would be sent shortly to the 'Y' Room. Francis added that a further 
SNAP test of the New Zealand H/FD/F stations would be conducted to explore the 
potential for all four being used as a working combination. The Special Shipping noon 
position reports referred to were regular intercepts of certain Japanese traffic; the Special 
Consular material concerned the cable communications between the Japanese Consul in 
Wellington and the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo. These could be flagged for perusal and 
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routed through Singapore or Hong Kong, courtesy of Cable & Wireless Ltd, the P&T 
Department and the Navy. 
The immediate Japanese naval target of the 'Y' Room in 1941 concerned 
Japanese naval and air movements in the Marshall Islands. Familiarity with regular 
Japanese operators' habits allowed the interception telegraphists to conduct a simple form 
of radio-fingerprinting as they intercepted traffic. 
An operator has a distinct 'signature' when sending Morse Code 
regardless of whether its Kana or international [ sic]. Similarly, the transmitters 
have a signature, note (tone) and keying characteristics which can be recognized 
by experienced operators and our D/F stations were manned by very experienced 
operators. This became known as "finger-printing a transmission" and formed a 
sound basis for the identification of a particular unit .... we were ninety-five 
percent certain that our area of interest was submarine traffic controlled by a 
master station Jaluit wrr.7S 
The reliability of this form of radio-fingerprinting depended on the' ear' of the intercept 
operator. There was one way to get closer to check and confinn the inferences from the 
laluit traffic. Williamson of the 'Y' Room 
did two trips on Achilles supernumary [sic], not shown on my papers, trained four 
more operators in Kana and D/F techniques and when in the Gilbert and Ellice 
Islands had a 24 [hour] watch set on Japanese M/F frequencies being used by 
laluit Radio, the control station for Japanese submarines operating in that area. 
Bearings were taken on the ship's M/F D/F from various positions in an 
endeavour to pinpoint the areas of most activity including the precise position of 
the bases. [ sic] We had to stay out of air surveillance range for obvious reasons. 
The [Japanese] M/F transmissions could not be heard by the Pacific net as M/F 
has only a comparatively short range. There was little doubt that activity in the 
region was increasing at a high rate. All this activity was of course promulgated 
to the Y organisation world wide per medium of the weekly intelligence 
. 76 
summanes. 
In a routine exchange on 18 August, the RAN DNI revealed to Beasley some 
Australian success in breaking into certain Japanese traffic. 
The bi-weekly return setting out positions of Japanese shipping is not 
compiled from D/F sources, but from 'Y'. It is the practice of Japanese vessels 
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engaged in overseas trade to transmit to the head offices of their companies the 
daily position reports, prepared in a specially improvised code. Payr.Cdr.Nave 
was successful in breaking these codes some time ago. Japanese vessels engaged 
in the coastal trade and 'Near-Seas' trade do not conform to the practice. 77 
Another instance of this reading of Japanese merchant shipping radio traffic can be seen 
in the following signal from the Staff Officer Intelligence in Kingston on 29 August. 
.... from Special Intelligence report MONTEVIDEO MARU reported being 
closed and spoken to by a British auxiliary cruiser on Wednesday 6 August in 
position 29 degrees 02'S 129 degrees 29 W.78 
Special Intelligence meant Most Secret Sources, or Ultra. The Japanese merchantman's 
traffic was clearly being read. This sharing of intelligence from intercepted messages is 
further illustrated in an exchange revealing difficulties with Japan's diplomatic 
representative in Wellington. On 1 October, a letter from Lieutenant Commander Barker 
of the CIB's General Intelligence Section to the Director of the Security Intelligence 
Bureau disclosed: 
The following signal arrived 30/9/41 from the Australian Liaison Officer 
at Batavia:· 
'1 learn from special intelligence that the departure of 'Nieuw 
Amsterdam', 'Aquitania' and 'Coptic' from Wellington on 15th September was 
reported on the same day to the Ja~anese M.[inistry of] F.[oreign] A.[ffairs] by 
the Japanese Consul at Wellington.' 9 
These ships were 2NZEF troop transports bound for the Middle East and the Consul's 
cables threatened their security should the Japanese pass on such information to the 
Germans. Australia conducted surveillance on diplomatic traffic between Japan and 
Australasia, and to this end the RAN DNI requested Beasley on 3 October, 
MOST SECRET. Copies are required of all telegrams to and from 
Japanese Consul. Can you ensure that all outbound traffic is routed via Sydney 
and forward by airmail copies of any detour messages not passing through 
Sydney.80 
152 
Four days later, the Captain on the Staff, Singapore, sent an intelligence summary to 
Beasley. 
Consular Special Intelligence Report dated i h October: 
1. Consul-General Wellington sends Tokyo details of New Zealand purchases of 
aircraft as follows: 1938 - 30 Vickers bombers, 5 Oxfords; 1939 - 29 Baffins, 
40 Gordons, 30 Vincents; 1940/41- estimated 200 to 250 aircraft. 
2. Unkown number of Hudson and Harvard [sic] have arrived May 1941 and 100 
Tiger Moths manufactured in New Zealand in addition to 395 civil aircraft. 
3. Squadrons located Auckland, Christchurch, Ohakea and Wellington. 
4. 12,162 personnel volunteered for aircrew up to March 1941. 
5. Comments - This is probably a reply to Tokyo's request. My 0301 7th 
October 1941 ... Please treat as Most Secret. Inform RNZAF. 81 
The conventions for these summaries were that the content did not replicate the enemy's 
textual message, as a precaution against hostile interception. The contents were the 
analyst's paraphrasing of the enemy signal. 'Comments' [sic] indicated the analyst'S 
interpretations, as distinct from the rest of the summary. This report was brought to the 
attention of the CAS, who sent a memorandum to the PM, the Permanent Head of the 
Prime Minister'S Department and the War Cabinet on 13 October.82 The CAS noted that 
most of the information seemed to come from published Air Department Annual Reports 
to Parliament. The first paragraph information was contained in Annual Reports for 
1938, 1939 and 1940; the Hudsons, Harvards and Tiger Moth numbers from 1939 and 
1940. The civilian aircraft numbers were inexplicable and incorrect. The bases 
mentioned was the Consul's interpretation of a statement on the 1939 Report, while 
personnel numbers came from the 1940-41 Report. The CAS observed: 
It had always been thought that the Japanese Consul was acting as an 
intelligence link in New Zealand but so far the intelligence regarding the RNZAF 
which he has despatched to Tokyo aprears to have been gleaned from official 
non-secret papers and is not up to date.s 
He added the significant caution to the recipients. 
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Your attention is specially directed to the fact that this report should be 
treated as Most Secret so that there should be no possibility of compromising this 
source of information.84 
On 27 October, the Captain on the Staff, Singapore, sent a further signal to the DNI 
Melbourne, Beasley in Wellington and the DNI Admiralty. 
Personal: Consular Special Intelligence Report dated 24 October. Tokyo telling 
Minister, Melbourne and Consul, Sydney and Wellington [sic] that General Staff 
have asked him [ sic] to collect geographical information on Australia and New 
Zealand. Any material obtained should be sent [to] Investigation Bureau Foreign 
Office by [diplomatic] bag. General Staff want maps of all kinds, geographical 
photographs and statistics, guide books and directories. 
Comments - [sic] text indicates Japanese residents will be used to obtain material. 
NO repetition NO action should be taken which could compromise irreplaceable 
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source .... 
It is interesting to note the intention to use Japanese living in Australia and New Zealand 
to obtain infonnation. On 29 October, Beasley drew attention to the Japanese action in a 
memorandum to the Secretary ONS and the Director, Security Intelligence Bureau. 
The report recalls the practise of many Japanese consulates in various 
countries of bringing in objectionable propaganda material in the diplomatic bag. 
The extent to which the Japanese consulates have regularly misused their cypher 
and bag privileges not only to evade the censorship [sic] but also passing the 
results of espionage safely out of the country is well known. The inconvenience 
to which the Japanese consulate and the Japanese resident military officer in India 
have been put by their withdrawal on 30 August 1941 of all cypher and bag 
privileges in India has been correspondingly great. The order came to them as an 
unexpected and most unpleasant shock of course and no little perturbation.86 
The Japanese Consul was becoming a nuisance. 
Further changes were envisaged for the 'Y' Room, as the Naval Secretary 
explained to the Captain on the Staff, Singapore on 15 October. 
.... the existing organisation for W rr and Special Intelligence will continue in its 
present fonn, as desired by you ... .it is realised that the infonnation derived from 
"Y" and Special Intelligence is complementary and for this reason, together with 
your view that it is desirable to have the nucleus of both "Y" and Special 
Intelligence centres in as many parts of the Empire as possible, consideration is 
now being given to the possibility of inaugurating a small Special Intelligence 
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Section in New Zealand. For this .... it is proposed .... to send an officer to 
Australia with a view to improving co-operation in "Y" and Special Intelligence, 
and also for .... obtaining such basic training in the latter as may be possible in 
a .... short time. 
Suitable action is being taken to forward the Japanese Naval 5-figure 
traffic to you and all Kana traffic to Australia.87 
The 'Y' Room was moving in the direction of adding a small Special Intelligence 
dimension to its interception role. 
The FECB reflected in October 1941 that the co-operation of Australia, New 
Zealand, India, Burma and other stations had permitted the co-ordination of the 
interception of wireless and cable traffic 'in such a way that maximum .... coverage is 
given to all diplomatic traffic of importance emanating from countries in the Middle East 
and Far East. ,88 Japanese, German, French, Italian naval, consular and diplomatic traffic 
were intercepted, plus some Russian and Thai traffic.89 At this time Musick Point was 
working on Italian and Japanese traffic, Waipapakauri intercepted German traffic until 
August when it reverted to Japanese, and Awarua was on Japanese traffic until the end of 
August, when it once more took up German duty. The H/F D/F bearings on Japanese 
naval units from Awarua and Waipapakauri were also assessed as very good. Suva was 
employed on German traffic. Two German Norddeich frequencies, 8,470 kc/s and 12,700 
kc/s were in continuous use by the Japanese.90 
Co-operation with the Americans was making progress with the circulation of 
intelligence on movements of Japanese naval units. On 27 November the Captain on the 
Staff, Singapore signalled the DNI Admiralty, DNI Melbourne and DNI Wellington, 
noting 
U.S. Naval Intelligence reported that 10 aircraft carriers were in 
commission and this has since been confirmed FECB from W rr traffic. It was 
also established from WIT traffic (and confirmed by Manila) that these carriers 
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were organised in five squadrons which are believed to be numbered 1 to 5 
inclusive. There is in addition no doubt that there are two carriers in each 
squadron. 
The following ships are definitely identified by W rr. Each squadron is as 
follows: 
1 st Squadron Akagi Kaga 
2nd Squadron Soryu Hiryu ... 91 
'Manila' was the US naval signals intelligence unit on Corregidor. The Japanese 
carriers' callsign identifications were made by FECB's radio-fingerprinting. A signal on 
28 November from the Captain on the Staff to the DNI Admiralty, repeated to NZNB, 
ACNB and the SO(I) Hong Kong, illustrated the tracking of carrier movements. 
From wrr traffic 4th aircraft carrier Squadron returned to Japan before 26 
November. 5 th aircraft carrier Squadron believed to be in Saipan area. 7th 
Squadron probably in Samma. [sic] 3rd Destroyer Squadron South China Sea.92 
If they maintained wirless silence, of course, they could not be tracked. 
In the run down to hostilities with Japan, there were a few clues for the New 
Zealand 'V' organisation that something was brewing, although these were more 
transparent in hindsight. The Suva H/F D/F station recorded a spectacular rise in signal 
traffic on 8,470 Kc/s from Japanese naval and air transmissions in the Mandated Islands 
during November (see diagram overleaf).93 On Friday 28 November 1941, Report No.7 
from the Suva station gave a run down on currently intercepted traffic to the SO(Y) in 
Wellington. On the German traffic 
Suva D/F maintained watch on Series "B" until November 15 th, Up to this 
time reception was rather poor. This was mainly due to frequencies employed by 
Kiel e.g. 5,315 Kc/s being far from suitable of daylight reception at this station. 
No transmissions from Gennan Mobile Units were heard on these frequencies ... 
Reception of Norddeich has been very poor for practically the whole 
month ... probably due to seasonal effects ... , 
Only one transmission has been heard on Norddeich's frequencies during 
Silent Periods. This occurred on 1 i h November between 0835 and 0838. Station 
was sending Japanese letters but note of transmitter and style of sending were 
typically German. Bearing obtained was 290 degrees 3rd Class.94 
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The SO(Y) annotated 'there has been no evidence of disguised transmissions of this type 
[before].' On the co-ordination of 'Snap' routines, the Suva report continued 
This has been very poor during the past month and the majority of 
"SNAP" messages have had to be obtained from Auckland on tape. Delays in 
receipt of these messages at the D/F Station average from three to eight minutes, 
consequently when operator has shifted to frequency nothing has been heard of 
the transmission. As majority of these messages are for 5,455 Kc/s have now got 
the operators to go over to this frequency on spec. [ sic] while awaiting a repetition 
of the signal from Auckland. If nothing is heard on this frequency they shift to 
8,470 Kc/s.95 
A 'Snap' was the direction of all the New Zealand stations to intercept a transmission on 
a particular frequency and take a D/F bearing, several bearings producing the 'cocked 
hat'. 8A 70 Kc/s was the most prolific frequency in the rise in radio traffic in the Marshall 
Islands in November. Suva reported 
Reception of Japanese Naval has been quite good during the dark hours 
but during daylight hours little has been heard other than Shore W rr Stations 
Intercommunicating [sic]. Callsign list in use here is out of date so it is not 
possible to distinguish whether call signs received are Air, Mobile or Shore 
Stations. Most of these however appear to be in two areas viz in the Marshalls 
and around Indo-China.96 
The lack of a current callsign list was unfortunate at this time, although the activity 
concentrated in two regions were clues. For the prescient, however, Suva noted 
Very little has been heard of any Japanese Merchant Shipping 
transmissions during the past month.97 
Where were the merchantmen? Returning to Japan or friendly ports? Why? The 
Japanese Consul in Wellington meantime received interesting instructions. The Captain 
on the Staff, Singapore signalled the DNI Admiralty, DNI Melbourne and DNI 
Wellington at 0905Z/2 December: 
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Personal. Consular Special Intelligence Report dated 2nd December. Tokyo sends 
message to Consul, Wellington, but with Circular No.2446 of which following is 
gist: 
1. On receipt of message take following secret action - (a) bum all cyphers 
except one copy each of OITE and L code, and signal HARUNA en clair 
when this is done. (b) bum (? Group) file and secret documents. 
2. Tokyo says these are in preparation to cope with any possibility but Consul is 
to continue to function as usual. 
3. Comment - No indication as to circulation of message which has second 
degree of priority. 98 
This was a war warning message. Beasley passed it to the PM and Berendsen, the 
Permanent Head of the Prime Minister's Department.99 The signal was part of a pattern 
repeated in Australia and Washington in the days preceding the landing at Khota Baru in 
Malaya and the attack on Pearl Harbor. 
The Y Room's watch on the enemy continued with increasing apprehension after 
Pearl Harbor, the invasion of Malaya, and the loss of Prince of Wales and Repulse. The 
new COlC Daily Summaries, followed by weekly COIC Intelligence Summaries, 
displayed the focus of attention during this difficult period. The 'Y' Room continued to 
monitor closely enemy operational traffic. A consideration that further offensive 
operations southwards were undoubtedly in the offing, provided motivation for close 
attention. Two days before Christmas, little change and normal movements were noted 
in the Marshalls plus increased air activity around Wotje and Truk.lOO On Boxing Day, 
the assessment of the Y Room was mostly unchanged. 
w rr traffic tends to show an increasing connection between 1st Fleet units 
in the Marshalls, Truk, Saipan areas with 4th Fleet units in the same area, C. in C. 
4th Fleet and C. in C. South China Fleet. Air activity in the Marshalls area is also 
linked with this traffic. 
There is some indication from W rr traffic of a possible change in 
disposition of certain South China and 1st or Combined Fleet units. lOl 
On 30 December, the Y Room was making inferences from traffic about commanders. 
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The Senior Officer of the Marshall Island Area is possible [ sic] TE TI 33 
(unidentified callsign). His Staff Officer (Air?) is probably at Wotje. TE TI 33 
himself is probably at laluit while the mobile unit (TE TI 3) in which he is borne 
is at sea. 
From W rr traffic there is a strong link between TE TI 33 and C. in C. 
Combined Fleet, C. in C. 4th Fleet, C. in C. Southern Expeditionary Fleet, Japan 
and Air and Naval Units in the Mandates. [SiC]102 
By 5 January 1942, the 'Y" Room estimated there were at least six important naval units 
in the Marshalls, and two in the Truk area, and one might be the commander of the 4th 
Fleet. Other movements of naval and air units were noted and there were over 150 
auxiliary naval units throughout the Mandated Islands. W rr traffic continued to show 
strong connections between TE TI3, the senior air or naval officer in the Marshalls, the 
Yokohama and Chitose squadrons, Wotje air base, the Combined Fleet, the 4th Fleet, the 
"Combined Air Force" and a further unknown airfield. Io3 The following day 
From wrr traffic there are now fifteen Naval units in the Marshalls area 
and eight Naval units in the Truk area. Five of the units in the Truk area and 
seven in the Marshalls area are of considerable importance judging from the 
vol ume and addresses of messages addressed [ sic], repeated or originated by 
them. 
The unit normally carrying the flag of the Senior Officer, Marshalls (TE 
TI3) is in company with one other Naval unit and an auxiliary.l04 
The weight of W rr and D/F evidence revealed Jaluit as a main base for surface units and 
submarines. Wotje was the main air base, Kwajalein was an air base, but Mejit was 
difficult to assess. lOS 
Keeping track of the enemy was a constant problem in a situation of great 
operational fluidity, and depriving the enemy of surprise was most important. On 21 
January, the 'V' Room disagreed with an American estimate that the Combined Fleet was 
concentrated in the Eastern Carolines and the Marshall Islands. 
From WIT traffic it appears unlikely that the Combined Fleet is in the 
Marshalls, Palao or Truk areas. It seems possible that it might be in the Saipan 
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area, though there is no definite evidence of this. The 2nd Fleet may be detached 
and possibly in the Truk or Marshalls areas. 
Air activity in the Palao area has greatly increased and is connected with 
1 st Fleet Air Command, an aircraft carrier, the Combined Fleet, the 23rd Aircraft 
Squadron [sic] and the 4th Fleet at Truk.106 
The number of naval units in the Marshalls had risen to 25, with not less than 14 at Truk. 
Radio traffic had increased in Truk and Palao, but slightly decreased in the Marshalls. Io7 
W rr traffic and D/F bearings by 6 February indicated the likelihood of the movement of 
substantial enemy units. 
It is clear from wrr traffic that a movement of some importance is about 
to take place or has already started, and is connected with the 2nd Fleet. This 
appears mainly to concern Palau but there is one indication linking the Marshalls 
area with the 2nd Fleet, which is at present in the Saipan area. 
The 3rd Battleship Squadron, one Cruiser Squadron and a Destroyer 
Flotilla have been reported as moving to the Celebes area. Comment. This may 
be the movement predicted two days ago of the possible southward move of the 
Combined Fleet - actually a part of it only by this report. [ sic] 
The 2nd Carrier Division is possibly in the vicinity of Helens Reef (Palau 
area). This is the division which has been operating in the Celebes area ... 108 
It is possible to see the 'Y' Room's contribution in context through the 
deployment list of Japanese warships in the weekly COIC Intelligence Summaries in 
January 1942. These were the summaries that annotated the sources of the intelligence 
for each entry on the list, a practice fortunately drawn to a close in February, and because 
of the capture of the weekly Summaries nos.12-15 later on)not a moment too soon. The 
COIC Weekly Intelligence Summary for 29 January had 74 entries on the location of 
Japanese units. Of these, sixteen came from the 'Y' Room's analysis of enemy traffic. 109 
The benefits from FECB and RAN 'Y' were augmented by the US Navy's Mid-Pacific 
Strategic Direction-Finder Net. This centred on the Radio Unit of the 14th Naval District 
in Honolulu (renamed in June the Combat Intelligence Unit, and later as Fleet Radio 
Unit, Pacific Fleet or FRUPAC). It was furiously producing Combat Intelligence 
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Bulletins (no.1 on 16 January and no.12 by 27 January), and came under US Naval 
Intelligence, OP-20-G. OP stood for OPNAV, the Office of the Chief of Naval 
Operations. The 20th Division of this body was the Office of Naval Communications. G 
Section was the Communications Security Section.110 The other naval signals intelligence 
unit, the Radio Unit of the 16th Naval District on Corregidor, was withdrawn to Australia, 
where it became the Fleet Radio Unit, Melbourne - or FRUMEL. The RAN suggested in 
February that some of the US personnel might go to New Zealand (the total unit being 
pulled out consisting of 8 officers and up to 68 other ranks)/l1 but this does not seem to 
have been taken up. 
The advantage of having the United States in the war, in terms of intelligence, 
was offset for the first few months of 1942 by the partial disruption of the Royal Navy's 
and the US Navy's intelligence efforts with the withdrawal from Corrigedor and the 
FECB's evacuation to Colombo. 1 12 Beasley suggested to the Australian DNI on 9 January 
1942 that as FECB moved to Colombo, the ACNB should co-ordinate and pass RAN and 
RNZN 'Y' intelligence to the US Navy's C.-in-C. Pacific Fleet. 113 
The Royal Canadian Navy's Operational Intelligence Centre 3 (previously called 
Far Eastern Intelligence) had, since a visit by Captain Harkness in 1940, supplied 
intelligence to the FECB, and to the RAN and New Zealand 'Y' organisations. This 
contact dwindled rapidly after the entry of the United States in the war. However, the 
close co-operation between the FECB and the RAN and RNZN 'Y' units continued. An 
example of this was a signal on 11 February from the DNI Melbourne to the Captain on 
the Staff Colombo and the DNI Wellington listing callsign identification of a number of 
Japanese call signs, and requesting information. 
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1. From routeing of traffic, and originating number consider:-
(A) That HUKE 3, INE 3, MH 508, are alternative call signs for the same 
submarine unit. 
(B) That RESE 4 and WAH 18 are alternative call signs for another 
submarine unit. 
(C) That HEMI 2, HIKU 8, NaSA 7, NlNU 1, OE 8, and MU 4 are 
alternative for C.in C. fourth fleet. [ sic] 
(D) That KUMD 0 [and] MOO 7 are alternatives. 
(E) That HAN, HEI 3, IRI 9, MENO 7, NNU 4, and NEYO 2 are 
al ternatives for C.in C. second fleet. 
(F) That RIHE one [sic], TUWI 4, UI 2, HUMA 7, KONE 8, RESI 5, 
SETU 7, TEKE 9, and YOWl 0 are alternatives for C.inC. Combined 
Fleets. [sic] 
2. Consider call sign sheet line commencing with 9, repetition 9, allocate 
only to shore units, principal minor defence force detachments 3. Suggest 
decode meaning for terminal figure, add KANA KANA figure call sign: 
20 medical, 32 supply and account 49 communications 58 probable 
operations, but in any case is applicable only to flag and senior officers 4. 
Request information. 1132Z/10 114 
The 'Y' Room in Wellington on 25 March sent a D/F signal to CINCPAC concerning a 
German naval unit located by Awarua on 8400 kilocycles 020 degrees 
Time of origin German message 1740/25 four letter groups. 115 
In early April the Captain on the Staff, Colombo raised concerns on delays from 
Wellington in the transmission of 'Y' reports to the Bombay Fort and to FECB in 
Colombo. The SO (Y) requested the P & T Department allocate three free periods on the 
lkw A WA transmitter at Wellington Radio for 'Y' intelligence. 116 
The 'Y' Room at Navy Office moved into a new building as part of the Combined 
Operational Intelligence Centre in 1942. One of the staff described it. 
The 'Y' section consisted of two small rooms and a map room tucked 
away in one corner of an area on the Second Floor of the Stout Street Building 
under twenty four hour security guard. [The] staff consisted of a Warrant 
Telegraphist (later Lieutenant) Philpotts [sic] in command, three P.O.Tels, .... two 
Wren coders and Dr.Campbell from Victoria University where he was the Maths 
Professor. All D/F bearings, Kana traffic copy, D/F station, operator comments 
were mulled over for the first hour or so of every day at a discussion by all the 
staff and added into or compared with Coastwatching reports and Admiralty 
sitreps from world wide 'Y' stations. Il7 
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The 'Y Room was expanding its business under trying conditions. A Special 
Intelligence section was formed within the 'Y' organisation with Philpott in charge. 
Officially new to the section, although he may have helped out informally before, was a 
35 year old Scotsman, Professor James Campbell, professor of mathematics from 
Victoria University of Wellington. He joined the Navy as a Temporary Lieutenant 
(Special Branch) on 23 January 1942. In May, Campbell went to Melbourne on a two 
month course 'for instruction and practical experience in Special Intelligence.' 118 Another 
who had informally joined the section in a part-time capacity as a translator was 
Mr.Robert Boulter, CMG, Trade Commissioner at the United Kingdom High 
Commission in Wellington. Boulter, over fifty years old, had been at the High 
Commission since 1934, and remained there until 1949. He originally entered the British 
Consular Service in Japan as a student interpreter and eighteen years later transferred to 
the Commercial Diplomatic Service, being appointed to the British Embassy in Tokyo. In 
1 <)29 he transferred to the Trade Commissioner Service in Singapore. He was awarded a 
CMG in 1933 for services during the 1923 Yokohama earthquake, where he was Consul-
General at the time. His title altered to Senior Trade Commissioner and Economic 
Adviser to the High Commissioner in 1946. He was to be awarded an DBE in 1947 'For 
services rendered to His Majesty's Government in New Zealand during the war.' 1]9 
Another senior intelligence officer from FECB, visiting Australia and New 
Zealand to assess the W rr and Special Intelligence position, commented favourably on 
progress In the Wellington 'Y' organisation. Speaking of 'keen co-operation and 
enthusiasm' shown by the small, efficient and 'most capable' 'Y' staff, he noted that 
'New Zealand is now able to tackle problems connected with Minor codes and Plain 
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Language [intercepts] in addition to wrr intelligence.' He referred to Campbell (the 
Victoria University mathematics professor) as a most promising student of Special 
Intelligence, and Campbell travelled with the officer to Australia en route to the Special 
Intelligence course. The 'Y' staff listed were Philpott, Campbell, and Mr. Boulter, a 
'Half-time translator', with two women assistants, one of whom knew 'quite a bit of 
Japanese.,120 
The work of the Special Intelligence section partly involved the passing of 
selected intercepted traffic to the RAN intelligence authorities by cable, either as 
complete messages or extracts. If a whole message was requested, the message heading 
was to be separately encyphered and despatched. This was followed by a second 
message with the text in the form it was intercepted. 121 At this time the RAN was 
receiving Naval Attache Code and other traffic from the RNZN Special Intelligence 
section. These intercepts were included with Australian messages forwarded to the 
Admiralty, and this was to continue. Fuji and 'B' Machine traffic also came from New 
Zealand and any of that not already intercepted in Australia was cabled to London.122 'B' 
Machine (better known as 'Purple') and Fuji were the only high grade ciphers in use by 
the Japanese Foreign Ministry at the time. The Australian Diplomatic Section 
concentrated on the Fuji material and passed all new 'B' Machine material to GCHQ's 
diplomatic intelligence off-shoot, the 500 strong Government Communications Bureau in 
Berkeley Street, Mayfair, to be worked on there. 
A further part of this work concerned the circulation of current working reports 
between British, Australian, Canadian and New Zealand Special Intelligence authorities. 
There were two categories of these working exchange signals. The first type looked 
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carefully at lists of Japanese naval caUsigns assigned to specific Japanese surface 
warships, submarines, communication centres and shore stations (the call signs changed 
irregularly and often). These were known as Japanese naval call sign allocations or 
callsign recoveries. The second type consisted of daily reports considering the external 
features of intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages to do with date, time message 
number, originator and so forth. These reports did not deal with encrypted texts of 
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messages. 
The FECB suffered a second bout of dislocation, and by 27 April only half the 
Special Intelligence and 'Y' organisation remained in Ceylon, although 'Y' and Zymotic 
signals would continue to be sent from Colombo. The other half of the organisation under 
Shaw and Francis had been withdrawn to Kilindini in East Africa. 124 This dislocation had 
ensued through having to destroy stations and recreate them as a result of the Japanese 
mounting a carrier-borne attack on Colombo on 5 April. 125 The disruption of the British 
and part of the American signals intelligence organisations and the offensive operations 
of the Japanese Navy had an impact even on New Zealand's slender 'Y' contribution. 
This delicate stage of the war put pressure on the operators of the radio stations and the 
direction-finding equipment. At times the urgency of immediate operational 
requirements dictated short cuts. For example, as the Battle of the Coral Sea raged 
between 3-8 May 1942, the H/F OfF operators at Awarua. 
were not really concerned with intercepting or copying Jap traffic, but only with 
taking bearings on the stations they were directed onto by station "NIT" (US 
Pacific Fleet HQ in Hawaii). It was very busy over this period as we were 
d' d J II' 126 lrecte onto numerous ap ca SIgns. 
During March, the Japanese had penetrated the three-mile limit of the New 
Zealand coast. On 8 March 1942, the Japanese submarine 1-25 entered Cook Strait and 
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reconnoitred Wellington harbour using its spotter plane in the early hours of the next 
morning. It despatched the aircraft over Auckland on 13 March while in the Bay of 
Plenty. The 1-25 was not located by direction-finding equipment. 127 A group of Japanese 
submarines from the Eighth Submarine Group were despatched into Australasian waters 
in Mayas a result of the March reconnaissance, to seek out concentrations of enemy 
warships. This group was under the command of Captain Hanku Sasaki, the commander 
of Submarine Division 3.128 Towards the end of May 1942, Sasaki's own submarine, the 
1-21, headed south, making a reconnaissance of Suva Harbour using his spotter plane. He 
then proceeded to New Zealand, and flew off the float-plane once more to reconnoitre 
Auckland Harbour. This flight took place in the very early morning hours of 24 May, but 
because the Waitemata Harbour was shrouded in mist, the pilot was unable to spot any 
shipping. The fog was so bad that the low-flying aircraft lost its way, and was only 
assisted when the lights of Mangere aerodrome were turned on to help what sounded like 
an aircraft in difficulties. The aircraft made the 140 mile return leg to 1-21 without 
further incident. 129 
The New Zealand H/F D/F stations located the 1-21 on 26 Mayas Sasaki 
transmitted a long signal in the Tasman Sea en route for Sydney, well to the southeast of 
Lord Howe Island and almost due west of Cape Reinga. Bearings were taken from the 
signal, and the Katakana was copied by the operators at Awarua, Musick Point and 
Waipapakauri. The 'Y' Room in New Zealand was unable to 'read' the code (JN25b) at 
the time. The Katakana signal would have passed from the 'Y' Room in Wellington to 
the RAN's cryptographic team under Captain Nave and to the US Navy's codebreaking 
unit, FRUMEL, in Melbourne. These two units were reading JN25b with some delay. It 
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may also have been passed to FECB, which read IN25b. It seems this signal was not 
read in time in Australia (Nave could not recall the message and could not say when it 
had been decrypted),130 and nothing was passed to the naval authorities in Sydney. 
The 1-21 transmitted in IN 25b a report on the state of Suva Harbour while en 
route to Auckland, which made the FRUMEL Daily Digest for 31 May 131 for 
Commander US 7th Fleet. The Suva message sent by 1-21 to laluit Radio included '1 2nd 
class cruiser (Guru so Class), 7 type [sic] 8 small patrol boats. No merchant ships at 
anchor.' It is probable IN25b could only be read with some delay as the Suva message in 
the FRUMEL Daily Digest ascribes I-21's Suva signal being sent between 19 and 23 
May. If the contents of the message transmitted by 1-21 on 26 May was not read until 1 
June, then the information in it would have been too late as a warning message for 
Sydney. This was a pity, for the signal intercepted by the New Zealand stations read as 
follows. Telegraphic Order No.3 was transmitted at 2230M/26 May, reading, 
1. Day of attack will be as instructed. 
2. Order of departure of the to's [short for Kakuno, or 'cylinder', a term 
used for the midget submarines when they were being transported by the mother 
submarine] will be 1-27, 1-22 and 1-24. The to from 1-27 will pass through the 
heads 20 minutes after moonrise, followed by those from 1-22 and 1-24 at 20 
minute intervals. 
3.The choice of targets is left to the to commanders but every effort should 
be made to attack the following targets. 
a. If there is a battleship and a cruiser east of the Harbour Bridge, I-27's to 
and I-22's to are to attack the battleship and I-24's to the cruiser. If there are two 
cruisers, the craft from 1-22 and 1-24 will attack them while I-27's to attacks the 
battleship. 
b. If there is a battleship or aircraft carrier in front of Harbour Bridge, this 
should be attacked. 
c. If there are no suitable targets east of the Harbour Bridge efforts should 
be concentrated on those targets west of the bridge. 
4. The cardinal position for recovery on the first day will be a point four 
nautical miles, 170 degrees from the first point. 1-24, 1-22, 1-27 and 1-29, in that 
order, will be deployed in the direction of 110 degrees from the cardinal point 
with a distance of 4000 metres between each boat. 1-21 will be positioned at 6000 
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metres, 02 degrees of the recovery deployment centre. Parent submarines should 
take new recovery position off Port Hacking without further order on the second 
day.132 
This was complete operational intelligence for the raid, sufficient to prepare a trap for 
the three midgets and the five accompanying submarines (the four mentioned in the 
signal plus the command boat, 1-21). The New Zealand COIC Daily Summary noted the 
bearings for 1-21 's signal. 
D/F bearings from Awarua and Auckland placed a Japanese submarine in 
approximate position 34 degrees S 165 degrees E at 2230M/26. It is possible that 
this may be the same unit which was placed off the Australian coast by DIP 24/5. 
Aircraft for search to be in position dawn 27/5.133 
The Daily Summary for the next day noted: 
Following D/F bearings placing a Japanese submarine in approximate position 34 
degrees S. 165 degrees E. at 2230M/26, Hudson aircraft from Whenuapai carried 
ou t a search along the submarine's estimated course from 0317M/27 to dusk and 
throughout the moonlight hours and the search is being continued today ... 134 
The search for the submarine was continued the next day, with no result.135 Following a 
reconnaissance flight over Sydney in the early hours of 30 May, Sasaki transmitted 
another signal, Telegraphic Order no.4. This order gave an update on the targets inside 
the harbour. This mayor may not have been intercepted, but if it was received, it could 
no longer be read as a new code, JN25c, had just come into force two days earlier. 
Whether it was this transmission or another routine signal not long before the attack in 
the evening of 31 May, something was intercepted during the night in New Zealand. The 
duty officer in the 'Y' Room in Wellington that night, Leading Telegraphist Williamson, 
had 
modified my own receiver [at home] to cover the 6 MHZ frequency being 
used .... and when not on watch at night in the Y Office [I] monitored this 
frequency .... About three hours before the Sydney Harbour attack, when 1 was the 
night watch 'controller' in the Y Office, my wife rang to say there seemed to be 
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activity on the frequency on our home set. I took a chance and alerted Awarua 
who immediately instigated a 'SNAP' to all stations. The bearings coming in 
confirmed a big southern shift abeam of Sydney, these being passed on receipt to 
ACNB and [the] Admiralty, 'OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE'. All DlFs 
remained on the frequency passing in bearings on every transmission. Lieutenant 
Philpotts [ sic] and all the staff spent the rest of that night waiting for some 
information as to what was happening. About 0900 the next morning after 
reading wild reports in the morning paper, we received the Y report from [the] 
Admiralty detailing the damage caused .... 136 
Between 1 and 3 June, D/F bearings were obtained on Japanese submarines off Sydney 
by Awarua (301 to 304 degrees), Musick Point (265 to 270 degrees) and Waipapakauri 
(268 to 270 degrees). 137 
The RAN had been warned, but had taken few precautions. Sydney Harbour had 
been raided overnight by three Japanese midget submarines, which did little damage 
other than sink an accommodation vessel, HMAS Kuttabul, killing nineteen sailors on 
board, a torpedo meant for and narrowly missing the American heavy cruiser Chicago 
which had just got under way. All three midget submarines were lost along with their 
crews, a result which appeared to be more good luck than good management by the RAN. 
A timely warning was thus sheeted home. Had 1-21 's signal of 26 May been decrypted in 
time and passed on to the right place, the consequences may have been more expensive 
for the Japanese submarines. A New Zealand H/F D/F report in the early morning noted 
At 0600 June 1 an approximate fix was obtained of the Japanese submarine 
reported 70 miles S.E. of Sydney on 29/5. The submarine appears to have moved 
down the Australian coast about 120 miles. 138 
The same day a 
Japanese unit presumably connected with submarines was by D/F at 1958M/l in 




The New Zealand HIF D/F stations continued to intercept signals and take bearings of the 
enemy off the Australian east coast over the next few days. On 2 June 
At least four enemy units are reported by D/F to be in the vicinity of Sydney 
between 1950M/2 to 2155M/2.140 
On 3 June 
Two sets of D/F bearings from Awarua, Auckland and Waipapakauri at 2001M/3 
and 2205M/3 placed two Japanese units (probably submarines) in vicinity of 
Jervis Bay and Port Jackson respectively. 
At 2230/3 the Australian coastal steamer "IRON CHIEFTAIN" was torpedoed in 
position approximately 28 miles east of Sydney Heads and at 2310M/3 the 
Australian steamer "AGE" was shelled for 20 minutes ... The second attack took 
place 18 miles to the north eastward of the first ... 141 
The attack on the Age was carried out by Sasaki's 1-21 while 1-24 under Commander 
Hanabusa sank the Iron Chieftain.142 A signal from the Captain on the Staff, Colombo 
sent to the ACNB at 1209Z/4 June, repeated to NZNB, observed 
D/F bearings from Auckland, Waipapakauri, and Awarua show Japanese units 
Edward Orange RE KU KE T A and R1 to Southwest of Sydney between 0700 
and 1400 GMT 2nd • Assume you are obtaining these. 143 
On 8 June the COIC Daily Summary noted 
D/F bearings were obtained of two Japanese submarines; one off Sandy Cape at 
2050M/8 and one in approximate position 33 degrees S 151 degrees E at 
2142M/8. 144 
Ten days later, in the wake of the heightened vigilance created by the Sydney 
Harbour raid, there was an understandable flurry of concern when the Cook Strait ferry 
"RANGITIRA" reported passing in dense fog at 0945M/18 a suspicious object 
that had the appearance of a small submerged submarine in position 43 degrees 
25'S 173 degrees 02'E approximately 14 miles N.E. of Godley Head, Port 
LytteIton. Thick fog prevented aircraft from Wigram carrying out a search. A 
Hudson fitted with A.S.V. from Nelson searched the area and reported a log about 
3 '1 h f h .. 145 fil es sout 0 t e .... posltlOn. 
Two days later 
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H.M.N.Z.S. "FUTURIST" at 0710M/20 reported sighting a SUSpICIOUS object 
which looked like a submarine in position 6 miles south of Island Bay, about 3/4 of 
a mile away from ship ... 146 
There were no contacts by the H!F D/F stations, however. 
By the second half of 1942, the plotting centre for the results of direction-finding 
bearings was staffed with Wrens (the Women's Royal New Zealand Naval Service), and 
incoming D/F intelligence was first passed to Room 233 under the 'Y' Room's control. 
This was very important work, and for a period the centre plotted all D/F bearings for the 
US Commander of the South Pacific Area (COMSOPAC). Around three to four hundred 
bearings were received over a twenty-four hour period from stations around the world, 
and the daily results summarised and promulgated. The movements of all Japanese 
submarines were particularly closely followed. 147 
Meantime, Philpott, the SO(Y), visited the US Navy's intelligence centre in 
Honolulu and the intelligence organisations in Australia in early 1943, and as a 
consequence. the co-operation between Wellington, Melbourne and Pearl Harbor was 
much improved with regard to operational intelligence. 148 
By early 1943, New Zealand's H/F D/F network worked for immediate 
operational purposes to the American D/F set up. The US Mid-Pacific D/F Net was run 
by the Pearl Harbor control station 'NIT'. H/F D/F stations at Kodiac, Dutch Harbor, 
Bainbridge, Imperial Beach, Midway, Oahu, Palmyra, Samoa, Guadalcanal, Awarua, 
Musick Point, Waipapakauri and Suva, worked to the control station. The RAN stations 
of Coonawarra, Harman and J andakot supplied bearings but were not controlled by Pearl 
Harbor. Pearl Harbor initiated flashes to all H/F D/F stations on the net with the 
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frequency and usually the callsign of the enemy transmission. Flashes in New Zealand 
were received by Awarua, the New Zealand controlling station and passed by landline. 
In addition, Awarua is able to originate a "Snap" message in plain 
language .... by a suitable automatic relay system, over the cable to Suva. At 
present, the "Snap" messages override any "flashes", in order to cover the 
frequent occasions when submarine transmissions in the South Pacific area are 
heard by New Zealand stations and not by the control at Pearl Harbor. 149 
Plotting centres were maintained at Pearl Harbor, Wellington for South Pacific 
and Bainbridge for North Pacific. The New Zealand stations passed bearings in to centres 
by cable in plain language which had up to four hours delay. The system was being 
reorganised with control at Pearl and Wellington and Bainbridge being sub centres. 
Wellington had taken over the task of plotting fixes for COMSPAC who passed them on 
to task forces. In addition, close liaison and exchange of bearings also took place with the 
RAN, the FECB, the RCN and the Intelligence Centre Pacific Ocean Area (ICPOA) in 
Honolulu. ISO 
Towards the end of 1942, a new and highly secret form of intelligence collection 
was introduced in New Zealand that would enhance the work of the H/F D/F stations, 
filling out the picture for the 'Y' Room, under the guidance of Lieutenant Merlin 
Minshall, RN. It was part of the leading-edge of the technical means of gaining insights 
from the physical characteristics of enemy signal transmissions. This was REB or radio~ 
fingerprinting, and the role of the New Zealand station established is covered in the next 
chapter. 
In 1943, Room 233 of the 'Y' organisation was staffed by a Petty Officer and 
seven Wren ratings working on callsign identification, frequency lists, frequency 
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indicators and Japanese wrr, while consolidating D/F, radio-fingerprinting and Special 
Intelligence. ls1 
Across the Tasman, the RAN's fourteen strong Special Intelligence Section 
(Diplomatic) had recently been taken over by the Australian Army, but the RAN 
continued to pass on all raw traffic received from the NZNB, which was 'greatly valued.' 
This included the texts of locally intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages for handling 
in Melbourne. The Australian Army Special Section (Diplomatic) wished the flow to 
continue and offered their weekly Special Intelligence Precis to the New Zealand Army's 
Director of Military Intelligence in return, enclosing the latest copy. The Precis offered 
good background information although distribution was restricted ta the service 
intelligence bodies and the high command. It was assumed similar limits would apply in 
New Zealand, although 'You may think is desirable ta show these precis to Mr.Boulter 
whose comments might prove of value.' The New Zealand DMI contacted the DNI and 
the offer of the weekly Precis was accepted, with an extra copy requested far the DNI. A 
copy would be passed to Boulter in the Special Intelligence section for perusal. 152 
By December 1942, an internal AIF Special Intelligence Section (Diplomatic) 
minute estimated that on average some 3,000 groups of Japanese diplomatic traffic were 
being passed to London per day. Japanese military and naval attache traffic amounting to 
about 800-900 messages per month was microfilmed and despatched. Is3 
An addition to the Wellington 'Y' Room's Special Intelligence section was Alan 
Carter, who joined as a Temporary Sub-Lieutenant (Special Branch) on 9 March 1943. 
Carter was a 'statistical clerk' who had joined the Army on 14 January 1941, aged 
nineteen. He completed a military intelligence course and went to Army Signals at 
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Narrow Neck. He was granted leave without pay and took a job as a clerk outside the 
Anny in August 1941, and was placed in the military intelligence reserve pool in early 
1943. Carter remained with the Special Intelligence section where his mathematical skills 
were put to good use until early 1945.154 
The Special Intelligence section now consisted of three officers, Philpott, 
Campbell, Carter, plus Mr.Boulter and four Wren ratings, working under general 
guidelines from FRUMEL. In November 1942, it had been proposed that they work on 
'J.N. F [sic] J N 54 [and] Current J.N. 15 GUERILLA.' By May 1943 their efforts were 
concentrated on three Japanese naval ciphers, JN15D, JN20H (Minor All Purposes Code) 
and IN 180 (Honshu Shipping Control Cypher) , as well as on low grade language codes. 
Commander Laird, a visiting FECB intelligence officer, thought the section should be 
used as an exploitation centre for small special tasks. l55 Commander Saunders, ex-Hut 
Three at Bletchley Park, evaluated the section in favourable terms on his tour of British, 
Canadian, American and Australian interception centres during September and October. 
He called on 4 October 1943, noting its remarkably good productivity in relation to its 
tiny size. He thought it should continue to intercept 'traffic unique to it location .... and to 
recovering call-signs as at present.' More assistance for Philpott with technical 
information and recoveries on low grade ciphers was required. 156 
There was co-ordination of Allied signals intelligence in the Pacific, but it 
remained incomplete. This was not simply because American, British, Australian, 
Canadian and New Zealand intelligence organisations were not wholly integrated. It had 
to do fundamentally with the split between the US Navy's intelligence organisations 
(based on OP-20-G) and MacArthur's intelligence set-up (with the focus on the Central 
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Bureau). In the background to this was the mutual hostility between the US Anny and 
the US Navy on intelligence matters. This was not merely because of the strong 
personalities of Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur: it went back to interservice 
rivalries. 157 Slightly compounding this split was the ambiguous Allied Intelligence 
Bureau, which seems to have served principally British and Australian interests in South-
East Asia Command (SEAC). 
Although the co-operation In naval intelligence had been proceeding fairly 
steadily since December 1941, it was not until early 1944 that the US Navy's OP-20-G 
came up with a proposal for' complete integration'. A memorandum from the Assistant 
Director of Naval Communications at OP-20-G in March 1944 set out a plan for a Trans-
Pacific Coverage Plan. This suggested: 
During April it is desired to start unification of all Japanese intercept 
coverage into a fully coordinated plan, maintaining at the same time the present 
f h · . 158 autonomy 0 t e vanous proceSSIng centers. -
Noting that 'in recent months' there had been 'considerable progress' towards that 
end, it was felt that the time was ripe for full coordination. The important rider was the 
autonomy of the processing centers, which included SIN West Coast/Washington, 
FRUPAC in Honolulu, FRUMEL in Melbourne, Flowerdown in the United Kingdom, 
and the Captain on the Intelligence Staff in Colombo (COIS). The OUTLINE OF 
TRANS-PACIFIC COVERAGE PLAN indicated that these processing centres would be 
linked in Washington in a Trans Pacific Network Center run by OP_20_G. 159 The central 
location at OP-20-G had the function of maintaining 
an hourly record .... of what is being covered by all the processing point 
networks .... [S/N, FRUPAC, FRUMEL, Flowerdown, and eOIS] and the number 
of messages received hourly on each circuit by each processing point. 160 
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The autonomy of the processing centres was indicated: 
Each processing point ... . [SIN, FRUPAC, FRUMEL, Flowerdown, and 
eOIS] shall determine its own coverage priorities in accordance with its own 
needs, control its assignments to its component receiving stations, and report 
composite figures hourly to the Trans-Pacific Network Center at OP_20_G. 161 
What was being suggested was an assessment of the size of the intercepted traffic 
flow each processing centre was receiving, to look for gaps and fill these in, particularly 
where traffic faded but was being received clearly by other stations. It would be possible 
to see thinly covered areas and steps could be taken to fill the gaps. Similarly, too much 
overlap could be minimized. Thus interception could be tracked but not get in the road of 
the priorities of individual networks. 162 Those linked by teletype could report hourly; 
others could send in by mail to complete the coverage picture. The sketch plan for the 
coverage set down 'Nairnville' in New Zealand as linked to FRUMEL as a centre that 
would send in coverage reports probably by mail. ( See diagram overleaf)163 Nairnville 
Park in Wellington, referred to the interception facilities of the Special Section of the 
New Zealand Army Signals Company, for a considerable amount of locally intercepted 
traffic was provided by this unit. The analysis cell of the unit, made up of Lieutenant 
MacKenzie (the GS03 (Intelligence and Y), a cryptographer, Dr. Edward Bennett, and a 
translator, Gilbert Lennox-King, worked closely with Philpott's Special Intelligence 
section. A full evaluation of this unit is the subject of Chapter Seven. 
At the beginning of May 1944, listening watches for the interception of enemy 
radio transmissions - the 'Y' watch - were maintained at Awarua, the new naval wrr 
Station at Waiouru, in Suva, and by the Army at Nairnville Park. Most of the intercepted 
traffic from these stations went to the 'Y' Room at Navy Office. The H/F D/F net in 
New Zealand remained the four stations of Awarua, Musick Point, Waipapakauri and 
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Suva. They could be operated as a complete unit under the 'Y' Room, or in conjunction 
with both the US and Australian HJF D/F organisations.164 The big change for the Navy 
came with the establishment of the large Naval W rr Station at Waiouru, which postwar 
became HMNZS Irirangi. This was equipped with very powerful high speed transmitters 
and receivers which were tuned to communicate with the Admiralty, Kilindini, 
Esquimalt, Belconnen, Honolulu and Bombay. The potential of the station was 
substantial, and would carry the communications of the British Pacific Fleet for the last 
phase of the war. 165 
The great perennial problem for New Zealand during the war was its basic 
vulnerability to incursions by enemy naval units. The slow large converted merchantmen 
that served as the German Navy's poor man's commerce raiders were nonetheless 
effective in the South Pacific and in New Zealand waters. Their careful practice of 
wireless security permitted them to cruise largely uninterrupted, only noticed when they 
struck. The mines laid off Auckland underlined this great weakness in 1940, but 
although a number of vessels were sunk by the raiders, tying up cargoes in ports when 
alerts were on, the impact was negligible on trade and the movement of men and supplies 
overall. Even the sinking of the Turakina and the Rangitane did not have more than a 
passing impact, cushioned by a Government concerned not to panic the population. If 
1940 and 1941 were the German years in New Zealand waters, the Japanese took over in 
1942. This time New Zealand was aided by a foe with what can only be described as a 
ludicrous doctrine for the employment of submarines. While some ships were sunk in the 
Tasman by Japanese submarines, they were not many, and again, few got into difficulties 
in New Zealand waters. The cruises of the 1-25 and 1-21 in March and May 1942 
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demonstrated just how unprepared New Zealand was for surprise attacks on shipping. 
Despite signals interception, the enemy units remained largely unnoticed and undetected 
and unhurried. 
In late 1944 the arrival the submarine arm of the German Navy in the Far East had 
not gone unnoticed. In August the RCN's diary of Gennan wrr traffic intercepted noted: 
Six incoming enigma messages were recorded on the Indian Ocean service 
(Series 7) originated complete with a serial number in the range XI-XIOO. This 
traffic was deemed to have been sent to control by a shore station at the Gennan 
naval base at Penang.166 
This was intercepted at Colombo. On 26 September the SO(Y) in Wellington received 
from C. in C. Eastern Fleet: 
A shore station fixed in the PENANG AREA has been heard handling Gennan 
naval traffic as follows:- Time GMT; 0000 to 1000 on 31700 and 7365 
kilocycles/second, 1000 to 1630 on 11470 and 4265 kilocycles/second .... 
Control used call sign 6K8 but other stations are also active. Traffic consists of 
five letter code and naval engims [sic] bearing serial number X 001 to 100. 
Frequencies in paragraph 1 have been heard being used by U-boats east of about 
88 east to 6K8, probably when direct touch with GERMANY cannot be used. 
Normal U-boat procedure is used .... 167 
An annotation by Phipott instructed this be referred to Awarua, requesting monitoring of 
the frequencies and to 'report any results with bearings.' 168 The German U-boat U862 
later departed for a patrol cruise around the coast of Australia, into the Tasman Sea, 
around New Zealand, back across the Southern Ocean and to return to Batavia in 
February 1945. Although the sinking of two Liberty ships, one in the Tasman and one in 
the Indian Ocean signalled its presence, the circumnavigation of the New Zealand coast 
remained unknown in New Zealand for decades. 169 U862 had kept wireless silence in 
New Zealand waters. This submarine's patrol points up the limitations obvious in signals 
interception. Wireless silence meant no detection. 
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The end of the operation of the Special Intelligence section of the 'Y' 
organisation was signalled with the departure of Professor Campbell back to Victoria 
University on 23 February 1945, and the secondment of Alan Carter to FRUMEL on 12 
February 1945. Carter remained there until September, working in the JN11 Department 
under Lt.-Col.A.P .Treweek on research attached to the routine reading of current JN11 
traffic, with key and additive strip recoveries.17o Whether Boulter still popped into the 
'Y' Room from time to time is not known. Interestingly, the Army 'Y' analysis cell's 
personnel, namely MacKenzie, Bennett and Lennox-King, were all seconded to signals 
intelligence posts in Australia in 1944-45. 
On the grand scale that the Allies fought the intelligence war from the late 1930s 
to beyond 1945, New Zealand's contribution to the war in the ether was minute. This 
could hardly be unexpected, given the tiny defence resources of a small population of one 
of the world's less strategically significant archipelagos. The nature of the direct New 
Zealand naval experience in the signals intelligence war can be seen in a number of 
factors. The lengthy history of operational involvement in signals interception, the co-
operation that tended to permeate throughout, and the existence of vital overseas linkages 
were fundamental. Foresight, the contributions to operational success, and the dedication 
of the intelligence personnel sketched the boundaries of this little war in the ether. 
The long experience of the Navy, with the indispensable condition of its practical 
working relationship with the P&T Department, laid down a foundation in the First 
World War that underpinned New Zealand signals interception in the second 
conflagration. The maintenance of that relationship in the interwar years, and the 
practices of co-operation between naval intelligence and the civilian radio stations, 
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allowed the threads to be taken up quite quickly in 1939. The personnel slipped into 
those pre-existing patterns of practice, and required only relatively small adjustments to 
become operationally effective. The acquisition of the ability to read Katakana was one 
of these adjustments. It is not accidental that it was in signals intelligence that more 
progress was made more speedily and effectively than in any other area of New 
Zealand's intelligence activities between 1939 and 1945. While the Navy, with its 
Admiralty pedigree, provided the leadership in the field, it was the existence and 
availability of the large pool of P&T wireless operators that made the little interception 
offensive possible. 
New Zealand signals interception was marked by co-operation at different levels 
within the interception units throughout. The 'Y' organisation would have got nowhere 
at all without the civilian HIP D/F stations, for it was these (along with the Army 
intercept unit) that provided the bulk of the locally obtained raw material for analysis. 
The monitoring of enemy transmissions by naval, civilian and military wireless operators 
and the smooth passage of intercepted traffic to the centre could only be achieved through 
durable co-operative operational practices. The P&T Department staff bridged both the 
Army and Navy interception units, providing the essential technical staff to make it work. 
Without them, technical innovation like the REB post - staffed by outsiders - would have 
been impossible. 
The overseas linkages were vital. The whole 'Y' offensive was largely an 
Admiralty initiative, springing from the Naval Intelligence Division in London, which 
also had its roots in the success of Room 40 in the First World War. The Far East 
Combined Bureau fe-established the co-operative ventures in signals interception 
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pioneered in 1914-18, but on a grander scale. The New Zealand 'Y' organisation's 
operational linkages with first Singapore, then Colombo, were also enhanced by the 
ubiquitous Australian connection, itself coming from past practice. This was a 
fundamental relationship that spanned the awkward period of the aftermath of Pearl 
Harbor and the withdrawal of FECB from Singapore. All these in tum led into the new 
working relationship with the United States, and in particular the US Navy's OP-20-G 
units, FRUP AC and FRUMEL. There was an operational transformation of the signals 
interception effort in the Pacific, spear-headed by OP-20-G, MacArthur's United States-
Australian Central Bureau in Brisbane, and the British-Australian Allied Intelligence 
Bureau of South-East Asia Command. The transformation more than compensated for 
the reduction in British effectiveness, in the aftermath of the events of early 1942. For 
the RNZN interception work it meant still closer links between Melbourne, Wellington 
and Honolulu. 
Foresight was important.. Germany offered herself through past experience, not 
least because of the potential of her small navy to wage an expensive guerre de course. 
Japanese intentions in East Asia were signalled early, and the possession of large capable 
air and naval forces to permit her to drive south and across the Pacific made those forces 
favourite targets for signals interception. The picking up of the threads in 1939 was 
merely a first stage. The quickening of the pace of operational interception in 1941 
brought on the time of greatest success in 1942 and 1943. But it was the foresight of 
interception personnel at quite low levels that ensured the proficiency of that attack. The 
putting together of a combined intelligence organisation at a snail's pace stands in stark 
contrast to the operational inroads in interception achieved by tiny units early in an 
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expanding conflict. The slender interception teams were ready for war with Japan, 
against the odds. The 'Y' organisation and its Special Intelligence section, the W rr 
listening watches and the H/F D/F stations were far further ahead in terms of effective 
operational intelligence collection and analysis than the CIB/COIC. If any effectiveness 
was lost in 1941-42, it was in the combined intelligence organisation rather than the 
component interception stations. 
'Y', wrr listening watches, Special Intelligence, HJF DfF and REB only made 
sense in an Allied context. By themselves, their efforts were puny. Within the larger 
Allied operational framework, however, they made important contributions. The 'Y' 
monitoring of Japanese forces in the Mandated Islands both prior to and subsequent to 7 
December 1941 was significant at a time of repeated tactical reverses. When the shift of 
the FECB occurred, the necessary adjustments were made. The Blenheim REB station 
was an outgrowth of those reversals. Operational successes against Japanese submarines 
assisted in the destruction of enemy units and the re-routeing of shipping. If the D/F 
work against the submarines off Sydney was ignored, there was much closer trans-
Tasman co-operation as a result. The co-ordination of tactical signals interception by the 
British and then the Americans made quite effective use of the Australasian resources at 
their disposal. While the Americans, particularly the US Navy, became most important 
players, for the RNZN and the New Zealand Army the links with the British intelligence 
organisations remained effective and durable. 
There was for the Navy a perceptible winding down of interception effort during 
1944. This was connected to the perception of the departure of conflict in a northerly 
direction. The earliest casualty was the closure of the REB station. As the COlC slowed 
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down and diminished in importance, the Navy put considerable effort into expanding its 
communications facilities with the establishment of the Waiouru W rr Station. Watch 
was maintained for enemy surface raiders or submarines in vain. The raiders and the 
Japanese submarines had caused problems that could not be solved by signals 
interception alone. Their impunity, and the case of U-862, posed both tactical and 
strategic question marks for New Zealand's maritime defence both at the time and for the 
future. Wireless silence and wireless security were the greatest threats to operational 
intelligence derived from signals interception. It remains to look a little more closely at 
the radio fingerprinting station and the Army's interception unit. 
Chapter Six 
REB: Radio Fingerprinting 
Towards the end of 1942, a new and highly secret form of intelligence collection 
was introduced in New Zealand providing another dimension to 'Y' intelligence. It was 
on the leading-edge of the contemporary technical methods of obtaining insights from the 
physical characteristics of enemy signal transmissions. It was noted earlier that although 
the German pocket battleship, Admiral Graf Spee, had been tracked by H/F DIP from the 
Indian Ocean into the South Atlantic before the Battle of the River Plate, she was thought 
to be the Admiral Scheer. The problem of how to identify warships at sea from their 
signals transmissions was a difficult one. Enemy vessels at sea put up barriers to 
identification with encrypted traffic, callsign alteration, rapidly changing frequencies, and 
high-speed transmissions, and through maintaining wireless silence for long periods. 
The Royal Navy had gone some way towards solving the identification question 
through the employment of REB or 'Z' Intelligence. REB was a letter convention used 
to disguise the initials RFP, standing for radio-fingerprinting. REB was a form of radio 
fingerprinting using particular mechanical devices. As Nigel West has commented, 
RFP was a crucial element of traffic analysis and enabled Sigint specialists to 
deduce considerable data from signals that resisted decryption. That remains true today 
for it is the only reliable method of distinguishing between manual operators.1 
Radio-fingerprinting has already been referred to as recognising the 'hand' of an 
operator, that is to say, peculiar characteristics exhibited by operators transmitting using a 
Morse key. Another shade of this was to be able to recognise the tone of a transmitter. 
These measures relied upon the acute 'ear' of the intercepting operator. This could work 
quite well at times, given large amounts of traffic and familiarity with the enemy wireless 
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operators' keying patterns. Experienced interception operators could recognise particular 
transmitting counterparts. With large numbers of warships at sea, and several operators 
per vessel on large warships, this was a more problematical. 
The new method was devised to recognise enemy transmitters, not by sound, but 
by a visual representation of a series of transmissions. In early 1938 an article in an 
American scientific journal had indicated that it could be feasible to take a photograph of 
a transmission to enable the transmitter to be identified.2 It was based on the principle 
that although callsigns might change and the operators too, the radio transmitter located 
in a vessel remained the same. Transmitters did not, as a rule, get moved from ship to 
ship. If the transmitter in use could be recognised, a breakthrough for the purpose of 
identifying the vessel or shore station could be made. By November 1939, the radio-
fingerprinting device was actively experimental, and further improvements were made on 
it from then onwards.3 The former head of FECB, Captain K.L.Harkness, put it this way: 
[The] Principal strength of [the] Y organisation in Colombo [ie FECB, 
which had earlier been in Singapore] was its ability to read the fingerprints of 
individual Japanese ship's distinctive transmissions. Individual operators, of 
course, had their own recognisable styles of using their keypad, and signals 
intelligence had earlier perfected the art of reading individual transmissions. But 
W rr transmitters also left their own tell-tale evidence, so that even though 
operators came and went, wrr equipment remained. Before the war [with Japan], 
the FEeB had employed sophisticated equipment to photograph Japanese high 
frequency transmissions as they appeared on a cathode ray tube and thus 
established a substantial dictionary of images by which to identify ships solely on 
the strength of their characteristic transmissions. These were called Radio 
Fingerprints (RFP) and functioned in much the same way as a library of 
fingerprints. Thus, regardless of changes in callsigns or efforts to disguise a 
ship's location, individual ships could be tracked by their wrr transmissions.4 
In the United Kingdom, the REB units were based at Flowerdown and 
Scarborough. In charge of the REB unit at Flowerdown was a certain Lieutenant Merlin 
Minshall, whose significance will be appreciated later. Minshall was first briefed on the 
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REB equipment by Reginald Bainbridge-Bell, who worked with Robert Watson-Watt on 
the development of radar. Minshall ascribed the invention of the REB machines to 
Bainbridge-Bell, although Arthur Marder asserted it was the work of the marine biologist 
Professor A.C. Hardy, Professor of Zoology and Oceanography at Hull.5 
One of the first operational successes using REB equipment in conjunction with 
H/F D/F was in the Bismarck chase in May 1941. Bismarck and Prinz Eugen were 
sighted by the Swedish cruiser Gotland as they passed through the Kattegat, and the 
Gotland sent a report identifying Bismarck to Stockholm.6 Swedish naval intelligence 
. informed the Norwegian Military Attache who passed the information on to the British 
Naval Attache. His Most Immediate signal to the DNI at theAdmiralty read: 
Kattegat today, 20 May. At 1500 two large warships escorted by three destroyers, 
five escort vessels, ten or twelve aircraft passed Marstrand course north-west. 
B3. 7 
Bismarck sent a signal to Gruppe Nord when the Gotland spotted her, and this 
transmission was picked up by REB equipment at Flowerdown.8 A good photograph was 
taken of the cathode ray tube display of the warship's transmission and filed. The REB 
photo record with its timing, when put together with the sighting report from Stockholm, 
identified the transmission source as Bismarck. She subsequently made 22 signals to 
Germany during her cruise. These signals were intercepted by HIP D/F stations and the 
twelve REB machines at Flowerdown. When Bismarck disappeared after the loss of 
HMS Hood, three signals from her were intercepted in the forenoon of 25 May, providing 
D/F bearings on an enemy unit. Two Flowerdown REB machines obtained useful 
photographs of the transmissions. These, when compared with the earlier ones from the 
Gotland incident and subsequent traffic, clearly revealed Bismarck as the source.9 The 
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D/F bearings plus this identification, proved very useful to Admiral Tovey in marshalling 
his scattered units to run her down. Another transmission suspected to be from the 
battleship was correctly distinguished by REB as another German unit.lO Further 
transmissions from Bismarck simply assisted in refining her location. The codebreaking 
efforts at Bletchley Park played little part during the chase, for the content of Bismarck's 
signal traffic was not read until after she was sunk. 11 
In early 1941 an REB 'outfit', as the device was tenned, was installed at the 
Royal Navy W rr Station at Kranji, Singapore, and by mid-year a 'library' of film of 
Japanese radio transmissions had built up. These filed segments of film were compared 
with other 'Y'intelligence including H/F D/F stations, and thus annotated was literally a 
dictionary of samples of wireless transmissions of the main high frequency sets of all 
Japanese major naval units and shore stations. This was useful in establishing the identity 
of particular vessels, regardless of the transmitted callsign.12 The call signs were being 
changed once a month before hostilities opened, but were altered far more frequently 
afterwards. These were identified using REB without too much difficulty.13 It is obvious, 
but needs noting, that wireless silence defeated this kind of intelligence (and should be 
remembered with regard to Admiral Nagumo's wireless silence before Pearl Harbor). 
The withdrawal of the FECB 'Y' organisation from Kranji to Colombo in January 
1942, and from Colombo to Kilindini (Mombasa) in April, was disruptive for REB work, 
because of an immediate lack of availability of specialised REB equipment.14 The 
dislocation was limited as far as possible, though there was a requirement for REB 
equipment to be located elsewhere. Elsewhere included Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand, being closer to East Asia and the central Pacific than Colombo or Kilindini, 
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while the United States had developed its own radio-fingerprinting machines. In 
December 1941, the Royal Canadian Navy received REB equipment from the Admiralty 
and in January 1942 began using REB on an experimental basis, getting the equipment 
properly calibrated. (The technical details of the apparatus will be considered when we 
tum to the New Zealand station shortly.) In March 1942, Dr.N.1. Hendy arrived from 
England to spend several weeks with the Canadian 'Z' organisation to assist in getting 
their radio fingerprinting classification system under way. On 29 March 1942, the first 
REB intercept of an enemy vessel was recorded in Ottawa, and during May, June and 
< J ul y, 19% of all transmissions intercepted at the 'Z' station were classified. This is said 
to have compared quite favourably with other stations elsewhere with better equipment. 
Most of this was concerned with U-boat tracking during the so-called 'Paukenschlag', as 
the submarines made heavy inroads into shipping in the eastern Atlantic, the Gulf of 
Mexico and the Caribbean. Later in the northern autumn of 1942 with a change in U-
boat tactics, a further application now became apparent. This was the use of REB in 
assessing by transmission discrimination the number of U-boats involved in the early 
stages of a convoy attack. IS This became a regular feature during the period of the great 
convoy battles of 1942-43. 
Between January and September 1942 TINA equipment, a further refinement of 
radio fingerprinting, began to be used in Canada. TINA and REB equipment operated at 
three temporary locations in Ottawa. Sufficient material was obtained to allow a 
satisfactory system of TINA classification to be drawn up. The 'Ottawa System' of 
TINA classification was adopted by both the US Navy and the Royal Navy, and although 
alterations were made to it in later years, the basic principle remained the same. 16 TINA 
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was the 'study of the morse characteristics of individual wireless operators.' 17 Tape 
recordings of transmissions were made. This consisted of reading a transmission on an 
undulation tape. By measuring the symbols, the characteristic touch of the operator could 
be distinguished. Is Careful systematic analysis followed, for which the 'Ottawa System' 
fonned a basis. TINA was less successful than REB, but remained a useful supplement 
in traffic analysis. 
The object of the US-British Radio Intelligence Conference, 6-16 April 1942, was 
to consider the latest developments in British and US 'Y' technology. It included many 
matters connected with 'Y' and wrr Intelligence, direction-finding and radio 
fingerprinting. It was also concluded that the interception of Japanese naval traffic was 
not receiving enough attention in terms of physical means of collection, as there were too 
few listening posts. This in turn meant the British and American processing agencies 
were no longer getting enough raw material to meet the requirement for operational 
intelligence. More operators and more sets were needed. The installation of more REB 
equipment was a supplementary measure to improve the situation.19 In the light of this it 
is not difficult to see why an REB station would be established in New Zealand at the end 
of the year. 
On 10 April 1942, REB and TINA were discussed at the United States-British 
Radio Intelligence Conference. Dr Hendy gave a presentation on REB and TINA, 
describing the general principles of REB and TINA classification. Discussion of more 
detailed technical aspects of the operational use of both methods followed. For instance it 
was noted the quality of REB photograph could be altered by equipment changes in coils 
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and cathode ray tubes.-
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In October 1942, the head of the Canadian 'Z' organisation, Lieutenant 1.H. Low, 
visited the US Navy's 'Z' set up and made arrangements for an exchange of 
classifications between the RCN and the US Navy. Approved in December, a daily 
exchange of classifications started in January 1943.21 In early 1943 the head of the 
RCN's 'Y' Gennan organisation, the head of the section dealing with U-boat traffic, and 
Lieutenant Low of the 'Z' organisation visited England, including Bletchley Park, the 
Operational Intelligence Centre in London, and the naval station at Scarborough. Low 
spent most of his time at Scarborough which was the main centre for REB and TINA. He 
found the Royal Navy's and the RCN's classification methods similar, and obtained 
useful information on technical matters to do with frequencies that had been confusing 
the classifiers in Canada. Scarborough, as one of the most important signals interception 
stations, left the visitors impressed by its immense array of aerials, the size of the 
operating room, the completeness of the 'Z' intelligence section and the efficiency of the 
direction-finding operators.22 Arrangements were made for the RCN to receive the 
Scarborough and Flowerdown Daily Reports. These were very useful, if a little delayed. 
Low noted that most REB personnel in England were Wrens, and recommended that the 
RCN staff the REB posts with women?~ The Royal Canadian Navy's first volume of 
Japanese naval callsign identifications was promulgated on 18 August 1942, with a 
second volume on 30 August. Positive identifications and callsign changes were sent to 
the Admiralty, Kilindini (part of FECB), the ACNB, and the NZNB?4 
The first steps on REB in New Zealand were taken towards the end of 1942. An 
obscure, isolated property at the end of Wratts Road, Rapaura, near Blenheim was visited 
by Lieutenant Philpott, the SO(Y), Lieutenant Merlin Minshall, RN, and the Deputy 
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Director of the Wrens, Helen Fenwick. Minshall was sent to New Zealand by the 
Admiralty to set up an REB station, although on his own account he persuaded the DNI 
in Wellington that such a station would be a good thing.25 He was listed as part of 
Philpott's 'Y' organisation. Minshall was an eccentric character, but he had a great deal 
to do with getting the New Zealand REB station established and operational, based on his 
experience with the REB unit at Flowerdown. 
The SO(Y) noted on 15 September 1942 that preliminary work for the proposed 
REB station near Blenheim was complete, and that it was intended to staff it with Wrens. 
DLHendy from the Naval Intelligence Division was in Australia and would visit New 
Zealand to assist in the establishment of the station. Financial approval for the REB 
station was urgently requested?6 The SSO concurred, noting that there were separate 
entry arrangements for the new Wrens, who needed to be trained as soon as possible.27 
A memorandum to the Minister of Defence on 18 September 1942 outlined the 
REB station proposal, though it refrained from spelling out exactly the station's task. 
Noting that most secret and specialised W rr equipment had recently arrived from Britain, 
it suggested that its purpose was 'designed to solve one of the outstanding problems in 
direction finding intelligence and has been used with conspicuous success ... .in England.' 
An officer of the Admiralty's Naval Intelligence Division had been sent out to train 
personnel and install the equipment, and he was expected shortly.28 The Minister was 
reminded of the value of the 'Y' organisation's wireless intelligence since it provided the 
only definite knowledge of enemy movements beyond the range of air reconnaissance.29 
It was proposed to install the equipment at a new station near Blenheim for 'technical 
reasons', and it was necessary for the station to be on the landline linking Awarua, 
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Musick Point and Waipapakauri H/F D/F stations. The site was a 1;4 acre property with a 
seven-room farmhouse belonging to R.Dosser, an Army Port Security officer.3o The 
station would be staffed by eight Wrens, including the Wren in charge. The house 
required furnishing and alterations and additions for the work required, plus to ensure 
reasonable living conditions for eight women isolated in the countryside. A small car was 
required for supplies, stores and for taking daily reports to Woodbourne to be sent by air 
to Wellington?1 Cost estimates came to 2,665 pounds, 15 shillings and threepence, plus 
extra charges for rent and phone. It would be necessary to provide a military guard. As 
the equipment was of 'immediate value' operationally, it was essential that the REB 
station proposal be treated as very urgent.32 The proposal obtained War Cabinet approval 
on 8 October.33 
The Blenheim W rr Station was under the administrative control of Wren Petty 
Officer Jetta Keay. She stayed at Rapaura for most of 1943, and was replaced by WPO 
Margaret Finlay, who was in early 1944 succeeded by WPO Joan Sayers. The Wren staff 
divided into wireless operators and classifiers, and there were to be four of each. The 
telegraphists were Nan Barker, Nell Luttrell, Bunty Pigott, and Margaret Scott. The 
classifiers were Dorothy Shroff, Marguerite Boxer, Philippa Tweed and Janet McLeod. 
Janet McLeod left early and was replaced a little later by Marion Pitt.34 They were being 
introduced to highly secret work, arguably the most secret of any New Zealand 
intelligence establishment during the war, aside from the 'Y' Room itself. The work was 
totally outside their experience, and indeed, apart from Minshall, outside that of everyone 
else in Wellington. The Wrens, leaving aside the Wren Petty Officer in charge, were all 
brought in from outside the Navy. All well educated, they were told they would have 
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officer status after a short time,3S although this turned out to be false. A guarded house 
full of women naval officers would have attracted attention. In any case, the SO(Y) 
himself was only relatively recently commissioned,36 and as a regular was probably 
disinclined to support commissioned rank for the Wrens. 
The Wrens were put on short and separate courses, one for telegraphists and one 
for the classifiers, the latter lasting for some seven to ten days. The courses were 
overseen by Dr Hendy. 37 He had assisted the establishment of the REB stations in Canada 
in March and April, and was doing the same thing in Australia. He has been described as 
... of middle height, chunky, stocky, not much hair, a solid little man. I 
think we got on well with him. I mean he went straight in with the information. 
We were possibly less in awe of him than we would have been of 'uniforms' at 
that stage ... He was ex-British Museum.38 
The telegraphists were given a crash course in Katakana and were briefed to some extent 
on what they would be doing at the REB Station. Petty Officer Allan Packer had a good 
deal to do with this and the familiarisation at Blenheim. Packer was one of the original 
telegraphists sent to establish the Suva H/F D/F Station in 1941. The classifiers were 
introduced to their role, the processing and classification of the product of the 
telegraphists' work. At the heart of this lay the photographs of signal transmissions 
displayed on a cathode ray tube. Hendy 
... was talking all the time about wavelengths and the theory that there was an 
electrical trip at the beginning of every signal that became identifiable ... 39 
Put another way, 
... if the millisecond or so of the film which followed the pressing of the 
transmitters key was examined with a magnifying glass, the film, unless reception 
conditions were bad, allowed the transmitter to be identified with certainty.40 
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In mid-November an advance party of Wrens Keay, Luttrell, Boxer and Tweed, 
with Hendy who had 'certain equipment' set off from Wellington to the wrr station via 
Picton.41 A safe for document storage was ordered by Minshall and sent to the Royal 
Naval Officer at Picton on 16 November. This was to be, possibly, a matter of no small 
significance.42 The station was already set up by the time the Wrens arrived. The house 
itself was surrounded by a seven-foot tall barbed-wire perimeter fence, with a gate 
guarded by an anned sentry 24 hours a day. To begin with, a second sentry patrolled the 
perimeter fence, but this was discontinued at the request of the Wrens in the interests of 
privacy.43 The guard detail, seven to ten strong, was provided by an Anny Guards Vital 
Points detachment, quartered outside the fence and not pennitted to venture inside. Entry 
was permitted only for personnel with passes signed by the SO(Y), Philpott. This was 
strictly adhered to. This put effective obstacles in the way of the curious. 
The house itself had three bedrooms upstairs, and the rooms downstairs had 
certain modifications. The Operations Room containing the REB equipment was at the 
front on the ground floor. Directly behind the Ops Room was a small laboratory and a 
dark room. Entry to this was from the Ops Room. The only sign on the h.ouse itself that 
there might be anything interesting inside was an unobtrusive bracket on the wall outside 
above the bay window of the Ops Room. This was an aerial lead-in for the radio 
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receIvers. 
One of the most unusual matters to be attended to by the advance party was the 
erection of the aerial. One might have expected a large lattice aerial for the 'w rr 
Station', but Lieutenant Minshall had a more discreet arrangement. The (Apparatus for 
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erecting aerial array' consisted of 4 % lbs of rope, 1 longbow, 3 arrows, 4 balls of twine, 
and an aerial lead-in tube, plus 200 feet of copper wire. Minshall noted: 
The method of using a bow to get the aerials up was the only one practicable as a 
120 foot blue gum which was considered unclimbable was used to support the 
aerials. The alternative method was to erect masts.45 
Using the bow, Minshall shot a line into the treetops. Blueprints in the Station's file for 
two very tall conspicuous masts were unnecessary. Minshall's method cost under six 
pounds, as against 220 pounds per mast.46 Although there was an initial problem with the 
aerial coming adrift in February, treetops remained the 'masts' for the duration of the 
Station's existence. The radio receivers and the special equipment were all set up. Under 
the guidance of Minshall, Hendy, Packer and Leading Telegraphist Prichard, the Wrens 
got down to the serious business of using what Marion Pitt would call in her diary 'the 
gear'. The haste of assembling of 'the gear' had nearly serious consequences. The 
considerable amount of power used was not securely earthed, and Wren Pigott received a 
considerable jolt when she went into the toilet at the back.47 
An interesting aspect of the tight security surrounding REB was the position of 
the Wren Petty Officer-in-charge, the redoubtable Mrs Keay, whose popularity was not 
universal. While administratively in command, she had nothing to do with the radio 
fingerprinting operation. She was not cleared to see the equipment, and not permitted 
inside the Operations Room. One Wren who disliked her found the Ops Room 
something of a refuge.48 The others seem to have got on with her, or put up with her. 
While it may have seemed necessary to have a finn hand in charge of a group of 
intelligent and energetic young women adrift in the countryside, the fact that she was 
reduced to a purely administrative role was a basic weakness. Mrs Keay's two successors 
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had similar limitations imposed on them. It was a restriction that inadvertently put an 
artificial limit on operational effectiveness. It meant there was no-one with authority to 
demand action when things went wrong, which was probably an intentional oversight. 
But it led to one particular problem. 
A technical manual existed for the use of the REB staff, which explained the 
principles behind the equipment and its purposes. Most of the content of this was 
covered in the detailed instruction and briefings the Wrens received from Hendy. 
Unfortunately, it was attached as an appendix to the document 'Orders for Naval wrr 
Station, Rapaura (Blenheim)'. There is little doubt that the Wren Petty Officer would 
have had access to the orders document. She was not cleared to see the Most Secret 
'Appendix V to Orders for Naval wrr Station Rapaura (Blenheim), Technical 
Instructions', and 'Notes on "Z" Procedure for Classifiers'. On the title page of 
Appendix V a note personally signed by Philpott on 10 December 1942 read: 
When not actually in use it is to be kept locked up in a steel chest, and 
may be shown ONLY to those officers and ratings to whom a knowledge of its 
contents is essential for the perfonnance of their duty.49 
The title page also noted there were only three copies. Copy 1 was held by Philpott at 
Navy Office. Copies 2 and 3 were held at the Naval W rr Station Rapaura. Appendix V 
noted that the operators were to make themselves familiar with the 'Handbook for Outfit 
R.E.B. 2 H 401 dated March 1942', and the classifiers similarly with the 'Notes for "Z" 
Procedure for Classifiers dated 1 5t December 1942' .50 
The problem was that none of the Wren wireless telegraphists or classifiers ever 
sighted the document. Indeed, the five Wrens interviewed only became aware of its 
existence when shown a copy in the 19908. Having read it, they reflected it would have 
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been very useful reference. The safe delivered to the Resident Naval Officer, Picton, was 
not seen by the Wrens at the Station. It is just possible, therefore, that the copies of the 
Most Secret Appendix V were inside this safe, and stayed in Picton. The RNO, Picton, 
was responsible to the Naval Officer-in-Charge, Wellington, for administration of the 
personnel and the conduct of the station, so the idea that the safe stayed in Picton might 
not be surprising.s1 He was certainly not cleared to see the manual, and was probably 
unaware of the safe's contents other than that there were documents inside deposited for 
safekeeping. This is, of course, speculation. Another view is that the SO(Y) never sent 
the copies of the manual to Blenheim or Picton. As Philpott was extremely wary about 
security, and as this was very secret indeed, it may not have been out of character for him 
to have kept it all to himself. The ambiguity posed by the position of the Wren Petty 
Officer may have led to this restriction on useful procedural information for the 
operational staff. Had she been cleared like her subordinates, there would have been no 
point in concealing the manual. Whatever the case was on this issue, it had a few 
operational consequences. 
The Wren operators and classifiers had been given to understand that Hendy 
would return after he visited Australia, and they had a good number of technical 
questions for him. He never came back, so they were to a large extent left in the dark, 
although Minshall, who was familiar with REB, remained for a time.52 It is therefore 
surprising that the operators and classifiers worked as well as they did. 
When the Station got under way, Petty Officer Packer supervised the 
telegraphists, training them to check and maintain the REB equipment safely.53 This last 
measure was important, as the REB machine was quite dangerous. It was necessary 
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when adjusting it to wear a large heavy rubber glove on one hand and keep the other hand 
behind one's back to avoid electrocution.54 Any serious problems necessitating internal 
adjustments with the power on were not to be carried out by the staff, but were to be done 
by radio mechanics sent from Wellington. 55 It would have been more useful to have had a 
technician based in Blenheim, but for whatever reason this was not considered. 
Interestingly enough, when the P&T Department staff had to repeatedly attend to the 
telephone and landlines to the station they simply posted a man to the Post Office in 
Blenheim. 
Lieutenant Minshall spent some time adjusting the REB set and supervised the 
settling-in period over two to three weeks.56 The Operations Room was set up and 
worked as follows. A tall metal structure like a free-standing wall cabinet stood in the 
centre of the Ops Room. This whole contraption was the 'Outfit R.E.B.2 H 401'. This 
was made up of the metal framework for the Outfit REB (2) noA Oscilloscope, and the 
35mm ultra secret cine-camera Model 341gB, using very sensitive film at a very high 
lateral speed. Integral to this structure was a Collier & Beale H.R.O. 941 Radio Type 
Receiver and a Collier & Beale Calibration Type 443 HF Receiver. The telegraphist sat 
in front of the middle of the contraption with headphones on. In front of her was the 
oscilloscope with its cathode ray tube to provide a visual presentation of the signal being 
intercepted. To her right was the camera, built in to the apparatus. The telegraphist was 
very busy when tuning in on an enemy transmission, which might be very short. She had 
to find the frequency, take down the Katakana callsign on a notepad, and decide the 
preCIse moment to take a photograph of the oscilloscope display. Timing was a11-
important. The photograph was taken by the telegraphist by pressing a button in front of 
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her and holding it down for three seconds, counted as "One-higgledy-piggeldy, two-
higgeldy-piggeldy, three-higgeldy-piggeldy, off." The signal had to be strong and clear 
for a good photo.57 The operator logged the details of the transmission, including the 
time of receipt, the callsign to and call sign from the Katakana preamble if possible, and 
the frequency. She assigned a monthly number to the interception. To this would be 
added any other details which might assist in locating or identifying the transmitting 
station.58 
One of the duty operator's tasks was to keep watch on the N7 landline. The 
Blenheim W rr Station with the callsign RNW was connected with the HIF D/F stations 
of Awarua (ZLB), Musick Point (ZLF) and Waipapakauri (WPP). The H/F DfF 
operators were not told the function of the new station, as there was no need for them to 
know. They were told, however, that they were to co-operate fully with RNW. They 
were also unaware for a while that RNW was staffed by Wrens. Not surprisingly, the 
more experienced P&T operators were much faster than the Wrens with their Morse. 
After some time with a technical adjustment to their Morse key the Wrens cut in one day 
on the rather dubious chatter on the landline and 'there was silence for a while - and then 
one started again, and we indicated we heard so they stopped. ,59 The landline was used 
between the H/F D/F stations to co-ordinate the taking of bearings and RNW sometimes 
tracked around with the direction-finding stations. Mostly its frequencies had been 
directed from the 'Y' Room in Wellington, and the operators became skilled at fishing 
around at night for their particular targets, enemy submarines at sea. Most of the REB 
interception work was carried out at night. 
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Mer the photo was taken by the wrr operator, the high-speed film in its cassette 
was removed from the camera when convenient, developed by the classifiers in the dark 
room, and the strips of film hung to dry. Each strip could be about a metre long. When 
dry, the classifiers took the strips of film to the classifying table located between the REB 
machine and the bay window of the Ops Room. The two duty classifiers then classified 
the strips, entered the details in the Classifiers Log, and compared them visually with 
previous strips filed away. A match of the film image would reveal that the transmitter 
was the same as the one compared with. Details were entered in the Classifiers Log, as in 














KJcs. Group No. R.F.P. No. 
10,000 70/KEN 100 
16,800 55/IKE 110 
The strips of film were then mounted by stapling them onto filing sheets and stored away 
for reference. The sheets were marked with the time and date (GMT), the callsign, 
frequency, group number and RFP number. 
Once all this had been completed - there might be a batch, or in urgent cases 
singly - a phone call on the secure line (the secraphone) was put through to extension 846 
at Navy Office. This was Room 233, part of the 'Y' organisation, and the details passed 
on. These were the date and time (GMT), the callsign, frequency, the RFP no. and an 
assessment of reliability, A,B,or C. A meant 'definitely identified', B 'probably 
identified', C 'possibly identified'. At all times the words 'film', 'pictures', 'photograph' 
etc. were to be avoided, and the phrase 'RFP records' [sic] was to be used instead.61 
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The 'Y'Room in Wellington then incorporated the intelligence received into their 
analysis of the situation. The REB product, along with that of the H/F D/F stations, was 
shared with FRUPAC in Honolulu and the FRUMEL in Melboume.62 
All of this describes generally the procedures carried out for the radio 
fingerprinting operation at Blenheim. However, it should be noted that there were no 
doubt variations from time to time. Everything depended on what the operators and 
classifiers had been taught by Hendy, Minshall and Packer. Hendy had been there 
initially to supervise the processing of the film, the type of results the operators and 
classifiers were obtaining, and the beginning of the library of filmed records for 
comparative purposes.63 Hendy had gone, but Minshall remained in Wellington until June 
1943. During this early period the operators and classifiers were gaining experience of 
intercepting and photographing enemy transmissions and comparative analysis of 
developed film. The targets of the Blenheim wrr Station from the outset were Japanese 
submarines, and their traffic was distinguished because they invariably transmitted 
'RSNI' (RSN-bar) in their signals. Japanese submarines were located by H/F D/F and the 
radio fingerprinting permitted the 'Y' Room to estimate the number of submarines 
involved (was it one submarine making two transmissions but with different callsigns, or 
two submarines, or more, etc.). 
It has to be remembered that there were also Canadian, Australian, American and 
British REB units operating at this time in concert with H/F D/F stations. The Blenheim 
station only made sense in conjunction with H/F D/F reporting. However, this kind of 
combination of location bearings and identification analysis could prove leth::tl for the 
submarine provided friendly surface forces were in a position to intervene. An example 
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of this kind of location intelligence from H!F D/F, a US Naval intelligence report on 25 
January 1943, included the following: 
(A) INTELLIGENCE 
Dog Fox (5) fIXes were obtained on seven enemy submarines. SUBS by Dog Fox 
South and East x 12155 x OT166 x 07161 x 07158 x 01161 x and also one at Zero 
One North One Seven Four West x. 
(B) SOURCES OF INTELLIGENCE 
D/F fixes for 24 January 1943: 
NEW GUINEA - SOLOMONS 
IDENT FREQ PLOT & AREA 
SUB 6385 166-E 07-S 
SUB 6385 162-E 07-S 
SUB 13220 162-E 07-S 






Dog Fox stood for direction-finding. The New Zealand cOle Daily Summary for the 
23/24 January noted two enemy submarines reported to be 15 miles SE of Port Moresby 
at 1030M/23 January. The Daily Summary for 25/26 January 1943 reported an enemy 
submarine placed by D/F near 020 degrees S 165 degrees 30'east or 165 miles northwest 
of Noumea at 0150 hours local time on 25 January.65 
The Japanese submarine I-I was attacked on the night of 29-30 January 1943 by 
the RNZN minesweepers HMNZS Kiwi and HMNZS Moa, and after a spectacular action 
was sunk in shallow water off Guadalcana1.66 HMNZS Matai made four visits to the 
wreck between 1-13 February. The salvage operation on the hulk of the I-I carried out by 
the salvage ship USS Ortolan was very fruitful, as the submarine had been carrying a 
large amount of code material. A signal on 9 March noted that ' .... all documents and 
publications from item-1 [1-1] have been forwarded to CINCPAC .... ' It was to provide 
valuable insights into Japanese naval traffic.67 The action was interesting because 
movements of Japanese surface vessels and submarines down the 'Slot' in the Solomons 
were often predicted by traffic analysis from H/F D/F and REB location and 
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identification reports. The intercepted traffic provided localities based on last 
transmissions. Allied warships were often patrolling on the basis of predicted enemy 
movements, although successful interdiction came down to the alertness of the ships' 
crews. It is known that the New Zealand minesweepers had been ordered to patrol a set 
line four miles long across Kamimbo Bay. It may well be that the Blenheim W rr Station 
had a hand in location intelligence that led to the I-I night action, but it is very difficult to 
prove. Elphick has argued this was the case, but this argument only amounted to the 
existence of the Blenheim post, a general comment on its usefulness against Japanese 
submarines, and the fact that the New Zealand corvettes sank the I-I (and he has the date 
wrong).68 
Maintenance work at Blenheim was carried out by Leading Telegraphist 
Pritchard. He went to Blenheim on 8 February to correct a minor fault on the REB 
equipment, install a second receiver, adjust the power supply, check the aerial which had 
recently blown down and replace locally, and to calibrate and draw frequency curves for 
both receivers.69 The work had certainly picked up in pace. On 24 February the Naval 
Officer-in-Charge, Wellington, reported on his recent visit to the Blenheim W rr Station. 
The complement of one Leading Wren and seven Wrens [excluding the Petty Officer] 
was too small. At least two Wren operators were always on watch, and more, at times. 
They had to do be involved in the domestic work of the station as well with cleaning and 
cooking, and he considered efficient watchkeeping over a period of time would 
deteriorate. This added at least two hours daily to a 56-60 hour week, which increased in 
the event of leave or sickness. One Wren had already found the strain to be beyond her, 
and the Leading Wren in charge felt the others were feeling it. He suggested either three 
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more Wren wireless operators be sent or a Wren cook, steward and another operator were 
needed.70 
The Wren who left was Janet McLeod.71 The staff were definitely at a 
disadvantage having to do all their own cooking (they found initially that not all could 
cook), and they were rightly aggrieved.72 Had the personnel been male, a cook and a 
steward would certainly have been provided. The SO(Y) sharply disagreed with the 
NOIC Wellington, whose comments were based on a misconception. 
The hours worked by the Wrens, allowing for two hours daily for 
domestic duties, are -
W rr operators .... 44 hours per week 
Classifiers .... Average, 56 hours per week 
The misconception lies in the statement that at least two Wren operators 
are always on watch. This is not correct. During a proportion of the day no 
operators at all are on watch at present.73 
He noted that steps had been taken to increase the complement by one Classifier to 
reduce their hours, which would average 42 hours per week, and only be slightly 
extended with leave or illness.74 
There were other problems. On 27 February the SO(Y) on 27 February outlined 
the P&T Department's difficulties in maintaining the landline link to the HIP D/F stations 
in an efficient condition because of heavy dew, rain or atmospheric disturbances, 
entailing adjustment over each 24 hour period. The SO(Y) noted that the landline's 
efficiency was crucial 'since the co-ordination of the D/F net and REB depends upon it.' 
The P&T Department decided to have a repair man stay in Blenheim each night.75 The 
SSO annotated his concurrence in view of the Blenheim station's 'operational value', 
which had been 'strikingly illustrated' that week. 76 
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This referred to events over the last few days. On the night of the 22-23 February 
1943, the COIC Daily Summary no.431 noted that a radar contact had been made by the 
Cape Turakirae RDF Station at five minutes past midnight on a bearing of 150 degrees 
about ten miles distant. Ten minutes later a 'fair' D/F fix of a Japanese submarine from 
four stations indicated its presence in the Cook Strait area, possibly off the southern 
entrance.77 Airborne and sea searches were mounted and a long thin streak of oil found. 
Searches continued over the next two days and a radar contact was made in Cook Strait 
by the Cape Campbell radar. Anti-submarine air cover for shipping was provided by 
RNZAF aircraft. At 0604 hours on 24 February a D/F fix was made of a Japanese 
submarine at 29 degrees 30' south, 165 degrees east, about 150 miles west of Norfolk 
Island.78 At 2135 hours on the evening of 25 February 
a Japanese submarine was placed by D/F in position 123 degrees from Portland 
Island, east coast NORTH ISLAND, distant 50 miles. This was identified as the 
same unit mentioned in Summary 431 .... Shipping has been wamed.79 
An air search was mounted and anti-submarine escorts for shipping continued to be 
provided. Four days later, there was a further D/F fix on the same submarine on a 
northerly course about 660 miles north of Auckland. 
A further D/F fix was obtained on the Japanese submarine (mentioned in 
Summary 434) at 0020M/l [March] indicating a general northerly course. The 
cut was very narrow and would indicated an approximate position 26 degrees S., 
175 degrees E., about 660 miles north of AUCKLAND.8o 
The submarine was fixed by the H/F D/F stations and identified by the Blenheim REB 
station. 
A replacement Wren classifier, Marion Pitt, joined the Blenheim wrr Station on 
26 March, having only been in the Navy seventeen days. She spent the next days settling 
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in and finding her feet with the work. When people went out, she noted in her diary that 
'there must always be two people left at the station. ,81 
A senior British officer visiting Wellington noted in his report to the Admiralty 
that an REB Section had been functioning since December 1942 'and is staffed by Wrens 
and has provided useful information in [the] case of Japanese S/M [submarine] 
transmissions. A library is being built up .... ' 82 In conjunction with the interceptions of 
the direction-finding stations, the REB station contributed its identifications to the 'Y' 
Room's analysis of the daily submarine position. The increased proficiency in the 
tracking and identification of enemy submarines by HJF D/F, REB and led to a move for 
a daily submarine chart in mid-1943 in the COIC. In April-May seven submarine fixes by 
local D/F were taken of enemy units in the Tasman or the Tonga-Fiji area.83 An example 
on 11 April the Daily Summary indicated 
Intercept signals place an enemy submarine in an approximate position 30 miles, 
bearing 115 degrees, from GABO ISLAND light, Victoria, at 1700M 11th. A D/F 
fix was also obtained at 0608M lih within the area mentioned.84 
During this busy period the Blenheim W rr Station was visited on 3 June, as 
Marion Pitt noted in her diary: 
Lt.Minshall & Cheyne [ sic] arrived by plane 2p.m. Took photos of us in 
uniform ... mainly the operators. Had quite a banquet for dinner - 12 of us as 
Pritchard is down to fix gear - roast meat served by Minshall & Cheyne, vefs, 
fruit whip, peach shortcake, walnuts, choc, coffee etc. Quite a lot of backchat.8 
The next day the night's interceptions were under scrutiny. 
Up at the ungodly hour of 5.30 & was occupied most of morning running 
after Cheyne and Minshall - work point of view only - In afternoon Cheyne gave 
us an interesting talk on aUf "little pets." Had an early tea as they were leaving 
86 for plane .... 
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The visit of Minshall and Cheyne was to ensure that everything was going satisfactorily 
with the radio fingerprinting procedures. The "little pets" referred to the Station's 
principal targets, the Japanese submarines. Life at the Station was a mixture. On 22 June 
1943, 
Wet again! Seemed to be working most of morning. Surprise in afternoon 
- three Air Force at gate asking for Midge! Was Keith Hancock & 2 others 
asking Midge & Bunty to dance on Thurs - lucky things. They had only gone 
about V4 hr when [Mrs] Keay arrived - a great piece of luck! Bunty, Midge & 
Schroff went to pictures with one old guard .... whil~ I was on watch! Poured with 
rain and we nearly had a flood as river almost reached the top of the bank. 87 
On 23 July, the REB apparatus, the 'gear', needed attention. 
Mrs Keay left today to go on her course in Auckland. Barks arrived back 
after being recalled from leave & Mr Davies came over on boat [from 
Wellington] also with part of our gear. He fixed it up fairly soon so Scotty & I 
drove him over to Picton.88 
The Station was inspected on 28 July. 
Great day - visit of the big noises. Intended time arrival 10.30, actual 
time 10 A.M., hence we were caught in slacks etc - gems cooking in oven. They 
gave us ten minutes to change - what a rush as we arranged ourselves calmly (we 
hope!) in mess .... to meet Capt.Boyle who fortunately was only one who came 
with Keay. Had morning tea with us & looked over place - was quite 
. dl89 lmpresse . 
The next day, a small metal component of the REB outfit flew off. 
In early hours of evening lost minute part of gear - kids spent 1 liz hrs 
looking for it. Most amusing sight: Pip sprawled full length under table, Schroff 
on top of cupboards & Bunty searching in cracks!!! Rang Philpott who said "It 
must be in room somewhere!!" Lost. ... [therefore] no work.9o 
On 30 July the Station remained non-operational. 
Still out of action due to the small missing part! We spent a whole hour 
searching room from top to bottom again but all to no avail - it is most elusive.91 
Traffic continued to be monitored by the H/F D/F and REB stations. On 7-8 
August, for example 
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A submarine was placed by D/F in position 15 degrees 15'S 161 degrees 30'E 
(approximately 300 miles west of ESPIRITU SANTO) at 2015M i h •••• 
An intercept indicates that an Allied vessel sighted and attacked a submarine in 
position 14 degrees OS'S 166 degrees 45'E (approximately 30 miles south east of 
V ANUA LAVA) at 0135M 8th •••• 
A submarine was placed by DfF in position 14 degrees S 164 degrees E at 0212M 
8th• (200 miles west of V ANUA LAVA, NEW HEBRIDES). [sic] 92 
While the watch on the enemy continued, in early September there was more trouble with 
the REB apparatus. 
Ah! Woe is me! On house again - do I love it?l Kids having trouble with 
the gear - beats me why they don't send down someone who knows the gear as it 
is hopeless the kids trying to do it themselves as they have no idea.93 
At the same time, the head of the 'Y' organisation was regarded with little esteem. 
Philpott was a difficult person to work for, and the Wrens at Blenheim had little time for 
him, as this biting portrait of the SO(Y) shows . 
... our forgotten officer - Philpott. NOT a pleasant being either: rather slow & fat 
as from overdrinking, dark greasy hair, small black "rno" looking out of place 
above a large mouth which displayed a gap due to loss [of] front teeth.94 
On 30 September, there was yet another maintenance visit. 
We sang our little theme song to Mr Davies" My dear Mr Cheyne, please 
let me explain, these ----- cannot possibly be the same. I could say 212 or even 
266, but I would not agree to call them 313!" He was most amused. He didn't 
find much wrong with the gear so we think he thought the trip rather a waste of 
time.95 
The value of discriminating between individual submarines to assess the enemy's 
strength can be seen in the COlC Daily Summary for 1-2 October, when D/F fixes (and 
REB) indicated three or four enemy submarines operating in the western Solomons, 
Vitiaz Strait, southern Bismarck Sea area.96 
On the night of 3/4 November the radar station at Cape Campbell reported a series 
of radar contacts and sighted a low-lying object heading south-east. The Fairmiles from 
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Wellington were ordered to sea and the ferry Maori was screened as she crossed Cook 
Strait. The Blenheim W rr Station was alerted. 
Was pulled out of bed at 2 this morning by Lutt to do an important piece 
of work - 266 only 150 miles away! Got back to bed at 3 - up again at 6.30. 
Great Iife!97 
This suggested that if there was a transmission from a submarine, it was one that had 
been identified before. The motor launches depth-charged an object but nothing further 
was sighted. 
Other stations were intercepted by REB for identification purposes. On the 
evening of New Year's Day 1944, for example, the duty telegraphist had taken twelve 
seconds of film of shore station transmissions. This led to over five hours of classification 
work next moming.98 
The topic of the security of the Station was raised on 8 January by the owner of 
the farmhouse, Dosser, who was visiting neighbours. 
He told us about the irate Army Capt. who was refused admittance here even tho' 
he had pass signed by Prime Minister - sent in a 9 -page report - the P.M. was 
rung up - he said "If my signature isn't good enough, whose is?" t!! 99 
Dosser, although a Port Security Officer for the Security Intelligence Bureau in 
Auckland, had corresponded repeatedly with the Naval Secretary to get his house back 
early. 100 
The business of locating submarines by the HIP D/F stations and REB continued 
routinely. The Daily Summary for 15/16 January noted two enemy submarines in the 
New Hebrides, one near the position of a reported attack on a ship.10t Philpott decided to 
send Leading Wrens Luttrell and Barker on a month's elementary maintenance training 
for the station's electrical equipment. The SO(Y) calculated on 22 January that as the 
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situation at Blenheim was fairly quiet for the moment, the loss of efficiency could be 
accepted temporarily.102 Just as the two operators were setting off to the course, a 
classifier, Wren Tweed, was requisitioned by Navy Office for 28 days because of short 
staffing at Navy Office. On 27 January, Marion Pitt reflected: 
Midge and I doing all the work between us as Scottie on leave - hence I 
was on duty in ops room both morning & evening while Midge was on house. 
Things not too happy. Midge has another job in view so is anxious to get out & 
Schroffie is not too pleased about she and Bunty being left to do all the 
[telegraphy] work. 103 
By 31 January: 
On house. - household not very bright today, heaven knows what we will 
be like after five weeks. Philpott has a nerve and no one here has a good word for 
him. I bet it doesn't worry him, though.104 
On 11 February Wren Petty Officer Margaret Finlay was infonned she was 
leaving on 15 February.I05 The REB outfit developed a fault in the cathode ray tube next 
day, Wren Pitt indiscreetly recording 'The tube in the gear has gone bung so no 
records .... ,106 Wednesday 16 February saw a breach of security. The new Petty Officer, 
Joan Sayers, was inadvertently at fault on her first full day. 
While Schroff and I were doing dishes after lunch, we suddenly heard a 
man's voice in the mess room! We crept into kitchen and there was a Lieut-
Col[onel]. Apparently he was an intelligence bloke going over all secret stations 
& had a pass signed by the Naval Sec. Of course Joan [Sayers] didn't know about 
Philpott['s] pass so she let him in. What a shock for the kids esp. as Bunty was in 
dressing gown, Midge in shorts & Scottie bare feet. He wanted to look over 
station but in Scottie's words "Midge won't let him into the ops room." .... He 
showed his identity card, said he knew what we were doing but then gave himself 
away as said we were [the] same as other stations. Ha! Ha! Altogether 
atmosphere was rather strained & he says he's going to complain to Naval Sec. 
about it. Prichard arrived in the evening to fix gear - soon found trouble - a 
. 107 
reSIstor. 
The Wrens reported the incident to Philpott, and nothing more was heard of the 
Lieutenant-Colonel. 108 Thursday saw more problems, this time with the radio. 
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Kids drove Prich to Picton after lunch: then Bunty & Schroff put in 
receiver which had been returned from Wellington & it won't work. Poor kids, 
they are having a hard time.109 
The next day Prichard was back to fix the receiver. lID Four days later, on 22 February, the 
Power and phone went off early this morning so Midge went to store to 
ring up. The repair man came out and met Midge and the following conversation 
took place: "Are you 319S?" "No, I am the Naval Station!" "Dh yes! Your 
Morse line is interfering with your phone lines." Strikes me that most people 
know part of our secret ... 111 
Wren Tweed was due back from her stint in Wellington on 1 March, but Marion 
learned over the phone that something untoward was afoot. 
We sure are forgotten down here in the country. There is a flap on & no-
one told us! I was talking to Percy [Wren Percival] on the phone & she said Pip 
won't be back to-night as there is no boat running. She was most evasive & 
talked in riddles so I left it. At 5.30 Midge rang up to find out definitely about Pip 
& heard the whole tale. One of our cats [a J ap sub] was off Auck.[land] - fired a 
torpedo, next sighted off Napier by a tanker then last night fired another torpedo 
at 'Rangitira'. It is hovering now off our coast! We were furious at not being told 
and we may have been of some use - makes it look as though they are not 
interested in US.ll~ 
This was an extraordinary turn of events. On the 26 and 28 February, two vessels had 
reported torpedo attacks well off the New Zealand coast. At 0157 hours on 1 March the 
ferry Rangitira reported a torpedo passed astern. The report of the Staff Officer 
(Operations) to the eNS indicated in outline the action taken. The first report resulted in 
a warning to shipping in the vicinity; an air search was not possible 'owing to shortage of 
aircraft.' The second report had stimulated responses, including the sailing of two 
minesweepers to escort the Rangitira, the diversion of a ship at sea and a zig-zag order 
for all shipping of the east coast of the North Island, and the sailing cancellation of the 
coastal steamer Pukeko from Napier until daylight. The ferry was to proceed at best 
speed, zig-zag and expect air cover at dawn. The torpedo passing the Rangitira resulted 
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in considerable panic. Air searches from Lyttelton to Gisbome were instituted, the ferry 
herself was to make port at maximum speed. The other ferry, the Arahura, was to zig-
zag and proceed to Wellington as fast as possible, two other vessels were recalled and 
two further ships diverted to the north of New Zealand. The ports of Wellington, 
Lyttelton and Dunedin were closed until further notice.113 The telegraphists at Blenheim 
meantime learned nothing. The 'Y' Room had not alerted Blenheim that anything was 
amiss. It was probably a typical breakdown of communications, but not one that did 
much good. After all, the REB operators' main targets were enemy submarines. 
The work of the HIP DIP stations and the REB station continued, nevertheless. 
The cOle Daily Summary for 4/5 March predicted 
Estimated position of enemy submarines a.m. 5/3:-
Possibly 1 approaching RABAUL from S.E. 
1 estimated west-bound from BUKA. 
1 on BUIN run, estimated off S. NEW IRELAND. 
1 may be patrolling Central SOLOMONS. 
1 or 2 in RABAUL HARBOUR. 
1 on reconnaissance mission in SUVA-TONGA area. 
Recent sightings indicate supply runs being made from TRUK to BUIN area. 
O 'd' d d' h' 114 ne In !Cate now procee Ing on t IS run. 
The suspicion of isolated enemy units returning to New Zealand waters remained, 
along with the obvious physical vulnerability of shipping. Nervousness in the wake of 
the ferry incident returned on 8 March, with an Asdic contact reported eleven miles south 
of Wellington heads. No results were observed,115 but that evening HMNZS Wakakura 
reported a periscope 40 miles off Godley Head and attacked with depth charges, with an 
air bubble and slight oil patch but no wreckage. 116 
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Luttrell and Barker returned on 10 March bringing the REB station back to full 
strength.117 By April questions were being raised about the REB Station's continuing 
role, as the SSO commented to the eNS. 
I have discussed the present situation as regards this Station with SOY. It 
is that watch is kept for 18 out of 24 hours, and it was only when 2 Wrens were 
undergoing a course at Petone that watch was only kept at night. 
With the Pacific war, as it is, moving North, it is natural that the value of 
the Station has decreased from when it was commissioned. On the other hand 
when there was a real scare in March, it was very much to the fore. Taking 
everything into consideration I think it fairly accurate to say that its future might 
be reviewed at the end of 1944 when we shall know more about the situation in 
the Pacific. llB 
The business about the 'real scare in March' was, of course, rubbish, as the REB Station 
had not been alerted about the situation that developed. Nevertheless, clearly something 
had arisen to get the SSO and the SO(Y) to contemplate the Station's future. That 
pressure might be coming from elsewhere is hinted at in an annotation by the eNS that it 
'will be possible to review this matter sooner than the end of '44.,119 
At the end of April people began to be posted out and not replaced. Marguerite 
Boxer, a classifier, was first to go. On Friday 28 April, Midge's last day, minor irritation 
surfaced when the duty telegraphist intercepted and photographed an enemy 
transmission. 
Scottie and I were on in work room & when Barks took a record at 9 A M 
Scottie said "Did you have to do that today of all days?" 120 
As Scottie was also leaving in a few days, her mind was clearly not on the job. The 
arrival of Mayan Monday brought the news that Luttrell and Barker were to go to 
Waiouru on Thursday. On Tuesday, Margaret Scott departed. 121 The next day brought 
things up short with a jolt. 
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Black Wednesday! Was on duty in work room & about 9.15 came out of 
our little room to find Shroff writing up diary. "We are all going - leaving here 
next Tues" she says [sic] & I laughed as I thought she was pulling my leg. But it 
was only too true. Davies had just rung up to say "Station was to close 
forthwith." Shroff & I sat with tears in our eyes it didn't seem possible that we 
could be leaving this rlace so suddenly. We are so attached to it & it has so many 
pleasant associations. 22 
Thursday was no easier. It was all over. 
Mr Davies, Prich & Mr Wolfe arrived to wreck our little home - started 
work in ops room & it was a sorry sight when the gear was all pulled to pieces. 
To think that we would never work in that little room again. Barks & Lutt left 
this morning .... Davies has told us that Bunty and Shroff may be going to 
Waiouru, Pip into [Room] 233 Jpart of 'Y'] - Miss Herrick has something for me 
but he wouldn't say just what.1 
The next day, 5 May, a little of the mystery was dispelled. 
Friend Dosser has duly installed himself on the farm & is very anxious to 
get in the house .... When we talked to him we found out the inside story of our 
hasty departure. Dosser gives a bottle of whisky to [the] Minister of Defence's 
sec[retary] & so gets an interview with Jones [the Minister], after interviews with 
Naval Sec. having come to nought. Result is that Jones says station must be 
closed down & we are thrust out at a moment's notice. Nice way to carryon a 
war! Boy, we were mad and we let Dosser know it toO.124 
A sad anti-climax to fifteen months of highly secret work. If it really was the agitation of 
Dosser that produced the result, that does not say much for the priority put on 
maintaining intelligence capabilitieso The war was not yet over. Yet, as had been 
observed, the war had moved north, and the opening range made successful radio-
fingerprinting difficult. This was a time of reorganisation and cutbacks. The REB 
equipment was moved into storage in H.M.Dockyard, Lower Hutt. It was still there in 
1946, and later on was moved to the Waiouru W rr Station where it was used for 
l Ob 0 P'i ca 1 ratIOn purposes. -. 
Elswhere, radio-fingerprinting was winding down. In Canada, 'Z' operations had 
been commenced at a new REBfTINA set-up at Coverdale in February 1944. Results 
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from this were disappointing, particularly from the REB which had become much more 
important than TINA, because most signals transmitted by V-boats were now short 
signals. During March only about 5% of them were classified. There was some 
improvement when a new receiver was tried. When two RCN officers visited England, 
they found that Naval Intelligence had concluded that TINA had ceased to be of 
operational value against V-boats, and even REB was now doubtful as U-boat signals 
security improved. Accordingly the 'Z' operations at Coverdale were reduced in June, 
while those at Harbour Grace were discontinued altogether. The RCN came to the 
conclusion that REB had been of only limited success against the German V-boats, but 
this did not mean that the principle was not sound. Employed by others on different 
assignments, particularly against the Japanese, with better facilities, REB proved to be 'of 
great operational value.' 126 The limited success of the RCN 'Z' operations were partly 
caused by the fact that the German U-boat transmissions had become highly standardised 
and had very few faults making positive identification of individual transmitters difficult. 
As well as this, U-boat transmitters operated at low power output so signal strengths were 
low, and REB pictures were often rendered useless or doubtful, marred by low amplitude 
. 127 
or nOIse. 
The operation of the radio-fingerprinting station at Blenheim was part of the 
cutting edge of contemporary signals intelligence technology, and was in fact New 
Zealand's first venture into what is today called electronic warfare. It was a singularly 
different aspect of 'Y', fitting in to the H/F D/F network as part of the 'Y' Room's attack 
on Japanese communications. Waters' draft history came to the conclusion that 
Blenheim's 'R.E.B. results on Japanese submarine transmissions proved to be extremely 
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valuable. A method of exchanging identification between Honolulu, Melbourne and 
Wellington was evolved and put into operation, helping still more to produce a picture of 
submarine activities. ,128 REB widened the spectrum of the New Zealand 'Y' attack on 
enemy submarines at sea, contributing to both local anti-submarine intelligence and allied 
theatre anti-submarine operations. 
Chapter Seven 
The Army 'V' Operation 
While the Navy's venture into signals interception was wide ranging in its scope, 
the New Zealand Army's foray in this field was more modest. In 1942 the New Zealand 
Army seems to have begun to be involved in the interception of enemy signal traffic, 
although, some preparations in terms of training may have been in train before the 
outbreak of the war with Japan. There were to be connections between the Army's 
signals interception operations and the naval 'Y' organisation, largely consisting of the 
evaluation and distribution of intercepted enemy traffic. 
The Army's venture into 'Y' intelligence began with the setting up of a Special 
Wireless Section. Instrumental in this was an enigmatic very junior officer, Lieutenant 
Kenneth MacKenzie. Neville Barnaby, his second-in-command, assessed him in this 
way: 
The Special Section [Army Signals] originated through MacKenzie, who 
was ... a commercial radio operator, with marine experience .... I think he took a 
personal interest in it at the beginning of the war ... He was not a very talkative 
bloke, rather reserved .... [He seemed] to have a personal interest in Kana which he 
may have had experience of while he was at sea before the war. ... [in 
the ]rnerchant navy .... I think the Section originated from his personal interest. 1 
MacKenzie was apparently involved with the training of telegraphists in Katakana 
for the Army before the opening of hostilities with Japan. This training took place in a 
warehouse on Customhouse Quay, using a staff of six marine radio operators and was 
quite separate from that carried out by the Navy. One K. Smith is said to have succeeded 
MacKenzie in running the instruction in Katakana.2 Later on, Katakana was taught in the 
Special Section. 
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MacKenzie may have been recruited into the Army by Colonel Wrightman who 
knew him personally, and in particular his ability to read Katakana.3 Joining the Army 
on 3 March 1942, MacKenzie was promoted to corporal and then acting sergeant two 
days later. On 9 March he was posted to Army Signals at Naimville Park. On 28 April he 
was commissioned as a Territorial Force lieutenant. Aged 34, MacKenzie had listed his 
occupation as 'clerical' or as a 'Credit Manager for Wright Stephenson & Co.', and 
attested that he had had eleven years experience in the merchant navy as a wireless 
operator.4 It seems he taught himself Katakana during his time at sea.s He spent twelve 
days in September 1942 teaching a General Knowledge Course for Army Signals 
personne1.6 
On 29 June 1942, the Chiefs of Staff noted that special wireless sections were 
.. 
being raised by the Army to listen to enemy radio traffic.7 One of the functions of the 
new Special Wireless Section, Army Signals Company, was to monitor illicit radio 
transmissions within New Zealand by means of radio direction-finding equipment 
installed in trucks. This effort was only a small one set up to plug a gap, but in the event 
seems to have found nothing of real interest within New Zealand.8 The two wooden vans 
were used to survey sites from which to conduct DIP monitoring of any clandestine 
traffic, and when any such transmissions were detected, they would drive out to intercept 
and take bearings on the signals. This was done in conjunction with the Police 
Department, and not, be it noted, with the Security Intelligence Bureau.9 
The Special Wireless Section was based to begin with in a railway hut at 
Nairnville Park, Ngaio. 10 Known more commonly as simply the 'Special Section', its 
most important operational role was to intercept Japanese wireless traffic, described as 
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Army 'Y' procedure. By the end of 1942, the Special Section was having increasing 
success in its interception operation. In October, the Section intercepted and recorded 
over 6,500 enemy signals. The Section Notes for November, signed by 2nd Lieutenant K. 
MacKenzie, O.C. Special Section, recorded that 
During the month of November 1942 the Special Section received and 
transposed of 6902 Enemy wrr Messages, an increase of approx 300 on the 
previous month .... 
Reception conditions during the month were generally good on the lower 
frequencies but considerable difficulty was experienced on some of the day 
frequencies. 11 
This trend continued, and the following month MacKenzie reported: 
In December 7748 messages were intercepted from enemy stations and 
transposed. This total shows an increase of approx 800 over the November 
f o P Igures. -
The increasing enemy traffic demanded more operators. Alongside the 24-hour 
interception watch, the training of new personnel went on. 
MacKenzie's own notes on Katakana are worth briefly considering, as they 
provide an insight into training in Katakana. The notes, 'Some Examples of KJK Used in 
Communications', opened with a caution 
the Japanese language ... .It must be pointed out that there exist no short cuts 
enabling one to acquire a comprehensive knowledge of this language. Years of 
unremitting labor [ sic] are required to master even the fundamentals of writing 
Japanese KANJI (the classic language, which is basically Chinese;) however, 
KANA, or phonetic Japanese writing, can be learned in a short time. 
Communications personnel may, with practice, intercept and transcribe some 
portions of coded messages which use KANA. 13 
Even a cursory reading of the notes gives an idea of the complexity facing the 
telegraphists in mastering the subtleties of Katakana. 
In KA T AKANA and HlRAGANA each character represents a sound but, 
unlike English letters, each is made up of a consonant followed by a vowel, i.e. 
ka, ki etc. Exceptions are the vowels a.e.i.o.u, and the consonant n. The 
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KATAKANA consists of 50 somewhat angular symbols which, apart from their 
use on aircraft are used by the Japanese mainly for transcribing foreign sounds, 
and in notices, official documents, telegrams, ships' names, etc. Inscriptions in 
KATAKANA are usually written from the right, either vertically or horizontally, 
but on occasions are written from left to right as in English. The HIRAGANA 
syllabary compares with KATAKANA as our script letters (a) compare with 
block printing (A). It also consists of 50 forms, but they are cursive in shape and 
are used in writing letters, in some newspapers, etc. These characters are seldom 
used for aircraft markings or for depicting ship's names. 14 
Setting out some fifty Katakana syllables, the notes mentioned that 'sometimes Katakana 
symbols are used with Japanese numerals and the result is confusing.' 15 
The notes outlined the scope of the language task confronting the trainee 
operators. A couple of examples illustrates the difficulties. In dealing with the subject of 
the use of Katakana with maps, the grid referencing system was referred to along with a 
diagram. The maps referred to related to thirteen maps, retrieved along with a diary and 
other material from the 'Reconnaissance Satchel' of a Japanese airman shot down in 
April 1942. While the Katakana symbols sometimes followed the sequence of the 
syllables set out in the notes, they sometimes followed 
.... the sequence in which they are found in a well known Japanese poem called 
the "Iroha Song." The poem includes all the K/K syllables. To say a man knows 
his IROHA UTA is to say that he knows his ABC'S.16 
The syllables in the lroha Uta arrangement were set out in Katakana, in Romaji (Japanese 
Roman letters) and in Japanese Morse. Later, the notes observe: 
When the kana syllabary is used in radio or telegraphic communications, 
KJK is habitually employed. It should be remembered that this is the printed or 
typewritten form, and that the receiver of the message, when transcribing the 
code, would use HlRAGANA. This corresponds to ordinary penmanship as 
compared to the typewritten or printed letter .17 
A considerable inventory of Japanese Morse filled the last few pages under the 
heading "Communications in Code'. Consisting of lists, they were set out in sections: 
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Kana Code Signals with Morse Equivalents; Code Signals for Numerals; Code Signals 
for Punctuation; Abbreviations and Procedure Signals; and the Ainnan's Code of 
Abbreviations. I8 
In November 1942, the Special Section's 'Monthly Notes' recorded the equipping 
of a new room for operator training in Special Section work and the commencement of 
Course 1M for new personnel on 9 November.19 Examinations for the course were held 
on 18 December with 'very satisfactory' results.20 Course 2M for new operator training 
began in early December, and some members of the previous course were placed on 
interception watch with experienced Special Section operators to gain valuable 
experience in actual operational work and handling of the equipment.21 Thus new 
operators could be brought straight into interception work, assisting a relatively smooth 
expansion in required personnel. According to Barnaby, the Special Section 
.... had a very good team of operators (telegraphists). A very large proportion of 
them were ex-Post Office [staff]. Some of them were Grade I in the Army, but 
the Army even in the early stages preferred to keep those operators in New 
Zealand. They'd been picked out for this particular job.22 
There were alterations in the work and structure of the Special Section. The 
internal security function - the monitoring conducted for illicit signals was reduced 
(because of the lack of such traffic), - and there were alterations to the command 
arrangements. The 'Special Section Notes for June 1943' noted that the continuous 
'Policing Watch' was discontinued on 17 June and replaced by a random twenty-four 
hour watch once a week. At the same time, the Special Section was reorganised. On 14 
June MacKenzie moved to Army Headquarters, leaving Barnaby with the day-to-day 
running of the Section.23 Captain KJ. Coates seems to have taken over the' Special W rr 
Section' at the end of June, and was later succeeded by Barnaby?4 
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At Army Headquarters, Lieutenant MacKenzie remained head of the Special 
Wireless Section as GS03 (Intelligence and 'Y'). Above him was the GS03 
(Intelligence) at the COIC, Captain Dawson, and further up the chain of command was 
the GS01 (Operations and Intelligence), who in 1942 was Major J.H. Beale.25 
MacKenzie was still running the Anny interception operation, in the same way as 
Philpott with naval 'Y'. The small Special Section was divided into two compartments: a 
straightforward traffic intercept station and an analysis section, neatly separated from 
each other. Out at Naimville Park, the Special Section's signals platoon of the Army 
Signals Company maintained round-the-clock interception of enemy traffic, plus the 
random radio security watch. In 1943, the strength of this signals platoon comprised two 
officers, twenty-four operators, six advanced trainees, thirteen ordinary trainees, and nine 
NZEF trainees, making a total of fifty-four personnel. Total strength of the Special 
Section plus the cryptographer, the translator and the '1 clerk at Army Headquarters, 
came to fifty-seven personnel, although this varied with postings and leave. Somewhere 
between fifty and sixty appears to have been the norm.26 
The interception station of the Special Section was moved from Naimville Park 
up onto a hilltop site at Johnsonville, into a small collection of nondescript huts. The 
Special Section acquired the curious nickname 'OOPU', the acronym for Stalin's secret 
police in the 1930s. Set among the gorse bushes, the station had leaky roofs and the tin 
shed toilets away from the wireless rooms were just holes in the ground. Four W AACS 
were posted to the Special Section in October 1943, B. McGlynn, M. Murray, A.I. 
Stratford and M. Hart. One of them reflected: 
At 'OGPU', in the wireless room, there were two hot stoves for warmth, and these 
were also used to supply us with a snack which was usually on the hour, every 
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hour, when we were on night shift. It would usually be cheese melted on an 
enamel plate with onions added, served with some fried bacon - very good on 
cold nights.27 
The radios were manned twenty-four hours a day in four shifts, the night shift 
being the busiest,28 the best time far short wave signals reception. There was bench 
space for five operators and their wireless receivers along one side of the wireless room 
with its bare floorboards and two pot-bellied stoves.29 The usual listening watch in the 
wireless room comprised a warrant officer operator in charge of four telegraphists. The 
signals platoon operators intercepted and copied the Katakana traffic, transposing it into 
Ramaji script.3D These intercepts were passed by secure phone or despatch rider to 
Gilbert Lennox-King at Army Headquarters. This was a neat cut-out barrier, obviously 
for security reasons. Barnaby related: 
We had an officer [Lennox-King] in Army Headquarters who took our results day 
by day and they were just hand written on the usual message form and that was it 
- we didn't see any more of them. We used to hear rumours and rumblings from 
time to time, but that was it. Nothing official.31 
The analysis section (or Headquarters Special Wireless Section located at Army 
Headquarters) under MacKenzie comprised a cryptographer, Dr.Ted Bennett, the 
translator Gilbert Lennox-King, and an 'I' Clerk, Irene Fitzpatrick.32 Bennett was a 
biologist, and was seconded to the Central Bureau in Brisbane later in the war.33 
MacKenzie's analysis cell closely collaborated with Philpott's Special Intelligence 
Section of Campbell, Carter and Boulter, not least because a proportion of the intercepted 
traffic was diplomatic and of interest to Boulter in particular. The Army's Special Section 
intercepted traffic went to a number of addressees, sent through the naval Special 
Intelligence Section or direct.34 According to Lennox-King 
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.... much of the infonnation gleaned from the 'Kana' messages was of importance 
and where applicable was passed by the H.Q. Special Section to Melbourne and 
later to Brisbane. As the action moved north the value of our readings fell away 
from the point of view of 'combat' action, but we did get interesting material 
from as far afield as Java. 
The naval intercepts were in many cases in a one-off code or a code that 
was not deciphered by the Americans until later in the war. I think that one of the 
features of New Zealand's part was that on many occasions our stations picked up 
messages that the stations in Australia did not even hear. Of course, a lot of 
intercepted messages related to minor matters in a particular area, such as weather 
forecasts, but other 'briefs' when put together produced some surprises. By the 
time I left the Section in 1945 and went to Australia I think our good work was 
over, but during the 'peak' it was indeed an interesting time.35 
There was a range of Japanese traffic intercepted. These included Tokyo-Batavia traffic, 
. Tokyo-Saipan, Tokyo-Truk, and a 'high-speed link' and diplomatic traffic between 
Tokyo-Irkutsk.36 The Tokyo-Batavia traffic seems to have been best received in New 
Zealand, partly because of the time of day the signals were intercepted, the equatorial 
effect on communications (better quality signals received further back), and the bounce 
effect of high-frequency short wave transmission.37 The diplomatic traffic probably also 
included material intercepted from diplomatic posts in South America. Fuji and 'B' 
Machine (,Purple ') material went from New Zealand to the Australian diplomatic section, 
as mentioned earlier, and was sent on to the Government Communications Bureau at 
Berkeley Street, the diplomatic branch of GCHQ. Some intercepted traffic was not 
Japanese, and was collected for longer-tenn interests. This accumulated traffic was given 
to Captain Roy Kendall, who visited Wellington from time to time.38 
Kendall ran Secret Intelligence Australia (SIA), which was an MI6 organisation 
working for London and Mountbatten's South East Asia Command (SEAC). Secret 
Intelligence Australia was Section B of the Allied Intelligence Bureau, a British-
Australian umbrella organisation (not to be confused with MacArthur's American-
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Australian Central Bureau). It has been asserted that Kendall's SIA was controlled 
directly by London 'on the understanding that it kept out of the South-West Pacific.,39 It 
seems to have largely done so. SIA also had interests in both operational and tactical 
in telligence collection. 
According to MacKenzie himself, encoded Japanese weather messages were 
intercepted, copied and passed to Dr. Gabites at the Meteorological Office. Gabites is 
said to have broken the simple code.40 Weather reports were of operational significance 
for Japanese and Allied aircraft and ships at sea. If these messages were read, their 
routine contents were quite likely to be found in other messages in other codes. This 
might provide a 'crib' into that code, a lever by which to unzip the rest of the message. 
In mid-1944 MacKenzie departed for duty in Australia from 5 July 1944.41 On 3 
August, Captain Perkins conducted a handover from Captain Barnaby, who left the 
Special Section on 8 AuguSt.42 The interception operation continued for the rest of the 
war, and 'Nairnville' has already been noted as one of the US Navy's OP-20-G's sources 
of intelligence in its March 1944 plan. The Special Section Army Signals finally ceased 
its operations on 18 July 1945.43 
MacKenzie had been required for work elsewhere. Headquarters, Allied Land 
Forces, Melbourne, requested his services for 'special duties'. He possessed 'special 
qualifications for the duties concerned and has previously worked with the [Allied 
Intelligence] Bureau.,44 This reference was connected with the Special Section's 
intercepts passed to the Allied Intelligence Bureau, partly the material of interest to 
Kendall of the SIA. From 5 July 1944, MacKenzie was 'seconded to British Special 
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Ops. 'and he reported to the SIA two days later.45 MacKenzie was employed in an SIA 
sub-section known as "M" Special Unit. A memorandum on 9 November 1945 noted 
Lt. MacKenzie has technical radio qualifications necessary for the operation and 
maintenance of special radio equipment employed by SIA Section of Allied 
Intelligence Bureau.46 
At the end of hostilities MacKenzie was in the Dutch East Indies, and he came 
across a Japanese wireless station in Batavia still under the control of a Japanese Marine 
officer. Taking this station over with the threat of force, MacKenzie discovered the 
station was one end of the Tokyo-Batavia link that the Special Section in Wellington had 
monitored. He souvenir-ed the crystals, a head set, and a Morse key.47 He was promoted 
to captain on 19 December 194548 and remained with the SIA until 5 June 1946.49 
An off-shoot of the Special Section, Army Signals Company, was created and 
deployed into the forward area. This was a 'Y'section that was sent to the Solomons with 
'A' Wireless Section of the 3rd New Zealand Division. According to Coates, the 
commander of the 'Y' section: 
The operators were trained in Wellington. Ken MacKenzie was given the job of 
training and putting the Section together as an Interceptor Group [sic] and 
attached to Army Signals, Army HQ Wellington. Ken MacKenzie was later 
transferred to other intelligence duties and it was at this time I replaced him as 
officer in charge.5o ' 
The 'Y' Section consisted of an officer and five operators. They were deployed on Green 
Island (Nissan) and conditions were quite good as the 3rd Division Headquarters had been 
established for a period prior to the Section's arrival. This Section also acquired the 
nickname 'OGPU". Using a No.I07 receiving station, the operators maintained a 24-
hour watch intercepting Japanese traffic. They recorded Katakana messages 'at high 
speed' by hand and passed them to 3rd Division Headquarters 'for translation', 'for 
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decrypting' and 'for interpretation by Japanese "language experts.",51 The operators were 
skilled ex-Post Office telegraphists. The Section operated for around a month, and 
recorded 'over 400 loggings' .52 
The Anny's venture into 'Y' intelligence was distinctive. It added its small 
measure to the Allied intelligence attack on enemy communications. It provided raw 
intercept material for FRUMEL, the Central Bureau and the SIA, while the analysis cell 
closely linked in with Philpott's Special Intelligence Section. From 1942 to July 1945, 
the Special Section provided an interception service well regarded by the Australian, 
American and British intelligence authorities in the South Pacific and Southwest Asia. 
Tiny in size, the virtue of its geographical location made it useful for collecting signal 
traffic more difficult to intercept elsewhere. 
Part III 
The Watch on the Coast 
Chapter Eight 
Coastwatching - New Zealand Shores 
There is nothing so fundamental to intelligence gathering and the maintenance of 
security as simply keeping a good look out. It is unsurprising that an island state with 
extensive maritime boundaries would expend some effort in mounting direct surveillance 
on its borders. The possibility of the enemy putting ashore somewhere, the need to keep 
a physical eye on the approaches to the country's ports, the fear of raids or the worst 
nightmare of all: invasion, were all powerful motivations to obtain immediate warning 
should such trouble arise. The watch from the coast, 'looking out to sea', encapsulates in 
its entirety the activity of coastwatching. How this kind of operation was conducted 
around and beyond New Zealand's borders is the object of attention of the next two 
chapters, including as it did outlying islands far away, some of which were not New 
Zealand sovereign territory. If New Zealand, with its coastline larger than Britain and a 
population of a million, was faced with an unacceptable mathematical proposition to 
begin with, the assumption of further coastwatching responsibilities in island territories 
distributed across ocean wastes as large as the North Atlantic might be regarded as 
unreasonable. Yet this exactly describes what occurred. Conveniently, as this 
assumption of dual duties arose, it is useful to deal with coastwatching around New 
Zealand in this chapter, with plans, coastwatching stations opened, the arrival of the 
enemy, and the rundown of the requirement. The other half of the dual duties is the 
subject of Chapter Nine, concerning New Zealand coastwatching in more distant islands, 
from sub-Antarctic waters to beyond the equator. The most important question was how 
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effective were the coastwatchers? A related issue was whether, under the circumstances 
of the time, it was surprising that anything substantial was achieved at all. 
In 1929 a draft plan was conceived by the Naval Board which outlined a scheme 
for coastwatching on New Zealand's borders.1 Although suggesting that these be manned 
by naval reservists, the Board later gave consideration to using Marine Department 
personnel, as coastwatchers did not need to be fit for active service. As might be 
expected, it would fall to the ubiquitous P&T Department to equip the posts with 
telephones, wireless operators and wirelesses? In mid-1935 the Naval Board confirmed 
that Marine Department staff could man coastwatching stations rather than the naval 
reservists, who were then freed for active service. The coastwatchers' tasks were to keep 
a lookout and report sightings of ships and aircraft and anything unusual about these to a 
naval officer. Both the North and South Islands were subdivided into Northern and 
Southern Groups, four in all, each under a naval District Intelligence Officer. The 
Northern Group, North Island was centred on Auckland and was to have eight 
coastwatching posts. The Southern Group, North Island had seven posts, with 
Wellington as the centre. The Northern Group, South Island would have twelve stations, 
with Christchurch as the hub, and the Southern Group, South Island had ten posts 
focussed on Dunedin.3 
On 14 January 1937, representatives of the Naval Board, Anny GHQ, the 
RNZAF, the P&T Department and the Marine Department met to revise the scheme. The 
Naval Secretary had expressed the intent in a memorandum on 30 December 1936 that 
, ... the proposed organisation allows for watchers along almost the whole coast of New 
Zealand.,4 The coastwatching organisation, according to this meeting, was to be under 
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the Marine Department, the core being lighthouse personnel, plus postmasters and other 
P&T Department staff and civilian volunteers. Four Naval District Intelligence Officers 
would be appointed to the four main ports, and either telephone or telegraph were to be 
the means of communication between the posts and the DIGs.5 
The departmental representatives at the January meeting were re-constituted as a 
committee of the ONS, the War Watching Committee, which had its first meeting on 2 
August 1937. Unexpectedly, the Admiralty threw a spanner in the works with a 
communication on 28 July that expressed the view that: 
... the intention to use lighthouse keepers, operating from lighthouses, as part of 
the War Watching Organisation was contrary to Admiralty policy, which is 
opposed to such a practice on the grounds that lighthouses and lightships are by 
international usage non-belligerent, and that any established system of using them 
for intelligence purposes would reacte [sic] adversely on the i~munity normally 
accorded them.6 
Very sensibly, the second and third meetings of the War Watch Committee 
considered the Admiralty'S views and declined to accept them: lighthouses would be 
used.7 While further objections were raised by the Admiralty, it was pointed out by the 
Committee that the lighthouse staff lay at the heart of the local scheme, that the country 
was thinly populated, and there was not a large pool of people to draw on for 
coastwatching duties.8 
In September 1938, the coastwatching scheme had a list of some fifty-eight 
proposed stations, divided into four districts around Auckland (seventeen stations), 
Wellington (fifteen), Lyttelton (eighteen) and Dunedin (eight). Each post was to have 
sufficient personnel to maintain a twenty-four hour watch. The Air Department would 
patrol the unguarded coast between Okura and Puysegur Point.9 In July 1939, the Army 
agreed to take over the manning of thirteen posts to be run by the P&T Department and 
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three Marine Department stations. lO By 1940 the War Watching Committee had been 
renamed the Coastwatching Committee. 
In March 1940 there were said to be sixty-two coastwatching stations, which 
broke down into the following categories. The three Port War Signal Stations and one 
Coastal Battery Observation Post were part of port defences. Some eighteen 
coastwatching stations were located in Marine Department lighthouses, while a similar 
number were manned by local Harbour Board workers. These personnel were all familiar 
with ship recognition. Finally, twenty-two stations were staffed by military reservists, 
and located in remote areas, often with poor access, but with commanding views of long 
stretches of coastline. This last consideration was thought important to detect vessels 
hiding in uninhabited localities or putting landing parties ashore unhindered. A few 
lengths of coastline were covered by periodic commercial or RNZAF air patrols, the most 
important of which was the two hundred mile stretch between Puysegur Point and 
Jackson's Bay.ll This was a very thin cordon for a very long coastline. It is therefore 
surprising to note that the Chiefs of Staff Committee decided early in 1940 to close down 
between twenty-four and twenty-seven stations leaving thirty-eight or thirty-five open, 
compensating with more air patrols. 12 
A closer view of the distribution and type of station can be seen by considering 
the posts of the Wellington District. Here seven stations were staffed by the Anny, four 
by local Harbour Boards, three by the Marine Department, one by the P&T Department 
and one by naval reservists. The P&T post was at Waitangi on the Chatham Islands, with 
wrr communications. All other communication links were by telephone. There were 
posts at Table Cape, Napier, Bare Island, Cape Turnagain, Flat Point, Sinclair Head, 
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Foxtoil, Patea, and New Plymouth (five Army and four Harbour Board). These nine 
stations were to be closed. Seven stations remained: Castlepoint (Marine Department), 
Cape Palliser (Marine Department), Baring Head (RNVR) , Beacon Hill (Army), Cape 
Terawhiti (Army), Cape Egmont (Marine Department) and the station on the Chathams 
(P&T). This was a major reduction, even if it was envisaged that posts could be re-
opened, if required (the fuHlist is in Appendix Two ).13 
A document, 'GUIDE TO PERSONNEL ENGAGED IN COAST WATCHING 
DUTIES' was issued, directing the attention to what should be reported and how to report 
it. Reports were to go urgently to the 'District Naval Intelligence Officer' by telephone 
or telegraph, concerning unusual movements of aircraft or vessels, landing of enemy 
parties or enemy agents. 14 Ships and aircraft movement reports were to include the time 
sighted, a calculation of direction and distance from the post or a geographical feature, 
numbers of vessels or aircraft and nationality if known. Distinctive marks, name, type, 
direction heading, estimated speed, and date and time the report was made were added.1s 
Warships or suspicious craft required additional details describing features, size, 
shape and location of masts and funnels, the colour of the hull, upper works and funnel, 
shape of bow and stern, estimates on length and tonnage, gun numbers-size-position, 
ditto torpedo tubes. Was the ship well-decked or flush, were there conspicuous 
ventilators or derricks, did it have W (f, and why was it considered suspicious? 16 
Submarine reports were to include whether the submarine was on the surface or whether 
just a periscope sighted, description and estimation as to size and number of guns, and the 
name of any ship attacked (and if so, the state of the ship). Aircraft messages, where the 
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aircraft could not be identified, were to include features: biplane or monoplane, number 
of engines, boat-shaped fuselage, floats or wheels.17 
Reports of mines were to be particular about the date, time and position, whether 
it was a moored mine, a moored mine awash, or a drifting mine. The type and 
appearance of the mine including any marine growth or not (this related to how long it 
had been in the water), its colour, and if any horns were showing, were significant points 
to cover. Other matters to have a variety of details to be reported were gunfire (sharp or 
thunder, continuous or intermittent, near or distant, direction, wind force, visibility, date 
and time), and enemy landings or agents (exact location, movements and activities, 
numbers, vehicles, who observed landings, etc.).18 
The objects of the coastwatchers' attention were to be reported in a commendable 
amount of detail, provided that was available. The location, role and circumstances of 
the coastwatching stations varied widely, but an idea of the translation of the guidelines 
into operational activity can be gained by looking at an example. This can be seen in the 
main features of the reporting and receiving activities contained in the Communications 
Orders for the War Signal Station on Stephens Island. The Station was to maintain radio 
schedules during the day at 0550 hours, 0840, 1130, 1510 and 2100 for routine traffic and 
the passing of meteorological reports to the Meteorological Office in Wellington. A 
loudspeaker watch was to be kept for ten minutes each hour on 1840 kilocycles for calls 
from Wellington, and it was noted that a constant loudspeaker watch was maintained at 
Wellington wrr Station on 2012 kilocycles. In an emergency, Stephens Island could call 
on 500 kilocycles. All coded messages used NZSP02 and SYKO codes, and all signals 
were to be addressed to 'Navycharge, Wellington'. Stephens Island was to report on all 
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eastbound and westbound shipping other than small craft, and all aircraft movements. 
Where the name of the latter was unknown, the type, the time of sighting, bearing, 
distance, course and markings if visible were to be noted. Any reports of vessels 
behaving in a suspicious manner were to be prefixed "IMPORTANT".19 
It was an ongoing round-the-clock business. To do this effectively was to spend 
time and be alert doing it. Yet, as the Official History of the Coastwatchers noted: 
The duties of the coastwatcher are not spectacular. His role is passive or 
preventive rather than active or aggressive, but the information he obtains can be 
of vital importance ... 
The coastwatcher's duty is tedious. He has to spend long hours looking 
out over the inconstant but unchanging ocean or struggling with his radio, groping 
for contact with the outside world. He has to endure, perhaps to an exaggerated 
degree, all the monotony and boredom of service life ... It is only near a few main 
ports that he will have enough to do to keep healthily busy.zo 
In June 1940, the watch on the coast was brought up with a jolt. On the night of 
13 June, the German auxiliary cruiser Ship 36, the Orion, arrived in the approaches to 
Auckland with 228 mines. It was a cloudless night with visibility for about twelve 
Gennan nautical miles, with bright moonlight, with a very light wind from the southwest. 
The raider had listened into the voluble radio traffic of the New Zealand shore stations. 
The lighthouses were working, which was of assistance in navigation. At 1926 hours, the 
first moored contact-type mine was dropped overboard, for a row stretching across the 
eastern passage between Great Mercury and Cuvier Island. The second line of mines was 
laid across the approach to Cuvier Island in a zig-zag. A third, longer line was laid right 
across the northern approaches to the Hauraki Gulf, extending from off the northern end 
of Great Barrier Island in an arc some six and a half miles off Moko Hinau Island and 
then around in a line to the northwest. The last mine went overboard at 0236 hours on 14 
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June, the end of a seven hour operation. Captain Weyher of the Orion recorded in his 
War Diary that: 
It was not possible to approach closer than 8 Gennan nautical miles to the 
CUVIER lighthouse without being sighted by the signal station ... 
During the [ seven hour] operation three outward bound steamers and one 
inward bound vessel were sighted .,. the track selected lay well away from the 
steamers and this fact combined with the clouding of the sky at 2300 hrs. allowed 
the mine barrage to be laid unnoticed and without incident.21 
Once finished, the raider turned onto a course of 50 degrees, and slipped away. 
The New Zealand cruiser Achilles and the armed merchant cruiser Hector arrived at 
Auckland between 2100 hours and midnight. Two ships had sailed from Auckland, one 
at 2100 hours and the other at 0045 hours, while the coastal vessel Port Waikato arrived 
at midnight. 22 Nothing had been noticed, which doesn't say much for the watchkeeping 
on those ships. The Marine Department coastwatching station on Moko Hinau had seen 
nothing, although the raider nearly circumnavigated the island. Nor had the Port War 
Signal Station manned by naval reservists on Tiritiri Matangi, or the station at Cape 
Colville manned by the Army?3 It was an appalling lack of vigilance. Five days later, 
when the Canadian-Australian mail steamer Niagara struck a mine just before 0344 hours 
on 19 June and sank, there was a great deal of confusion. This was, after all, just what 
the coastwatching stations were intended to prevent. 
Over seven months later, doubts were still being raised as to the effectiveness of 
coastwatching. On 26 February 1941 it was noted: 
The Chiefs of Staff are not satisfied that the methods of passing reports 
from Coastwatching Stations to the Central War Room are entirely adequate and 
efficient and are also of the opinion that a review should be made of the Stations 
at present manned with a view to seeing that the most effective organisation 
. . . 24 
necessary IS In operatIOn. 
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The Chief of Naval Staff was to initiate action on this matter. Nearly two months 
later, Captain Rotherham, the Naval Officer-in-Charge, Auckland, raised questions ,on the 
efficiency of coastwatching stations in his area, including the provision of very basic 
items, according to a minute of 21 Apri11941: 
Captain Rotherham also raised the question of the proper provision of 
Coast Watches at the Coast Watching Stations manned by the Marine Department 
and the provision of binoculars. 
In general he said that he could not report that the Coast Watching 
Stations kept an efficient look out ... 25 
So had the undisturbed mining of the approaches to Auckland been just an 
isolated incident, an aberration? It was isolated, certainly insofar as enemy naval units 
that came within the New Zealand three mile limit from 1940 to 1945 were infrequent 
visitors. The visit of the Orion was not the only glitch of this kind to occur, however. 
The discreet passage of the Adjutant a year after the Orion in mid-1941 is a case 
in point. This British-built 350 ton whale chaser Pol IX was part of a Norwegian whaling 
fleet captured by the Gennan raider Komet in the Southern Ocean. The ten other vessels 
were sunk, and this one was taken as a prize, and put into service at Kerguelen Island as a 
small raider, renamed the Adjutant. Sailing up from the south, she arrived off Lyttelton 
with a load of twenty magnetic mines on the night of 24 June 1941 which had been cross-
loaded from the Komet thirteen days earlier.26 
The Adjutant proceeded to lay ten mines off Godley Head and Baleine Point 
outside Port Lyttelton in the early morning hours of 25 June. It was a dark night with a 
wind blowing. The light on Godley Head was burning, and the raider used this as a 
reference point.27 At least seven of those mines were laid within three nautical miles of 
236 
Godley Head, and a couple less than two miles away.28 Nothing seems to have been 
sighted by the Port War Signal Station manned by naval reservists on the headland. 
She then headed for Wellington. According to her War Diary, her captain, 
Lieutenant Karsten, noted the Adjutant's sighting of the Baring Head light at 2100 and 
Pencarrow Head at 2200 on 25 June. He goes on: 
... Here again as at Lyttelton, everything is lit up peacefully. The harbour 
is barred by two searchlights, located between Palmer Head and Pencarrow Head. 
One acts as a constant barrier and the other sweeps the approach sector at 
irregular intervals, ending up at three patrol boats with masthead lights, lying to 
port of the Adjutant as she approaches. Minefield is to be laid at full speed (14 
knots) and not at seven knots as arranged. Get-away to be covered by smoke 
screen. Events developed as follows: 
2312 Challenge from Baring Head. Adjutant does not reply. Steams through at full 
speed on course 12 deg. [north by east]. Baring Head makes morse signal to 
searchlight which, however, sweeps right over Adjutant four times. 
2316 Order to lay mines, although initial position has not yet been reached. 
2320 When laying fourth mine, Adjutant is picked up by a searchlight. 
2321 Smoke made. The fifth and sixth mines are laid on the run in, the remaining four 
under cover of the smoke screen, after turning back, and on a slightly different 
course from the one intended. 
2328 Last mine laid. Depth of mines between 26 and 33 metres ... 
2329 Smoke stopped. Course set for Baring Head. The searchlight continues to sweep 
the smoke screen which now separates Adjutant from the patrol boats. Shortly 
after passing Baring Head, the vessel turns landwards and so becomes obscured 
from the searchlights.29 
Karsten then summarised the measures taken after the laying of the smoke screen. 
Three searchlights were used, one from Palmer Head, one from Pencarrow Head and one 
from the southwest. There were three patrol boats that he assumed were motor torpedo 
boats and a minesweeper. He described them as burning navigation lights and moving 
into the beam of the centre searchlight, and he noted they were exchanging morse signals 
with Beacon Hil1.3o The Adjutant had hastily laid a double row of ten magnetic mines off 
Pencarrow Head directly in front of the main entrance to Port Nicholson. They sank to 
the bottom, designed to be set off by vessels over 5,000 tons.31 
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Waters, the Official Historian, has suggested that there were no suspicious 
sightings at either port during the two nights in question.32 With regard to the 
Wellington mining, this was not the case. The activity described by Lieutenant Karsten 
suggested some sort of response to the appearance of the whale chaser. 
A report by Major C.A. Williamson, the Deputy Fire Commander at Beacon Hill 
noted that he and Lieutenant-Commander Bottomley had been alerted at 0018 hours by 
the Port War Signal Station at Baring Head about the sighting of a dark object.33 The 
sighting was reported to the Naval Control Service and Army District Headquarters.34 It 
would seem the timings described by Karsten were slightly out. Nevertheless, the 
descriptions on file by at least two observers fitted the Adjutant very well. The Duty 
Officer at the Fire Commander's Post on Beacon Hill, Captain Mathers, viewed the 
vessel this way: 
... [the vessel] had a foremast and a high bow similar to the tug Toia. Distinctly 
saw wash as the vessel turned away. Definitely showed no lights and gave 
impression that she was attempting to pass Baring Head without being detected, 
I . 35 very c ose In... -
The little fishing boat was manoeuvring in a position almost directly between the FCP on 
Beacon Hill and Baring Head. At the coastal battery's Forward Observation Post co-
located with the Naval Port War Signal Station at Baring Head, Lance-Bombardier 
Blackett, reported that a searchlight beam gave a good description of the nature of the 
dark object: 
... when [the] beam [of the searchlightl was exposed, [it] disclosed small vessel 2 
masts, funnel and bridge amidships ... 3 
This description also fitted the Adjutant. Others at the FOP saw the vessel too as it turned 
and attempts were made to get the range, but were prevented by 'smoke' or 'haze' .[sic] 37 
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It would seem that the mines had been laid in haste at a greater speed than desirable, and 
not quite as close as intended. While the anonymous intruder had scurried away, the 
minelaying was completed. No pursuit was mounted after the small vessel sighted, and 
the Adjutant got clear away. The alarm had been raised, but an opportunity missed. 
Although she headed off at her full speed of fourteen knots, the little raider's engine had 
persistently given trouble over the past few days. She was compelled to stop at 0440 
hours about seventy miles off the coast. She limped on, the engine knocking badly, and it 
was not until five days later that she made a rendezvous with Ship 45, the Komel, 
. northeast of the Chatham Islands.38 This missed opportunity of interception of the raider 
was more than compensated for shortly after the mines were laid. Just six hours later the 
cruiser HMNZS Achilles steamed over the mines into Wellington Harbour.39 Nothing 
happened - the mines, for some reason, did not go off. They still lie there today. 
The Naval Officer-in-Charge, Wellington, noted in a memorandum to the Naval 
Secretary later that day that the sighting by the shore battery was not suspicious, and that 
he was 'practically certain' the vessel was a fishing vessel called the Korowai. 4o A 
minute on file of 1 July noted that the vessel was the Korowai taking the coastal route to 
Tokomaru Bay,41 The Naval Secretary sent a minute the next day to the Naval Officer-
in-Charge, Wellington, to the CGS and the CAS noting that 'it is considered that the 
vessel' was the Korowai. 42 
The events at the entrance to Port Nicholson on the night of 25-26 June 
demonstrate the fine line between what, one is tempted to suggest, farce and tragedy with 
regard to coastwatching, Had the mines gone off under Achilles, the responses from the 
shore stations and the patrol vessels would have come under heavy scrutiny, and no doubt 
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the attribution of the sighted boat's identity to the Korowai might have been less than 
acceptable. It should be noted that the coastwatchers had done their job: they sighted the 
little raider, could not identify it, and reported it, and measures were taken (the use of the 
searchlights). It is simply the case that those measures were not enough, that no attempt 
to apprehend the vessel was made, no pursuit mounted. If a repeat of the Niagara had 
occurred, involving New Zealand's most famous warship, or a later Cook Strait ferry, the 
night's operations would have become notorious. In the event, and not unexpectedly, the 
coastwatchers' observations were explained away. 
The other established instances of this kind of close encounter around New 
Zealand have already been mentioned, so can be dealt with quite briefly here. On the 
night of 8-9 March 1942, the Japanese submarine 1-25 entered Cook Strait from the west, 
and proceeded through on the surface under a full moon to Palliser Bay, passing within 
five miles of a well-lit Cook Strait ferry.43 The 1-25 remained unnoticed by the Port War 
Signal Station at Baring Head, the Fire Commander's Post at Beacon Hill, the Marine 
Department post on Cape Palliser and the Army coastwatching station at Cape 
Terawhiti.44 In the early hours of 9 March, the I-25's floatplane launched off Palliser 
Bay, and the aircraft flew over Wellington Harbour. It returned unnoticed to the 
submarine, which retrieved it, and headed up the East Coast of the North Island.45 Once 
more, a lack of vigilance allowed the enemy to pass unremarked. 
In the Bay of Plenty on 13 March, the 1-25 's floatplane was launched once more, 
this time on a return flight to Auckland to reconnoitre Waitemata Harbour, which it did 
successfully.46 The submarine was sighted at 2130M/13 March by the fishing vessel 
Waimana to the west of Cape Runaway, and 'hydrophone effects' were picked up near 
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the same location by HMS Viti at 2130M/13 March.47 A further report was made by a 
fisherman, Mr.George Meredith, of Tauranga.48 He had had the unpleasant experience of 
anchoring his launch in Honeymoon Bay at Mayor Island in the small hours of 13 March, 
to get an early start for the day's fishing. As the sky lightened with the dawn, he 
discovered his launch had company. Less than 800 metres away lay the 1-25. He and his 
companions kept still, and after ten minutes there was a boom and a cloud of black smoke 
from the submarine as her engines started. After a short time she turned away to the east. 
Meredith's launch slipped out, kept inshore to Southeast Bay, and headed for Tauranga, 
which he made by mid-moming.49 He reported to the Chairman of the Harbour Board 
and a controller of the Emergency Precautions Scheme. An emergency meeting of the 
EPS committee was held, and the members laughed at the reported sighting.5o The NOIC 
Auckland was notified. All the reports were duly noted by the Navy, although the 
assessment was that the Waimana had probably mistaken the Viti for a submarine.51 This 
was unlikely, for the Viti in no way resembled the 1-25. 
In May 1942 the Japanese submarine 1-21, the command boat for the Sydney 
Harbour raid, was en route to Sydney via New Zealand. The 1-21 launched her aircraft in 
the early hours of 24 May, a discreet 140 miles off Auckland.52 There was fog over 
Auckland, and the aircraft briefly lost its way. Obligingly, the airfield lights at Auckland 
airport were turned on for what sounded like a low flying aircraft in distress. This was 
enough to re-orientate the crew, and the floatplane made the return journey to the 
submarine without trouble.53 
Both of these visits came to light much later, according to the COIC General 
Intelligence Summary no.13 of 28 November 1944. Headed: 
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12. JAPANESE SUBMARINES IN NEW ZEALAND WATERS. 
Evidence of Japanese V-Boat activity off New Zealand and Australia in 1942 
is corroborated by a translation of a captured enemy document recording the use 
of submarine borne aircraft for reconnaissance. The document states that flights 
were made over Wellington and Auckland in March 1942, and over Auckland in 
May 1942. The flights in March were made from the 1-25 and the May flights 
from the 1_21.54 
The Summary then went on to note the details of the sightings in the Bay of Plenty and 
the interpretation placed on them at that time, including the fisherman's report from 
Tauranga.55 
The early part of 1942 was a fraught time in New Zealand. It might have been 
expected that there was a heightened degree of watchfulness. It is remarkable that Cook 
Strait ferries were travelling lit up at this period the war, or that aircraft incursions could 
be made unchallenged over Auckland and Wellington. The same could be said for 
Sydney, which was to have a lesson on the consequences of being incautious, in the form 
of the Sydney Harbour raid. 
Apart from the tracking of Japanese submarines by HIF D/F, REB and the local 
radar posts in 1943 and 1944, the last close encounter with the enemy was with the 
German submarine U862 in January 1945. Once more, a total lack of caution ashore and 
a return to peacetime procedures was perceived by the U-boat's crew.56 U-862 seems to 
have encountered less difficulties than the Orion in 1940. There were certainly better 
anti-submarine defences in place in Auckland and Wellington at that time, in terms of 
indicator loop systems and patrol craft, but there was little danger in getting in close in 
Gisborne and Napier, or loitering with intent off Cape Brett or Cook Strait. There had 
been a possible lapse in coastwatching at the Portland Island Marine Lighthouse, 
although this remains unproven. 
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The problem of false, inaccurate or inconclusive sighting reports was always a 
hazard of the coastwatching business, and from early on in the war difficulties 
surrounded these. Some were simply incredible, others less so. The effect of them 
cumulatively made for scepticism on the part of those receiving the reports. One 
interesting example right at the heart of the COIC occurred in the small hours one night 
in 1942, when a watchkeeper woke Commander Hannay, the senior Duty Officer, to say 
that an unidentified aircraft was flying over Wellington. Hannay was said to have 
growled 'It's probably just a seagull with some burning waste up its arse.' And went back 
to sleep. 57 What follows is a small sample of the kinds of things that could contribute to 
ambiguity and disbelief. 
A signal from the Naval Officer-in-Charge, Auckland, to Navy Office, 
Wellington at 1930M/27 March 1942 noted a report from Great Barrier Island. A small 
vessel was seen between the Barrier and Channel Island at 1600 hours on Wednesday. It 
disappeared suddenly, giving the impression that it submerged. The: 
Day before our wireless transmitter was jammed at 1700, for 30 minutes. 
At 6am today fishing boat "Tryphena" reported a loud explosion near the boat and 
smoke - master called in to complain that he had been shelled.58 
The message came from Great Barrier at 1625, was at District Headquarters at 
1905, and was sent by NOIC Auckland to the Navy Office in Wellington twenty-five 
minutes later. This was then followed by an exchange of signals between the DNI in 
Wellington and NOrC Auckland to get further infonnation, including an enquiry as to 
whether anything had come in from the Army coastwatching station at Port Jackson, 
Cape Colville. Nothing came of the enquiries. 
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On 1 April the Marine Department post at East Cape reported to NOIC Auckland, 
who relayed to Navy Office Wellington that: 
2 ships sighted without lights off Hick's Bay. 
2052M/1 59 
Another unidentified ship was sighted by the 'watchers at East Cape' on 3 April at 
1711 hours, so NOIC Auckland informed NOW at 1713 hours. Less than an hour later 
NOW signalled NOIC, Auckland, at 1811 hours a possible identification as the 
, Waipiata?,60 
Another report was a commentary on the state of the local coastwatcher's 
communications, as much as the content of the message. A roundabout message was 
received at 1110 hours on 13 April from the Police Commissioner who had a telephone 
message from the Police Inspector in Greymouth at 1055 that the: 
Coast Watching Station at Okarito reported to the Police at Wataroa [sic] 
that at 1a.m. today two lights were seen out to sea about 17 miles away travelling 
north. Only visible for about ten minutes then disappeared.61 
The police noted that the lights seen was probably the stearn vessel Totara. 
Nearly a year after the Adjutant, there was a greater readiness for action in 
Wellington, particularly in the wake of the Sydney Harbour debacle. At 0015 hours on 
20 June 1942, the Fire Commander's Post on Beacon Hill sent a sighting report to Navy 
Office that 'small vessels' had been picked up by searchlights and a search was 
proceeding.62 The minesweeper HMNZS Futurist was one of the searching units. Later 
that morning, the Futurist encountered an intruder. At 1020 hours the Staff Officer 
(Operations) sent a signal to COMSOPAC that a minesweeper had sighted a submerging 
submarine at 0710 hours, 240 degrees and six miles off Baring Head. Sailing from 
Wellington were suspended, and if necessary a broadcast to shipping would folIow. 63 
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At 1245 hours the US naval radio station in Auckland signalled the Cypher Office 
at Navy Office that they were sending a submarine warning to all US warships in the 
South Pacific and to COMSOWESPAC, CINCPAC, COMINICH and COMAIRSOPAC, 
and requesting the RNZN to send a signals to all other warships in the area, and to notify 
the NZNB that these messages were being sent.64 
By 1620 the RNZN had decided to take precautionary measures. The NOIC 
Wellington signalled that all navigational aids in Port Nicholson were to be extinguished 
immediately after the sailing of the ferry Rangitira. Sailings for all vessels over 400 tons 
were suspended from 1730 to 0700. Lighting over areas facing the harbour was to be put 
out other than that required for handling cargo.65 
This was indeed decisive action. However, the written reports that followed after 
the return of the Futurist to port revealed some disagreements about what had been seen, 
and suggested certain deficiencies on the part of the minesweeper's crew. Captain 
Elyuious, the NOrC Wellington, was particularly critica1.66 It probably confirmed his 
scepticism about sighting reports like that of the fishing vessel Korowai the previous 
year. 
A signal from the NZNB to all British merchant shipping at 0100 on 31 August 
1942 reported that gunfire had been heard on the Chathams from the direction of Pitt 
Island just after midnight on 30 August.67 It was another alarming report not 
substantiated. The worst kind of report was the hoax, and an example of this occurred in 
Northland. Under the heading 'Perverted Sense of Humour' in COIC General 
Intelligence Summary of 16 November 1944 it was noted that a person had caused 
needless difficulties with unreliable sighting reports of submarines off Reef Point at the 
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southern end of Ninety Mile Beach. The 'Humourist' produced a report and photograph 
of a submarine he claimed to have sighted. He indeed sighted a submarine, but on close 
analysis it turned out to be a model in a bucket of water, which would result in 
'considerable trouble for the photographer'! 68 
Lights, gunfire, shapes, an aircraft carrier off New Plymouth, submarines that 
may have been whales, mixed in with the odd concrete evidence of the enemy's close 
proximity, made for intelligence noise, promoted cynicism, and possibly resulted in a 
lowering of the guard. It only took a very short period of inattention for a real intruder to 
pass by unseen. This was compounded by the cold fact that large stretches of coast were 
not watched by anyone for long periods of time. 
Approval for eleven extra coastwatching stations around the North Island had 
been given in the middle of 1942, but not all of these, nor a proposed one on Stewart 
Island, were put into operation. In the early part of 1943 with the improvement in the 
war in the South Pacific, the War Cabinet approved on 25 Maya large reduction in the 
number of coastwatching postS.69 Of the total of seventy-six stations, seventeen were 
abandoned and thirteen reduced to care and maintenance. The latter remained fully 
equipped and could be immediately used in an emergency. Later in 1943, nine more 
were abandoned and seven others reduced to maintenance level, leaving thirty in 
operation.7o At the end of April 1944, a bare twenty-one coastwatching stations were 
listed, with Auckland retaining five, Wellington nine, Lyttelton five and Dunedin two.71 
The reporting system stayed constant, that is, the posts reported to the Naval Officer-in-
Charge of the main port, who in turn reported to the DNI in Wellington. This level would 
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fall further. By 11 July 1945, only twenty coastwatching and radar stations around the 
New Zealand coast were operational. 72 
This was quite a reduction, and it has already been suggested that by the time of 
the intrusion of U-862 in January 1945, the dwindling number of posts reflected a 
considerable dilution of the watch. Basic coastwatching had been too little too late to 
begin with, and was now being wound back too soon. The advent of a different fonn of 
coastwatching modified the rapid decline a little. This was the use of shore-based radar 
interwoven with the traditional coastwatching posts and port defences. Before turning to 
the radar stations, however, a short digression is necessary to note another fonn of 
watching that made a brief appearance on the New Zealand scene. 
An Air Observer Corps was set up by the RNZAF to facilitate the rapid reporting 
of incursions or raids by enemy aircraft. The Chief of Air Staff outlined in some detail 
these proposals to the Chiefs of Staff Committee, which became the basis for COS Paper 
no.133 of 25 May 1942.73 The Observer Corps system would incorporate the existing 
coastwatching system but 'amplified' by observer posts at military centres, aerodromes 
and other points. All observer posts would be connected to observer centres, and these in 
turn would be linked to a reporting centre at each of the Combined Headquarters in 
Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch. It was noted that the existing landline system 
used by the Navy was 'inadequate for the transmission of reports' of air movements, 
which needed to be rapidly sent to Fighter Headquarters 'without delay.,74 The 
construction of 'Radio Location Stations' was acknowledged, but it was clearly felt that 
an Observer Corps system would fill in the gaps in tracking the movements of enemy 
aircraft. 
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The establishment of the observer reporting centres would supplement 'the 
existing air warning system' which might be damaged or suffer breakdown; provide 'the 
only accurate source' on types and numbers of enemy aircraft, while giving warning to 
areas not yet covered.75 Inland targets would get some warning, and should the enemy 
'get established' in the Dominion, there could be 'more complete observation of the 
movements of enemy aircraft.' 76 
Communications were clearly the key to this, with special priorities needed over 
existing landlines, and special lines would be required from the Observer Centres to the 
Combined Headquarters. There were going to be complications in the provision of extra 
lines by a quite hard-pressed P&T Department. It seemed that even in simple terms there 
would need to be one or two switching points and exchanges between the Observer Posts 
and the Observer Centres, according to the P&T Department.77 
The Observer Centres were not to be on the coast, and the density of posts was 
related to the appreciation of the vulnerability and importance of the area as regards 
invasion or raids. 78 It was considered that the use of the coastwatching stations, 
aerodromes, Vital Points guards, and military headquarters could be made without 
needing to develop' an extensive volunteer system or the fulltime employment of a large 
number of civilians for these duties.' In isolated areas, it might be necessary to get the 
vol untary co-operation of farmers or other civilians 'for some hours during the day.' 
Small staffs would be needed for the training and running of the Observer Centres and 
Observer Posts in each locality. The Observer Corps was to be developed on a priority 
basis from north to south,79 it being assumed that the main threat would come from the 
north. I t was noted that inland posts need not be manned continuously. Some seventeen 
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Observer Centres of varying priority were envisaged for the North Island. Thus, to give 
three examples, the Observer Centre at Kaitaia (Priority Nl) was to have nine Observer 
Posts of which three were existing coastwatching or radar stations); the Warkworth 
Observer Centre (Priority N4) had three Observer Posts; while Auckland (Priority Nl) 
had eleven Observer Posts.80 The Auckland Observer Centre's posts consisted of: the 
naval coastwatching station on Tiri Tiri Matangi, the anny coastwatching post on 
Waiheke Island, posts at Clevedon, Papakura, Pukekohe, Otau, Waipipi, the Harbour 
Board coastwatching station at Manukau Heads, the radar station in the Waitakeres, and 
posts at Helensville and Silverdale. An inland Observer Centre at Hamilton (Priority 
N3) had Observer Posts at Raglan, Ngaruawahia, Te Aroha, Morrinsville, Matamata, 
Tirau, Te Awamutu, and the Guards Vital Points posts at Arapuni and Horahora.81 
The War Cabinet took note of COS Paper no.133 on 4 June, although approval 
had already been given for the fonnation of the Observer COrpS.82 The Observer Corps 
Centres were located in buildings in towns, eg the Union Bank Building in Hamilton, the 
Laloma Tearooms in Blenheim, and Wardell's Building in Christchurch.83 Each of the 
Observer Posts was to be manned by six or more people, equipped with binoculars and 
connected by phone to the Observer Centres. One of the main sources of personnel was to 
be the Home Guard.84 
The Observer Corps was never completed, and operated on a reduced basis. On 6 
July 1943, a memorandum recorded that the Chiefs of Staff perceived a reduced level of 
threat. The strategic situation had changed, New Zealand was not likely to be invaded, 
heavy air attack on New Zealand was no longer feasible, New Zealand airfields were not 
likely to be attacked, and any enemy aircraft operations were likely to be small scale.85 It 
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was assumed there would be six months' warning of a change for the worse flagged by a 
deterioration in the 'Forward Area' to the north. In the event of a surprise attack there 
would be no time to get a full Observer Corps into operation, and it would be the radar 
posts and the coastwatching stations that would report aircraft movements. This situation 
therefore did 'not justify the retention in being of an Observer Corps organisation', and it 
was decided to let the Observer Corps lapse until the resumption of Alert level 3.86 
If the Observer Corps was to pass quietly away, the radar stations introduced a 
durable medium-ranged surveillance option that continued into the postwar period and 
beyond. Once the fear of invasion subsided, the radar stations obviated the need for the 
Observer Corps. The radar stations were in the long run permanently to alter in certain 
respects how the watch off the coast was kept. 
The operation of radio location sets is neatly encapsulated In this DSIR 
memorandum. 
In radio location a short burst of radio waves on very short wavelengths is 
sent out and reflected back by the object to be detected. Time to and from the 
object is measured and this gives the range, the measurement being carried out by 
a cathode ray tube, a device which sweeps a beam of electrons across a 
fluorescent screen .... time for the waves to go 1,000 yards and back is 6 
microseconds .... 87 
Radar gave a visual representation with a greater range than line of sight and a position 
bearing on the physical object. It could, and did, however, pick up a lot of clutter, like 
waves, whales and kelp, for instance, so it was by no means infallible. Dr.E. Marsden, a 
physicist and the Director of the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, 
travelled to England in 1939 to find out about a 'secret device connected with air 
defence'. Two radar sets - one ground set and an airborne air-t~-surface vessel (AS V) set 
- were ordered by the Government. Marsden brought back many drawings and 
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specifications and the ASV set in October.s8 The ground radar set is said to have been 
used for training at the RNZAF Electrical and Wireless School at Wigram, and was sent 
to Fiji after the opening of the war with Japan.89 
It should be noted in passing that the design of a number of different radar sets 
was later undertaken by Professor F.W.G. White and Mr.T.R. Pollard of Canterbury 
University College and D.M. Hall and F.A. McNeill of the DSIR. Further work in new 
radar development was carried out at the Wellington East Post Office by C.W.N. Watson-
Munro, E.R. Collins and LK. Walker.90 
The Wellington firm of Collier & Beale (whose radio sets were extensively used 
in the interception of enemy signals) built the first operational ground radar set in New 
Zealand. This was set up at Fort Motutapu off Waitemata Harbour by the DSIR. This 
Tower set gave a warning of the approach of aircraft up to forty miles plus, and to the 
horizon for surface vessels.91 
Ship Warning and Ship Warning Gunnery radar sets were installed in the major 
warships Achilles, Leander and Monowai during late 1941 and early 1942, and twenty 
ASV sets made by the P&T Department equipped the Vildebeeste torpedo-bombers and 
the Airspeed Oxford training aircraft.92 The Radio Physics Board, comprising the Chiefs 
of Staff, the Director DSIR, the Director-General of the P&T Department and the 
Seceretary ONS, set the policy priorities to do with the manufacture of radar. These were 
aircraft and ships first, coastwatching second, and coastal defence last.93 Apart from 
ships and aircraft, it was thought fifteen Coast Warning sets were needed, along with four 
Chain Low Flying sets and sixteen Coast Defence sets, plus a small number of more 
specialised sets. The Navy's radar requirements were for ships and coastwatching ; the 
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Army for coastal battery range finding, anti-aircraft batteries and the control of 
searchlights; the Air Force's requirements centred on airborne sets, Identification Friend 
or Foe (IFF) beacons, and the ground radars for the approach of aircraft. The manufacture 
of radar sets and the training of personnel for service overseas became one of the features 
of radar development in New Zealand. 
The Chiefs of Staff's decision to set up sixteen radar coastwatching stations in 
New Zealand run by the Navy was approved by the War Cabinet in July 1940. These 
were to be located to give cover to the approaches to the main harbours and Cook Strait 
and Foveaux Strait. They were to be self-contained stations, with a staff of an officer, 
eight or nine operators and two mechanics.94 
These quite comprehensive intentions were a little short of fulfilment over 
eighteen months later. The state of play by the end of 1941 showed that the six Army 
Shore Defence or Coast Warning radar stations were unfinished, the Navy's six Coast 
Warning stations were unfinished or 4 not sited', and the Air Force's four CH and two CW 
radars were similarly incomplete, not least because of an uncertain supply of valves.95 
The RNZAF radar units were first organised into flights, and later into squadrons, 
so that, for instance, Special Radio Flight No.1 became 60 Squadron; SRF No.2 became 
61 Squadron. SRF No.1 took in all the Air Force radar stations around Auckland. SRF 
No.2 looked after all RNZAF radar stations from New Plymouth to the Clarence River.96 
As examples around Auckland, RNZAF Radar Units Nos.1,2,4,5,6,and 7 were set up 
over nine months frorn mid-March 1942 to mid-January 1943. RNZAF Unit No.1 was 
the original radar station set up by the DSIR and P&T Department in 1940 on Motutapu 
Island. This was moved to Mokohinau Island late in 1941, and the Unit equipped with a 
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British Admiralty 79Z Tower set became operational on 16 March 1942, three days after 
I-25's aircraft flew over Auckland. This station was said to have picked up the floatplane 
from the 1-21 in May 1942, but that the plots were 'disbelieved.' RNZAF Radar Unit 
No.2 at Hot Water Beach, Coromandel, was fully operational on 2 July 1942. Units 4, 5, 
and 6 were operational late in 1942, and Unit 7 in January 1943.97 
By May 1943 there were some sixteen radar stations operating around the coast, 
most of them in the North Island.98 We have already noted in passing the alarm raised by 
the four RDF stations covering Cook Strait on the night of 3-4 November 1943, when the 
REB station was also alerted and the Fairmile motor launches from Wellington were sent 
out to check on a suspected submarine contact. The RDF stations did valuable work, but 
could be deceived. Three examples illustrate this quite well. On 26 February a radar 
bearing was made on a contact 180 degrees and twenty miles from the Flat Point RDF 
post. although a search by a Vincent from Rongotai proved fruitless.99 During the night 
of 27-28 February radar plots were made at 2100 hours and 0138 hours off Godley Head. 
The search that followed was negative and a whale was sighted from Godley Head after 
dawn.loo On 2 March 1943, there were three separate RDF contacts made by the Cape 
Egmont 'Air R.D.F.station No.l1' between 1825 and 2057 hours. One of these was 
identified as a ship that left New Plymouth at 1800 hours. Another series of contacts 
remained unidentified from what was thought to be a vessel eight and a half miles east 
from Cape Egmont travelling four to eight miles from the coast between 1935 and 2000 
hours. Weather conditions in the area at the time were 'misty rain' with visibility down 
'1 101 to one ml e. 
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This is not to suggest the stations were always ineffective. Far from it. There 
were simply limitations of a different order from those of normal line of sight 
coastwatching. Contacts could be obtained, but identification was not so easy. 
The radar units began to be reduced in 1944, partly because the war had moved 
north and partly because radar personnel were needed for service in the Pacific Islands. 102 
For instance, around Auckland, the RNZAF Radar Units Nos. 1 and 2 ceased operations 
in January and September, while control of NosA,S,6, and 7 were taken over by the Air 
Department. 103 
The naval shore radar position in Auckland in April 1944 can be described as 
follows: 
The port of Auckland is given radar coverage from Cape Brett by an older 
pattern CW radar and a similar set at Bream Head. Three microwave sets are 
situated at Great Barrier Island (Nagel Cove), Cape Rodney and Cape Colville, to 
guard the outer approaches to the Hauraki Gulf, whilst at Takapuna a British 
Naval Type 271 set operates in conjunction with the Army Coastal Artillery to 
cover the inner harbour approaches against possible attacks by submarines.104 
Radar Post No.4 on euvier Island had been reduced to care and maintenance, and 
Radar Post No.7 on Bream Head was similarly run down in late April. Down south 
around Wellington at this time, 
The Cook Strait area is covered by four Naval Radar units situated on 
Stephens Island, Cape Campbell, Turakirae Head (adjacent to Baring Head) and 
Paekakariki. The two former are of the older CW pattern, whilst the two latter are 
. . h CW' 105 mIcrowave WIt sets In reserve. -
The slow introduction of shore-based radar into New Zealand from as early as 
1940, but more effectively from mid-1942 onwards, brought a new dimension to the 
watch off the coast. Coastwatching around New Zealand in certain localities now 
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consisted of a layering of line-of-sight stations, the relatively all-weather radar posts, and 
other specialised stations. 
This interwoven system in the Wellington District, for example, was made up of 
radar posts, coastwatching stations, a coastal defence command post, a naval W rr station, 
a radio-fingerprinting station, and anti-submarine fixed defence stations. These 
comprised: the Radar Post MW 5 (microwave) at Turakirae, Radar Post MW 6 at 
Paekakariki, Radar Post No.9 on Cape Campbell, Radar Post No.11 and the War Signal 
Station on Stephens Island, the Coastwatching Station on Farewell Spit, the 
Coastwatching Station at Cape Terawhiti, the Brothers Coastwatching Station, the Port 
War Signal Station at Baring Head, the Fire Commander's Post on Beacon Hill, the Port 
W rr Station on Tinakori Hill, the Coastwatching Station on Cape Palliser and the Anti-
Submarine Fixed Defence Station at Worser Bay. Still in the Wellington District were 
the Coastwatching Station at Robinhood Bay, the Port War Signal Station and the Anti-
Submarine Fixed Defence Station in Queen Charlotte Sound, the wrr Station at Wedge 
Point, the War Signal Station in Tory Channel and the Blenheim wrr (REB) Station.106 
Further afield, but still under Wellington's jurisdiction, were the Port War Signal Station 
at Portland Island and the Coastwatching Station at East Cape, and the Waiouru W rr 
Station. The Blenheim REB station closed down in May, and the naval wrr Station at 
Tinakori was to be abandoned in June, transferring its work to Waiouru. 107 
This was a considerable range of posts engaged wholly or partly in coastal 
surveillance in the Wellington area. AIl were connected to either the Naval Officer-in-
Charge, Wellington, or directly to the Navy Office through the DNI and the Combined 
Operational Intelligence Centre. It looked impressive, but was it enough? 
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Although the radar coverage was far from complete, there were now larger areas 
watched over around-the-clock. Shore-based radar, related to H/F D/F and REB, greatly 
increased the effective use of the electronic spectrum for surveillance purposes in New 
Zealand. It was supplemented, of course, by the ASV radar mounted in patrol aircraft, 
while the few major warships were reasonably outfitted with SW and SWG sets. One of 
the by-products of this process may have been the growth of a comforting fallacy that 
radar replaced the need for vigilance on the coast. This could not have been further from 
the truth. Radar, like REB, was an extremely valuable supplementary tool. It needed to 
be used in conjunction with a range of other measures as part of a surveillance package, 
including line-of-sight coastwatching. 
Coastwatching around the New Zealand coast, while always struggling against the 
geographical and demographic realities of too large a coastline and too few people, was 
at least an attempt to deal with a fundamental weakness. Belatedly leavened by radar and 
other means, it was not a total failure, so long as the enemy's activities remained modest 
and small scale. But chillingly, coastwatching did not cause any real discomfort to any 
enemy units close by, other than to briefly worry the crew of the Adjutant outside 
Pencarrow Head, or mildly concern U862 near Portland Island. A Cook Strait ferry sent 
to the bottom might have provided a salutary antidote to the illusion of security proffered 
by existing coastwatching operations. 
A number of conclusions can be drawn concerning the effectiveness of 
coastwatching from New Zealand's shores. The first of these is the slow start in 
establishing a national system. New Zealand coastwatching underwent a long leisurely 
gestation period from the plans of 1929, the deliberations from 1937 onwards by the War 
256 
Watching Committee of the ONS, through to the projected sixty-two stations of 1940. 
The planned reduction of more than twenty posts in mid-1940 to leave thirty-five to 
thirty-eight stations in operation revealed muddled thinking on coastal surveillance at the 
highest level. From the top level of government, the ONS committees, that is, the Chiefs 
of Staff Committee and the War Watching Committee (renamed the Coastwatching 
Committee), appeared to minimize the risks of a slender watch on the coast, and were 
only dissuaded from cutting back drastically by direct enemy action. It took active 
enemy mines to put a brake on retrenchment for a time. Even then, the extra number of 
posts on the New Zealand shoreline was quite small. This was a reactive 'stop-go' 
approach to coastal surveillance, depending on a demonstrable enemy presence. It did 
not assist the development of an integrated surveillance system, if indeed that was the 
intention. 
The thin spread of coastwatching posts pointed up the deficiencies. This was so 
thin that intermittent air patrols were conducted (weather permitting) to plug the vast 
gaps. While it may be conceded that a very thin line was unavoidable in absolute terms, 
it was abundantly clear that between sixty and eighty posts to cover the coastline was 
insufficient. Even where there was quite good coverage, as in Cook Strait, the cordon 
was still slender. Many posts, aside from the three main ports, were quite isolated. 
The channeling of incoming intelligence from the coastwatching stations seemed 
to be on a firmer footing. The centralisation of reporting, with the flow of coastwatching 
intelligence to a central body, was essential if the sighting reports were to be of use at all. 
On the New Zealand shore, watching reports went via the local Naval Officer-in-Charge 
at Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch and onwards to the COlC. 
257 
The interweaving of the various kinds of watching posts and the radar stations in 
the areas of the three main ports hinted at ways of increasing potential strength with 
interlocking and overlapping surveillance. Line-of-sight coastwatching stations, coastal 
battery observation points, radar stations, anti-submarine fixed defences (indicator loop 
systems), patrol craft (and in daylight ASV-equipped aircraft) brought the possibilities of 
detecting intruders within reach. Combined on occasion with M/F or H!F direction-
finding and REB, this was a reasonably credible mix. It indicated at the very least future 
directions for coastal surveillance, but it needed to be highly organised and well co-
ordinated. The interwoven system, where it existed, was not quite that integrated, 
al though it was a beginning. It may in fact have been a great missed opportunity. 
The multi-departmental approach to coastwatching was a positive feature, 
affecting matters from policy to the personnel deployed at the stations. The 
representation of the civilian departments and the three services on the ONS War 
Watching Committee or Coastwatching Committee involved several departments from 
the outset. The Navy lay right at the centre of the system. The Army and the Air Force 
(in the radar stations) were committed in various ways. The P&T Department, as usual in 
these matters, provided a high level of support in both communications equipment and 
personnel. The Marine Department lighthouse chain gave an established series of fully 
manned posts. Even the Harbour Boards at the ports furnished personnel for 
coastwatching. Although there was a little inter-departmental friction, the participation 
of a diverse range of organisations spread the load. 
Efficiency and effectiveness in the face of the enemy were in the end the measure 
of the watch on the coast. The tedium of looking for long hours out to sea worked 
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against the essential alertness and watchfulness coastwatching required. This was 
particularly so in backwaters where nothing unusual occurred for lengthy periods of time. 
Unfortunately, this aptly described the situation of most New Zealand coastwatching 
posts. The age-old problem of alarms, rumours, false sighting reports, mistakes and plain 
hoaxes conspired to furnish a layer of noise which distracted from the watch for the 
enemy, and made the recipients of coastwatching intelligence wary or cynical. 
The unnoticed visit of the Orion, manifested with the detonation of an active 
mine, was a signal failure of the coastwatching stations in the approaches to Auckland, 
. matched only, it may be said, by the slack watchkeeping on certain vessels in and out of 
the port over a seven hour period! In the wake of this mishap, and the sinking of the 
Turakina in the Tasman in August, it was surprising to note the doubts expressed by the 
Chiefs of Staff and Captain Rotherham in Auckland in early 1941 as to the usefulness of 
the coastwatching stations (down to reminders about binoculars). The small whale-
chaser Adjutant further demonstrated this same lack of vigilance off Lyttelton by the 
station on Godley Head, a year after the Niagara sinking. Off Wellington, it was a little 
different. The alarm was raised by the coastwatching posts. The failure to heed further 
back in the system, which but for the fortuitious hitch in the German mines might have 
ended with the loss of HMNZS Achilles off Pencarrow Head. The overflight of 
Wellington in March 1942 by a Japanese aircraft showed a lack of alertness, as did the 
fl ights over Auckland in March and May. Only one radar post in Auckland was 
operational at this time. The unproven lack of vigilance at Portland Island in 1945 was 
more than matched by the slackness at Gisborne and Napier, where any watching posts 
seem to have been closed down. The use of lighthouses for navigation, the lights ashore 
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at night, and the indiscreet chatter of radio stations were most useful for both the Orion in 
1940 and U -862 in 1945. 
It is hard to escape the conclusion that coastwatching was largely a failure on the 
New Zealand shore for a variety of reasons, the most important of which was a lack of 
commitment and a lack of application to the task. Many posts were not, of course, put to 
the test. But as the most significant deficiencies in the watch occurred at the main ports, 
the prime targets of enemy interest (and focal points for merchant shipping), the 
coastwatching organisation was plainly not very effective. The Combined Operational 
Intelligence Centre in Wellington was not well served by the coastwatching posts on the 
New Zealand coast. Ironically it was better informed by coastwatchers on outlying and 
very remote islands. 
Chapter Nine 
Coastwatching - The Islands 
New Zealand's island possessions were also to have coastwatching teams placed 
upon them, and New Zealand assumed coastwatching responsibilities extending to the 
tropics. There were different reasons and different approaches for this great arc of 
outlying coastwatching posts that stretched from the Southern Ocean far northwards to 
the Gilbert and Ellice Islands. The Gilberts lay in close proximity to the mandated 
Marshall Islands under Japanese rule, the main intelligence target area of the 'Y' Room 
in 1941. 
The RAN's extensive coastwatching system in the western Pacific island 
terri tories was established earlier and was more effective than the New Zealand system 
thanks to the foresight of the RAN Director of Naval Intelligence, Commander Long, and 
his coastwatching organiser, Eric Feldt. The RAN took responsibility for coastwatching' 
in the Solomons and the New Hebrides, and a number of New Zealand coastwatchers 
(including a few RNZN telegraphists) served with distinction during the Japanese 
occupation, notably Donald Kennedy (who gained a DSO) in the Solomons. 
New Zealand's island coastwatching was slower to get off the ground. The 
coastwatching activities run by New Zealand from the sub-Antarctic to the tropics was 
incremental in its development. Thus Fanning Island and Pitcairn along with the Cooks 
were the first to come into focus. German raiders operating in New Zealand waters 
spurred the development of posts on the Chathams, the Auckland and Campbell Islands 
and the Kermadecs, and were a factor in the extension of the co-ordination of 
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coastwatching across a range of Pacific Island groups. The Japanese entry into the war 
underlined this expansion which anticipated the outbreak of hostilities in December 1941. 
This New Zealand-British initiative resulted in the establishment of a Controller of 
Pacific Communications, effectively a co-ordinator of coastwatching based in Suva, 
working to Wellington. Networks of parent stations and outstations were set up in Fiji, 
the Gilbert & Ellice Islands, the Phoenix group, Samoa, the Cooks, Tonga and Fanning. 
The widening of New Zealand island coastwatching responsibilities is the subject here, 
and to the north this was to be tested by direct contact with the enemy. 
The first post to be set up was of a different kind, for particular reasons, and one 
of the furthest away. During August 1939 HMS Leander transported a platoon of thirty 
soldiers and two officers to the cable station at Fanning Island to the north of the Equator. 
This was to prevent a repeat of the First World War experience when one of Von Spee's 
cruisers made a surprise raid and damaged the cable link with New Zealand. The New 
Zealand Army established coastwatching posts in the Fanning Group, the main station 
being at the cable station on Fanning with the callsign VQN, and subsidiary posts at 
English Harbour and Washington (BYM). A post was also set up on Christmas Island 
(ZGZ). The number of troops on Fanning increased in 1941 to company strength, rising' 
to 113 all ranks. Fanning was taken over by 150 American troops in May 1942.1 
Another far-flung outpost was the British possession of Pitcairn Island, refuge of 
the Bounty mutineers. In late 1939, Nelson Dyett who was a 'ham' radio operator and 
married to a Pitcairn Islander, was approached by the Navy to establish a coastwatching 
post on the island. He took his own home-built transmitter, set up his station on Pitcairn 
in December 1939~ and was provided with the Playfair Code for communications. He 
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had previously worked for the T&G Insurance Company, and was essentially an amateur 
spy in Government service.2 His civilian status ought to be noted, along with those 
civilians in many other posts, for this had its own hazards, as will presently be seen. The 
Pitcairn post got operational quickly and remained that way until much later in the war. 
The GBMS (Great Britain Merchant Ships) station in Rarotonga in the Cook 
Islands became the parent station for all coastwatching outposts in the Cook Islands. One 
of the first of these was the station set up on uninhabited Suwarrow or Suvarov Island in 
October 1940, as it was regarded as one of the few such islands in the South Pacific with 
a really good anchorage, which would be useful for enemy surface ships.3 A party of 
three were put ashore on Suwarrow on by the Government schooner Tagua on 26 
October. It consisted of a surveyor from the Public Works Department, a P&T wireless 
operator and a native assistant.4 On 29 December a hurricane struck the island, with seas 
hreaking over large parts of it.s A proportion of stores were lost. In January 1941 a 
somewhat plaintive request for relief was made, but the new party did not arrive until 
April.6 The expansion of the war did not affect Suwarrow, but another hurricane in 
February 1942 did a great deal of damage, with waters rising up the trunk of the tree 
where coastwatchers had taken refuge and waves over twenty feet high breaking over the 
beach. The radio was destroyed and it took over a month before a set cobbled together 
from parts made contact with Rarotonga again.? The Tagua arrived with a third party on 
7 June, this time consisting of a radio operator and two soldiers. A concrete and larrah 
log twenty foot tower was built before the next hurricane season.8 Unfortunately, the 
radio operator fell out with the two soldiers, so he and his radio were housed in a tent 
some distance away.9 The hurricanes were the only matters of significance on Suwarrow 
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for the entire war. The station was transferred to the Air Department as a meteorological 
post in July 1945 and subsequently closed.lO 
Much closer to home were the Chatham Islands. The P&T Department radio 
station in the Chathams conducted a coastwatching service from the beginning, as a 
memorandum of 28 June 1940 makes clear. l1 In 1941 following the sinking of the 
Holmwood which plied between the Chathams and the mainland, there was increasing 
apprehension on the islands about possible raider activity. A signal on 30 January 1942 
noted the: 
Disappearance of 97 sheep MANGERE ISLAND (44 degrees 16' S 176 
degrees 18' W) between August and late November, indicates possible raider 
responsibility. D/F fixes 28 th September, and 4th October may connect. 12 
The unease engendered led to a Security Intelligence Bureau officer being despatched to 
the islands to report on the situation. This report in June 1942 was taken into account in 
part, when it was decided to set up a number of posts throughout the Chathams equipped 
with 15 watt transportable Rrr sets which would communicate with a central post. War 
Cabinet approval was granted on 23 June,13 and the Chathams' coastwatching 
organisation was established with the covername 'HAT'. The personnel strength on the 
Chathams was one officer and twenty other ranks. The main station, HAWK, was at 
Waitangi (ZLC) with posts on Manakau (WREN), Kiangaroa (ROBIN), Matakitaki 
(THRUSH) and Pitt Island (PENGUIN). Waitangi communicated with Wellington by 
wrr.)4 The Chathams coastwatching stations operated through until March 1944, when 
b 15 WREN and THRUSH were closed, and then ceased completely y July. 
Far to the south of New Zealand, the Auckland Islands and Campbell Island lay in 
remote forbidding waters. Back in September 1938, a letter from the Minister of 
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Industries and Commerce to the Minister of Marine had drawn attention to a report by 
L.C. Walker of the Latex Rubber Co. on 'The Influence of the Auckland Islands on New 
Zealand's Defence', accompanied by a letter from R.A. Falla on the neglect of scientific 
investigation in the Auckland Islands. I6 Walker had noted the comments of the French 
explorer D'Urville on the potential of Port Ross and Carnley Harbour as natural refuges, 
while Falla had noted that natural science investigation of the islands had been largely 
limited to visits in 1909 and 1929. In April and May 1939, F.R. Field wrote to the 
Governor-General expressing concern about the possibility of a hostile power taking 
Port Ross, only three hundred miles from New Zealand and using it as a base from which 
to attack New Zealand and Australia, noting the attributes of Carnley Harbour and Port 
Ross as anchorages. 17 
The Chiefs of Staff took a different view in July, however, noting that the 
Auckland Islands were four thousand miles from the nearest Japanese base in the 
Marshalls, and that they were unlikely to make use of such a base so far south. The 
Chiefs of Staff thought a visit from a naval vessel from time to time was sufficient. I8 
The cruiser Leander visited the Auckland Islands and Campbell Island at the end 
of September. Having closely examined Campbell Island on 28 September, the next day 
she inspected Port Ross, steamed down the east side of the main island and stood off two 
miles from the eastern entrance to Carnley Harbour in a gale, the visibility down to six 
miles between squalls. As nothing was seen, she departed for Wellington on 1 October.19 
This was not the same as confinning that nothing was there. The cruiser returned to the 
islands in November, sailed in to Carnley Harbour, and examined some inlets, as well as 
going to Port Ross, checking out other inlets with the ship's aircraft.20 
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By the end of 1940, there was a change of tune. The Niagara in June revealed 
just how close the war could come. In August the merchantman Turakina had been sunk 
by an unknown raider in the Tasman en route to Wellington (this was the Orion again). 
The loss of the small Chathams' steamer Holmwood on 25 November and the Rangitane 
two days later confirmed the ability of German raiders to range freely in New Zealand 
waters.21 The possibility arose that the raiders might be using southern uninhabited 
islands as bases. This was fuelled by the fact that one of the Turakina' s survivors related 
that after the Turakina was sunk the raider had gone far south, and the prisoners had 
glimpsed steep cliffs and snow?2 
In December 1940, approval was granted by the War Cabinet for parties to be 
placed on Campbell Island and the Auckland Islands, and on 21 January approval for 
financing the setting up of coastwatching stations at Carnley Harbour, Port Ross and 
Perseverance Harbour was granted?3 The covemame for the operation was the CAPE 
EXPEDITION, which began when the schooner Tagua left Wellington on 5 March 1941. 
There was not a little apprehension as to what might be found. In mid-February two 
unidentified southbound ships had been sighted off the coast of New Guinea (as it turned 
out these were the Orion and her supply ship Ole Jacob). Added to a sighting report of 
the German pocket-battleship Admiral Scheer heading south in the Indian Ocean on 22 
February, it was surmised that these vessels might have met somewhere in southern 
waters.24 
The arrival of the Tagua at Port Ross on 10 March, and the entry to Carnley 
Harbour three days later, was rather cautious. If the enemy was encountered, the 
occupants of the schooner were to say they were on a fishing trip, which was a trifle thin 
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as a cover story. On board were portable huts, stores for many months, radio equipment 
and code-books. As this first party of coastwatchers were all civilians on what was 
obviously a military expedition, this would have entitled the enemy to summarily execute 
them.25 This careless oversight was to be repeated again and again. 
The lack of the enemy's presence did not dispel the fears immediately. At the 
head of the North Arm of Carnley Harbour, around five acres of bush had been recently 
cleared by persons unknown. It had been suspected that the German merchantman 
Erlangen which hurriedly put to sea on 26 August 1939 from Dunedin with insufficient 
coal aboard might have gone south to collect wood. So it turned out, and subsequent 
German accounts confirmed she was anchored in the North Arm of Carnley Harbour for 
five weeks taking aboard four hundred tons of wood to be able to steam to a neutral port. 
I t is clear that while Leander layoff Carnley Harbour at the end of September, the 
Erlangen lay concealed inside.26 When conducting searches, it paid to be thorough. 
The Cape Expedition provided a dramatic contrast in living and operating 
conditions to stations elsewhere. Three shore radio stations were set up, No.1 at Port 
Ross (ZLB2), No.2 at Carnley Harbour on Auckland Island, and No.3 at Perseverance 
Harbour on Campbell Island. 27 They reported directly to Awarua Radio (ZLB). Only 
one signal a day at staggered hours was made at the start. The small 57 ton motor vessel 
Ranui remained for use as required, its four-man crew looking after an observation post 
at her anchorage at Waterfall Inlet on Auckland Island. Each station had a dinghy and 
outboard motor.28 
Portable double-plywood huts with double-paned windows were constructed, and 
three years' food supply was provided, as relief from New Zealand was unpredictable. 
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Wild pigs and cattle and rabbits on the Auckland Islands and sheep on Campbell Island 
added fresh meat to the diet. Clothing was abundant, and windproof material was of 
fundamental importance as cloud cover was more or less permanent and the wind 
constant. To begin with, the emphasis was on concealment, and emergency radio posts 
were set up away from the shore stations.29 
For administrative purposes, the personnel came under the Aerodrome Services 
Branch of the Public Works Department, an interesting departure from the other 
coastwatching stations. The numbers of personnel were small, a mere fifteen to eighteen 
in 1941, rising to twenty in 1943 and 1944, and dropping back to nine in 1945. Only four 
men were located at each post in 1941, and five from 1942. All staff were civilians, but 
they were all inducted or 'attested' into the Army as privates in December 1942. 
Geologists and naturalists were members of the second and subsequent relief parties. 
Surveyors were also sent down, so a good deal of scientific work was carried out over the 
years.30 
In June 1942 daily weather reports were sent by signal and from 1943 
meterologists were based in the islands. Over the whole period, only two Allied 
merchant ships were sighted by the northern coastwatchers, one westbound on 21 July 
1943 and the other eastbound on 15 October. Another small task was that of research to 
do with the ionosphere, collecting data on shortwave radio reception for Awarua.31 The 
closest the enemy came after the islands were occupied was a long way to the north, 
when U-862 rounded the south of New Zealand in January 1945. 
When the coastwatching parties were finally withdrawn in 1945, the Perseverance 
Harbour station on Campbell Island was retained as a permanent meteorological station.32 
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The coastwatching stations in the Auckland Islands and Campbell Island had not been 
failures in any direct sense, although they were not put to the test. They simply 
represented a wise precautionary measure, a tripwire that wasn't tripped. 
Two coastwatching stations were set up on Raoul Island in the Kermadecs to the 
north of New Zealand around August 1941. The staff of these posts, two operators and 
four soldiers, lived in a Public Works Department camp in the north of the island. A hut 
was built on the south coast to look out over Denham and Boat Cove, about a mile and a 
half from the camp which was linked by field telephone. Raoul (ZME) linked direct with 
Wellington Radio (ZLW), although a constant watch was kept by Auckland Radio.33 
The Auckland Islands and Campbell Island along with the Chathams and the 
Kennadecs formed an outer chain of stations connected directly to New Zealand. Further 
to the north, leaving aside the special position of Fanning Island with its cable station, 
New Zealand was to exercise effective operational control of a large number of 
coastwatching posts scattered across the island territories of the South Pacific. These 
comprised the farthest away coastwatching commitments, and had to be organised 
somewhat differently. 
It seems that as early as July 1939, the Commodore Commanding the New 
Zealand Station raised the subject in Suva of co-ordinating coastwatching and 
communications in a reporting network in the South Pacific. It was left to the High 
Commissioner for the Western Pacific and Governor of Fiji, Sir Harry Luke, to sort out. 
Rather familiarly, by early 1941, nothing effective had been done! The alarm was raised 
by the Communication Advisory Committee which noted that there were seven 
authorities controlling communications: the Colonial Secretary in Suva, the New Zealand 
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armed services in Fiji, Amalgamated Wireless Australasia (A WA), the Department of 
External Affairs (NOT the Department formed in 1943 but its tiny predecessor that 
mainly looked after Samoa), the Cook Islands Department and the Tongan Govemment.34 
The Committee urged that the British Government be asked to request the New 
Zealand Government to appoint under New Zealand direction a Controller of 
Communications in the Pacific Islands.35 The Chainnan, Mr.W.R. Newall followed this 
up with a letter on 5 February to the Secretary ONS in Wellington. This was passed on 
to the War Cabinet, which was 'startled', and the matter was handed over to the Chiefs of 
Staff Committee for deliberation.36 
A meeting was held in the office of the CNS on 19 March 1941. Sir Harry Luke, 
the CNS, the CAS, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary ONS, the 2nd Naval 
Member, the SSO (Nicholson), and the GS01 (Goss) from Army Headquarters were 
present. They discussed ONS Papers no.169 and 170, respectively entitled 'Control and 
Co-ordination of Radio Communications in South Pacific Area' and 'Coast Watching 
Organization in the South Pacific.' 37 A number of decisions were taken to put to 
Cabinet, and it was noted that Sir Harry Luke had agreed to the proposals. These 
included that a New Zealand Controller of Pacific Radio Communications be appointed 
and based in Suva, assisted by the Governor of Fiji, and that if war broke out the 
Controller became directly responsible to the New Zealand Government for operational 
control of Pacific communications. European wireless operators were required for Tonga 
and the Gilbert and Ellice Island groups. The operators were to be required for a period 
of six months or more. It was noted that because of isolation, it was proposed that each 
operator might be accompanied by two soldiers drawn from 8th New Zealand Brigade 
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(around eighteen men and nine civilian operators). Colonel Goss saw no difficulty in 
making these arrangements.38 
Mr.L.H. Steel was appointed as Controller of Pacific Communications on 28 June 
1941. He was to advise and co-ordinate and liaise with the Governor of FijilHigh 
Commissioner for the Western Pacific on radio communications of all kinds. It was 
noted that the Director-General of the New Zealand P&T Department would continue to 
control and coordinate all wireless traffic between New Zealand and its dependencies, but 
Steel could advise and take independent action on urgent matters.39 
Suva had obvious advantages as a control centre for South Pacific 
communications as it already had a powerful radio station, was linked by cable to New 
Zealand, Australia and Canada (through Fanning Island), and was centrally located. 
Apart from the central station on Viti Levu, the main coastwatching stations in Fiji were 
located on Vanua Levu, Lau and Kandavu.40 
Suva was fed by a series of parent stations in the island groups, while these 
collected reports from their outlying coastwatching posts. In 1941, the parent stations 
were Ocean Island for the Gilberts (later replaced by Bern) with ten stations, Funafuti in 
the Ellice Islands (seven stations), Canton for the Phoenix group (four stations), Apia in 
Samoa (eight stations, including three in the Tokelaus), Rarotonga in the Cook Islands 
(eleven stations), Nukualofa in Tonga (six stations), Fanning Island (three stations). Suva 
was naturally parent station for Fiji (nine stations).41 
In the Phoenix Group, a station was set up on Canton Island before December 
1941, and from July the radio on Niue became a coastwatching station. More stations in 
the Cooks were established in 1942 and 1943, as were further posts in Tonga in 1942.42 
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The coastwatching station on Ocean Island in the Gilberts Group had been 
operating for quite some time already. In 1939, Ocean Island (call sign VQK) handled 
some 6,858 messages and a year later (up to November 1940) dealt with 7,658 messages. 
Over 95% of the traffic was handled on shortwave. It was noted the receiver was 'totally 
inadequate' and there was a need for two receivers.43 Some of these were routine 
messages, and others were not. A series of signals illustrates the traffic of intelligence 
gleaned from coastwatching very well. It also demonstrates a flow of intelligence from 
the coastwatching station to Wellington, reference from Wellington to further afield and 
back. At 1655 hours on 21 November 1940, the Resident, Ocean Island, sent a signal to 
the Staff Officer Intelligence in Wellington, repeated to the DNI, Melbourne: 
Following information has been received from reliable European at 
Butaritari but source is not stated. Begins. 
250 planes at Wodje [sic] Island and 2500 lapanese. 80 planes on laluit 
and 4000 1 apanese. Trees on position of both Islands destroyed to make way for 
aerodromes. Quantity of rifles and other arms landed laluit during October. 
Ends. 44 
Commander Hannay sent a signal later the same day to the Captain on the Staff in 
Singapore, the C.-in-C. China Station and the DNI, Melbourne, repeating the information 
but not mentioning Butaritari, another island in the Gilberts.45 Six days later, a signal 
from the Admiralty in London to the 50(1) in Wellington, repeated to the Captain on the 
Staff, Singapore, the China Station and the DNI Melbourne, asked for further 
information: 
Following from D.N.I. YOUR 2112/2l. 
Request data aircraft observed. Does number represent a recent increase? 
What type and number were observed? Please grade [intelligence]. 
1840/27 46 
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The SO(I) in Wellington signalled the Resident, Ocean Island at 1231 hours 29 
November. 
Your 1655/218t November re JALUIT. Admiralty requests:-
(1) Data aircraft observed. 
(2) Whether number represents a recent increase. 
(3) If any, types of aircraft and their numbers. 
(4) Grade of reliability [of report] 
Signal me as much of this information as possible. Any further 
information on this subject would be of great value.47 
On 3 December, the Resident, Ocean Island replied by signal to the SO(I). 
Noting that the Admiralty's request for amplification had been passed on, he indicated 
that obtaining the intelligence might not be easy: 
I will forward as much of such information as possible but communication 
between Butaritari and Marshall Island [sic] is only approximately four times a 
year and reports must therefore be infrequent. 
I expect shortly to receive a fuller written report from Butaritari wireless 
operator. 48 
Getting access to laluit from the Gilberts was clearly a tricky business. 
Nevertheless, infonnation could be obtained, and the proximity to the Japanese held 
islands made the Gilberts attractive for coastwatching. Sightings and agent reports 
supplemented the intelligence gained by signals interception. 
A report on Ocean Island' at the request of Mr.Philpotts' [ sic] of the 'Y' Room on 
28 December outlined the state of the coastwatching station, its staff and equipment. The 
station was now in a new building on the north side of the island, 150 feet above sea 
level. It was equipped with combination shortwave/medium wave Gambrell Type 581 
transmitters, and a six year old Marconi Type 352 receiver. There were two European 
and four native operators. The maintenance of the equipment, the routing and 
supervision of the signal traffic, and the logging of the traffic was done by the European 
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staff, while the actual watchkeeping was done by four native operators in six hour shifts. 
The Europeans took over when difficulties in traffic handling were encountered. It was 
later reported that the radio equipment was overhauled in February 1941, and now 
provided a constant watch on 500 kilocycles in addition to other routines.49 
There had been a fair amount of German raider activity in this area of the Pacific, 
including something of a minor debacle in early December 1940. A number of phosphate 
ships were sunk by the raiders Orion and Komet in company with the Kulmerland. They 
had disguised themselves as Japanese ships and fooled the radio operator on Nauru by 
jamming distress messages, then transmitting bogus signals of reassurance. On 27 
December the Komet returned to Nauru and shelled the British Phosphate Commision's 
facilities, causing extensive damage, and reducing phosphate production for a 
considerable period.5o 
In October 1941 Ocean Island became the parent station for the nine new posts in 
the Gilbert Islands. The period July to October 1941 had seen the despatch of fourteen 
teams of radio operators and soldiers on HMS Viti to the Gilbert and Ellice Islands. The 
wireless operators selected for the coastwatching posts were from the P&T Department, 
while the soldiers came from 8th Brigade in Fiji.51 For the coastwatchers in islands not 
far south of the Japanese Marshall Islands, this was to be the riskiest New Zealand 
coastwatching undertaking of the war. For some, it would prove fatal. 
July saw the parent station of the Ellice Group set up at Funafuti with one 
wireless operator, Mr.Don Vaughan. There were other Europeans on the island, so no 
soldiers were left there. Nukufetau and Nui were set up the same month, Nanumea in 
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August and Nurakita in October. These posts worked to Funafuti and each had one 
operator and two soldiers.52 
In August, the new posts in the Gilberts were established. Bern was set up as the 
other parent station (along with Ocean Island) with one operator, Mr.A.L. Taylor. 
Butaritari followed along with Abaiang, Abemama, Nonouti, Maiana, Kuria, and 
Tamana, and finally Little Makin in September. Each station had a complement of three, 
except for S.R. Wallace, the lone operator on Abaiang. On Abemama, for example, the 
post was staffed by Mr.J.J. McCarthy, the P&T wireless operator, Private R.I. Hitchon 
. and Private D.H. Howe.53 A full list of the Gilbert and Ellice coastwatchers is contained 
in Appendix Three. 
The radio equipment at the main stations in the Gilbert and Ellice Islands 
consisted of a Collier & Beale 100 watt transmitter, a Collier & Beale receiver, and an 
A WA Teleradio 3B 10 watt transmitter and matching receiver. Teleradios were the 
communications equipment for the sub-stations. Spare radio sets were concealed in 
working order to be used if the Japanese came, and the Morse signal LLLL followed by 
the callsign signified a landing. 54 
The coastwatchers were to arrange a twenty-four hour watch and establish 
lookouts in concealed locations with the help of the local islanders. These lookouts were 
not to be more than two hours journey from the wireless station. The sub-stations worked 
on a common crystal-controlled frequency, for which the parent stations kept a constant 
listening watch.55 Communication went from the sub-stations through the parent station 
to Suva, and thence to Wellington. A Playfair code was supplied, and was initially 
regarded as reasonably secure (full instructions for Playfair are in Appendix Two). 
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According to Commander Nave of the RAN in a message to the SO(I) on 5 September 
1941: 
Regarding Playfair Code, we use a separate key word with each message. 
Each station is issued with a list of 100 key words and they select at random a key 
word for each message. This is indicated by the appropriate number appearing in 
plain in the preamble of the message. Therefore, unless the list has been 
compromised, there is no indication what the key word is from previous messages 
and the material for breaking down the code is dependent on the length of the 
message sent. 56 
This may have been so, and parent station operators like Vaughan and Taylor had 
particular obscure sources for key words for back up, if necessary.57 But given the level 
of success on the Allied side against encoded or enciphered traffic, it was unlikely to be a 
code that could withstand concerted attention, particularly if there was a lot of traffic, and 
the messages were standardised. 
The opening of hostilities had an immediate effect. Within hours of Pearl Harbor 
Ocean Island was bombed by Japanese aircraft, and some confusion ensued, with the 
main radio station being destroyed on orders which were later rescinded. After a time the 
island was back on the air, using other equipment modified by the wireless operator 
MLThird. As a consequence Beru in the Gilberts now became the parent station.58 
The Japanese began to occupy the northern islands of the Gilberts, with Little 
Makin's coastwatchers being captured and taken to Butaritari where the three 
coastwatchers and the District Officer were also made prisoner. The operator on Abaiang 
was taken on 23 December. All these captives were taken to Japan in January 1942, 
where they spent the duration as POWS.59 
In the wake of the sudden expansion of the war and the obviously fragile position 
of the coastwatchers in the remainder of the Gilbert Islands, a special meeting was called 
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to discuss the question of evacuating Europeans from the Gilbert and Ellice Group. The 
December meeting had been convened at the instigation of Sir Harry Luke, the High 
Commissioner for the Western Pacific. Prime Minister Fraser was present, and the 
general idea was discussed as to whether if would be wiser at least for the European 
coastwatchers and some islanders to make their way down in canoes to Bern, or if 
necessary, to Funafuti. A report dated 31 December 1941, referring to this meeting, 
recorded, 
We were unanimous that the coast-watching personnel must remain at 
their posts, until as the Prime Minister said, "A Japanese places his hand on their 
shoulder." 60 
The High Commissioner for the Western Pacific still remained perturbed about his 
administrative officers on those islands.61 This was carelessness and callousness, if not 
downright stupidity by officials as well as the Prime Minister. It was also needless. 
Clearly the Japanese had declared their intention to come south, and it is questionable as 
to what intelligence purpose was being served by allowing the coastwatchers to fall into 
the hands of a ruthless enemy. The posts in the Gilberts were highly exposed, and unlike 
the situation on the Solomons, there were few places to hide effectively. It is axiomatic 
to try to avoid handing over personnel engaged in intelligence work to the enemy. The 
policy made it inevitable that this would occur. The previous December's debacle was to 
be deliberately allowed the chance of repetition on a larger scale. 
On 19 April 1942 it was decided belatedly to induct the civilian P&T radio 
operators into the Army retrospectively, in order to prevent them being shot as 'franc 
tireurs', as the enemy was perfectly entitled to do, for the civilian radio operator 
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coastwatchers were operating as spies.62 This decision was to remain secret in order not 
adversely to affect the fate of those Gilbert's operators already in enemy hands. 
The rest of the Gilbert and Ellice Island stations continued to function, monitor 
the enemy's movements and make weather reports. The New Zealand Government 
ninety-three foot 35 ton schooner New Golden Hind brought supplies to the Ellice 
Islands in early July. She could only make 3-5 knots on her motor, supplemented by 
sails, and was thus highly vulnerable. As the stations would report sightings of unknown 
vessels immediately, clearly a string of messages would let the Japanese know a vessel 
was in the area. The delivery of supplies was a slow business. Indeed, off Nanumea, 
interception of the schooner by enemy aircraft was only frustrated by cloud cover. A US 
naval intelligence officer on the New Golden Hind spent some time during the visit to 
Funafuti checking if there was room for an airfield.63 
The enemy continued his expected probes south, and in July, August and 
September, Japanese reconnaissance and bombing of islands intensified to try to put 
wireless stations out of action. On 26 August, Ocean Island sent its last message when 
the Japanese shelled the island. In September, the rest of the Gilberts were overrun.64 
On 25 September the Maiana station stayed on the air and gave a description of 
the Japanese landing and their search for the station. Just as the enemy reached them, the 
message 'Japanese coming, regards to all' was transmitted.65 That evening, Don 
Vaughan on Funafuti was in contact with Beru (Zee), which was taken the next day. On 
Beru, Taylor and Murray avoided capture for a week, but could not get their hidden radio 
into operation. Don Vaughan noted after the war: 
[They] had given themselves up a week later to avoid threatened reprisals against 
the natives at Bern. Altogether a very unenviable situation to end up in! 66 
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Taylor and Murray had planned to escape but the Japanese had threatened the 
locals if the coastwatchers were allowed to slip away. On 3 October the Japanese 
returned and took them prisoner, the Japanese soldiers ill-treating them and smashing 
their glasses into their faces.67 Part of an official report from Vaughan to the Controller 
of Pacific Communications was sent to the Naval Secretary coincidentally on 3 October. 
It quoted Vaughan's observation: 
Mr.Taylor is, as you know, doing a great job up there and both he and 
Murray are resigned to their fate. The suspense over the last year has been 
considerable and you can imagine their feelings when each of their stations is 
taken without an LLLL call being heard. We are indeed fortunate to be so far 
south - not enough for me!! Personally I shall be very glad when the opportunity 
to return to civilization occurs.68 
All those who were captured, some seventeen radio operators and soldiers, were taken 
to Tarawa. Along with a few European inhabitants, they were tied to coconut palms for 
three days, and then were put in an enclosure. Required to labour on wharf construction 
at Betio, they faced a grim fate. After the bombardment of Tarawa by a US warship on 
the afternoon of 15 October, the seventeen New Zealanders and five other Europeans 
were beheaded or otherwise' killed as a reprisal. 69 The hand of the Japanese had done 
more than touch their shoulders. 
The implications for the Ellice Islands were clear. Don Vaughan noted on 12 
October: 
When Bern failed precautions were taken at Funafuti to guard against a 
surprise attack by enemy forces. The coastwatching system was overhauled and 
the number of watching points increased. Fuel for the wireless station was stored 
in several places although only one of these was underground. A large axe, 
matches and several tins of petrol were placed inside the wireless station, and 
preparations made for demolition of the apparatus and destruction of codebooks 
etc, should these steps become necessary. Several crates of foodstuffs were 
transported to Funafola at the south end of the lagoon. Funafola is adjacent to the 
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islet of Telele on which the emergency wireless station was erected and suitably 
camouflaged.7o 
By remaining operational in the face of the Japanese advance into the southern 
portion of the Gilberts, the coastwatching stations carried out their tripwire function to 
the letter. The personnel had become expendable as a matter of policy, yet for the 
tripwire to work, the coastwatchers had to remain dedicated to their tasks to an 
extraordinary degree. It flagged the progress of the enemy but cost them their lives and 
handed the Japanese a whole section of the coastwatching system. As not all stations had 
been able to destroy all communications materials and equipment, skilled interrogation 
might have yielded quite a bit to the Japanese. Their brutality seems to have precluded 
such exploitation. 
Some idea of the level of traffic still being passed under such trying 
circumstances can be gleaned from Funafuti's (ZJU) Monthly Reports. 71 These provide 
snapshots of a parent station operating as a junction node between the main station in 
Suva (BZO) and Funafuti's sub-stations of Nanumea (BYP), Nukufetau (BYI), Nui 
(BYR), Vaitapu (BYF), Niutao (Bye) and Nuilakita (BYY) during July, August and 
September 1942.n The information gained came from the scattered outposts of largely 
native watchers to each sub-station and was passed to ZJU. The parent station, along 
with its own information from the outposts on Funafuti, sent the accumulated intelligence 
to Suva, to be forwarded to Wellington. 
Funafuti (ZJU), as the parent station for the Ellice Islands, maintained regular 
round-the-clock schedules, communicating to facilitate the throughput of required 
information. In August 1942, for instance, between 0100 hours and 0830 hours ZJU 
communicated with the sub-stations four times, with BZO (Suva) thrice, and similarly 
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with zee (Bern) - the parent station of the Gilberts. From 1015 to 1805, Funafuti linked 
with BZO four times, with VPD (another Suva station) once, with the sub-stations twice, 
with Bern once, along with ZIU (Hull Island) and VQS (Rotumah). From 1825 to 2250 
hours, BZO was in contact twice, and each sub-station twice. Weather messages were 
received and sent in batches in the early morning (0815-0830), early afternoon (1315-
1330), and in the early evening (one at 1745, others 1830-1850)?3 Apart from these 
regular schedules, other signals were exchanged depending on operational urgency. If 
the reports for July, August and September are examined, the direction of the volume of 
traffic through the parent station is revealed, the bulk of the messages going one way, 
from the outposts to Suva. 
In July Funafuti handled 1333 messages in all. Some 513 messages were received 
and 820 transmitted. The traffic between Funafuti and Suva amounted to 636 messages. 
Of these, 560 were sent from Funafuti to Suva, of which 511 were weather messages (a 
fair proportion of 'weathers' were generated by Funafuti itself). In return, Suva sent 76 
signals to Funafuti including 22 weathers. Funafuti's traffic with the sub-stations 
amounted to 466 messages handled. Most of these were the 311 inward weather signals, 
plus 78 other messages. Funafuti sent 77 signals to the sub-stations. Funafuti also 
handled 61 other signals in communication with other stations, mostly in the Gilberts.74 
The following month Funafuti dealt with 1157 messages, 427 being received and 
730 sent. The Funafuti-Suva traffic comprised 533 signals. Some 517 signals went from 
Funafuti to Suva (491 weathers), and just 16 messages were sent from Suva to Funafuti. 
Funafuti's traffic with its sub-stations amounted to some 421 messages handled. The 
sub-stations sent 310 weathers and 59 other signals to the parent station, while Funafuti 
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dispatched 52 messages. Funafuti also handled 51 messages in communication with 
other stations, most of which was traffic with the Gilberts' stations.75 
September, the month when the parent station in the Gilberts, Beru (ZCC), fell to 
the enemy, showed an increase in traffic handled by Funafuti. Signals handled totalled 
1405 messages, of which 552 were received and 853 sent. The Suva-Funafuti traffic 
comprised 669 signals, 645 of which went to Suva (including 569 weathers). A mere 24 
signals were despatched from Suva to Funafuti. The traffic between the sub-stations and 
the parent station amounted to 507 messages. It was made up of 422 weathers and 48 
others from the sub-stations, while the parent station sent 37 signals in return. Funafuti 
handled some 82 other messages, 24 transmitted to other stations and 58 received. Most 
of these latter were connected with the deteriorating situation in the Gilberts.76 
Funafuti could be described as busy. While much of the information was routine, 
the operational context was not. This was a period of increasing enemy activity, 
reconnaissance overflights and bombing raids, while the landings following one another 
to the north hinted at what lay in store if the Ellice Islands too remained undefended. 
If that was not enough, by late 1942 it had become clear that the Playfair code 
was no longer secure and the enemy was listening, as might have been expected. Both 
Vaughan in Funafuti and Taylor in Beru were under this impression before September 
1942. They adopted their own particular counter-measures in late July, using the second 
volume of a certain technical manual as a book code. Both of them had used the book on 
a course in Suva previously.77 On 2 November a NZNB signal to the New Zealand Naval 
Liaison Officer in Fiji noted the successful Japanese interception of Playfair, and looked 
at ways of limiting the damage. 
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1. It is now certain that the Japanese are aware of the type of code in use 
for communication with British Coastwatching Stations in the Pacific, as well as 
the W rr frequencies used. Consequently it must be realised that even with the 
frequent changes of keywords at present employed no (R) no message sent in 
Playfair code is secure for more than a few hours at the most. 
2. In order to deny the enemy even the smallest piece of infonnation, it is 
therefore essential to refrain from transmitting any messages, except in 
exceptional circumstances, to Coastwatching Stations other than those of a short 
and completely innocuous character such as "Yes", "Concur". 
3. In particular, names, positions, dates, movements, place names 
connected with friendly forces, shipping or aircraft should on no account be 
referred to in signals in this code. 
4. It is realised that this prohibits practically all messages to (R) to 
Coastwatching Stations but this must be accepted in the interests of security. 
5. Request you will inform His Excellency [the Governor] and Controller 
Pacific Communications.78 
An instruction from Navy Office in Wellington as early as 11 July had instructed 
coastwatching stations not to report the visit of friendly vessels by Playfair code. The 
Monthly Report from Funafuti in November reflected: 
With reference to the above signal (2356Z/11th July, 1942): it has not yet 
been possible to deliver this instruction to the operators at BYP Nanumea or BRY 
Nui who are now the only ones unaware of the proximity of friendly units. All 
stations in this group have, however, been advised that the Playfair code is to be 
considered unsafe, and the number of messa~es between the substations and the 
parent station has been reduced almost to nil.7 
The transmission of sighting reports in code was now problematical. The arrival of the 
US forces at Funafuti on 2 October made things considerably more secure in the Ellice 
Islands, if less comfortable. The radio station not too long after this found itself right on 
the edge of the island's new 7,000 foot long and 200 foot wide runway, from which 
numbers of fighters and bombers now operated. In early 1943 it was upgraded to take 
heavy bombers like Liberators and Fortresses. Life was no longer quiet for the wireless 
operators.80 The Ellice Island stations remained open into 1945, becoming less important 
as the war moved northwards. 
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There were other changes. Mr. Steel was succeeded by Mr.J.H. Hampton as 
Controller of Pacific Communications in November 1942. Hampton returned to New 
Zealand in March 1944 for urgent medical treatment. He was not replaced, as the 
requirement for a full time Controller of Pacific Communications was no longer regarded 
as necessary. His centralising role was undertaken instead by the a.c. Suva Aeradio 
station (BZO), Captain W.A. Perry, as additional duties.81 In a somewhat bizzare 
postscript, Steel and Hampton were retrospectively given military rank in early 1945, 
Steel as a Lieutenant-Colonel and Hampton as a Major. 82 
In 1943 a British and Allied Merchant Shipping (BAMS) station was established 
on Pitcairn Island by the RNZN at the request of the US Navy.83 There was a fair amount 
of shipping transiting the area with inadequate radio equipment, and the Pitcairn BAMS 
station furnished communication requirements.84 The operation's covemame was the 
P AN Expedition, which sailed from Auckland on the American merchantman, I.Stirling 
Morton, on 15 December 1943. The party comprised a member each of the Western 
Pacific High Commission, the Public Works Department and the P&T Department. The 
coastwatcher on Pitcairn, Nelson Dyett, was incorporated into this scheme, having been 
attested into the Army. Four P&T Department operators with Army rank and Dyett got 
the station into operation by early 1944, and it stayed open until October 1945.85 The 
station then transferred to the Western Pacific High Commission with Dyett as the 
operator, and he stayed until 1948.86 
During 1944, as the tide of war moved inexorably northwards, a large number of 
coastwatching stations in the Pacific Islands were shut down. In May, June and July, 
stations were variously closed in the Phoenix group, the Tokelaus, Fiji, Tonga and the 
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Cook Islands.87 A memorandum from the Naval Secretary to the Assistant Secretary of 
the War Cabinet on 17 July 1945 noted: 
... the last of the Stations in the Pacific Islands Coastwatching net-work was 
closed in December 1944.88 
The war had moved away, and the operational requirement for tripwire listening posts no 
longer existed. 
What then can be made of New Zealand's island coastwatching initiatives? The 
outposts strung across the island territories of the South Pacific were inevitably spread 
thinly. The more remote coastwatching stations entailed calculated risks or assumptions 
of expendability. The stations on Fanning Island, the Auckland Islands and the Gilbert 
Islands were all occupied with the possibility, however remote, that the enemy might 
appear in force. The platoon (and later company) on Fanning, the civilians at Carnley 
Harbour, and the small teams scattered through the Gilberts posed little problem for the 
enemy other than to carry out their tripwire function and signal his arrival. The isolation 
was compounded for the stations in the Gilberts, being cut off from convenient or 
adequate resupply. The logistical support in terms of shipping from the sub-Antarctic 
islands to the Gilberts was pathetic, as it seems to have largely consisted of HMS Viti, the 
Fijian administration's motor vessel Degei, and the three New Zealand Government 
schooners Tagua, Ranui, and New Golden Hind. Apart from the first vessel, these were 
too small and too slow. Inadequate logistics compounded difficulties in running the 
widely dispersed stations. 
The routeing of intelligence from the island coastwatching stations seemed to be 
on a reasonably sound footing. Reports from the sub-Antarctic islands went via Awarua 
to the COIC. The Controller of Pacific Communications and the main station in Suva 
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provided the central node connecting the Pacific island parent stations with Wellington. 
This appears to have been a fairly efficient system, even if one of the main codes used 
between islands became compromised. This flow of coastwatching intelligence to a 
central body was essential if the sighting reports were to be of use at all. 
The revelation that the Erlangen had sheltered in Carnley Harbour in the 
Auckland Islands signalled the possibilities for enemy vessels in remote island 
possessions. In the South Pacific island territories, there was a better level of vigilance 
assisted by the evident proximity of the Japanese. With far less resources than the New 
Zealand stations, the Gilbert and Ellice Island outposts provided a steady stream of 
routine and operational intelligence concerning enemy movements. Failing to heed the 
warning in December 1942, the New Zealand authorities made one cynical calculation 
too many, which cost the lives of the personnel in the southern Gilberts. 
In the Gilbert and Ellice islands the coastwatching was effective and the enemy 
detected and his presence extensively reported. The Combined Operational Intelligence 
Centre in Wellington was well served by the coastwatchers of the outlying and remote 
islands in marked contrast to those on the New Zealand coast. Although the expansion of 
New Zealand coastwatching in the islands was incremental and improvised for the most 
part, a good deaJ of useful intelligence work was carried out with slender resources under 
at times (and in particular places) difficult circumstances. Above all, the requirement for 
a useful tripwire in the forward area seems to have been met. 
Part IV 
The Struggle Over Internal Security 
Chapter Ten 
A New Security Service 
While the watch on the coast suffered from the limitations imposed by 
geographical and demographic realities, it might be expected that internal security was 
far less problematical in a small population in wartime. It can be said with some 
confidence that this turned out to be the case. However, internal security, the watch for 
enemy agents, for saboteurs, for subversion, for maintaining the security of certain areas 
of infonnation of importance, is not an easy task in a democratic state. Apart from the 
efforts of the Police Department in this direction, there was no special security 
intelligence body entrusted with this task at the outset of the war. It is clear that the 
Police Department regarded internal security as an integral part of their own province. 
The establishment of a specialist security service in early 1941 was an indication that all 
was not considered well with internal security in Police Department hands, however 
satisfied the police might be with their own arrangements. The intrusion of the new 
Security Intelligence Bureau (SIB) was destined to be an unhappy one, resolved 
inconclusively by a police takeover in early 1943. The requirement for security 
intelligence to preserve internal security, while recognised in general terms, was 
interpreted in different ways. 
Part IV considers the troubled development of the first New Zealand security 
service. The establishment of the security service and its first two years of operation 
comes under scrutiny in this chapter. It includes the plan to set up a security body, its size 
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and shape, the appointment of the director, the problems of independence and serving 
two masters, along with the implications and direction taken for expansion. 
Chapter Eleven contemplates the debacle of the Ross affair in mid-1942, a 
watershed for the continued operation of the SIB. The Ross fiasco had far-reaching 
effects on the SIB and its direction, resulting in a successful takeover bid of a military 
intelligence organisation by a civilian department. It 'cured' the Prime Minister once and 
for all of taking close interest in an independent security service. Chapter Twelve 
compares the intelligence product of the SIB and the Police Department, touches once 
more on the vexed question of port security, and looks at the possibilities afforded 
possible penetration of New Zealand government departments by a foreign power under 
these circumstances. 
In New Zealand, two factors coincided in contributing towards the establishment 
of a separate security service. These were the issues of port security and the fifth column 
menace. Port security was an area of concern for much of the war, with the prospect of 
direct sabotage of shipping through cargo handling, or the leaking of information to the 
enemy on vessel arrivals and departures. The Police Department took the view they had 
internal security and port security very much in hand, l while the naval authorities were 
far less confident. Port security was an element that led the Chiefs of Staff to press for a 
separate security service. 
By March 1940, complaints were surfacing on the lack of effective wharf 
surveillance and the absence of effective measures to prevent unauthorised persons from 
boarding vessels.2 Masters of merchant shipping reported instances of inadequate 
provision for dockside sentries against sabotage and the openness of the wharves for 
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anyone to obtain particulars of vessels to be passed on to the enemy. Communist stickers 
were being placed on vessels in all sorts of places. Explosive devices could easily be 
substituted for them. Security precautions at Auckland were said to be non-existent? In 
the wake of sinkings by Gennan raiders, the anxiety increased. 
The fifth column fear was a product of the early reversals of the war in Europe. 
Suggestions for the setting up of special bodies to deal with security can be found in a 
telegram on 29 June 1940 outlining the War Office's view of the fifth column threat. In 
the wake of the invasion of Denmark and Norway, the collapse of the Low Countries and 
the fall of France, the telegram drew particular attention to what was said to be a 
worldwide organisation 'of Italians and Germans,.4 This body was supposedly highly 
organised for carrying out paramilitary and fifth column activities. It noted that recent 
experience of German fifth column activity had shown it to be very efficient and that it 
had largely contributed to the German military successes on the Western front.s German 
plans and preparations for future fifth column action were alleged to be advanced. While 
measures may have already been taken to prevent these sorts of activities, the telegram 
suggested urgent action was needed elsewhere, and proposals had been put forward for a 
Special Branch to be set up in New Zealand. The purpose of this Special Branch would 
be to take action against enemy fifth column and para-military activity, and to undertake 
similar fifth column activity in territory likely to be under threat of enemy occupation.6 
Para-military activities were defined as being allegedly 'many operations' not previously 
held to come under military operations, like 'raids, demolitions, sabotage by specially 
trained personnel' in the front or behind the lines. Friendly powers could assist in 
countering this kind of activity through establishing a fifth column of their own, 
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including the setting up of self-contained independent units comprising specialist 
personnel trained in special tactics, using sub-machine guns, grenades and explosives. 7 
Preparation and distribution of stores to such units and education of the civilian 
population in methods of countering fifth column activities were essential. 8 
This idea of creating organisations to mirror Germany's alleged fifth column 
juxtaposed the use of a security intelligence body in conjunction with independent armed 
special forces. By the end of 1940, the fifth column panic had lost something of its 
appeal in Britain. The investigations of the intelligence and police authorities had found 
no evidence of a fifth column movement, and as early as July, the security service, MIS, 
was 'very much inclined to doubt' that an organised fifth column existed.9 The desire to 
shore up security and carry the offensive back to the enemy in Britain resulted in the 
creation of the sabotage organisation, the Special Operations Executive (SOE), from 
MI(R) and Section D of MI6, both fledgling sabotage units. tO The irregular independent 
fighting organisations were the independent companies, which became more widely 
known later as the Royal Marine Commandos. As MIS's B Division and the celebrated 
Twenty Committee took control of the German Abwehr's espionage offensive against 
Britain,11 the response to the largely groundless fifth column fears resulted in sharp 
intelligence and irregular force counter measures, with deleterious results for the enemy. 
The arrival of the British 104 Military Mission in New Zealand in November 
1940, headed by Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Mawhood, accompanied by Captain Freddie 
Spencer-Chapman, Captain J .Michael Calvert and two NCOs, signalled the move 
towards setting up a security service and independent fighting companies. 12 Mawhood's 
Mission had similar business in Australia and Malaya as well. Mawhood had been born 
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in India and served in the Australian Imperial Forces during the First World War. He 
transferred to the Indian Army in 1918, apparently later worked for the British Secret 
Service in Persia, and ended up in MIS ,13 
On 23 November 1940 Mawhaod addressed the Chiefs of Staff Committee on 
security measures in Britain, and at this time was apprised af the stand-off between the 
service chiefs and the Prime Minister over the intelligence summaries of the Combined 
Intelligence Bureau,14 He may also have become aware of certain sensitivities between 
the Chiefs of Staff Committee and the Police Commissioner, as a proposal for adequate 
liaison between the Combined Intelligence Bureau and the Police was discussed, an issue 
which had given rise to friction a month earlier. It was noted that Mawhood would meet 
the War Cabinet, and officers of the Combined Intelligence Bureau. ls 
Following his meeting with the War Cabinet, Mawhood reported to the Chiefs of 
Staff Committee on 26 November 1940 with an organisational outline for a security 
service. In Those present were the CNS (Parry), the CAS (Saunders), the acting COS (Sir 
Andrew Russell), Colonel Goss of the Army Department, and the Secretary ONS 
(Shanahan). The Chiefs of Staff Committee accepted Mawhood's outline and 
recommended a security intelligence bureau along those lines should be set up without 
delay. Personnel should be selected and despatched to Australia for training; 'a suitable 
officer' should be invited from the United Kingdom to run the bureau; and 'the Bureau 
should be responsible to the Chiefs of Staff.' The Committee decided the Secretary ONS 
should prepare a paper setting out Mawhood's proposals for submission to the War 
Cabinet. 17 
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The Chiefs of Staff paper asserted that an independent 'Security Intelligence 
Service' [sic] should be set up in New Zealand separate from military intelligence and the 
police, although there should be close co-operation with both. IS On the grounds that the 
Army was responsible for both internal security and intelligence, the organisation 
established should have the same relationship to Army Headquarters as MIS had to the 
War Office in the United Kingdom. 19 
Security personnel were to be deployed in a central headquarters and regional 
branches. The headquarters, located in Wellington, consisted of the head of the service -
'the 'Chief Security Intelligence Officer' - and two 'Assistant S.1. Officers', five 
intelligence sergeants, and five women clerks. In Auckland, Palmerston North and 
Christchurch (to reflect the Northern, Central and Southern Military Districts) there 
would be regional bureaux, each consisting of a 'District S.l. Officer', an 'Assistant S.l. 
Officer', a Sergeant-Major, twelve intelligence Sergeants (fourteen for Christchurch 
because of 'extra' ports), and one shorthand typist. Personnel needed to be specially 
selected and their backgrounds 'thoroughly checked' before they were taken on. Military 
districts were to submit the names of potential personnel, preferably well educated 'and 
of high intelligence and integrity'. Those who appeared and passed a preliminary 
interview were to be checked out by the police. Mawhood would do final interviews 
after he returned from Australia and select the required officers and NeOs. He noted that 
it might be necessary to detach officers to the Pacific Islands, and if so, their numbers 
should be added to the headquarters' establishment in WelIington?O 
While it was' desirable' for the general public to know that a security service had 
been established, it was 'most important' that the personnel, organisation and operations 
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remained secret. The headquarters would be best set up in a private house, the personnel 
wear plain clothes and use unmarked cars and motorcycles. 21 The initial training of 
personnel might have to take place in Australia, but the headquarters should be able to 
train all subsequent members.22 
Fiscal independence was necessary for the security service, for it would often be 
impossible to disclose the reasons for 'many disbursements'. Pay and allowances of 
military personnel in the organisation should come from ordinary Army accounts. All 
civilian personnel must be paid and employed directly by the security service and not be 
under any other department. It was 'strongly recommended' that the Chief Security 
Intelligence Officer have a 'Secret Service Fund' which he would not be asked to account 
for, apart from' a quarterly certificate' which gave no details of particular expenditure.23 
The chart attached to the Mawhood report (reproduced overleaf) set out the 
relationship between the proposed security service and other government departments. 
The notes below the diagram underlined the need for the security personnel to 'be given 
complete freedom of action' to report directly to the person concerned to avoid delay in 
obtaining information and passing it on 'to the right quarter', this being later confinned 
through official channels. This included 'ready right of entry' to carry out investigations, 
for which a pass would be needed. The notes showed that while solid lines on the 
diagram depicted 'control and administration', the dotted lines showed the quite direct 
routes by which information might be passed, or investigations undertaken?4 This 
showed a certain practical flexibil ity. The dotted two-way arrows indicated' channels for 
passing of information and requests for investigation' to a variety of bodies. These 
included the CAS and the eNS, the Commissioner of Police, the Prime Minister's 
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Department, other Ministers and other government departments, as well as 'Security 
Intelligence Organisations' in other 'Empire' countries. There would also be this kind of 
liaison with the tri-service 'Combined Intelligence Centre' [sic], ie. the CIB. This was to 
be problematical, not least because of the continuing procrastination by the services in 
setting up a really effective combined intelligence centre, and this did not eventuate for 
another twelve months. At a lower level, the three proposed 'District' bureaux would 
similarly have close contact with the 'District Intelligence Centre[s], which were 
subordinate to the 'Combined Intelligence Centre'. The flaw was, of course, that these 
latter bodies had not been set up. The same close working relationship was envisaged 
with the local police. Visits by security personnel to ports, industrial areas, coastal 
localities, the local police, army units and headquarters, Air Force stations, and naval 
vessels and shore stations were to be very much routine.25 
The chart depicted administrative control of the security intelligence service to be 
directly from the War Cabinet, through the COS and the Colonel, General Staff, to the 
Wellington headquarters of the 'Central Security Intelligence Bureau'. Below 
Wellington headquarters were the 'District' bureaux and officers 'detached overseas'. 
Colonel Goss, as Colonel, General Staff in the command arrangements, neatly underlined 
the intent of the Chiefs of Staff paper in a memorandum in early December. Noting the 
close liaison between the security intelligence organisation and the projected special 
companies, he observed that this only applied for the passing of infonnation. The chain of 
command through the CGS and the Colonel, General Staff was merely for administrative 
and policy purposes, as 'the Army is the organization responsible for the internal security 
of the county in war. ,26 This assertion would have been of some surprise to the police. 
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Goss affirmed the independence of the security service at all levels. While there was to 
be a Bureau in each Military District, it was 'entirely independent' and did not come 
under the Officer Commanding the District. This independence applied to the whole 
security service vis-a-vis its relations with the three armed services and the police. Goss 
noted that while the Military Districts would receive information from these Bureaux and 
although the Bureaux might investigate matters brought to their attention by the OC 
Military District, control and the methods of the Bureaux were not the concern of the 
local Military District. This principle applied at the top level of the services and the 
police.27 Here was a potential source of conflict. 
There was a certain measure of ambivalence. Reflecting the emphasis of the 
current fifth column concerns in his linkage of the special paramilitary companies and the 
new security service, Goss asserted that the special companies were intended to be 
deployed in New Zealand and 'the Pacific territories'. These units were to deal with 
'situations' uncovered by the security service. The special companies were nonetheless 
independent of the security service, and both bodies were 'to be controlled by Army 
Headquarters.,28 Clearly this linkage of security intelligence with separate clandestine 
special forces formations reflected a certain direct command function by Army in some 
circumstances. There was to a definite echo of this at a critical moment in the Ross affair 
in 1942. 
On 27 November the War Cabinet considered the Chiefs of Staff paper on the 
'Security Intelligence Organisation'. The Prime Minister advised adoption of the Chiefs 
of Staff's recommendations and War Cabinet approval was given the same day.29 The 
acting CGS sent an urgent memorandum to the Minister of Defence with a number of 
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supplementary suggestions which the Minister 'approved verbally' .30 The training 
arrangements for the 'Special Companies' being raised to be used in conjunction with the 
security service required attention, as did suitable buildings for the Central and District 
bureaux, nominations for potential personnel from the services, and an officer to head the 
organisation. Mawhood suggested a cable to the CIGS at the War Office was more direct 
and preferable than via the Dominions Office or the High Commissioner. The 
memorandum included the following draft cable, subsequently sent: 
Government has approved formation in New Zealand of a Security Intelligence 
organisation and would appreciate the loan of a qualified officer to control this 
service STOP While any nominee from you would be acceptable, Lieut.-Colonel 
Mawhood, after study of local conditions, suggests Lieutenant Kenneth Folkes, 
Security Intelligence Officer, Eastern Command, as being most suitable STOP 
Can offer him rank of Major at British Army rates pay and allowances STOP 31 
This was to be an unfortunate choice. Mawhood left for Australia on 28 
November, leaving arrangements to be made by the Army for the new security service. 
He returned to New Zealand with Calvert in mid-January 1941 for a period of six weeks 
to select personnel. Around thirty were selected and a security intelligence course was 
conducted by Mawhood at Trentham Military Camp. The course was visited by the 
Prime Minister, the Minister of Defence, Semple, Coates and Hamilton. Fraser is said to 
have told them they would be doing a very important job.32 
Personnel selection was completed early the following month and the new 
Security Intelligence Bureau (the SIB) staff took up their duties on 10 February 1941.33 
Apart from the small Headquarters staff in Wellington and the Wellington Bureau, the 
outstations in Auckland, Palmerston North and Christchurch consisted of merely twenty 
security officers. The Auckland branch, for instance, was made up of Captain H.C. 
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Meikle, Lieutenant S.R. Ellis, Warrant Officer R.C. Steven, Sergeant M.O. Sherlock, 
Mr.C. Shelley and Mr. F.S. Goulding.34 
In command of the SIB was the new Director, Major Kenneth Folkes, much later 
described by the Prime Minister as 'an obvious misfit', and by one of his officers, 
Lieutenant T.P. McLean, as 'a slimy Limey' .35 Others thought differently of him. His 
secretary, Molly Bishop, reflected that 
Major Folkes was not a fool - he was a solicitor so did have a trained 
mind. He was certainly odd and didn't go out of his way to endear himself to 
either the armed services or the Police who regarded him and the Bureau with 
some suspicion.36 
She added: 
It seemed to me that he did nothing to try to adjust to New Zealand 
conditions and did not go out of his way to co-operate with the heads of the 
various services and [the] Police, so therefore they did not co-operate with him. 
At that time there were some Englishmen who regarded New Zealanders has 
colonials and therefore inferior human beings - he was one of them and that did 
not endear him to the services and police.37 
Another officer, Captain R.S. Cutfield, observed 
Major Folkes was a qualified solicitor, had a great personality, was very 
astute. He spoke with a very clear diction, and to a lot of people made them 
appear as underdogs.38 
Major Folkes looked down his nose at people, a feature that rubbed local established 
bureaucrats up the wrong way. With the police already opposed to a separate security 
service, the stage was set for conflict. The nature of a security service is to pry into 
matters (an inevitable part of the job), but unlikely to win friends. 
Out in the military districts, the SIB staff set about their business. As one of them 
recalled 
There was no set routine for the staff. A lot of our work was based on 
counter-espionage, sabotage and propaganda. The type of inquiry being 
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undertaken controlled whether a uniform or civilian clothes be worn. An Army 
uniform was the norm.39 
Port security remained in the hands of the police. Considerable doubts were being 
raised about public access to shipping information. A private letter to the Minister of 
Defence on 28 December 1940 questioned indiscreet commercial radio broadcasts, 
shipping information in the press nearly disclosing sailing dates and the easy availability 
of departure times. The correspondent who enquired about a passenger liner bound for 
England was given the official departure date three months ahead, with the additional 
information that the actual sailing was ten days after that date. The writer was not asked 
for any identification.4o In response the CNS observed that departures and arrivals 
needed to be known a little distance before for cargo handling purposes to prevent 
shipping delays.41 He asserted that shipping owners, shipping agents and masters had 
been warned of the necessity to keep movements as secret as possible. Noting the writer's 
concerns, the CNS took the view that there was too much public discussion of shipping 
matters.4:! This, of course, somewhat begged the question, as it was unlikely public 
interest would diminish as troopships continued to depart and raider sinkings persisted. 
At the same time, newspapers like the New Zealand Herald and the Waikato Times were 
advertising specific details of sailings and arrivals, as well as future voyages, full 
particulars of which were noted as obtainable by applying to shipping offices.43 
Concern was also being expressed across the Tasman as a Sydney Morning 
Herald item on 18 February 1941 headlined 'Lack of Secrecy in N.Z. - Crowds See Ship 
Go. - Peace-Time Scenes on Wharf' spelt out.44 Auckland was most unfavourably 
contrasted with Sydney. The CNS expressed his misgivings about the situation to the 
Pennanent Head of the Prime Minister's Department on 3 March.45 The Police 
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Commissioner, responding the same day to doubts raised by the Australian Prime 
Minister on 26 February, put the onus of gangway security on the ship's masters, who 
should provide guards for gangways and cargo handling. The Commissioner asserted 
that wharf security was covered by permits checked by a constable located at the 
approach to each wharf. The New Zealand measures were better than those in Australia, 
according to the Commissioner.46 This did not square, of course, with what was being 
reported. The dissatisfaction with police handling of shipping security would not go 
away. 
In June 1941, the Chiefs of Staff noted that the procedure for dealing with 
infonnation on subversive activities or matters pertaining to the security of the armed 
forces were to be within the purview of the Security Intelligence Bureau. In cases where 
it was difficult to decide whether they should be handled by the SIB or the Police 
Department, the information would go to the SIB which would send them on if it became 
clear that they were a police matter.47 This discretionary power was unlikely to be 
acceptable to the police. 
Three months later, the Chiefs of Staff found themselves at odds with the SIB. 
The Chiefs of Staff understand that reports have been requested by 
members of the Government from the Officer in Charge of the Security Bureau 
[ sic] concerning questions connected not only with the security of the Armed 
Forces but also on matters which are not properly the concern of this 
. . 48 
organIsatIon. 
Although the reports requested had been passed to the relevant Chief of Staff by 
the Director SIB, this was not before they were sent 'direct to the Government. ,49 While 
the Bureau should consider security deficiencies in the armed forces, the Chiefs of Staff 
took the view that operational matters were not the Bureau's concern.50 The Chiefs of 
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Staff tactfully raised the issue of SIB reports on 'matters of an operational nature' with 
the War Cabinet. 51 Their paper referred back to the original chart setting up the 
organisation, drawing attention to the fact that the diagram 
.... provides that the Officer in Charge of this Bureau shall have the right of direct 
reference to the Prime Minister and to other Ministers.52 
It went on to suggest that it was more desirable that such security reports should be 
passed to the appropriate service chief at the same time as the person requesting it, even 
if the report was 'requested direct by a member of the Government.' This would enable 
comment to be made to complete the picture.53 Any report which touched on two or more 
services should go to all the service Chiefs via the Secretary ONS. The distribution of a 
copy to a 'Government member' was to include forwarding to the appropriate Chief of 
Staff, with a note from the Director SIB that comment should be expected. A request for 
a report on an operational matter should go direct to one of the service chiefs (or if more 
than one, through the Secretary ONS), and the Director SIB should inform the 
government member that the request was one for the Chief or Chiefs of Staff.54 
The War Cabinet considered the Chiefs of Staff concerns on 29 September, at 
which point 
A general discussion took place on this paper and no very definite 
conclusion was reached. The P.M., however, insisted that Folkes is directly under 
himself and may report direct to him on any subject. However he engaged 
himself to send any operational question direct to the Chief of Staff concerned. 
This answer is not satisfactory but the argument is not worth taking further. 55 
I t was noted that 
... .in view of the right of direct access to the Rt.Hon. the Prime Minister which 
the Security Intelligence Officer possesses it was considered that reports should 
still be furnished in the usual way by this officer.56 
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The Prime Minister indicated that any report he received on one of the services would go 
'immediately' to the service for 'an expression of opinion.' The Prime Minister added 
that he wished to consider the functions of the SIB shortly and he proposed that the 
Chiefs of Staff should have an input to those discussions. The Director SIB's access to 
the Prime Minister was underlined. 
Like the matter of the CIB intelligence summaries, this was yet another difference 
of opinion between the Prime Minister and the Chiefs of Staff. The comment in the 
Brooksbank report, written around the same time, had observed that it was unclear where 
the responsibilities of Major Folkes' organisation began and ended.57 The real problem 
lay in the dual responsibility of the Director SIB to both the Chiefs of Staff and the Prime 
Minister in the War Cabinet. This put Folkes in an invidious position because of the 
existing differences between Fraser and the Chiefs of Staff. Folkes' personality 
compounded the difficulty. He lacked the skilful diplomacy needed to serve both 
masters, something that the Secretary ONS by contrast clearly understood. The latter had 
McIntosh to turn to, in any event, whereas the Director SIB was caught between the PM 
and the service chiefs. 
Opposition to the new security service manifested itself in the circulation of a 
scurrilous pamphlet on the SIB in Wellington in August 1941. Entitled 'This Fair 
Country Now Has its Himmler and its S.S.Men', it attacked the SIB as constituting a 
Gestapo-type body (the full text is in Appendix Eleven).58 It did, apart from running a 
contradictory line between menace and stupidity, publish the names and personal details 
of a large number of SIB personnel, often interpreting those details in a malicious or 
sarcastic light.59 The SIB was made up of 'mediocre journalists, clerks', 'counter-
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jumpers', 'misfits, unfits, shirkers' and 'pimps'. Folkes was New Zealand's Himmler. 
Folkes' income of 1,100 pounds, the headquarters address, the alleged annual cost of the 
SIB at 50,000 pounds, former occupations of personnel, and slurs on character and 
intelligence were included. Almost every officer mentioned got a derogatory comment, 
although Captain Meikle and Captain Lindsay were excepted, along with the Auckland 
Bureau staff. Wellington and Palmerston North staff got a real barrage. It suggested the 
SIB's attempts to test security by obtaining illegal access to restricted areas or classified 
documents was unfair.60 The detailed infonnation provided on named personnel 
suggested that much of it came, if not directly from government files, then certainly from 
persons with access to that information from within the public service. This was black 
propaganda designed to discredit the security service. 
Despite this opposition, the Folkes organisation continued to expand, partly as 
result of dissatisfaction with police performance on port security. In September 1941, the 
Vital Points Committee's report on the 'Safety of Wharves and Shipping' criticised 
measures in hand. 61 The system of guarding gangways by ships' crews was found to be 
ineffective by both the police and the SIB, and it was proposed that fifty-two extra police 
be allocated for these duties. The shipping companies did not want to pay for this, 
al though they were prepared to meet half the costs. Pass proliferation was another issue. 
Shipping companies issued boarding passes and strongly resisted the suggestion that this 
be a police responsibility. The police and the harbour boards issued wharf passes. The 
Committee decided that ship passes needed to be separate from wharf passes, and that a 
wharf pass plus a boarding pass were necessary to get onto a moored vessel. It was noted 
that wharf entry was controlled only at Auckland and Wellington. A great variety of 
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passes and exemptions operated. Police, customs officers and naval personnel had passes 
issued by the police, as did harbour board staff. Watersiders simply had their union card, 
and non-union members gained restricted passes with the Social Security card. Special 
passes were issued to ships' crews, while travel documents sufficed for passengers. 
Shipping company staff had their own passes.62 With only Auckland and Wellington 
attempting entry restrictions, pass proliferation and exemptions provided opportunities 
for abuse. 
Major Folkes drew attention in December to a further problem. An officer of the 
SIB saw a launch put out to a ship anchored in the stream which had not yet been cleared 
by Customs, and return with the ship's master and possibly other persons from the ship. 
On enquiry it became clear that unauthorised landings were a local practice, although 
usually verbal pennission was obtained from customs officers. This was most irregular. If 
a master could land in this way, so could anyone else. It was clearly wrong for a launch to 
contact a foreign ship when it had not been cleared. Folkes considered that this added 
weight to the case for a port security organisation.63 
Uneasiness surfaced about outward bound mail handling between the Post Office 
and ships docked at Wellington. On 4 February 1942 the Naval Secretary drew attention 
to the unsatisfactory procedures. at Wellington. The route a ship would follow could be 
generally deduced from port destinations stencilled on mail-bags. They could be seen by 
mail room staff, van drivers, wharf stevedores and anyone with access to the mail room, 
the wharves or the ship. The Naval Secretary requested the labelling be altered so that the 
destination port was known only to those who needed to know.64 
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On 26 February 1942 the War Cabinet approved the establishment of a Port 
Security Control under the SIB.65 The Prime Minister directed that the Police 
Department, the Customs Department, the Department of Internal Affairs and the Justice 
Department co-operate with the SIB in port security.66 Up to 45 staff were to be drawn 
from two sources: officers from the SIB and other ranks from the Army's Field Security 
Wing. The accommodation, facilities and transport requirements of the Port Security 
Control were to be met by Anny. The personnel strength began with four staff in 
Auckland, seven in Wellington and three in Christchurch. It was proposed to increase to 
eight in Auckland, fifteen in Wellington (including three for a small headquarters 
element) and four in Christchurch.67 
The aims of the Port Security Control were quite wide and varied. It was to 
prevent movements of undesirable persons in and out of the country or monitor such 
persons. It was to gather intelligence from people passing through the ports, and to 
furnish security details during troop embarkation.68 A watch was to be kept on small craft 
movements and illicit mail channels, and passport checks conducted. Port Security was to 
receive intelligence from, and provide intelligence for, overseas security bodies like MIS. 
Liaison within New Zealand was essential, and the services, seven other government 
departments, the harbour boards and the Waterfront Control Commission were points of 
contact. So were consulates, shipowners, shipping companies, shipping agents, airlines, 
US War Shipping, and the Norwegian shipping and trade mission. Trade unions, Lloyds' 
. 69 
Surveyors and allied armed forces were also to be consulted when appropnate. 
The liaison with the Customs Department was very close. In April 1942, the 
Comptroller of Customs minuted staff in eight ports regarding the new Port Security 
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Control organisation and anticipated close contact with the SIB. Responses from local 
Collectors of Customs outlined arrangements made. Thus, for example, Captain Lindsay 
of the Christchurch SIB Bureau had an agreement in place for his men to accompany the 
Customs' Boarding Inspector or Searcher when ships arrived in Lyttelton or Invercargill, 
and it was noted that the importance of avoiding unnecessary delays was understood.7o 
Keeping a watch for undesirable persons included maintaining the Consolidated 
Black List. This was in tum compiled from the C.S. War Black List, the Suspect Seamen 
List, the Home Office Suspect List and the Far Eastern Black List. The Consolidated 
Black List contained about 15,000 names, updated by amendments from MIS. The Port 
Security Control compiled the Dominion Port Security Suspect Index based on shipping 
moving through New Zealand ports.71 
Embarkation security for troopships was another routine task. An example in 
Wellington between 1600 hours 20 November and 1600 hours 22 November outlines 
what was involved. 72 Twelve SIB personnel were rostered on in four hour watches. They 
were to be available on the wharf in that time and have contact with the ship's duty 
officers. The gangway guard's entry book was to be checked. Restrictions placed on 
military personnel and mail needed attention, as all leave had ceased for those on board 
from embarkation. No-one was to come off without a signed pass by one of two named 
army officers. US naval personnel on board were similarly restricted. The vessel had to 
be patrolled several times in the course of each watch. Civil passes were not accepted 
unless the bearer was actually on duty. An eleven strong section of Field Security 
personnel were to help out when required.73 
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The expansion of the war and the arrival of the Port Security Control put further 
pressures on the still quite small security service. In early January 1942 the Chiefs of 
Staff paper considered an application by the Director SIB for an increase in establishment 
of the SIB of twelve officers (one more major, three captains and eight lieutenants).74 
This was based on the grounds of the SIB's increasing workload, the need for effective 
liaison contact with the anned forces, limited promotion prospects, and the desire to 
employ personnel with specialist qualifications, like lawyers. The Secretary ONS 
affinned the increase as reasonable and necessary to support the valuable work of the 
SIB. However, as the Director SIB was directly responsible to the Prime Minister and 
War Cabinet, the Chiefs of Staff passed approval of the increase on to the War Cabinet.75 
To reinforce his case, Folkes sent a memorandum to Shanahan on 14 January 
pushing for further expansion of the SIB. He outlined the SIB's work.76 Military security 
came under four headings: the security of information, the security of material, the 
security of personnel and operational security. The task of security intelligence was to 
prevent these areas being eroded by espionage, sabotage and propaganda.77 He 
emphasised the preventative nature of security intelligence. The function of the SIB was 
to seal up as far as possible all channels by which information might reach the enemy. 
With secret or confidential information this amounted to restricting circulation to the 
minimum number of persons and as late as possible, which might involve modifying 
systems of circulating information.78 The SIB's role with security of material was to test 
the efficiency and effectiveness of the guarding of military points, and to make 
recommendations when weaknesses were found. 79 As to military personnel, adverse 
propaganda, rumours, poor morale emanating from political extremists, defeatists and the 
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disloyal needed attention. Judgements had to be made on whether activities were 
subversive or calculated to impede the war effort. If such activities were detected, the 
SIB was to provide advice on what remedial steps needed taking to at least neutralise the 
them.
so On security of operations, the fullest security measures should be adopted from 
the start of the development of operations, and here the SIB might offer suggestions on 
those measures.81 Folkes asserted that a considerable amount of effort was being 
expended in security briefings and security courses for personnel, and that a security 
reporting system had been set up. From these reports some attempt was made to establish 
'an accurate picture of the security position within the Armed Forces' each month.82 
The other side of the SIB's role was to deal with 'CIVIL security'[sic]. This 
included the detection of bribery and corruption in Government departments; 'concentric 
associations of aliens' and their movements; the actions of pacifists and conscientious 
objectors and disaffected organisation; illicit signalling and photography; censorship 
evasion; subversion; international suspects; and the sources of rumours. Prevention of 
sabotage in industries engaged in war production by vetting personnel was a further 
activity, as was the security of the wharves and shipping information. Communications 
in Government departments needed to be secure, while from time to time investigations 
might need to be carried out for MIS.83 All this work entailed practical liaison with other 
government departments like the police, customs and the censorship authorities. Apart 
from issues to do with aliens which overlapped with the police, the SIB's relations with 
the other two centred on port security, mail and foreign crews. 
Folkes listed his present establishment as forty-three sergeants, three warrant 
officers, four lieutenants, four captains, and one major (himself) to deal with all these 
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matters. Of these, eleven NCO positions were vacant.84 The Wellington Headquarters in 
January 1942 consisted of the Director, a captain, a lieutenant, three NCOs and three 
typists. The Wellington Bureau was run by 2nd Lieutenant Mclean, with eleven NCOs 
and two typists. Auckland, under Captain Meikle, had one warrant officer, three NCOs 
and three typists. The Christchurch Bureau under Captain Lindsay had one lieutenant, 
eight NCOs and two typists. Palmerston North was run by Captain Park with one 
lieutenant, five NCOs and one typist.85 
Folkes wanted the officer establishment raised substantially, on the grounds that 
the pay and rank were unattractive to NCOs and for the practical reason of the rank 
difference. This had proved problematical when NCOs had to liaise with commanding 
officers at army bases, air force stations and naval establishments. Moreover, the 
proliferation of security courses and the addition of responsibility for the selection and 
training of the Army's Field Security personnel necessitated using officers for course 
lecturers. As the Auckland district was a large and important one, he asked that the 
officer in command be raised to the rank of major, and that in addition, three captains and 
eight lieutenants be added to the SIB overall. He also asked 'for consideration 
concerning my own rank' as, after all, the SIB were now responsible for 'directing and 
controlling' military and civil security, as well as the Army's Field Security Wing. The 
last remained 'under direct Army command. ,86 Pushing for urgency, Folkes argued that 
the scope and volume of the SIB's work was rapidly increasing. He hoped the Wellington 
Headquarters and the Wellington Bureau could be transferred to the New Government 
Building in Stout Street.87 
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The Chiefs of Staff responded favourably, acknowledging the Bureau's increased 
workload with the expansion of the war. There were indications from information 
received that the enemy was adopting all possible means to obtain details of shipping 
movements and to place their agents on the armed forces staffs.88 The Chiefs of Staff 
considered the SIB valuable and judged the establishment increases reasonable. They 
approved increasing the Director's rank to Lieutenant-Colonel. There was no immediate 
room to move the SIB into Stout Street, but there might be later in the Defence Services 
Building.89 Interestingly enough, the Prime Minister failed to get around to the promotion 
of the Director, the prospect being overtaken by adverse events in mid-year. 
This was a very positive picture of the security service. During 1942 to the 
middle of the year, the SIB was conducting a large range of activities: investigations, 
security courses, security briefings, advice on security and setting up the Port Security 
Control. A number of examples illustrate the preventive direction of security intelligence. 
Accuracy was important, but security investigations were not infallible by any means. 
In January Folkes received a report from No.2a Group of the Home Guard in 
Rotorua, entitled 'Report on Ratana Activities'. Dated 8 January it suggested some 
disaffection in Te Puke, Whakatane, Taupo and possibly Opotiki.90 One Lieutenant 
Ngata, lately returned from overseas service and last heard of at Tokomaru Bay, was 
referred to as causing trouble on the East Coast. The report also commented on two 
Japanese living on the East Coast who had recently sold their businesses and not been 
seen lately. One of these was a storekeeper and billiard saloon owner, J. Kamizona, who 
was married to 'a Maori woman from Te Araroa', with one son. The other was a baker, 
H. Kimioika, married to a 'white woman', lived at Ruatoria. The information on the 
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fanner was inaccurate: Morinosuke Kamizona died in 1938, leaving a wife and four 
children. She died two years later and the business was sold.91 The baker apparently, 
according to an SIB officer, was of interest to the security service. This was an attempt by 
Japanese interests 'to infiltrate the Maoris, by putting an agent named Kimioika amongst 
them at Ruatoria, by promising all sorts of wild things about returning their land to 
them. ,92 
A Chiefs of Staff paper, considering the custody and distribution of secret 
documents referred to the SIB's testing of access by unauthorised persons. Using SIB 
staff, it was found that secret documents were not always adequately guarded. The simple 
point was made that what SIB personnel could achieve could also be done by enemy 
agents. In the deteriorating climate of early 1942, the possibility of such activity could 
not be easily dismissed.93 
A selection course for Field Security personnel was an occasion of friction 
between the Director SIB and the Army. This was a time of gravely deteriorating 
fortunes in the Pacific war, a time for urgency. On 7 April, the Brigadier commanding 
the Northern Military District sent a memorandum to Anny General Staff critical of the 
way the selection course was organised and the lack of appropriate paperwork.94 There 
was too much reliance on phone messages. The G3 Training at Anny General Staff ran 
for cover, noting that the course had not been arranged by the Training Branch. All 
arrangements had been made by Major Folkes: two days of lectures followed by 
motorcycle, pistol and map reading, the last three days to be done by Trentham 
personnel. At 0845 on the first morning the Camp rang Army General Staff to say the 
instructors had not arrived, and the course was being taken on bayonet fighting. 
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However, it was discovered that Folkes was en route to Trentham. The GS01 
(Operations & Intelligence) asked Folkes to submit a report.95 On 15 April Folkes 
responded waspishly that he had decided to say nothing about the unsatisfactory 
circumstances surrounding the course, but now it was raised he would comment.96 
He noted that he had, for reasons beyond his control, put the course on at short 
notice (four days). When he arrived at Trentham, he found that only the personnel from 
the Southern Military District had arrived, while those from the Central Military District 
would only make it by 1700 on the first day.97 It is interesting to note that personnel from 
across Cook Strait made it in time, whereas those from Palmerston North didn't. Was 
this because war didn't occur on Sundays? Folkes started the course with the personnel 
for the Suva Field Security Section absent, in spite of the fact they were due to sail three 
days after the course ended. He re-arranged part of the course for the late-comers. The 
last three days (map, pistol, motorcycle) were to be taken by Trentham Camp staff, and 
the course was to be extended by one day. Folkes was told the Camp Instructional Staff 
did not work on Good Friday and so would have to add two more days.98 This was a 
veri table caricature of an idle peacetime army. Folkes was then rung on Saturday to say 
the men were waiting for him, when he had arranged for camp staff to take the course for 
map-reading! He had this corrected and finished the course himself on the Monday.99 In 
a separate memorandum Folkes noted that twenty-four personnel had been selected for 
the Field Security Sections. 1OO The GSOl (Training) sent a strong memorandum to Folkes 
pointing out how his 'unsatisfactory' arrangements had resulted in criticism from a 
Brigadier. 1ol Folkes annotated this memorandum and returned it, noting that he assumed 
"1 102 Wh·l the GSOI had written in ignorance of Folkes' own memorandum of 15 Apn. 1 e 
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this demonstrated shortcomings on the Army side, the fallout indicated a level of friction 
between Folkes and certain staff officers at Army General Staff. 
Addressing departing troops on security precautions was another role for the SIB, 
though it probably did little good. On 10 May, Major Folkes gave a security address to a 
parade of NZEF reinforcements at Trentham bound for the Middle East. 
... This morning you men are thinking that you are likely to be moved out 
in the not very distant future, and you will probably realise you are undertaking a 
perilous journey. The situation in the Pacific is serious, and it is of vital 
importance that no word as to the date or port of embarkation or names of the 
transports are discussed ... 
r tell you that information does go out of New Zealand; infonnation 
concerning movements of troops and ships, which is vital infonnation to the 
enemy. It is cheaper for the enemy to destroy the troops before they arrive at their 
destination instead of baving to fight them ... 
You have your orders not to give away information. Some of you do not 
think of the seriousness of these things; others do not pay any attention, because 
they think they are clever. I want to tell you plainly that it is not clever, it is 
stupid and criminal; and I cannot emphasise too strongly the vital necessity of 
keeping quiet on any matter concerning Military movements ... 
It does matter to the enemy when you are going and where you are going, 
and from which port you are sailing. So 1 appeal to everyone of you to say 
nothing at all of these vital matters to your friends or relatives. I03 
The safe passage of troopships was of great concern. Coincidentally, later this day, the 
SS Nankin was intercepted in the Indian Ocean by a German raider. On board were 
sensitive New Zealand COle weekly intelligence summaries which fell into enemy 
hands. Japanese submarines added to the raider menace, although the visit of 1-25 in 
Cook Strait had gone unnoticed in March, and that of 1-21 off Auckland was yet to come. 
The fears connected with raiders led to a different kind of security investigation. 
On 23 April the DNI contacted Major Folkes with regard to the situation in the Chatham 
Islands. He drew attention to the Chiefs of Staff Committee's minutes that outlined the 
nervousness of the islanders, the loss of the sheep presumably to a raider'S crew on Little 
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Mangere Island, the concerns of the local magistrate to do with morale and the need for 
some co-ordination of security measures. He asked if Folkes could send a security 
officer to investigate and report. 104 Folkes duly sent Sergeant J .M. Allison with the cover 
rank of captain. Allison prepared a detailed 44-page report in June,105 noted sourly by the 
Deputy Chief of Naval Staff as too long, and: 
... could be summed up generally by saying that the Chatham Islanders are 
simple and credulous, mainly loyal, and almost entirely untrustworthy as far as 
sighting reports are concemed.106 
For all that, the tenor of Allison's report was quite objective.107 It included observations 
on roads, telecommunications, the operation of fishing vessels, blackout precautions, 
wireless reports of vessel sailings, liquor, cars, the airfield and the Home Guard.108 By 
this time a decision had been taken to set up four coastwatching stations on the islands. 109 
Allison's report provided an outsider's view, fulfilling the requirements of the DNI's 
original request for an investigation. 
Increases in security intelligence tasks notwithstanding, the Director SIB 
continued to push for expansion. On 21 May, Major Folkes sent a memorandum direct to 
the War Cabinet on the subject of the New Zealand Intelligence COrpS.110 It opened with 
a catalogue of the SIB's achievements in military, civil and port security and in setting up 
reporting systems for the services. He had advised the Deputy Chief of the General Staff 
that the Anny's security would be improved with the establishment of Field Security 
Sections. This had been accepted and the Minister of Defence approved the formation of 
an Intelligence Corps, with a Field Security Wing under the Corps. Folkes had selected 
and trained personnel for four Field Security Sections, three of them being deployed in 
New Zealand and one in Fiji.III Observing that Army intelligence had only provided for 
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an 'la' fonnation, that is 'Intelligence Operations', he noted an 'Ib' fonnation, 'Security 
Intelligence' was omitted. From his 'conversations' with Army General Staff it was 
desirable to fill the gap.Il2 Where the GSOl Ia fitted into the chain of command, the SIB 
covered de facto the absent Ib post. The Field Security Sections' efficiency was severely 
reduced without the unifying direction from a Commandant of the Intelligence Corps. As 
field security personnel were 'Territorial Troops', the Commandant needed a New 
Zealand Army commission. The SIB could no longer look after the Army's security.113 
There was general agreement in Anny General Staff that an 'Ib' Security Intelligence 
chain be set up, that a Commandant of the Intelligence Corps was necessary, and that it 
was "expedient' and 'essential' that Folkes should hold both posts 'of Commandant and 
the Ib officer in the Army' .114 Folkes was the only qualified person for the post and the 
Intelligence Corps relied on the Director SIB for training, direction and daily security 
i ntell igence. 11S The problem was the DCGS had informed him of 'obstacles' over such an 
appointment and that he should approach the Minister of Defence. This memorandum to 
the War Cabinet was the result. 116 
Of course, most of this was bunkum. First, field security sections were 
established with the 2nd New Zealand Division in the Middle East, long before Folkes 
arrived on the scene. Second, the post of Commandant of the Intelligence Corps did not 
have the centralising and directing role in quite the way Folkes described it. Third, there 
were doubts at Army General Staff about allowing the Director SIB to take over the 
Intelligence Corps (an echo of Brooksbank's comment). In fact, as Folkes revealed, 
Army General Staff had out-manoeuvred him. One of his subordinates, Captain 
R.S .Cutfield, had been appointed Commandant of the Intelligence Corps. Folkes felt this 
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was ill-conceived. Cutfield lacked the necessary depth of experience for the post, was too 
young, and did not have 'available the Intelligence material which is essential for the 
efficient running of the Corps. ,117 This was a gross, if confidential, slur on Cutfield. 
Folkes ignored the fact that he himself had moved from Lieutenant to Major in one easy 
bound on appointment as Director SIB. He considered that he already fulfilled the duties 
unofficially, and making him Commandant would unify the concept of security. It would 
not obstruct his present obligations to the Prime Minister or the Anny. Unified direction 
would bring security intelligence completely under one hat, as in the United Kingdom. 11 8 
It would be cheaper. 119 
This was self-serving stuff. In the United Kingdom, in fact, the posts of the 
Director-General of MIS and the Commandant of the Intelligence Corps were separate. 
The memorandum was vintage Folkes, playing his Prime Ministerial card against the 
Army. It was not a very wise thing to do. He was not appointed head of the Intelligence 
Corps. however, for events now took a very different course. The early period of the SIB 
was about to end in calamity. At the end of March 1942 a security investigation got under 
way that would dramatically affect the fortunes of the SIB and its colourful Director. 
By mid-1942 the SIB was engaged in a range of security intelligence tasks under 
difficult conditions imposed by the expansion of the war. Yet the SIB existed within a 
difficult climate right from its inception, even before the arrival of Major Folkes. Given 
the varying degrees of tension between the Chiefs of Staff and the Police Department, 
and the differences between the Chiefs of Staff and the Prime Minister, setting up a 
security service in the face of police opposition was asking for trouble. With an awkward 
Director bent on increasing his empire while working for two powerful masters, an 
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accident was on the cards. The SIB expanded and friction increased, not least with the 
Police Commissioner. Quite apart from anything else, the SIB and the Police Department 
were two agencies competing in one arena, but with wholly disproportionate resources at 
their disposal. Insistence on the independence of the SIB from the services and Folkes' 
direct access to the Prime Minister, while leaving the security service under the Army, 
posed problems. The Director's access to the PM at least rivaled the Police 
Commissioner's, and probably gave the Secretary ONS and others in the Prime 
Minister's Department food for thought. Serving two masters - the service chiefs and 
the Prime Minister - required a Director with great diplomatic qualities, a mandarin's 
mandarin. But Folkes was not like that; quite the reverse. Really effective liaison with 
the police was precluded. The SIB was too small from the outset, creating pressure for 
expansion, but an enlarged SIB was unlikely to be viewed favourably by opponents. The 
Port Security Control and the attempt by Folkes properly to establish (and absorb) the 
Intelligence Corps along with Army's Field Security Sections, were further grounds for 
suspicion. Resentment about the SIB's testing of security measures added to the mixture. 
It was not surprising, then, that if the SIB got into difficulties, few hands might be lifted 
in support of the security service and its idiosyncratic Director. 
Chapter Eleven 
Fiasco - the Ross Affair 
A security investigation began in very peculiar circumstances in late March 1942 
and the ramifications from it would shake the very foundations of the security service and 
alter the relationships between the Prime Minister, the Police Commissioner and the 
Chiefs of Staff. It became the touchstone for smearing the competence of the SIB and its 
Director, and was focussed on in later published works as the most memorable aspect of 
the SIB.1 It was also highly political, an aspect not so widely publicised, leaving a 
number of unanswered questions. How was it that a single investigation could result in 
the SIB becoming the victim of a takeover by a civilian department? The affair from the 
outset was to embroil the political leadership and potentially the head of the SIB. A great 
opportunity was presented to (or created by?) opponents of the security service. 
On Saturday 27 March 1942 a prisoner released from Waikeria Prison near Te 
Awamu tu made a phone call to Semple, the Minister of Railways, and obtained an 
appointment to see him in Wellington the following day.2 Whatever was said to the 
Minister on a public telephone line caused the Minister to agree to meet him. The 
prisoner got to Wellington, presumably by the overnight train, and on the Sunday met 
Semple. Semple took the man to the Prime Minister. Fraser, having met the convict, 
then rang Major Folkes at about 2 pm and asked him to come 'immediately' to Fraser's 
office in Parliament. The Prime Minister did not get in touch with the Police 
Commissioner, Mr. D.1. Cummings, in spite of the fact he was dealing with a convicted 
criminal. As the Secretary ONS in the Prime Minister's Department had been receiving 
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fortnightly Police Intelligence Summaries since late 1939 dealing with internal security,3 
the failure to phone Commissioner Cummings is puzzling. It was done so at the request 
of the convict, a man neither Semple nor Fraser had ever met before. 
Folkes arrived at the Prime Minister's office, where he found Fraser, Semple and 
another man introduced to him as Mr. 'Calder'. Fraser explained that 'Calder' was a 
criminal called Ross, who'was really a very bad man', and an expert in the use of 
explosives, who had just served a term for the misuse of gelignite.4 Folkes later reflected, 
according to a transcript of an interview with the Attorney-General and the Solicitor-
General, 
Mr. Fraser then told me that Calder had contacted Mr.Semple by 
telephone early that morning following which Calder had had an interview with 
Mr.Semple following which Mr. Semple had had an interview with the Prime 
Minister [ sic]. At the latter interview Calder was present when, according to the 
Prime Minister, Calder told a long story of being contacted at Frankton Junction 
by a gentleman calling himself Barrett, and a scheme in rough outline was 
proposed to Calder whereby certain sabotage should be effected and suggestions 
of assassination had been made. Mr. Fraser requested that I take Calder to my 
office and interrogate him again and then have the matter 
investigated .... Accordingly I took Calder to my office in a motor-car and I had an 
interview with him lasting an hour. He then told me a story concerning the 
meeting at Frankton Junction.s 
There is an inconsistency here about when 'Calder' rang Semple first, whether on 
the Saturday or early on the Sunday. Before he left, the Prime Minister told Folkes that 
he was on no account to infonn the Police Department of this matter.6 The reason was an 
undertaking given by the Prime Minister at 'Calder's' request.7 Folkes took 'Calder' back 
to the SIB Headquarters in the APA Building. Apparently, according to Colin Hanson, 
who has talked to the duty officers, 
There were two SIB officers on duty in SIB that Sunday, and both of 
them, in addition to Major Folkes, were aware of the Prime Minister's strict 
instructions with regard to the Police.s 
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As 'between .... [the Police] Force and Folkes [there] existed a deadly hatred',9 
this may not have been a difficult instruction to keep, to begin with. Folkes said he was 
told by 'Calder' that he'd received disguised messages while in prison, and 'Calder' 
expected to be contacted on release. The name of H.W. Klein was mentioned in 
connection with communication. Barrett was said to have told 'Calder' he would be 
contacted in Auckland early that week. Folkes evidently questioned the ex-prisoner, one 
Sidney Gordon Ross, as to his motives in coming forward - money and other reasons -
but Ross asserted that he was a patriotic New Zealander in spite of being a criminal. lO 
Apparently, Ross's story told separately to Semple checked out with that told to 
Folkes. 1] Folkes sent Ross to the District Security Officer of the SIB's Auckland Bureau, 
Captain Meikle, with instructions for Ross to be pennitted to meet Barrett. Meikle was to 
have operational charge of the case, and particularly to look for any evidence that Ross 
was Iying. 12 It was Meikle and his senior NCO, Warrant Officer R.C. Steven, who were 
to conduct the investigation. 13 
After Ross was supposed to have met Barrett in Auckland, he was allegedly sent 
by the latter to R.A.K. Mason, the editor of the left-wing publication In Print.
14 
Steven 
asserted that Ross indicated he was to meet Mason, and 'We saw that he did meet 
Mason.' 15 With what was later to come to light, one might wonder as to what he talked 
about with Mason. This meeting may also have triggered police interest, for it is very 
clear from the Police Intelligence Summaries that Mason was under police surveillance. 
The police, of course, knew very well who Sidney Gordon Ross was, including the fact 
that among his criminal convictions was a history as a confidence trickster. 16 If they did 
become aware at this point, it was a lot earlier than was subsequently admitted. 
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Ross was sent by Mason, so he said, to 9 Boston Terrace in Wellington, where he 
was to meet with some conspirators. Ross infonned Steven and Meikle that the man 
behind the plot was one Remmers who lived at Ngongotaha near Rotorua. As well as 
Remmers, there was also a house in Rotorua occupied by four others involved. 17 
Meikle's investigation proceeded, although hampered by caution and his inability to use 
the police. Ross, as 'Captain Calder' of the Merchant Navy, based himself in the Grand 
Hotel in Rotorua. Steven accompanied Ross on a number of occasions, and by this time 
there were trips to Rotorua, to New Plymouth and other places.18 It needs to be 
appreciated that the roads in the central North Island were not that good, and there were 
long stretches of main roads that were unsealed. Trips tended to be quite long, and 
keeping an eye on a developing investigation in Auckland, Rotorua and New Plymouth 
using a small number of security officers was quite difficult, given the sensitivity of the 
case. Perhaps this was just what Ross intended. 
Ross was good at keeping Steven from directly overhearing his conversations 
with those allegedly involved, including Remmers. An opportunity to eavesdrop 
occurred when Remmers was admitted to hospital in Auckland. This attempt to see if 
Ross was lying was described by the Attorney-General as 
.... quite a skilful one. A naval rating was installed in the hospital ward in 
Auckland in which Remmers was laid up. The idea was a good one. The naval 
rating proved himself an accurate reporter of what he heard and saw. It was bad 
luck for the Security Department [sic] that the result appeared to confion Ross's 
story. This probably helped greatly to mislead Captain Meikle.19 
It is said that this only touched on a small part of Ross's story and the edge of the 
plot, and only showed 'Remmers was an able man', whatever that might mean.20 
Nevertheless, it did show a partial check on Ross. For nine and a half weeks the 
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investigation continued. At some point the police had become aware that Ross was 
leading a lifestyle which was well-accommodated, with transport, and in the company of 
SIB personnel. It was later said that this was because of an alert police officer.21 It has 
also been suggested that Folkes at some point got hold of Ross's criminal record,22 and 
this would also have alerted the police. After all, what reason could Folkes have for 
wanting Ross's record? And was the record provided complete? This request could 
hardl y have failed to come to the attention of senior police officers involved in internal 
security matters, but such was the level of hostility at the top level that nothing was done 
. to warn off the SIB. Was that, if true, intentional? If the police were aware, why did 
they not warn the Prime Minister that his security service was using a known confidence 
man in some investigation? 
Matters now came to a head. Having been specifically tasked by the Prime 
Minister to investigate, and having kept Fraser and Semple abreast of progress,23 Folkes 
decided it had gone far enough. In a letter to the Prime Minister on Wednesday 10 June 
1942, he outlined the situation as he saw it: 
Sir, 
I have the honour to record, as directed by you, the facts, as I know them, 
concerning an organisation operating in this Dominion, for the purpose of fifth 
column activities in assisting an invading force in the conquest of this country. 
Simply, but plainly, the position is as follows: There is established in the 
centre of the North Island a Headquarters of this organisation, at the head of 
which is an elderly man with a criminal record in this country, and I believe, in 
England. I am satisfied that the name by which he has been known in this country 
for many years is not his true name. Closely [sic] associated with him are several 
persons of foreign origin or association. The existence of some of these persons 
is unknown to the Authorities, and I am satisfied that they entered this country by 
unlawful means. Also connected with this organisation in a lesser degree are two 
New Zealanders, one a journalist and the other an expert wireless technician at 
present holding a post in the most important Wireless Station in the North Island. 
The total number of persons involved ... .is as follows: 
14 Germans 
1 Russian 
1 Asiatic (believed Japanese) 
1 Swiss 
2 New Zealanders 
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After many weeks observation and surveillance, the following plan 
emerges: Immediately prior to the invasion .... counterfeit money is to be 
circulated, rumours disseminated, water-works, tunnels and viaducts to be 
destroyed. The assassination of important Ministers is freely discussed between 
the parties as the culminating factor in the destruction of public morale as a basis 
for successful invasion. 
To implement this plan, the organisation obviously requires persons 
experienced in the use of explosives and gunmen. They have already enlisted the 
aid of an expert in the use of gelignite - who has been detailed to perform the 
destruction of ARAPUNI and WAIKAREMOANA WATERWORKS. The 
explosives required are available at any time. This expert is now about to enlist 
the aid of other persons up and down the country whose functions will be 
localised in their own particular district. The organisation has already enlisted a 
marksman. In this connection it is important to observe that four of its members 
are armed, night and day. Highly subversive pamphlets are already in draft form. 
Soon after I commenced investigations into this case, I was able to sheet home to 
a soldier at Trentham the authorship of a pamphlet (copy of which is attached). It 
so happened that I was able to prevent distribution of this pamphlet without 
impairing investigations into the organisation as a whole. The case of the soldier 
in question - one KLEIN - who is linked with the organisation - is now engaging 
the attention of the Solicitor-General. 
At this stage it is convenient to discuss: 
(a) When the plan is to be put into effect. 
(b) What steps are to be taken by the Government to prevent it 
With regard to (a) I opine that it is likely to occur sometime in July. It is 
clear that the leader of the organisation in this country is expecting intelligence to 
reach him by the arrival of one, probably two, individuals from outside the 
Dominion. The event has been delayed it seems, but pending that, plans are being 
carefully formulated. 24 
Folkes thought it was possible that the persons bearing the intelligence would come from 
Australia, and he noted that the 'wireless technician' was supposed to visit Australia, 
although the travel plans had come to nought.25 He observed that there seemed to be 
similarity between the New Zealand organisation and the Australia First Movement, 
which was the subject of contemporary criminal proceedings. There were, however, 
difficulties in obtaining evidence in New Zealand. 
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I have to make it perfectly plain that I am unable to adduce evidence 
which would fix the guilt of the parties concerned within the ordinary criminal 
code. The reason for this is the acute appreciation of the organisation of the 
desirability of avoiding details of their plans being reduced into writing and for 
clandestine meetings and secret conversations. Therefore, to bring them within 
the criminal code it would be necessary to produce indisputable viva voce 
testimony concerning the conspiracy. This is impossible to do at this stage?6 
This was a very clear statement that proof for judicial proceedings had not been obtained. 
Folkes also wished to make it plain that if the Government took and exercised certain 
powers, then he would be able to stop the conspirators and the conspiracy. Probably 
fatally, he underlined his assessment: 
Every possible action has been taken by me to prove the truth or otherwise 
of intelligence which I have received, by checking and cross-checking, and in 
every single case where this has been possible, the result has been positive. In 
other words, I believe my Informant. The question arises, therefore, what is to be 
done? As I have said above, I cannot make out a case for a criminal tria1.27 
He went on to note that no case could be made until the plan was put into effect. Folkes 
had not proved his case at all. Had he merely asserted that all his findings now required 
further checking by the police he might not have put himself at risk. The words '1 believe 
my Informant' put his personal credibility on the line. When the Police Commissioner 
saw this letter, he must have rubbed his hands. Folkes had delivered himself into the 
hands of his opponents, although on 10 June 1942 only the Prime Minister was apprised 
of his conclusions. 
Two weeks passed, and what occurred during that time is unclear. Certainly, it is 
probable the Prime Minister talked to one or two senior officials - perhaps McIntosh or 
Shanahan in the Prime Minister'S Department. The latter as Secretary of the ONS 
routinely consulted with Folkes and the Police Commissioner. Perhaps the Police 
323 
Commissioner was informed? Certainly, the Secretary ONS would have been consulted if 
Folkes needed to talk to the Chiefs of Staff. 
On 24 June 1942, a Chiefs of Staff Committee meeting was attended by Air 
Commodore Goddard, the CAS, Commander Stirling-Hamilton (the DeNS) who was 
standing in for the CNS, the Secretary ONS, with the meeting being chaired by the CGS, 
Lieutenant-General Puttick. Folkes was there to address the meeting. 
Major Folkes, Director of Security Intelligence Bureau, stated that he had 
been requested by the Prime Minister to inform the Chiefs of Staff that there 
existed in New Zealand a Fifth Column Movement which, so far as could be 
judged, was well organised and extended to a number of centres. The information 
which he possessed indicated that there were three full German nationals 
controlling the organisation, who were unknown to the Police authorities and had 
obtained entry to the country by illegal means. In addition, it is believed that 
there are up to 37 other members of the Movement, making a total of 40. He 
added that it was proposed to arrest these persons very shortly, and that it would 
be essential that they should all be arrested at the same time and on the same date 
in order to prevent evidence being destroyed. As it was known that many 
members of the Movement were armed, it would be necessary for personnel 
effecting the arrest to be armed and so overcome any possible opposition. 
2. Major Folkes therefore asked that the Army might agree to help him in the 
arrest of these persons by making available up to 100 selected personnel. 
3. There was some discussion as to whether this request should be met. It was 
agreed that it was not for the Chiefs of Staff to decide whether or not such an 
organisation existed, whether danger could be apprehended from it, the numbers 
of its members, nor indeed when the proper time to strike should be. It was 
therefore agreed that the Chief of the General Staff would make arrangements for 
the necessary number of men to be provided for Major Folkes on request.28 
It is interesting to note the subtle nuances of the meeting minutes. Clearly the 
Chiefs of Staff were taken aback. The third paragraph implies that Folkes was not 
believed by his audience, although the meeting agreed that Puttick, the CGS, would 
arrange to provide the requisite number of troops to Folkes on request.29 A sidelight on 
this situation is that here was the security service providing the Army with information 
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concerning classic so-called 'fifth column' activity. In the original concept, the Special 
Companies should then be employed in dealing with this activity. 
Was the Prime Minister still backing Folkes at this point? According to Folkes' 
letter, he had communicated to the Prime Minister that he had taken the matter as far as 
he could, and that the Police Commissioner and the Chiefs of Staff must be informed, and 
Fraser had agreed.3o Hence the meeting. 
On 2 July, eight days later, Folkes met with the Prime Minister and Police 
Commissioner Cummings in the Prime Minister's office.31 At this point the investigation 
was handed over to the Police Department. A special team of police officers was sent to 
Rotorua and it took two days for them to establish that Ross's conspiracy was a hoax. On 
29 July the story broke in the N.Z.Truth newspaper, which recounted flamboyantly how 
the SIB had been hoodwinked. However, the 'best detective officers in the Dominion' 
under 'the ablest criminal investigator the New Zealand Police Force has produced' 
sorted it out.}::! These were Detective A.M. Harding, P.J. Nalder and P.Doyle.33 Harding, 
it will be recalled, was the Police representative on the Combined Intelligence Committee 
who pushed the Police's internal security barrow. They were led by Superintendent 
James Cummings,34 an officer in his mid-fifties, the Police Commissioner's brother. 
Quite obviously, the press had good police contacts by the way the story came 
out. Much was made of the accommodation and expenses incurred in the course of the 
SIB's investigation, the bogus rank of 'Captain Calder' the 'Impudent Gaolbird' and 
fI ights to and from Rotorua. They mentioned how a convict the day after his release was 
interviewed by a cabinet minister who passed him on to another cabinet minister.35 This, 
of course, neatly disguised the Prime Minister's role. The two 'hard-headed Ministers' 
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passed the prisoner on to the SIB to see if he was 'a lunatic, a liar or genuine. ,36 There 
was a need for an investigation and overhaul of security before blunders and an 'orgy of 
jitterbug spending' was repeated.37 What was required was New Zealanders with 'solid 
commonsense and alert minds who will not fall for the fantastic humbug of the first glib-
tongued imposter who comes along. ,38 As quickly as the furore erupted, the lid was 
slammed down. On 30 July the press censor suppressed any further mention in the media 
of the SIB or the hoax.39 
An inquiry was conducted by the Attorney-General, H.G.R. Mason, and the 
Solicitor-General, H.H. Cornish. Mason spoke first to Captain Meikle. Mason and 
Cornish conducted a lengthy interrogation of Major Folkes on 26 and 27 August, and 
Cornish interrogated Warrant Officer Steven on 15 September. On 18 September Mason 
produced a six page report for the War Cabinet.40 
It is quite clear from the transcripts of the interviews with Folkes that Mason and 
Cornish were out to trap him, and equally that Folkes was attempting to squeeze out of 
the tight spot he had got himself into. In discussing methods of investigation, this 
exchange took place: 
A TIORNEY -GENERAL: ... Let us have no misunderstanding. The methods are 
the very essence of it because the question begins to present itself in my mind 
whether your whole establishment is not an establishment, and the methods of it, 
suited to another country and other circumstances! 
MAJOR FOLKES: I am obliged to you for that because I have not been able quite 
to appreciate the drift of this interrogation. 
A ITORNEY -GENERAL: And unsuited to aUf circumstances - that certainly is 
beginning to present itself as possibly a main question.41 
There were numerous attempts to ensnare Folkes as he tried to back away from 
the categorical assertion of his letter to Fraser in saying he believed ROSS.42 However, it 
was also obvious that both Fraser and Semple had been kept infonned of the case as it 
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developed over the weeks.43 The interrogation of Steven by Cornish on 15 September 
was more neutral.44 Cornish's unfortunate public experience in the Ostler case the 
previous year probably made him more cautious and sympathetic.45 The aim was to get 
something on Folkes. Cornish was sceptical of the SIB's handling of the investigation, as 
might be expected. Steven observed that the case was difficult right from the outset. 
MR.STEVEN: To begin with we were in a difficulty because we were instructed 
that the police had not to come into it but we knew we could not conduct any 
inquiry into Ross's allegations. We have no executive authority and without 
police co-operation the case could not go on. It went on longer for the lack of co-
operation than it normally would have done.46 
Asked by Cornish as to why the SIB did not put people in close in Rotorua, planting men 
round the house. 
MR. STEVEN: I would not recommend that if we had to do it all over again. 
MR. CORNISH: Why not? 
MR. STEVEN: Because it is easy now when you look back and know all the 
facts to know that in doing that you would not be taking any risk, but when you 
are living with it and you do not know the risk you are taking and in any case 
when Ross is given to us and he is the man on whom we have to rely, we as the 
Northern Bureau had no right to do anything else but just what we did and that is 
carried out our instructions. [ sic] 47 
The Attorney-General's report to the War Cabinet was based on the more than six 
hundred pages of the SIB file on the case, a mass of Police reports 'and a final statement 
by Ross himself,.48 The interviews with Meikle, Folkes and Steven were not mentioned 
as part of this, although remarks about them in the report reveal conclusions based on 
personal contact.49 Having outlined the familiar ground that led to the case, the Attomey-
General had this to say about Remmers: 
Ross usually referred to Remmers as "the master" and never spoke of him 
except with a respect that was most impressive and might even be called 
reverential. This admiration was probably as genuine as it was undoubtedly 
deserved, for Remmers, an old man, is indeed a master artist in the sphere of false 
pretences, with a record vastly more imposing than Ross's. There is reason to 
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think Ross's plans owed something to Remmers at critical points. The Security 
Department [sic] was unfortunate in meeting this combination of talent.5o 
Indeed. If Remmers was a better confidence trickster than Ross, the tenor of Mason's 
remarks indicates this was known to the police. Remmers was another with a long police 
record. At the heart of Mason's criticism was the way the SIB compiled its reports. He 
compared the SIB's approach with that of the Police. 
It [the SIB] explains that it does not send a man to take a statement, as the 
Police do. The Security Department observes, tabulates, accumulates reports, and 
slowly builds up a picture. It does not check, test, and verify (as far as it can) as it 
goes along ... the method can accumulate .... much rubbish.51 
There are two observations to be made on this point. The first is that banging on 
doors asking questions and taking statements is not going to stay secret for very long. 
The second is that it is the quality of the analysis and recommendation for action that is 
critical. It can also be argued that the Police Department with its extensive nationwide 
resources and its draconian powers in wartime, including the ability to compel people to 
assist them with their inquiries, had far more inherent advantages than a few SIB staff. 
More importantly, their purposes were different. The Police focus was on detection of 
criminal activity and bringing the villains to book, although it should be noted that in the 
case of Communist organisations, for instance, it was quite content to simply keep them 
under close surveillance. The SIB's job was to watch and advise. 
Was the SIB investigation all rubbish? Mr. R.A.K. Mason, the poet and the editor 
of In Print, was under investigation by the Police for breaches of the Censorship and 
Publicity Regulations, according to the Police Intelligence Summary for 24 February 
1942.52 Reference was made to In Print in a number of these summaries, and there was 
some obvious satisfaction in the monthly summary for July 1942 dated 8 August that its 
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circulation had dropped from 15,000 to 12,000 and the Communist Party owed the printer 
the sum of 233 pounds.53 As Mason featured in the Ross case as one of the latter's first 
contacts, it is unlikely this would have remained unnoticed by the police. So both the 
Director SIB and the police had doubts about Mason. Similarly H.W. Klein, a law clerk 
who was a soldier in Trentham, featured in the Ross case: indeed he is named in Folkes' 
letter to the Prime Minister on 10 June, and in the Attomey~General 's interrogation of 
Folkes. Klein appeared in the Police Intelligence Summaries for 9 November 1942. He 
had been convicted on 27 October 
.... for "having in his possession material with a view to making or felicitating 
[ sic] the publication of a subversive statement. Klein has twice previously been 
before the Court for similar offences. At the time of his present offence Klein 
was serving in the Army. His previous offence related to the publication of the 
seditious pamphlet "THE SPARK".54 
One would have to say that some of Folkes' suspicions about Klein appeared justified. 
Klein was mentioned once more in the Police Intelligence Summary for 15 December 
1942. 
Inquiries have been made regarding the appearance at Trentham and 
Military Camps of certain seditious pamphlets. They are probably the work of a 
soldier offender, Harold Klein, who was recently sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment. There is no evidence of it being an organized effort.55 
This was rather intriguing, for quite apart from the Ross case, Klein and a farmer, Mr. L. 
Sim, were convicted back in June 1940 at Palmerston North for cyclostyling The Spark 
pamphlet for the New Zealand Bolshevik Party. This urged civil war in New Zealand 
and condemned the Communist Party as pacifist, Trotskyite, and controlled by petty 
bourgeois intellectual adventurists.56 One wonders how Klein came to be in the Army 
after that, or maybe the Army was not too discriminating. 
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The view taken of Klein and Mason by the Attorney-General while interrogating 
Major Folkes on the Ross affair is of interest. Dismissing the suspects in the conspiracy, 
the Attorney-General proceeded to contradict himself. He observed, according to the 
transcript: 
ATTORNEY GENERAL: .... and not one of them in the whole lot from the 
beginning to the end as to whose loyalty there could be the slightest question. 
The most glaring one is the fellow Mason. A good deal of suspicion attaches to 
Mason. Mason is a most unreliable fellow. He is not a Communist but is tarred 
with the Communist brush. As soon as Russia came in they are super patriots in 
that they are devoted to their country in that their country is an ally of Russia and 
must be upheld. They rushed forward to do everything possible and scorned the 
feeble patriotism of the rest of the community. [sic] I have not the least doubt that 
Mason would be of that type. Klein is the odd man out. With Klein the 
Bolsheviks are not nearly Bolshevik enough. He is a man on his own.57 
The Attorney-General formed his view from information supplied by the police 
investigation. Was it a matter of coincidence that Ross selected Mason and Klein to be 
part of his fake conspiracy, and the police had prior knowledge of these two? How did 
Ross know about Klein to include him in the plot, if Ross was in prison up to the day 
before he went to see Semple, Fraser and Folkes? How did he know to include Mason 
once Folkes handed over the case to Meikle and Steven from the Auckland SIB? At the 
very least, if the police were suspicious of Mason, Klein and Remmers, the interest of the 
SIB in them is unremarkable. 
The Attorney-General made six recommendations in his report on the Ross affair. 
Port and civil security should be handled by the police. There should be a proliferation of 
small security bureaux. Each service should operate its own security bureau. A small 
security bureau should act as a clearing-house between the services and the police. The 
rump bureau should pass all civil investigation to the police. The sm~ll bureau should be 
under the Chiefs of Staff and it should have access to police files. Finally that there 
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should be an advisory but not executive Security Committee.58 These were all matters 
that needed to be taken further. 
The Ross affair resurfaced in Parliament on 21 October with a pointed question 
by John A. Lee MP, who wished to know whether the NZ Truth report was correct, how 
much public money had been used, and when that expenditure would be presented to 
Parliament. The Prime Minister replied that the newspaper report was under 
investigation, but that 'it is not advisable in the public interest to discuss publicly the 
question of the means adopted to ensure public security. ,59 
The Navy was concerned about the future of the SIB. The new eNS, Commodore 
Lake, only arrived after the Ross affair came to a head. On 19 November Lieutenant-
Commander Barker minuted that he understood a report had gone to the War Cabinet 
recommending in effect the abolition of the SIB.6o He listed a number of positive points 
about the SIB. The personnel of the SIB were young and well educated. Their 
investigations were' a very different type of work to Police work or investigating crimes.' 
The SIB had a stimulating effect on the Army and other guards, watchmen and Police. 
Port Security Control was particularly useful. 
Port security especially is amassing information and started a system of control of 
the coming and going of seamen which is most valuable. Until lately when Port 
Security started there had been no apparent check on the arrivals and departures 
of merchant seamen and individuals passing as such. 61 
The Pol ice on wharf work, by contrast, appeared to be short of staff. On the same minute 
underneath the DNI annotated on 20 November that the SIB 
.... such as it is .... [is] a very mild replica of Gestapo and ... .is, of course abhorre~t 
to New Zealand officials who strongly resent the mildest control over theIr 
activities. I am convinced, however, that it is valuable ... 
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This campaign against the S.I.B. is, of course, inspired by the Police who 
all along have resented this encroachment as they consider it on their preserves 
[sic]. 
The matter is undoubtedly aggravated by the personality of Major Folkes 
who has perhaps not been as tactful in his dealings as he might have been, but it is 
impossible for a man in his job to be popular with Government Departments.62 
The DNI felt the new CNS should be warned of what was brewing because the 
issue would probably go to the Chiefs of Staff Committee and the SIB needed support. 
He noted: 
As will be seen from another paper which is going round at the moment 
the Police measures for the security of the wharves and of shipping have recently 
been open to very serious criticism. This may be due to their lack of personnel 
but is undoubtedly an argument in favour of S.I.B. and especially Port Security, 
which ... .is performing a most valuable service ... .in a field .. , .never even 
scratched by the Police before Port Security took over.63 
The paper referred to resulted in a memorandum from the Naval Secretary to the 
Secretary ONS on 27 November, drawing attention to police shortcomings in providing 
gangway guards, something they had agreed to rectify in 1941. A number of disturbing 
instances illustrated the Naval Secretary's points. Thirteen ships were listed, and only 
three of them were provided with a police guard. Moreover, on these occasions the guard 
was late coming on, by two or three or more days. Most of the cargoes involved 
ammunition, explosives or other munitions. 64 The police, of course, always seemed to 
find some excuse for not carrying out this duty.65 
The DNI concluded his annotation on Barker's minute by stating that he was 
unsure how these matters could be brought to the Chiefs of Staff's attention before any 
decision on the SIB was made.66 The DeNS added underneath that the 
Sec[ retary] ONS informs me that this is being treated entirely as a poHtical 
matter, to be dealt with by War Cabinet without reference to the C[hief]s of 
S[taff]. I believe that consideration is being given to augmenting the Police to 
take over Security's duties but this will not solve the problem of co-ordination 
332 
with all the other Service units ... nor will it allow the Services any check or "say 
so" in the security activities of the Police which affect them vitally.67 
On 24 November, the DNI added to the minute sheet: 
I realise it is difficult and probably impossible for us to take any action 
about the continuance of the S.I.B. unless the Government asks us our opinion, 
but I bring this up again because you will see from the tabbed memo that the 
whole question of the S.LB. was originally brought up by the Naval Secretary, 
and the arguments produced then are still valid.68 
The DCNS concluded on the side: 'There is nothing positive that we can do, but the 
tabbed memo may be of interest to CNS.' The signature of the Secretary ONS was there, 
indicating the naval minute sheet was passed to him.69 
The political fallout was indeed potentially dangerous for the Prime Minister. It 
was kept in check only by not publicly acknowledging that he was intimately involved, 
using censorship suppression of media comment. But somebody would have to pay. 
There were by now enough axes sharpened by the police, the Army, probably the Prime 
Minister's Department, and certainly the War Cabinet, and it did not take too many 
guesses whose head would be on the block. 
On 22 December the Chiefs of Staff decided to lend a hand. Having received a 
suggestion from some quarter that the SIB should test the security precautions with 
regard to physical access at Naval, Army and Air Force establishments and police 
stations, they turned their attention on the SIB instead.7o It is not hard to imagine the 
suggestion of testing security precautions in the wake of the Ross affair may have been a 
red rag to a bull. Who planted the red rag is another matter. The Chiefs of Staff took into 
account that the Attorney-General had conducted an investigation. They directed their 
criticism to Folkes personally. 
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We are satisfied that Major Folkes is not fitted to control the Security 
Intelligence Bureau. Some months ago he approached us and asked that a number 
of soldiers be placed under his orders to assist in the arrest of certain persons who 
were alleged to be Fifth Columnists and about to engage in a huge plot which was 
to synchronize with an attempted invasion at or near the port of New Plymouth. 
In the course of the discussion it transpired that Major Folkes had been in 
possession of knowledge of the alleged invasion for some months but 
notwithstanding this he had never, as he should have done, advised the Chiefs of 
Staff who are responsible for the defence of the Dominion. The inherent 
improbabilities and indeed the ridiculous nature of the alleged invasion attempt 
were quite patent to us at the time but we cannot emphasize too strongly that it is 
the duty of any person who possesses information of this kind to communicate it 
to those who are responsible for the defence of the country. While this duty might 
be imperfectly understood by a civilian, there can be no occasion on the part of a 
person with military training failing to recognize it. 
Despite the fact that at the time of the interview we expressed the 
strongest scepticism regarding the alleged invasion and sabotage plot Major 
Folkes was most definite that it was true and that it was necessary to take 
immediate action to arrest and detain the conspirators. 
In the event, this alleged invasion and sabotage plot was proved to be 
nothing more than a gigantic hoax and what little we know of the incident gives 
very strong reasons for believing that the leaders of the Security Intelligence 
Bureau were negligent and indeed distinctly incapable. 
In the circumstances we strongly recommend that the services of Major 
Folkes should be immediately dispensed with ... 
We are not at this juncture in a position to say whether or not the whole 
organization should be disbanded. Before furnishing our views on this question 
we would wish to discuss the position with the Commissioner of Police. The 
Security Intelligence Bureau has been of value in testing and providing security 
precautions particularly in connection with shipping and ,:ha:ves. .A certain 
amount of duplication does exist but with proper organIzatIon thIS can be 
eliminated.7 ) 
The paper was signed by the CGS, the CAS and the new eNS (Lake). The CNS 
had not been at the earlier meeting, for he had not arrived in New Zealand. It was a 
peevish performance, and the CGS had forgotten his role in agreeing to arrange for troops 
for Folkes. The Director SIB was castigated for not approaching the Chiefs of Staff, yet 
it was the Prime Minister himself who had insisted on keeping the matter from even the 
police. Here once again was the problem of serving two masters. The Director SIB with 
official direct access to the Prime Minister had been given a Prime Minsterial instruction 
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to keep the investigation under wraps. It was the Prime Minister who summoned Folkes 
in the first place. But the Director SIB was answerable to both the service chiefs and the 
Prime Minister. In fact, the Director SIB had proceeded as far as he should with the case , 
and at the right time requested Fraser to infonn the police and the service chiefs. It fitted 
the model for dealing with fifth column organisations outlined by Goss right back before 
the SIB was established.72 The Chiefs of Staff's consideration for the Police 
Commissioner contrasted with earlier attitudes. Judicious fence-sitting on the future of 
the SIB was the order of the day. Interestingly, they had not been given the Attorney-
General's report, and it is a matter of conjecture as to what the Secretary ONS might have 
said off the record. 
In spite of the press ban, the Ross case once more got into the papers on 2 
February 1943. John A. Lee MP at a bye-election meeting was reported in the Dominion 
as demanding to know about the man from Mount Eden who sold the assassination story 
and the waste of four thousand pounds of public money by 'some Sherlock Holmes 
department. .. .for which a Minister alone was responsible.' The government had been 
'uncommunicative' on the man from Mount Eden's adventures.73 This was a nasty little 
jab, for responsibility for the SIB lay with Fraser. 
The axe fell. Folkes resigned by 6 February. The new Director of the SIB from 19 
February 1943 was none other than Superintendent James Cummings, investigating 
officer for the Ross case, the Commissioner's brother. A memorandum declared Folkes 
no longer connected with the SIB, and Cummings took over 'at the direction of the Prime 
Minister.,74 The SIB was now in the hands of the Police Department. Later on, Detective 
PJ Nalder, also from the Ross case, would become Superintendent Cummings' deputy, 
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and eventually succeed Cummings, when the latter succeeded his brother as 
Commissioner. A singular coup, one way or another. 
On 24 February the Chiefs of Staff agreed to convene a sub-committee from the 
three services and the police to look at the SIB. The following day the Secretary ONS 
finally provided the Chiefs of Staff with copies of the Attorney-General's report, with a 
covering note mentioning that the future of the SIB was to be discussed.75 The sub-
committee met on 26 February, chaired by Shanahan. Army was represented by 
Lieutenant-Colonel Brooke-White and Captain Fraser, Navy by Lieutenant-Commander 
Beasley and Lieutenant Studholme, and the Air Force by Squadron Leader Wright and 
Flight Lieutenant Brown. Detective Sergeant Harding from the Ross team represented 
the Police.76 
There was almost total capitulation to the Police Department. The praises of the 
police were sung throughout. The police had an 'organised Security Service' although it 
was not constituted that way, being made up of 'certain selected officers'. By contrast 
the SIB personnel were 'relatively untrained in this work.,7? There was a plug from the 
Navy for the Port Security organisation. However, the consensus of the meeting 
suggested the SIB would have to come under the police, or the Navy would have to do it 
themselves.78 The Navy's November criticism of the police role in the courts was pushed 
aside. The two naval officers were clearly minority dissenters at the meeting, although 
the DNI as head of the COlC was the senior and most experienced intelligence officer 
present. Perhaps when democracy rules in these matters, intelligence goes out the 
window, so to speak. 
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While all 'duplication' of the Police Department's work should cease, the sub-
committee felt there was a need for a liaison agency between the services and the police. 
The officer in charge would be called the Defence Security Officer and needed to have 
the confidence of the services and the police. He could be accommodated in the Police 
Department. He would be the service correspondent with MIS, and the Police 
Commissioner would be the civil correspondent with MIS.79 In other words, the 
Cummings brothers working together. An Advisory Committee on security should be 
formed responsible to the Vital Points Committee. It would consist of the service chiefs 
and the Cummings brothers.8o The records of the SIB were to be taken over and disposed 
of by the Police Commissioner in consultation with his brother, the Defence Security 
Officer .81 The committee decided that the SIB should cease to exist, and the Defence 
Security Bureau should stand in its place.82 
The interesting thing to note is that all mention of the role of the Prime Minister 
had vanished. However, as the Police Commissioner had direct access to the Prime 
Minister and his brother was running the security service (and Fraser had cause to be 
grateful to him now for political reasons), there was not likely to be much problem. 
Perhaps the Prime Minister now had a firewall between himself and the Chiefs of Staff. 
The meeting of the Vital Points Committee on 8 March noted receipt of the sub-
committee's deliberations on the future of the SIB and the recommendation that the SIB 
be disbanded. It was decided to leave consideration of the report until the views of the 
Police Commissioner and the new Director of the SIB could be taken into account.83 
This bright picture of the demise of the SIB, and the apparently gleeful mopping 
up by the Police Department, was not subscribed to by all observers. A confidential letter 
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from the British High Commissioner to London on 16 March 1943 gave an interesting 
and different perspective on Folkes' 'colourful' career. Folkes had vigorously established 
his security service, and after a year the Chiefs of Staff had expressed the view that the 
SIB served a useful purpose (still the view of the present CNS). 
Unhappily it is almost impossible to keep anything secret in this Dominion, and 
perhaps it was early realisation of this that dissuaded him from making any effort 
to conceal the nature of his activities, of which he delighted in painting vivid 
pictures in club rooms and social gatherings .. , .[Despite this] a leaflet was soon in 
circulation giving the names of the members of the organisation and relating odd 
anecdotes in illustration of their methods. So far as the list of names is concerned 
the leaflet, was, I understand, accurate, and this blaze of publicity cannot have 
facilitated their work. Some stir was also caused by the revelation that among the 
characters whose bona fides had been investigated and past records raked over 
was at least one member of the Cabinet. 
The isolation of New Zealand has bred the belief that noxious pests that 
infest the rest of the world do not exist here. To this type of thinking the 
operations of a secret service appear to be redundant and offensive, and some 
antagonism was experienced by the Bureau in official quarters from the first, e.g. 
in the Prime Minister's Department.84 
Noting Folkes was directly responsible to Fraser, the High Commissioner went on 
to state that matters were not assisted when questions were raised concerning a refugee 
residing with one of the principal members of the Prime Minister's staff. The latter when 
confronted rebutted the allegations as old wives tales and xenophobia. 
Naturally enough the relations of Folkes with the police force, who 
resented his activities with the jealous eye of a professional rival, were also not 
easy. Dislike spread from officialdom to the press and it emerged last year that 
the Bureau had been the dupe of an elaborate hoax by an ex-convict, who lived in 
great comfort at public expense, on the basis of a melodramatic cock and bull 
story of a plot against the lives of ministers.85 
A press clipping of the fiasco was enclosed, evidence of the issue of the defence 
of public reputations being taken up by the 'gutter press' against over-zealous gullible 
secret police officials. The Bureau had since been sniped at by the Democratic Labour 
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Party about extravagance and expenditure. The approaching election made the SIB an 
embarrassment. It was now under a senior police officer. 
So far as I am aware the Bureau has not unearthed any enemy activities in 
New Zealand, but it seems only fair to give it some of the credit for the absence of 
any sabotage or incidents in New Zealand ports. In this connection I enclose a 
circular produced under its auspices to tighten up shipping security.86 
This was a very different perspective on the debacle. The opposition to the SIB 
from the Prime Minister's Department is intriguing, for at this time it comprised a 
relatively small number of officials. If the letter was even reasonably accurate, Folkes 
had managed to array a large well-placed group of enemies located in a spread of 
powerful positions against him. 
The DNI, writing to his RAN counterpart on 22 March, was frank In his 
assessment of the outcome of the Police victory. 
You may perhaps have heard that we have had a showdown with our 
Security Intelligence Bureau here. The Police have won the battle hands down 
and the Director of the S.LB., Major K. Folkes, has resigned. His place has been 
taken over by a senior Police officer, Mr.DJ. Cummings, and all the Port Security 
etc. has now come under the control of the Police. Undoubtedly, there were many 
things about the S.LB. which needed overhaul, but it had been useful to us as 
regards Port Security and we stood out against this coming under the Police. 
However, we were shouted down and are now waiting to see how the new 
organisation will work. It is not going too badly at present.87 
The security service now embarked on a quite distinctive course, remaining a 
nominally anny organisation run by a civilian department of state. In the wake of Folkes' 
departure there were further changes in personnel. In May, Captain Lindsay of the 
Christchurch office and Lieutenant McLean of the Wellington branch office left for 
overseas service. Lindsay was killed in action, while McLean ran a battalion intelligence 
section in the 2nd New Zealand Division. Mr.E. Daniels replaced McLean in Wellington. 
Mr. C.R. Hervey replaced Lindsay, and Mr. H.R. Moss replaced Hervey as Port Security 
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Control Officer in Christchurch. In April, Warrant Officer R.C. Steven left the SIB. In 
June, Captain A.W. Yortt became Deputy Director in SIB Headquarters.88 Captain Yortt 
was succeeded a year later as Deputy Director by Detective Sergeant P.l. Nalder on 17 
March 1944.89 The two senior SIB posts were occupied by police officers. Intriguingly, 
Captain H.C. Meikle stayed on in charge of the Auckland office beyond the end of 
hostilities in 1945, attaining the rank of Major.90 The man in charge of the day-to-day 
running of the Ross fiasco was curiously untouched in the aftermath. 
In August 1943, the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs sent a secret cable to 
the High Commissioners in Wellington and Canberra.91 He noted the 'security service', 
MIS, was anxious to establish closer and more personal contact with the security services 
in Australia and New Zealand. The snag was that after the 'past unfortunate incidents' 
connected with the Mawhood Mission in Australia 'and Folkes in New Zealand', they 
were unsure how to broach the subject. They thought the best course would be to invite a 
senior officer from both countries to visit the UK. Batterbee, the High Commissioner in 
Wellington wrote to Fraser on 13 August.92 The Prime Minister was clearly in no hurry 
on this, and did not reply until 6 January 1944, noting it to be a good idea. He would 
send 'Superintendent J. Cummings, the Head of Security Intelligence', and he expected 
him to visit the FBI in the United States as wel1.93 This was duly arranged, along with a 
visit to Ottawa and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.94 Cummings secured Nalder's 
appointment just before he left in March, and Nalder was left in charge during his 
absence.95 The police were not about to let their grip on the organisation slip. 
The Dominion on 11 September 1944 reported the Prime Minister's 
announcement of the closure of the Security Intelligence Bureau that month. All 
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documents had been transferred to the Police Department. The Director SIB, 
Superintendent Cummings, would be in due course, Police Commissioner.96 Four days 
later, in response to a question in Parliament on the SIB, the Prime Minister gave an 
extraordinary account of his recollections of the organisation. The extract from Hansard 
(which can be amended by MPs to say what they thought they would have said) read: 
Rt. Hon. Mr. Fraser (Prime Minister): With regard to the so-called secret service 
he assumed that the Security Intelligence Bureau was referred to. That was a 
branch affiliated with the Services set-up, at the express request of the British 
Government, to co-operate with the branches of the same Department throughout 
the Commonwealth. The officer in charge was one of the ablest police officers 
the country had ever known - Superintendent Cummings, who, in due course, 
would be Commissioner of Police. It was ex~ected that before long that branch 
would be absorbed into the Police Department. 7 
However, the Dominion report of Fraser's reply published the next day differed 
somewhat. Fraser said that the man who was the original head of the SIB had come from 
Britain. He was 'an obvious misfit', and later became involved in one of the silliest 
affairs he (Fraser) had ever heard of, and one which was worthy of Jules Verne. This was 
a hoax put across the officer by a criminal in Rotorua. And 
As soon as it came to my notice I asked Mr.Cummings to step in, and the 
whole thing was cleared up in 24 hours .... We asked Britain to take the officer 
back because he was quite unfitted for the work, which is now in the hands of a 
New Zealander. ... Superintendent Cummings a most able police officer and 
brilliant detective.98 
If accurately reported, Fraser had lied to Parliament. Not that this was easy to contest at 
the time. However, a feature in the New Zealand Observer of 11 October 1944 by 
'Spotlight' took Fraser to task over his remarks, and considerably redressed the balance. 
Not uncritical of Folkes, it gave him his due, noting that the Ross case had come to the 
SIB from Semple and Fraser, and that the SIB had been unpopular in Government circles. 
Not least of this unpopularity had stemmed from the SIB's uncovering of a corrupt 
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scheme of interfering with ballot cards in the National Service Department. The story 
emphasised that the Ross affair had been the occasion of political embarrassment for the 
Prime Minister, and this was why he had it in for the organisation and the first Director.99 
From the detailed content of the article, it was clear that 'Spotlight' had assistance from 
SIB staff or was an SIB officer himself. Whatever the case, his sources were well-
informed. 
The recollections of the Ross affair by late 1944 were long in the past. The SIB 
continued to function under Superintendent Cummings, and then Nalder. After the SIB 
was shut down there was no security service until a totally new organisation was formed 
in the mid-1950s. The Ross affair cast a long shadow. A Police Department Special 
Branch was fanned in the late 1940s while James Cummings was still Commissioner. It 
was headed by Nalder. 
Who benefitted from the police takeover of the SIB? Clearly the Police 
Department. Their view from the late 1930s was that internal security was their 
responsibility, and they simply regarded the SIB as an imposed and unnecessary 
competitor. Faced with the prospect of taking it over, absorbing it or closing it down 
altogether, it is interesting that the Police Commissioner and his brother found it more 
useful to keep the SIB alive under police command. Where the recommendation was to 
disband the SIB, they made a different decision. The Prime Minister and the Chiefs of 
Staff acceded to their wishes. 
Given the curious nature of the Ross debacle, what was the role of the police in 
the shambles? Did the police put Ross up to it in the first place? There is no proof of 
that. Equally there is no question but that the Police Department exploited the situation 
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to the full as it developed, letting the SIB get deep in trouble, then intervening just in time 
to save the Prime Minister from embarrassment. It put Fraser heavily in debt to the 
Cummings brothers and burnt the fingers of the Chiefs of Staff. By ensuring Folkes was 
removed, the police left themselves as the unchallenged experts on internal security in 
New Zealand. Whether they were as good as they thought they were is another question. 
In all, it was a curious result achieved in atypical circumstances, ie. the close connection 
of the Prime Minister to the affair. In the ordinary course of events, the first Director 
could have been replaced by another Anny officer. The plot itself was far-fetched, but it 
did develop during a quite tense period of the war when a lot of things were uncertain. 
During the period of the fiasco, the New Zealand coast was visited twice by enemy 
submarines, which could easily have put parties ashore with impunity, just as their 
launching of reconnaissance aircraft went unhindered. 
The Ross affair substantively modified the role of New Zealand's first security 
service. It was now an adjunct of the Police Department. In consequence, was the SIB's 
effectiveness much reduced? 
Chapter Twelve 
Aftermath 
The severe jolt of the Ross fiasco left the SIB firmly under police command, and 
the concept of an independent security service a fading memory. The swift and complete 
takeover took the SIB away from the orbit of the military. Internal security was now a 
police matter, and as an adjunct of the police the SIB would undertake some work in this 
area only under the firm guidance of sensible senior police officers. The SIB continued 
its half-life on routine tasks, with the advantage of access and much closer liaison with 
the civil department with greater expertise on internal security. The tensions caused by 
interdepartmental hostility were eliminated at a stroke, and the Prime Minister and the 
service chiefs could trust a security service run by Superintendent Cummings. 
How did the security service go about its business in the aftermath? The SIB 
produced regular intelligence bulletins about their investigations, although the products 
of the earlier period disappeared into police custody. The SIB's post fall intelligence 
products bear useful comparison with the regular Police Intelligence Summaries, in that 
they demonstrate some differences in perspective on internal security. Port security 
continued to be a problem with a weak Port Security Control and inadequate policing. 
The question of whether the SIB's focus was now directed firmly downwards into minor 
security details and away from the possibility of penetration of the government 
administration is one that must be asked. 
The Police Commissioner had passed Police Intelligence Summaries to the 
Secretary ONS since the outbreak of war. They continued to go to the Assistant Secretary 
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to the War Cabinet Secretariat after the internal reorganisation of the Prime Minister's 
Department in 1943.1 The summaries varied in regularity, commencing as weekly 
summaries, becoming fortnightly in mid-1941, then monthly from April 1942, and were 
generally one or two pages long (occasionally three).2 
The first Police Intelligence Summary on 9 October 1939 dealt with the 
registration of aliens, raised the possibility of internment, assessed the strength of the 
Anny's Guard Vital Points detachments as adequate, and Doted the extension of the 
Police patrol at the ports. In the Police Commissioner's view, 
I consider we are well informed regarding conditions and that there is no 
cause for apprehension regarding the internal state of the country ... 
The public reaction to the conduct of the war is most favourable. I would 
say that communism and anti-war organizations are not likely to gain ground ... 
There has been the usual spate of "spy stories", a considerable number of 
allegedly suspicious happenings being reported. Each one has been investigated 
as it is not wise to ignore any but the most obviously fantastic story. 
A close liaison with the three Defence Services is being maintained.3 
On 31 October the Commissioner's Intelligence Summary noted 'that internal 
conditions continue to remain normal.,4 From late 1940 the summaries contained the 
sentence 'Internal conditions remain satisfactory', usually just before the Commissioner's 
signature, underlining the fact that for the Police Department at least, the internal security 
situation was always under control.s Apart from aliens and the reporting of suspicious 
occurrences or possible acts of sabotage like fires in warehouses or on ships in port, the 
summaries devoted a considerable amount of attention to the extreme political left, with a 
focus on the Communist Party. It is quite clear that the police kept the Communist Party, 
its supporters and similar groups under close scrutiny. The police must have penetrated 
the party well and truly, given the intimate knowledge of the party's financial position, its 
membership and its publications. The watch on the communists was a regular feature and 
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something of an obsession in the summaries, and there is almost a detectable 
disappointment when Germany's invasion of Russia brought the Communist Party on 
side. This did not lessen the surveillance on the communists and their fellow-travellers. 6 
Pacifists, conscientious objectors and those who ran foul of the law in terms of 
emergency regulations figured from time to time, and their court convictions were noted. 
Most were for very minor matters. 
An instance of a very different sort was a suspected break-in at the DSIR 
laboratory in the Wellington East Post Office building on the night of 21 December 1942. 
Careful investigations were made, as the strong room door was found to be open and 
'there was much secret material in the place.' However, it was concluded that someone 
had forgotten to lock the door and left the light on.7 The reason for such close attention 
was not mentioned, for the laboratory was working on secret radar development.s 
In 1944, the objects of the summaries were much the same. The Communist Party 
and the pacifist organisations were still coming in for close attention. Klein's partner on 
The Spark, L.Sim, surfaced in the summary for 25 February with the New Zealand 
Bolshevik Party, which was concluded to be a one man band.9 The same summary 
concerned releases of aliens from internment, listed breaches of the Emergency 
Regulations and other minor matters. Co-operation was noted between the Police and the 
SIB in investigating letters to W AAFs inciting sabotage, and a suspicious sighting near 
Gisborne was reported. JO The Police Intelligence Summaries provided a fairly regular diet 
of information on activities within the country and assured the recipients that the internal 
security situation was assessed and under control. 
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The SIB's intelligence publications consisted of Internal Security Intelligence 
Bulletins, External Security Intelligence Bulletins and Port Security Control Bulletins.11 
Each dealt with a variety of matters. For example, External Security Intelligence Bulletin 
no.8 of 28 May 1943 covered army deserters hiding as seamen, visa fraud, methods of 
sabotage, the grading of intelligence, internees, a statement by the Australian Navy 
Minister, Censorship and Press Releases, the vetting of radio operators, the surveillance 
of German agents, the security of letters, illegal communications from enemy POWs in 
Canada, and the International Free World Association.12 
The SIB's intelligence bulletins were amalgamated from 1 July 1943 into one 
publication, 'The New Zealand Security Intelligence Bulletin.,13 Twenty one issues 
followed, from no.1 in July 1943 to no.21 in April-May 1945.14 Six came out in 1943, 
twelve in 1944 (the last being December 1944-January 1945), and four in 1945. Around 
ten or eleven pages in length, they were divided into internal security intelligence, 
external security intelligence and port security control.15 Occasionally they overlapped 
with the Police Intelligence Summaries, but for the most part did not. 
An interesting example of leakage of shipping information appeared in New 
Zealand Security Intelligence Bulletin no.8 of February 1944. 16 An investigation began 
when a reliable informant reported a security breach. A trainee dental nurse sent a letter 
to her mother telling her that a particular number of ships carrying US Marines had sailed 
in the morning to attack Japanese positions in the Gilbert Islands. The information was 
accurate, and the informant who was told about this by the mother was concerned enough 
to contact the SIB.17 It transpired that three young women had taken up socially with US 
Navy and US Marine Corps officers. The women were entertained at Service Clubs, 
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parties, camp messes and on board ship. The officers were pumped for information on 
ship movements, arrivals and departures. The women pieced the indiscreet talk 
together18 to keep track of "their" men, and through this got advance information of the 
large convoy's departure from Wellington preceding the attack on the Gilberts. It was 
potentially a case of 'careless talk costs lives' . 
Although the summary did not say so, the instance was particularly worrying 
because the attack referred to Operation 'Galvanic', the landing on Tarawa on 20-23 
November 1943. The Marines had suffered heavy casualties, and the coincidental 
leakage was a serious matter. The young women had, by careful collection and collation, 
gathered a good deal of accurate secret infonnation.19 As the casualties sustained in the 
operation had been unexpected, and the SIB's informant produced the report of the 
possible leak only eleven days after the assault went in, the SIB's interest was 
understandable. However, the casualties had come as a result of the amphibious 
operation's bungled planning, in which significant data concerning tides was ignored. 
The point was that the women had managed to gather operational intelligence which 
would have been most useful to the enemy. 
In Bulletin no.16 for October 1944, the SIB noted with some prescience the 
dangers posed by German submarines. It was observed that as the war moved north, the 
general public was inclined to be relaxed about disclosing shipping movements. The 
bulletin flagged the rise of Gennan U-boat operations closer to home, with the rise in 
merchant shipping sinkings in the Indian Ocean?O Part of this rise was caused by U862's 
bag in August, and shortly after this summary the submarine was making preparations for 
a cruise to Australasian waters. 
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The police and the SIB produced intelligence summaries similar in some respects 
but very different in others. The role of the police was to catch criminals and waylay 
those in breach of security measures. Their attention focussed inwards for the most part, 
and was very much predicated on judicial results: convictions in court, imprisonment or 
internment. The SIB viewed security intelligence from another angle, as well as blocking 
leaks. They tended to look at the larger picture, at what was going on overseas as well as 
within New Zealand. Their summaries reflected that difference. The summaries of the 
two organisations complimented each other, and taken together provided a 
comprehensive round-up on current security intelligence. Ironically, once the SIB were 
under the police, they were able to proceed better, because they were assisted rather than 
hindered in their work, and could tap into police resources. It is intriguing to reflect that 
the Cummings brothers were satisfied with the situation. Had the SIB been of no use at 
all, the Police Department could easily have shut it down forthwith. 
Security of shipping information remained problematical. At the time when the 
SIB was in pieces on the floor at the end of 1942, there occurred an unexplained and 
undetected slip. The serious leak came to light much later. On 22 May 1944, the Naval 
Secretary minuted the Assistant Secretary to the War Cabinet, the Police Commissioner 
and the Director SIB. 
Among papers captured at Salamaua on the 18th September 1943 is a 
collection of Japanese' 51 Sl Division Intelligence Reports. These are graded 
Military Most Secret. 
2.-1n report No.14, dated 20th January, 1943, is the following information: 
"3,500 American Army troops who left Wellington are apparently heading for 
Noumea or Port Moresby". 
3.-Four transports and one destroyer left Wellington on 26th December, 
1942, for Noumea. From the way the above is worded it appears to information 
which leaked out of New Zealand.21 
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Shanahan, now Assistant Secretary to the War Cabinet, informed the Naval 
Secretary, the Police Commissioner and the Director SIB on 26 May that the War 
Cabinet was 'today' concerned to know whether the Japanese intelligence report was 
accurate.22 Cummings as Director SIB replied to Shanahan (with copies to his brother and 
the Naval Secretary). Prior to receiving the latest memorandum 
I had ascertained that on the 26th December 1942 four small transports 
carrying 3,500 troops and accompanied by one destroyer left Wellington for 
Guadalcanal via Noumea.23 
He added: 
Although the date of departure from Wellington was 25 days prior to the 
date of the Japanese intelligence report, it is clear from the report itself that the 
information must have been in the hands of the Japanese while the convoy was 
still at sea. You will notice that the statement in the report refers to troops which 
were 'apparently heading for Noumea or Port Moresby.' It is clear therefore that 
while the convoy was still at sea the Japanese knew not only that the troops had 
left Wellington, but the precise number of the troops. 
I think the time lag between the date of the convoy's departure and the 
date of Japanese 51 st Division Intelligence Report No.14, may well be accounted 
for by the fact that the report was one found among a collection of Divisional 
Intelligence reports at Salamaua, and was probably an extract from, or repetition 
of, an earlier report from Japanese Intelligence Headquarters. 
The discovery of this report certainly seems to indicate the probability of a 
serious leakage of information from New Zealand?4 
This raised some interesting questions. How could such information have 
reached the Japanese while the convoy was still at sea? The timing would exclude 
ordinary mail, so cable or radio remained possible sources. The Japanese might have had 
a break-in to allied signals traffic is one possibility. The German B-Dienst was reading 
quite a lot of British merchant and naval traffic for much of the war. Direct illicit radio 
transmissions from New Zealand cannot be ruled out, but seem unlikely. Or perhaps 
again, like the unexpected arrival of the German raider off Auckland in 1940, this was 
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just another accident waiting to happen, the product of more careless talk. Had the 
convoy been intercepted and sunk, the leakage would have been more than academic. 
The Port Security Control continued doing its work throughout the troubled 
period for the SIB from mid-1942 into 1943, and on into 1944.25 While the work was 
carried out reasonably efficiently, the lack of commitment by the Police left holes in the 
physical security of shipping at the wharves. Port Security personnel, with minimal staff, 
could not fill the gap, and after the police takeover of the SIB were unable to do so. Port 
security and the safe arrival and departure of merchantmen was a standard maritime 
requirement for the duration of the war. For the most part, merchant shipping was not 
interfered with, more by good luck than good management. Police shortcomings in 
guarding wharves and gangways were a commentary on their attitude to port security. 
The SIB's tiny presence in the ports was a useful addition to the surveillance provided by 
customs officers, but little more than that. Not set up until 1942, it was too little far too 
late. The leakage of information from Wellington in December 1942 pointed up basic 
problems unresolved during hostilities. The ubiquitous inertia and failure to develop 
capabilities took over once operational urgency was perceived to have ebbed away from 
the New Zealand coast. The Port Security Control, thanks to the Police coup mounted on 
the SIB, was under police direction for most of its existence. If it failed to live up to its 
potential, the responsibility lay with the police. 
One of the main tasks of a security service is the prevention of the penetration of 
the government bureaucracy by hostile powers. The most usual form this penetration 
takes is through the cultivation of useful sources of information. Some sources of 
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information may be willing contributors, others unwitting contributors. Did this happen 
with the New Zealand civil service? 
The great Allied success in the intelligence war was not inevitable, nor was it an 
all-pervasive continuous catalogue of success. It does seem to be the case that the 
Germans and the Japanese had limited success against their enemies, although in terms of 
the cultivation of sources in the civil service and the armed services, none at all in New 
Zealand. The great British success against the Germans in the intelligence war was 
qualified by the penetration of a number British government departments by the Russian 
secret services, the NKVD and the GRU. It is only in relatively recent times that the 
extent and shape of this penetration in the form of agents has begun to be discerned, 
al though the main cases have been well known for a considerable period. It is one of the 
great ironies of the intelligence history of the Second World War that just as German 
military intelligence and certain German communications were being pulled inside out by 
the British, so the Russians were doing the same to parts of the British bureaucracy. The 
Russian intelligence services penetrated MI6, MIS, the Foreign Office, Treasury, GCHQ 
at Bletchley Park and one or two other places (like the office of the Minister of State 
outside Cabinet, Lord Hankey) besides?6 The so-called Cambridge spies and their 
Oxford counterparts plus a leavening of other agents produced a remarkable stream of 
intelligence for the Russians at Moscow Centre. Based on an energetic, talented and 
diverse collection of both illegal and legal agent runners like Mally, Deutsch, Orlov, 
Reiss, Grafpen, Gorsky, Kreshin, Shishkin and others, the penetration ran against the 
burgeoning tide of technical intelligence.27 Indeed, the agent penetrations benefitted from 
the breakthroughs in signals intelligence, as the main codebreaking centre was infiltrated. 
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The penetration might have been even more extensive had Stalin's purges not taken their 
toll on the Russian intelligence services. There is also the question of just how well the 
intelligence obtained was used. One has only to think of the paranoia of Modrzchinskaya 
at Moscow Centre throwing doubt on Blunt, Burgess, McLean, Philby and Caimcross in 
wartime to see that the Foreign Department of the NKVD had a patchy perfonnance on 
occasion.28 
Of the agents themselves, some are known but others still remain buried. Tudor-
Hart, King, Glading, Harvey, Klugman, Dren, Oldham, Burgess, Blunt, McLean, Philby, 
Cairncross, Long, Straight and others like Fuchs and Nunn May are well known.29 But 
there were a number of other agents - those of the Oxford ring, or the agent at Bletchley 
Park operating before John Caimcross arrived - that remain unidentified, or have only 
recently surfaced, like Norwood.3o The verdict remains very much open on which side 
was the more successful, or rather how the intelligence balance between the western 
Allies and the Russians panned out. The access to Russian intelligence archives in recent 
times and the books based on those files by John Costello and Oleg Tsarev (Deadly 
Illusions Century 1993) and Nigel West and Oleg Tsarev (The Crown Jewels Harper 
Collins 1998) thrust the door adjar. The collaborative works of Christopher Andrew and 
the defector Oleg Gordievsky, followed by the ongoing study with Vasili Mitrokhin (The 
Mitrokhin Archive 1999) have charted new waters on the extent of Soviet intelligence.31 
Given the extent of the penetration of the British government's intelligence 
organisations and bureaucracy in general, it would seem most unlikely that a slight public 
service like New Zealand's could be immune. Australia was not, so why would New 
Zealand be special, particularly when two important Soviet agents in Australia were New 
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Zealanders, revealed by Desmond Ball's and David Homer's seminal work on the 
Moscow -Canberra Venona traffic?2 The purpose of penetrating the New Zealand 
government lay in the links with Britain, Australia, Canada and the United States. 
Intelligence circulated to New Zealand would be a convenient check on material 
extracted elsewhere. The Ross fiasco's effect on the SIB and the allergic reaction within 
the public service to security measures in general appear to have made New Zealand a 
very soft touch. Two of the best places in the government administration for an agent in 
place were the Prime Minister's Department and the new Department of External Affairs. 
Given that they were run by the same team, there was considerable interchange of 
infonnation at the heart of government. The best vantage points were occupied by 
McIntosh and Shanahan and those who worked for them. Not that one is suggesting for a 
moment that either McIntosh or Shanahan had anything to do with the Russians. But 
their posts were extremely convenient, with oversight of incoming communications of all 
kinds from the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, the United States and New Zealand 
diplomatic posts abroad. 
Suspicion fell on two persons in the civil service, and a few early retirements 
from the Department of External Affairs in the 1950s had question marks about them.33 
The well-known economist Dr. W.B. Sutch, who was eventually to head the Department 
of Industries and Commerce, had a shadow cast over him as early as 1937, when Lord 
Hankey is said to have fingered him for a leak from the Imperial Conference (a great 
irony, for Hankey would subsequently employ a top-line Russian spy in his own office -
John Cairncross, no less.).34 Rather incredibly, in the immediate postwar period, Sutch 
was tipped to head an office in New York to establish a pennanent link with the UN 
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Economic and Social Council. Berendsen, New Zealand Minister in Washington, advised 
against the appointment, noting that Sutch had the ability, but '1 don't think the 
judgement, and I would not take the risk. ,35 After his appointment, Sutch was supposed 
to return to New Zealand, but was delayed by a lengthy illness. 
Early in 1948, something of a crisis erupted around Sutch. On 19 March 1948, 
Berendsen was constrained to write to McIntosh expressing his concern about receiving a 
letter from Thorn in New York expressing anxiety on Sutch's pro-Russian views.36 Sutch 
was Secretary-General at the Office of the Permanent Delegation of New Zealand to the 
United Nations. McIntosh wrote to Berendsen on 20 March that he had received 
complaints from Thorn on Sutch about mismanagement, judgement and behaviour. 
McIntosh had taken it further. 
I told the Prime Minister .... that the position appeared to be impossible and 
too dangerous to be allowed to continue. If what Thorn said about consorting 
with the Russians was correct, I was all for pulling him out on the spot, but Mr. 
Fraser was anxious not to be unjust, and suggested that we should ask Thorn to 
consult with Nash and yourself, and then for Nash to report [on returning to New 
Zealand] ... .I have never liked the interference of Nash in our affairs, and I 
expressed strong opposition to this course ... .I sent a telegram off to Thorn asking 
him to make an official complaint and recommendation, and stating that I took the 
view that recall would probably be the wisest course. 
Mr Thorn replied that his letter to me could be taken as official, that he 
would write but that he wanted to consult you first about any recommendations. 
As a result we are letting matters ride, which I think is a mistake . 
... . As the Prime Minister told you himself, he did not think that Sutch 
should have political responsibilities .... 
I made it quite clear to Bill [Sutch], when he was here, that this was a last 
chance, and that if he made any mistake or fell under suspicion he was definitely 
and irrevocably out. Thorn's one specific complaint would not perhaps be 
sufficient to justify the action now suggested but, knowing Bill and knowing 
Thorn, I was pretty certain that there must be many other instances ... ?7 
Mclntosh went on to say that he was worried that Sutch was ill and that this may 
have accounted for his failure to attend to his work thoroughly and conscientiously.38 The 
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trouble was, McIntosh did not see anyone suitable to replace Sutch. Berendsen, by his 
reply to McIntosh on 30 March, was extremely angry, as his earlier opposition to Sutch's 
appointment had been 'so pointedly and repeatedly' ignored. He felt Sutch should be 
confronted as it was basically unfair to be considering dismissing him without getting his 
side of the story, although it is clear that Berendsen was quite unsympathetic to Sutch if it 
was true he had been pro-Russian?9 Sutch remained in New York. At the end of 1949, 
Berendsen still wanted Sutch replaced. In May 1950, McIntosh observed to Berendsen 
that 
The Minister insists on Sutch being recalled, and he has two other 
Overseas officers marked down as being equally unsuitable, because of their 
political outlook. This particular situation I have found most disturbing and 
difficult. So far as Sutch is concerned, all that I have been able to do is to put off 
the eventual time of his withdrawal for a variety of reasons. First of all, we have 
no job for him here. Secondly, we have no suitable replacement for him in New 
York, and, thirdly, I have been trying to use this period to persuade Bill to get 
himself another job. So far he has had no success, mainly for the reason ... that 
when a United Nations opening comes up he is pushed aside because he is not 
liked or trusted. As to replacing him, Doidge does not think we should have 
anybody as expensive as Sutch, and Mr Holland sees no reason why the Post 
should be maintained at al1.4o 
McIntosh continued to press for Sutch to get a UN position. Persisting to push 
Sutch was almost counter-productive, as Berendsen sharply noted on 16 JUly.41 He wrote 
to McIntosh to say he regarded it as unfair to be asked to persuade the UN to take Sutch 
on as a competent and suitable officer, when 'I and I believe you and everybody else 
concerned' considered him to be the opposite. Berendsen thought he was entitled to a 
written instruction for the file before embarking on such a course. 
So I decided to do nothing until I could talk to Sutch, who has always been 
fully aware of my high opinion of him as a person and very low opinion of him as 
an officer (to say nothing of his political views and record, the doubts on which 
held by Cummings and Coy are almost certainly known to the FBI and to the UN 
356 
and may indeed be a factor, for all I know, in their unwillingness to give him a 
pOSt.).42 
But Berendsen noted the matter had been brought to a head, as Sutch rang about 
some immediate technical jobs that had come up and asked him to write on his behalf. 
Berendsen had done so, but there was no favourable response. The 'doubts by 
Cummings' referred to the Police Commissioner and the Special Branch in Wellington. 
Sutch continued in his career as a public servant, but always carried this odium of 
suspicion. In retirement, he was to be tried under the Official Secrets Act in the mid-
1970s, and was acquitted of a charge of espionage after suspicious meetings with Russian 
diplomatic staff in Wellington. It is most likely Sutch was a source of sorts for the 
Russians. Was he a stalking horse for someone else? 
The other civil servant was Paddy Costello. A quite startling claim over a number 
of years is that one of the senior intelligence officers of the 2nd New Zealand Division 
turned out to be a spy for the Russians.43 Although it is prosaic to say so, there is no 
doubt that Desmond Patrick Costello was a spy. It is merely a question of who he 
worked for. All intelligence officers are spies, and Costello was an intelligence officer. 
The question marks about him have to do with whether he spied for the Soviet Union as 
well as New Zealand. 
Costello, a New Zealander of Irish extraction, was educated at Auckland 
Grammar School and Auckland University College. He had an outstanding academic 
record, winning a scholarship to Trinity College at Cambridge in 1931. He was awarded 
first class honours in the classical tripos.44 His time at Cambridge coincided with that of a 
number of the Cambridge spies - Philby, Burgess, McLean, Blunt and Cairncross. 
Costello most definitely held Marxist views and was a friend of John Comford. He later 
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admitted to being a member of the Communist Party in his student days.45 He married 
Bella Lerner, a communist of Russian parentage.46 After Cambridge, Costello obtained an 
assistant lectureship at the University of the South-West at Exeter. He was said to have 
spoken out at Exeter against British government policy on a number of issues, and was 
supposed to have been dismissed from his post for associating with a student who was 
convicted of offences under the Official Secrets ACt.47 
In 1940, Costello enlisted in the 2NZEF as a private and was posted to the 21st 
Infantry Battalion of 5 Brigade, 2nd New Zealand Division. He listed his languages at 
this time as French, Italian, German, Modem Greek and Russian. In the calamity that 
befell this Battalion in the disastrous campaign in Greece, Costello's linguistic abilities 
came to the fore, and he was instrumental in securing a boat on which he and others 
escaped.48 Returning to Egypt, he was commissioned as a 2nd Lieutenant on 20 
September 1941, being posted to the Long Range Desert Group from 11 December to 5 
February 1942. In February Costello moved to A Branch, General Staff Intelligence at 
British Army General Headquarters in Cairo. In May he returned to the 2nd New Zealand 
Division as Divisional Intelligence Officer with the rank of Lieutenant. Promoted 
temporary Captain on 20 September 1942, he succeeded Geoffrey Cox as GSO III (I) of 
the Division on 4 June 1943. He remained in this post until the opening phase of the 
Second Battle of Cassino, handing over to Dan Davin on 15 February 1944.
49 
Much later 
he was accused of being a possible source of Ultra material for the Russians in his time 
with the Division in the Middle East. Geoffrey Cox, also a diplomat, took a different 
vIew. 
Costello was a tall, well built man, with a confident, though quiet bearing, 
and a tendency for sardonic humour. His views, which he did not parade, were 
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undoubtedly Marxist, but I think it highly unlikely, indeed virtually 
inconceivable, that he was a source of infonnation for the Russians during his 
time in the Army. He could not have informed them himself of Ultra, because 
neither Davin nor myself, and I believe Costello, had any knowledge of Ultra at 
the time. We knew that the British had valuable high level information about the 
enemy, but put that down either to skilled espionage out of Gennany, or localised 
intercepts of a kind made tactically in the field. Any information available to 
Costello during his time with the Division or during his time in GHQ in Cairo, 
would have been of little if any value to the Russians.5o 
This is not quite the same as saying Costello would have been of no use to the Russians, 
but nearly. 
During three months leave, Costello was interviewed in London in May 1944 by 
Fraser and McIntosh for a diplomatic post with the new New Zealand Legation in 
Moscow. Attention had been drawn to Costello from a press item featuring a New 
Zealand intelligence officer speaking and joking with a group of visiting Russian officers 
when they visited the Division in December 1943.51 Geoffrey Cox had gone to a 
diplomatic posting in Washington, and Costello wrote to Cox asking if he would support 
him being considered for the Moscow post. Cox wrote to McIntosh describing Costello's 
formidable linguistic abilities matched by rather rigid left-wing views. Cox hedged his 
support 
.... with the following qualifications which clearly must also be put forward: 
(1) his rigidity of mind may mean that he is another Sutch, if not in views 
exactly, certainly in his insistence on his own attitude. He would insist on his 
views openly and in no indirect way for he is the most positive of people. 
(2) he is married to a Russian wife, actually of Ukrainian stock, whose 
family have been in England for, I think, only one generation.52 
When Fraser asked Costello about his politics, Costello is supposed to have said 
that he was afraid he was a bit left wing, to which Fraser allegedly replied, 'oh well, it 
won't hurt us to have one or two Communists in Moscow. ,53 Following his successful 
interview, Costello spent a few weeks at the Northern Department of the Foreign Office 
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preparing for his Moscow post. The Foreign Office reported to the British Ambassador 
in Moscow that Costello had 'made an excellent impression in every way. ,54 Trouble 
loomed on the horizon in March 1945 when McIntosh wrote to Costello advising him that 
MI5 had reported his wife's current connection with the Communist Party and his record 
of problems at Exeter before the war. In his reply, Costello asserted that 
I am not, and have not been since well before the War, a member of the 
Communist Party .... as to my wife, your assumption that she would have broken 
off her political activities is of course correct. She ceased to have any connection 
with the Communist Party from the time I arrived in England last April, and has 
had none since to the best of my knowledge.55 
This put something of a blight on Costello's diplomatic career. A diversion came 
up in 1945 with the despatch of a party from the British Military Mission in Moscow to 
Katowice in Poland. Costello was attached with the temporary rank of Major to track 
down missing New Zealand POWs from camps liberated in Poland.56 He was the senior 
officer of this three-man mission, and while they did not find any New Zealanders, they 
reported on conditions in Poland, and on the extermination camps at Maidanek and 
Auschwitz-Birkenau. He managed to free a French officer, Captain Lequeux, and Dr. 
Olga Lengyel from the Russians. 57 A point that might be made is that if Costello was 
working for the NKVD, he would hardly have been in any position to press the issue hard 
about locating New Zealand POWs. 
Costello returned to the Legation in Moscow, where he was very much the 
mainstay of the diplomatic post. This meant that the bulk of the political reporting from 
Moscow was done by Costello, and he adopted a very realpolitik stance in his approach 
to developing events in Eastern Europe. Cox noted that Costello adhered to Marxist 
analysis, accepting that the ends justified the means, and had, for example, little 
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sympathy for the fate of Czechoslovakia and Masaryk. This did not prevent him from 
making some very perceptive political reports. The Cabinet of the incoming Holland 
government in New Zealand decided to close the Moscow Legation on 24 March 1950, 
although Costello stayed behind to dispose of the Legation's assets, the post finally 
closing on 13 June 1950.58 
Costello went to the New Zealand Legation in Paris. According to the Mitrokhin 
material, Costello was one of the Russians' most useful sources in Paris, his codename at 
this time being LONG.59 The British government objected to Costello's continued 
employment in the New Zealand diplomatic service. Although the Charge d'affaires at 
the Legation, Jean McKenzie, was strongly convinced of Costello's Ioyalty,60 the new 
Prime Minister was determined to have Costello moved out. By mid-1953 Costello was 
put on notice that he would have to go. 
It should also be noted that there were a few resignations from the New Zealand 
diplomatic service in the early 1950s, which have not been explored yet. At least two of 
them had connections with Costello back into the period of his war service, both of them 
from the 2nd New Zealand Division. Certainly one of those was brought to Shanahan's 
attention by MIS, although what was made of it is unclear.61 
Costello left to become Professor of Russian at Manchester University, 
unsurprisingly for a man of his linguistic attributes.62 This was not to be the end of the 
matter. In January 1961 the Portland spy-ring was broken up by the British MIS and the 
Special Branch, acting on infonnation from a Russian defector to the CIA. The illegal 
agent runner, Molody (alias Gordon Londsdale or BEN) and his spies, Houghton and 
Gee, were picked up, along with his communications team.63 The communications team 
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was a married couple, Peter and Helen Kroger, who were, according to their passports, 
New Zealand antiquarian booksellers. They were in fact Maurice and Lona Cohen, 
Foreign Department agents of Moscow Centre. They had narrowly escaped being 
apprehended when the so-called Atom Spy ring was rounded up in the United States.64 
The problem with the Cohens was that their New Zealand passports are said to have been 
personally authorised by Costello when he was at the Paris Legation.65 It is also said that 
the Russian defector to the CIA, 'Anatoli Golitsyn', fingered Costello. Whatever the case, 
it seems that Costello was put under surveillance and was observed meeting persons 
suspected of being Soviet agents.66 Costello was not apprehended, arrested or charged 
with anything. 
On 23 February 1964, Costello died suddenly of a heart attack at the relatively 
young age of fifty-three.67 Later that year, the Soviet agent Sir Anthony Blunt underwent 
his interrogation by MIS that was part of his immunity-from-prosecution deal. He 
informed MIS that Costello had been an agent of the Soviet KGB, which was painless, 
seeing that Costello was deceased.68 
The New Zealand government public service was penetrated by the NKVD/KGB. 
The question mark over Sutch remains to be conclusively resolved. Blunt and the 
Mitrokhin material show that Costello certainly worked for Moscow Centre. If Sutch and 
Costello were agents, just what sort of sources are we talking about? Clearly, if they 
worked for the Russians, questions about their reliability were raised early on. The 
danger lay only if those questions on their soundness were ignored. They were useful as 
long as they had access to information of interest. But it is an insufficient assumption 
that because a person's position in the bureaucracy is obscure he cannot get access to 
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more interesting material. Contacts between civil servants and the routine circulation of 
material between departments and committees suggest avenues. The resourceful person 
finds ways and means and one only has to look at Guy Burgess and Donald Mclean to 
see this easily demonstrated.69 While Burgess, Philby and McLean certainly worked far 
harder than has hitherto been imagined in providing information for Moscow Centre,70 
the case of John Cairncross stands as an interesting warning about resourceful spies. 
Caimcross found it very difficult, in spite of undoubted intellectual brilliance, to hold 
down a post for any length of time. He moved from the Foreign Office to the Treasury, 
to the office of the Minister of State outside Cabinet (Lord Hankey), to Bletchley Park 
and thence to MI6, and back to Treasury.71 Yet even In an apparent intelligence 
backwater like the Treasury, Cairncross managed to obtain a great deal of useful 
intelligence through carefully positioning himself to see all sorts of interesting material 
circulating through. While the Treasury post was interesting, Lord Hankey's office was a 
goldmine, as much secret material was circulated to him. These included incoming and 
outgoing Foreign Office telegrams, Secret Intelligence Service reports, War Cabinet 
minutes, reports from the Chiefs of Staff and a mass of other material. During 1941, 
Cairncross supplied 3,449 documents.7'2 One consignment of these had a covering letter 
from his agent handler summarising the contents. 
We are sending 60 films with material from LIST [Caimcross's 
codename]: Foreign Office cryptograms, weekly SIS, Foreign Office and General 
Staff bulletins, 2 reports from the commission of the BOSS [Lord Hankey] on the 
results of an investigation of the counter-intelligence service [MIS] with the 
characteristics of leading members of the staff and the functions of individual 
sections; a report on radio measures against night bombers; a report from the 
commission of the BOSS on means and methods of bacteriological warfare; 
documen ts from the Y Commi ttee ... 73 
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The comprehensiveness of the material from a variety of sources was its real 
strength. The penetration of Hankey's office is a cautionary tale in itself and the result of 
a careful reading of Hankey's personal habits by Caimcross's agent runners. Hankey's 
vegetarianism, plus acquaintance with one of Hankey's sons, was used as a lever to get 
Cairncross into his office.74 At this time, 1941, Philby was in MI6, McLean was in the 
Foreign Office, Blunt had just joined MIS, and Burgess had good connections in MI6, 
MIS, the Foreign Office and the BBC, and there was already another un-named agent at 
Bletchley Park. 75 Not to mention the obscure but valuable service rendered over 40 years 
. by Melita Norwood.76 
It would be very strange indeed if the New Zealand public service was immune to 
outside attention. It is quite well known that the Petrov defection in Australia in 1954 
produced the allegation that the Russians had a source in the New Zealand Prime 
Minister's Department. It has been assumed that this was Sutch, but it was not cleared 
Up.77 Certainly, the running together of the Prime Minister's Department and the 
Department of External Affairs, with the same head from 1946 to 1966 would have made 
it extremely convenient for long tenn agents. 
In all of this, the takeover of the SIB by the Police in 1943 lessened the chance of 
effective checks being routinely instituted in the New Zealand public service. The 
transfonnation of the SIB occurred in the same year as the reorganisation involving the 
Prime Minister'S Department, the establishment of the small Department of External 
Affairs and the War Cabinet Secretariat, making the co-ordination of much top level 
government policy easier. This was completed when McIntosh took over as Permanent 
Head of the Prime Minister's Department while remaining Head of External Affairs. If 
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there was any problem of security in External Affairs or the Prime Minister's 
Department, there was no security service to sort it out by then, and any such attention 
would have been most unwelcome while Fraser remained Prime Minister. The prospect 
of penetration of government departments in any serious way does not seem to have been 
considered. 
The arrival of the SIB on the intelligence scene in New Zealand was flawed from 
the outset. Advocated by the Chiefs of Staff to fill a perceived hole in security, it was 
established in the face of hostility from the Police Department. The linkage of the SIB 
with the Special Companies through the fifth column fear quickly fell away, and the SIB 
embarked on a course of widening its responsibilities. The personality of the first 
Director was most unfortunate and no doubt contributed substantially to SIB losing 
support in even sympathetic quarters. To the conventional security intelligence aims of 
maintaining within the military the security of infonnation, security of material, security 
of personnel and operational security, were added further responsibilities. The whole 
dimension of civil security - prevention of bribery and corruption in government 
departments, matters to do with aliens and disaffected persons, subversion and sabotage -
suggested the requirement for a much larger service. The security service was in direct 
competition with the Police Department from the outset. Given the relative disparities in 
resources, personnel numbers and local knowledge, it was quite obvious who would win 
in the long run, given that both heads of the SIB and the police had access to the Prime 
Minister and the Prime Minister's Department. 
The assumption of the further responsibility for raising and training the Field 
Security Sections in New Zealand dissipated effort further, as the expansion of SIB staff 
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did not keep pace. This problem was compounded with the establishment of the Port 
Security Control. Ironically, the attempt to form a New Zealand Intelligence Corps under 
SIB auspices was a wake up call for the Army to retain control of their own intelligence 
organisations. 
The Ross debacle was a poisoned chalice right from the start handed to the SIB by 
the Prime Minister himself, and the only interesting remaining question concerns whether 
it was a set-up. It is not proven that this was the case. That aside, this particular 
investigation had political ramifications from the outset by design, and Folkes should 
have seen the implications. Folkes, the outsider, lacked local radar within the bureaucracy 
and was already at odds with too many powerful personages. There is no question that the 
police, whenever they became aware of Ross's role, exploited the affair to the full, as it 
tactically detached the SIB from the Prime Minister, the War Cabinet, the Prime 
Minister's Department and the Chiefs of Staff in one fell swoop. Once the debacle hit the 
papers and came up in Parliament, the Prime Minister was compelled to smartly cover his 
tracks and put as much distance between himself and the fiasco as possible. An 
independent security service was thenceforth an anathema to Fraser. The positive 
assistance of the Police Commissioner and his brother was vital in this respect. The 
police seized the proffered opportunity to reclaim and expand their empire, and by 
absorbing the SIB they cleverly foreclosed any possibility for an independent security 
service to be revived. The SIB under police direction remained a small but useful adjunct 
to the police efforts in maintaining internal security. As a security service still nominally 
under the military but controlled by the civilian Police Department, it was a unique 
situation. 
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The intelligence summaries produced by the police and the SIB retained their 
different focus, but all security investigations were now finnly under police control. 
Police command also removed the problems that arose surrounding the access of the 
Director SIB to the Prime Minister. The Cummings brothers saw to that. The Prime 
Minister was no longer so interested in security matters, so the prospect of independent 
security reports evaporated. This in tum no doubt pleased the service chiefs. 
The SIB's Port Security Control was established too late with too few resources to 
be any more than a useful supplement to the activities of the Customs Department and the 
. police. The police were most deficient with regard to port security, when they mistakenly 
equated low risk as the same as low priority. Having seized control of the SIB, they 
failed to beef up and use the Port Security Control effectively. This was an area where a 
good deal could have been achieved, and which posed no threat to police interests. The 
leakage of information from local ports remained a largely untreated problem, in the 
context of general slackness in security arrangements. 
The possibility of dealing with penetration of the New Zealand public service by 
the enemy or any other power never got off the ground. The police fixation with the 
Communists and the left was directed with a high degree of interest at the low-level 
political machinations of a tiny minority. In other words, if there was any useful 
penetration from the intelligence point of view, the Police Commissioner's gaze was 
directed elsewhere, that is to say, downwards. Doubts about Sutch were not acted upon, 
and Costello was not regarded as problematical. The prospect of other more significant 
long-term moles was not considered at all. Even less was any idea that New Zealand's 
access to certain Allied intelligence might be used as a litmus test by a foreign power. 
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Under the circumstances, it would be unwise to assume a clean bill of health with regard 
to penetration. 
The SIB was prevented by the circumstances of its inception from becoming an 
independent and effective security service. The Police Department bears the 
responsibility for the way the SIB developed, and the police approach to security matters 
was crude and inept. For the duration of the war, New Zealand in fact did without a 
useful security service. Whether it paid a price for this, albeit a concealed one, remains 
to be disclosed. 
Part V 
Other Service Intelligence 
Chapter Thirteen 
Army Intelligence and Security 
Intelligence collection by the Army and the Air Force had an operational focus. 
Part V considers both services' intelligence organisations, and the reasons for the 
divergence from the Navy in the combined intelligence area become clearer. The Army's 
main thrust in intelligence was to provide tactical or operational support for formations 
deployed overseas, while a certain reserve capability was developed at home. The Air 
Force's air intelligence effort took a long time to get off the ground. Once it did, a steady 
expansion unfolded directly related to the deployment of No.1 Islands Group. Air 
intelligence pushed its single service interests and achieved substantial proficiency in 
intelligence collection, its expertise well recognised by the conclusion of hostilities. 
While the SIB was skilfully hijacked by the Police Department, although under 
nominal Anny Command, the Anny's other exertions in military intelligence proved to 
be more productive. The Anny's venture into signals intelligence has already been 
discussed. For the most part, the Special Section of the Army Signals Company was 
engaged in the interception of enemy signals traffic for customers outside the Army. It 
was more appropriate to consider the Army's 'Y' intelligence in the context of the whole 
New Zealand 'Y' offensive, hence its treatment in Chapter Seven. The Army 'Y' 
organisation was small but highly regarded (and highly secret) for all that. The main 
effort in military intelligence for the New Zealand Army during the war was in tactical 
intelligence collection and field security. This was centred on the formations deployed 
overseas for the most part, that is, the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force, comprising 
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the 2nd New Zealand Division in the Mediterranean theatre and the 3 rd New Zealand 
Division in the Pacific. A variety of intelligence and field security sections were formed 
on the British pattern and deployed. Field security sections were also fonned in New 
Zealand, and the Home Guard carried out some intelligence functions. 
Operational intelligence and security were the most important dimensions of 
intelligence for the Army, for without good intelligence and the maintenance of security, 
formations in the field could not conduct operations effectively and were at risk. It is 
intended to examine intelligence collection in the first part of this chapter, field security 
in the second, and lastly to touch on a couple of other minor areas connected with 
military intelligence. 
The New Zealand Intelligence Corps has shadowy origins which have not become 
transparent with the passage of time. There may have been a corps formed during the 
First World War, but nothing has come to light. The question of a Commandant of the 
New Zealand Intelligence Corps was raised by the Director of the SIB in 1942 with the 
object of the SIB taking control. As noted earlier, this was rebuffed by Army General 
Staff, and the Commandant who was appointed commanded one of the New Zealand 
Field Security Sections. However, it can be argued that the New Zealand Intelligence 
Corps came into existence earlier, when on 16 October 1939 Army Headquarters 
approved the raising of a number of units for the First Echelon of the 2nd New Zealand 
Expeditionary Force. Among them was the 2nd New Zealand Divisional Intelligence 
Section, New Zealand Intelligence Corps. This was creation by the stroke of a staff 
officer's pen on a memorandum.! The New Zealand Intelligence Corps existed de facto, 
although it did not have any central over-riding influence on the intelligence and security 
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sections. It was merely a matter of administrative convenience and for practical 
purposes, an irrelevance. 
There were a range of intelligence units raised by the Army during the war. The 
2nd New Zealand Divisional Intelligence Section was fanned in 1939.2 Each of the 
Division's three infantry brigades had brigade intelligence sections, and each infantry 
battalion a battalion intelligence section. A variety of field security sections were set up 
in New Zealand and the Middle East. The 2nd New Zealand Divisional Field Security 
Section was established in 1940 in Egypt and served with the Division from Greece to 
Trieste. A New Zealand Base Field Security Section was raised in Maadi Camp. In June 
1942 this Section's name was changed to 6th New Zealand Division Field Security 
Section as a deception measure, to fool the enemy into thinking another New Zealand 
division had arrived in Egypt. In November 1944, the name of the Section was altered to 
New Zealand Maadi Companies Field Security Section.3 
In January 1942 the Northern Divisional Field Security Section was established in 
New Zealand in the Northern Military District, and its name was changed later to 1 Field 
Security Section. At the same time a Central Divisional FS Section was set up, the name 
being changed subsequently to 2 FS Section. The officer in command of this Section 
held the appointment of Commandant, New Zealand Intelligence Corps, the first being 
Captain R.S. Cutfield. A Southern Divisional FS Section was raised also in January 
1942, and later became 3 FS Section.4 4 FS Section was created in New Zealand to serve 
with the 3rd New Zealand Division in the Pacific. 5 New Zealand FS Section was raised 
in Egypt in 1944. A further New Zealand FS Section was set up to serve with' J' Force 
in Japan in 1946.5 
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In addition to these there was a small unit, 1 Interrogation Section, set up in 
Egypt, and interrogation was also carried out at Featherston POW Camp when the 
establishment of a Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre (CSDIC) was 
contemplated. To deal with mail, two New Zealand Field Censor Sections were 
established in Egypt. 6 
Before turning to the development of the 2nd New Zealand Division's intelligence 
section, there is one special case that needs mentioning. This was the first occasion 
during the war when operations had been executed on the basis of what shortly 
afterwards became known as Ultra (from June 1941). It was the only occasion when a 
New Zealand commander used this kind of signals intelligence to make plans while 
commanding a corps-sized formation. This was the defence of Crete carried out by the 
commander of 2NZEF, Major-General Bernard Freyberg, VC. 
It is necessary to address this issue, because in spite of my consideration of the 
role of the German Enigma intelligence on Crete elsewhere,7 impressions have been 
conveyed more recently by historians like Paul Freyberg and Anthony Beevor that 
General Freyberg made decisions that led to the loss of Maleme aerodrome on the island. 
According to them he was ensuring the security of those 'Most Secret Sources' or that he 
misread the Enigma summaries, fearing the attack from the sea more than from the air.8 
These contentions do not hold up because Freyberg's preparations were sufficient to hold 
the island, if by a small margin. 
Freyberg was first briefed by Wavell personally on a new source of intelligence 
when he was unexpectedly given command on Crete on 30 April 1941. He was told that 
information from a well placed agent in Athens, codenamed BONIFACE,9 was 
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absolutely reliable, and that he would be receiving this intelligence as it came to hand. 
The intelligence consisted in fact of summaries of the German Luftwaffe Light Blue 
Enigma traffic, and the enemy, believing their communications to be secure, were quite 
voluble during the next twenty days until the invasion was mounted. Freyberg was told 
he needed to take great care of this intelligence, as the British did not wish to lose this 
most reliable source. The signals sent to Freyberg were prefixed ORANGE LEONARD 
or OL. Those sent to Wavell in Cairo were numbered with three digits, as in OL258 or 
OL262 for example. Those sent to Crete were numbered with four digits, the OL2000 
series. It is said that those sent to Freyberg were prefixed with 'PERSONAL FOR 
GENERAL FREYBERG - MOST IMMEDIATE,.l0 Apparently a British officer at 
Creforce Headquarters would decode the signal from London and pass it to Freyberg. 
Once read, the signal was burnt. II It should be noted that Freyberg had to rely on his 
memory once he had read the signal, as the content could not be kept. No doubt, 
although he had a good memory, he would not recall everything. How much notice he 
took of this intelligence was reflected in his plans for the defence of the island. 
The most important Enigma messages Freyberg received were as follows. 
OL2155 on 1 May revealed that the Luftwaffe was not going to destroy the airfields or 
1'" d . 
mine the harbour at Suda Bay on Crete. ~ On 3 May OL2157 note that aIr transport 
could not be ready for large scale operations before 6 May.I3 An attack on the island with 
a projected date was outlined in OL2167 of 6 May: 
Preparation for operation against Crete probably complete on 17 May: Sequenct~ 
of operations from zero day onward will be parachute landmg of ~ 
Fliegerdivision plus corps troops 11 th Fliegerko~s to sei~e Maleme CandIa 
[Heraklion] and'Retimo. Then dive bomber~ and flg~~ers ~1l1 move to. Male~e 
and Candia. Next air landing of remamder 11 Fhegerkorps mcludmg 
headquarters and subordinated army units. Then flak units further troops and 
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supplies. Third mountain regiment from 12th Anny detailed ... Admiral South-
East .will provide protection with Italian torpedo boat ... flotillas minesweepers and 
possIbly U boats. Sea transport by German and Italian vessels. Operation to be 
proceeded before zero day by sharp attack on RAF military camps and anti-
aircraft positions.1 4 
By 7 May he had a good overall picture of the enemy's plan of attack and was 
further briefed by a senior officer sent by Wavell on 11 May. By 13 May, he had already 
received a more extensive run down on the enemy's refined plan of attack in 0L302 
(which he may have been given the day before).15 0L302 is a very long signal detailing 
further the sequence of the coming attack. 
What is crucial is the appreciation promulgated by Freyberg through his BGS 
(K.L.Stewart) at Creforce Headquarters on 12 May, of which some 45 copies were 
distributed. They conveyed in no uncertain language the objects of the enemy's 
attentions. This document, 'BGS Appreciation - German Plan for Attack on Crete' set 






The first objective will most certainly be the three aerodromes, 
HERAKLION, RETIMO, and MALEME, the possession of which is an 
essential preliminary for the landing of troop carrying aircraft. 
The second objective will be the seizure of SUDA BAY and HERAKLION 
ports to enable ships to land further troops and heavy equipment required for 
the complete occupation of the island. 
(~) D [ day] 2. Having seized and provisioned aerodromes, this day will be 
devoted to securing with the aid of further airborne troops, the ports of 
HERAKLION and SUDA BAY. Dive bombers will operate in close 
support of ground tps. 
D 3 and subsequently . 
(h) Ships will commence to arrive on this day, and the complete occupatIOn 
of the island will follow as quickly as possible. 
From the above appreciation, it will be noted that the entire plan is ba~ed on 
the capture of the aerodromes. If the aerodromes hold out, as they WIll, the 
whole plan will fail ... 
It is further to be noted, that up to the present, the aerodromes hav~ no~ 
been bombed, nor have the ports been mined. !he obvious deductIOn IS 
that the Germans hope to use both themselves In the near future. 
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8. Although this appreciation has not mentioned sea Iandinas on beaches 
the possibi~ity of these attacks must not be overlooked; b~t they will b~ of 
secondary unportance to those from the air. 16 
It could hardly have been more clear: ' ... the entire plan is based on the capture of 
the aerodromes. If the aerodromes hold out ... the whole plan will fail ... ' Freyberg had 
made very good use of his intelligence. He planned to defend the airfields and the two 
ports. What occurred when things went wrong at Maleme had nothing to do with holes in 
the defence, Freyberg's concern about the projected sea attack, or covering for source 
BONIFACE. It had everything to do with the failure of the acting commander of the 2nd 
. New Zealand Division troops on Crete, Brigadier Puttick, to get a grip on his Division; 
the failure of the commander 5 Brigade, Brigadier Hargest, to see that orders were carried 
out~ and the failure of the commanders of 22nd Battalion, 23rd Battalion and 21st Battalion, 
to execute the planned response to the German attack. Above all, this meant that 
Maleme, along with the Kastelli airstrip, had to be held. 
The deployment of 1 Sl Greek Regiment at Kastelli rather than west of the mouth 
of the Tavronitis river bed deprived the enemy of a rough but usable airstrip. The failure 
of 23 rd Battalion to be permitted by Brigadier Hargest to attack in support of the airfield 
battalion was the key to the loss of the airfield. This was compounded when the 22
0d 
Battalion pulled off the airfield and the hill overlooking it. The failure to remedy that 
situation lies at the door of the 5 Brigade commander and his battalion commanders, in 
particular, Hargest, Leckie and Andrew. It had nothing to do with Freyberg not making 
good use of the Special Intelligence of the Enigma summaries. 
What lost Crete was a substantial failure within the New Zealand Division and 5 
Brigade to follow standing counterattack orders based on the 12 May appreciation. 
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Freyberg's defence plans came apart because subordinate New Zealand commanders 
responsible for holding Maleme, unlike the British commanders at Heraklion or the 
Australian commanders at Retimo, proved incapable of obeying quite straightforward 
directions. Crete, on paper, should not have had any chance of being held. Freyberg's 
use of his intelligence advantage plus the Germans' intelligence failure with regard to 
their plans and appreciations brought him within an ace of victory. It was the first time 
that Enigma intelligence had been used by a commander in fighting the enemy head on 
(in Greece it had permitted most of the rapid withdrawal of Lustre Force to succeed). It 
almost worked. The arguments as to the development of the battles on Crete aside, 
Freyberg's handling of the Enigma summaries demonstrated that he was prepared to take 
due cognizance of reliable intelligence, in this case in defence of an island. 
The 2nd New Zealand Division in the Mediterranean theatre was under General 
Freyberg's command for much of the war. The Division's intelligence set-up developed 
over a period of time, and became practiced in providing useful tactical intelligence. 
There were three levels of intelligence within the Division: at Divisional Headquarters, at 
the three Brigade Headquarters and at the various Battalion Headquarters. As one of the 
senior intelligence officers of the Division, Sir Geoffrey Cox observed: 
The relation between Divisional Headquarters Intelligence and the 
Brigades Intelligence officers rested on the fact that they supplied us with 
information, particularly documents from prisoners, about the enemy on their 
front, and about its terrain. We in tum provided them with information about the 
enemy facing them, and about the terrain, particularly in the fonn of air photos. 
One form in which such information was transmitted was the daily I Summary.17 
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There was no intelligence chain of command as such between the Intelligence 
Officers (or lOs) at different levels: 
There were no administrative or command links between Divisional 
Headquarters Intelligence and the Brigades. Since there was no New Zealand 
Intelligence Corps, all Intelligence Officers were ordinary infantry officers 
assigned to Intelligence duties. Some may have attended a course in Intelligence 
work. Brigade lOs were responsible to their Brigadier and their Brigade Major, 
not to the G III (1) at Div.HQ. We at Div. had no direct or formal link with 
Battalion lOs, who passed their information to their Brigade 10, and in tum got 
their infonnation from him. But we had informal links, based on personal 
contact, with the cas and las of individual Battalions. In Italy I had, for 
instance, close personal contact links with Sandy Thomas [CO 23rd Battalion], 
Angus Ross [10 23rd Battalion] and Peter Awatere [CO 28th Battalion]. They 
would call in at the I[ntelligence] truck when they visited Div.HQ, and I would 
from time to time go forward to their HQs. But this was more to maintain liaison 
than for any specific Intelligence purpose.1S 
The 2nd New Zealand Divisional Intelligence Section came within the orbit of the 
General Staff Officer Grade III (Intelligence) or GSO III (1), but was run by the officer on 
the next rung down, the Divisional Intelligence Officer or 10. The Section itself was 
basically a cipher section, and in Italy its title was altered to New Zealand Divisional 
Cipher Section. It comprised around a dozen personnel, and for instance in October 1941 
consisted of four warrant officers, one staff sergeant, three sergeants and one private, run 
by two officers, Lieutenant J.V. Hollis and 2nd Lieutenant G.S. COX.19 
The intelligence work at Division was done by the GSO III (1) and the 10. The 
development of the effectiveness of intelligence at this level took time, and it was 
probably not until Cox took over as G III (I) that Divisional Intelligence began to 
function well, although progress had been made before this. Robin Bell, the Divisional 
10 on Crete, became G III (1) once the Division returned to Egypt, with Hollis as 10 at 
first, but he was quickly followed by Cox. There was a tendency at this time for 
Divisional Intelligence to be regarded by other senior staff officers as something of a 
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spare part. The regular NZ Staff Corps officers, who provided cadres for division and 
brigade staffs at this time, tended to view intelligence collection in First World War 
terms. With static trench warfare, identification of enemy formations relied mostly on 
raids to obtain documents and prisoners. These could occur from time to time and did not 
d d'd 20 . eman rapl assessment. There was lIttle manoeuvre, nor swift development in new 
weapons as there was in the Second World War, where unexpected changes could greatly 
influence the outcome of battles. Thus, 
Detailed information about the enemy was regarded as interesting but not 
necessarily significant. 
This tended to diminish the role of the I[ ntelligence] staff as estimators of 
the enemy's strength and intentions, and to lead to their employment for other 
tasks, more in the liaison and operational field. Indeed there was a tendency in 
the early stages ... to see the Div.IO, if not the G III (I), as a spare general purpose 
officer on Div. HQ, available for a variety of jobs. In Greece, for instance, Bell 
was sent back on one occasion during the retreat to blow up a bridge - an 
operational task if ever there was one. Similarly, in the opening stages of the Sidi 
Resegh campaign I [Cox as 10] carried out the operational task of placing the 
lamps by which the night advance of the Division was guided. Once into Libya, I 
manned rear Div. HQ until a new HQ had been set up twenty miles ahead. 
These operational tasks interfered with the discharge of my true 
intelligence duties. Bell had left to me the task of studying the information about 
the enemy available to us before the battle. This was copious .... On the night we 
crossed the Wire [sic] and advanced into Libya in November 1941 the General 
called for an assessment of the strength of the German and Italian artillery around 
Tobruk. By the time this requirement reached me I had already spent a long day 
in the field preparing the route for the advance, and was very tired. I had to study 
the many documents involved, and work out the assessment by the light of a hand 
torch, lying under my truck to mask even that weak light. It made my work 
doubly - indeed trebly - difficult. Similarly manning the rear HQ, and bringing 
the rear party f?rw~rd during. the night, cost me ~n en:ir~ .night's sleep, i~pairing 
my work in estImatmg the eVIdence of the enemy s actIvItIes the next day. 
The 'Crusader' operations were something of a watershed, however. 
Before durino and immediately after Sidi Resegh, the pattern became 
established of'the G:neraI sending for Bell to give him information about the 
enemy and the terrain, and of Bell being included in planning discussions with the 
G I [GSa 1] and other operational officers. At t~is stage there were no regul~r 
conferences of the type which later became an mtegral part of the General s 
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method. I, as 10, was not called to them .... but prepared briefs for Bell about the 
enemy situation.22 
The value of useful intelligence at Sidi Rezegh was apparent. 
Once .... battle was truly joined, and Rommel's swift and unpredictable 
movements came into play, the importance of the role of Div. Intelligence in 
establishing the strength and intentions of the enemy became manifest. By the 
end of the [Crusader] campaign these were clearly established as being the central 
role of the Intelligence staff. Our ability to identify the unexpected German 
infantry units on the Tobruk front; to interpret the map captured with von 
Ravenstein; to identify von Ravenstein; and to establish beyond doubt that 
Rommel had turned back from the frontier to attack us were all events which 
reinforced this view. From Sidi Resegh onwards not only was the role of Div. 
Intelligence clearly established, but was increasingly respected by officers on the 
operational side.23 
While progress had been made, there were a couple of drawbacks. 
Bell was not a scholar, though he had a strong natural intelligence. He 
preferred to leave to me the task of studying the enemy forces opposite us, based 
on the copious flow of information from Corps and Army before the battIe, and 
on our own identifications during the battle. He had little inclination for written 
reports, and made no effort to establish a daily written I Summary whilst we were 
in action. Nor did Gentry, then the G I, make any effort to encourage him to do 
SO.24 
Nevertheless, it was during Bell's tenure as G III (I) that Freyberg's practice of 
referring direct to the G III (1) rather than through the G I, was established. From this 
point, this was to be the central feature of the functioning of intelligence at Divisional 
Headquarters.2s The practice came from Freyberg himself. 
The General had a keen interest in information about the enemy, not only 
on his immediate front, but in the Western Desert as a whole. This stemmed in 
part from his own sharp, inquiring mind, and very acute sense of 
responsibility .... After the debacles in Greece and Crete the Government were 
very concerned that their troops should not again be committed to hazardous 
enterprise without their prior knowledge and consent. This led Freyberg to take a 
view of the Middle East as a whole. There was also the fact that he was one of 
the most experienced commanders of British forces in the Middle East at the time, 
who in the British Army would have been a candidate for command of a Corps, 
and who naturally looked at issues on a wider front than that of the enemy 
immediately facing him. 26 
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Cox took over from Bell as G III (I) in 1942, and Lieutenant Paddy Costello 
became the Divisional 10 on 29 May?7 While the direct contact with the General 
elevated the importance of intelligence, there was a dividing line within the Divisional 
staff. The Intelligence staff were sharply differentiated from the Operations staff. 
In those days, before command vehicles came into being, Div.HQ offices 
were in lean~to's attached to either side of a 3 ton truck. The I Department 
worked in a lean-to on one side, the Ops in one on another. For security reasons, 
we of the I side were not allowed into the Ops side, though Bell may occasionally 
have been called in there for conferences. This pattern persisted throughout the 
war, so that we on the I side worked without any knowledge, except in the 
broadest terms, of the deployment of the troops on our own side. Similarly the 
Ops officers seldom visited what - after Sidi Resegh - became the I caravan. 
During battle we were, of course, in constant touch with the Ops side, feeding 
them immediately any information which came our way, and dealing with any 
queries they had. And when the pattern of daily conferences developed - a 
procedure which came about, 1 think, at the battle of El Alamein in October 1942 
- the Ops side were getting the briefings on the enemy situation which the G III 
(I) put before such conferences, and of course were recipients of the daily I 
Summary, which also came into being, as a regular .... publication around about 
the time of Alamein.28 
Cox left the Division to take up a diplomatic post in Washington, and his position 
as G III (1) was taken over by Captain W.F. Liley, MC, with Costello (now a captain) as 
10.29 It is however interesting to note that Freyberg had clearly recognised Costello'S 
intellectual brilliance, for at the pre-battle briefing for the New Zealand Corps operation 
to punch through Tebaga Gap in March 1943 it was Costello, the 10, who gave the 
intelligence brief. The presence of the G III (1), or on occasion the Divisional 10, at pre-
battle conferences became an integral part of Freyberg's preparations for battle. Freyberg 
would get the senior intelligence officer to open the briefing with the intelligence 
appreciation of the situation. The General himself would follow with an outline of the 
thrust of his plan for battle, which would then be open for discussion. Once the 
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discussion was over, the General then made his decisions, and gave his orders. It was up 
to his senior staff officers and heads of departments to draw up the plan for battle in the 
form of an operation order. The role of the intelligence officer was critical, and the 
tactical intelligence collected to enable the appreciation to be made had to be good. A 
poor intelligence assessment could lead to a faulty operation order with all the 
consequences that that entailed. Divisional intelligence assessment was therefore an 
integral component of the General's planning process, a regular and unremarkable feature 
of the Division's preparations to engage the enemy. From Alamein onwards, battles like 
. Medenine, Tebaga Gap, Takrouna, Orsogna, Cassino, Faenza, the Senio and Gaiana 
River and other engagements went through this planning cycle of the pre-battle 
conference. In the war of movement, intelligence at the Divisional level was one of the 
essential factors for success. 
Costello was appointed G III (1) in June 1943, with Dan Davin as his 10, a post 
which Costello held until 15 February 1944. Costello and Davin were the Divisional 
Intelligence team during the bloody opening to the Italian campaign, first on the Sangr~ 
and then at Cassino. Davin became G III (1) on 16 February in the middle of Cassino 
w hen Costello left on leave before taking up his post in the New Zealand Legation in 
Moscow.:w In June Davin left to take up an intelligence position at the War Office in 
London,3! and Cox returned from Washington to be G III (I) once more, with Captain S. 
Martin as his 10.32 Cox remained as G III (1) until the end of the war. 
Cox, Costello and Davin were the longest serving G III (1)s, representing an 
almost unbroken continuity (apart from Liley) from 1942 to 1945. Cox in fact served 
longest of them all. The contact between the General and the G III (I) allowed 
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intelligence at the Divisional Headquarters level to become an integral useful component 
of the Division's command. In Cox's view Freyberg was easy to work for, provided you 
were alert, fully briefed, able to describe the situation clearly, and handle close 
questioning in detail. 33 The General relied on good intelligence and took notice of it. Cox 
could not recall any situation when Freyberg was commanding the Division where an 
error was made because of disregarding intelligence on the enemy.34 The contact 
remained a working relationship.35 It made a difference, nevertheless. 
The General's avid interest in Intelligence set this pattern of his direct 
contact with the G III (1), for whom he would send whenever he wanted a 
particular query answered. This put the G III (I), a relatively low ranking officer, 
a Captain, in direct contact with a General, who on the Ops side would nonnally 
deal directly only with his G I and G II, his eRE, AAlQMG, eRA, and ADMS, 
the Infantry Brigadiers, and - at times, the commander of Battalions - all officers 
of the rank of colonel and above. This established a close working relationship 
between the General and the three of us ... Costello, Davin and myself.36 
The General's attitude towards his intelligence officers helped. 
The link was also strengthened by the fact that we were all three 
University men, and the General had .... a respect for University men .... There was 
also the fact that we knew, from our years in England, the English background, 
against which much of his own life had been lived. We too had an interest in 
world affairs in general, and some knowledge of them. This knowledge we were 
able to augment for the General in a way not open to the I staffs of other British 
Army Divisions. Because all three of us had worked at GHQ in Cairo (my 
contact was brief, a matter of 3 weeks in December 1941) and because of our 
University backgrounds, we had personal and working links with the I staffs on 
Eighth Army, some key members of whom had been at Oxford and Cambridge. 
This enabled us to secure information about, for instance, the progress of the war 
on the Eastern Front beyond anything a Div. I staff was entitled to. We were able 
to justify securing this information on the grounds that the General, as 
commander of 2NZEF as well as of the Division, required it. The General took 
all this infonnation with avidity ,[ sic] and enjoyed discussing it with US.37 
While this made for the smooth running of intelligence at Division, there may 
have been unintended consequences, not major, but intriguing. Costello had other 
loyalties. Cox, as noted elsewhere, had picked up on the fact that Costello was a Marxist. 
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Certainly, getting information in the name of the General might have been a very useful 
lever if used carefully. Cox was of the view that nothing useful to the Russians could 
have been learned,38 but some information might have been useful as a check against 
other sources. It can be noted that one of the Division's cipher staff, who came under the 
G III (1) and 10, later had a diplomatic career which also had a little cloud cast over it. 39 
Avenues, contacts and opportunities were there. That said, it needs to be noted that such 
speculation remains unproven at this point. 
A perhaps more important dimension was the need for the junior intelligence 
officers to be culturally accepted in the top of the Division. In Cox's view, 
Dan Davin and Costello were admirable G III (I)s, because of their 
mixture of rigorous intellectual training, and commonsense. One important aspect 
of that commonsense was the realisation that their ability to get their opinions 
listened to by senior officers of the Division rested in part on their being able to 
convince those officers that they were not ivory tower intellectuals, but men who 
shared many of the tastes of most people in the Div., capable of drinking their 
share of a bottle of whisky when out of the line, being able to hold their own in 
the banter of men facing hard choices and hard times, ready to take their share of 
the risks of war .... 
But in their work their intellectual training made them able to scrutinise 
infonnation carefully, to summarize and express it clearly, and to draw deductions 
from it.40 
This was the mark of good intelligence officers. The production of the daily 
Intelligence Summary, started in the Western Desert, was a central feature of the work of 
the G III (I) and the 10. A brief look at three examples gives an idea of the extent and 
detail of the analysis. The ability to appraise, to summarise the most important features, 
and to present them with clarity was what was required. 
An Intelligence Summary from Costello as G III (I) on 19 January 1944 paints a 
short, vivid and grim picture. It is rather chilling when it is realised that the remarks 
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about St.Angelo refer to the exact place where the US 36th Texas Division was to attempt 
to cross the Rapido river the next day, only to be bloodily repulsed. 
The CASSINO or GUSTAV line closely follows the west bank of the river 
RAPIDO from where the narrow river valley widens into a plain at G8627 
through CASSINO and SANT' ANGELO to the confluence with the river LIRI at 
G8812. North of CASSINO the line consists of machine-gun positions and 
weapon pits supported by field artillery. Houses have been demolished and trees 
felled along the river bank to improve fields of fire. At CASSINO anti-tank 
ditches have been dug and an area flooded between the main road and the railway. 
Demolitions are seen to have been carried out within the town, and many of the 
buildings have doubtless been fortified. 
Considerable progress has been made between CASSINO and the LIRI-
RAPIDO confluence. Wire is almost continuous and numerous machine-gun 
positions, weapon pits and mortar positions are sited on the rising ground west of 
the river. The village of SANT' ANGELO has been turned into a large strong 
point and other strong points are sited at irregular intervals of five hundred to 
fifteen hundred yards all along the line. This section of the line is strongly 
supported by field artillery. Trees east of the river and along the river bank have 
been felled so that at no point could good cover approaches to the river be made. 
In the area of the LIRI-RAPIDO confluence large tracts have been flooded. 
Forward of the line many of the road and rail bridges have already been blown.41 
S tanding on the ground today, which consists of a flat open pan half surrounded by the 
river with the village on rising ground on the opposite bank, the implications of 
Costello's portrait of the strength of the St.Angelo defences can be all too readily 
appreciated. 
A New Zealand Corps Intelligence Summary on the February attack by elements 
of 4th Indian Division and 2nd New Zealand Division gives a perspective on the 
difficulties encountered and the implications for further operations. This Summary was 
produced by Davin on 18 February, three days after he had taken over from Costello, and 
had this to say about the failure of the 28 th Maori Battalion to hold onto the railway 
station at Cassino: 
The enemy has also been able to qualify the success of our attack up the 
railway line towards CASSINO station. Though he could not prevent aUf taking 
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the station his defences on the hummocks at 860199 held out and fire from these 
and. the houses North of the station stopped our further advance. CASSINO 
station comm~nds .acces~ to Route 6 and the town. Our holding it contained also 
the ~hreat of JunctIon wIth our forces in the Monastery area and the consequent 
cuttIng off o~ enemy. troops in the town. Therefore the enemy lost no time in 
counterattackIng. WIth tanks from the North and infantry from the west he won 
back. the ~tat~on this afternoon. Now that he knows where to expect our thrust and 
the ImplIcatIons of a .failure to meet this second threat, the enemy may be 
expected to put up a fIerce struggle to hold the station and the roads North of it .... 42 
This short extract captures the essence of the situation very well. Not only had the attack 
been stopped, but the same way into the town was bound to be more heavily contested in 
the future. 
The third Intelligence Summary by contrast was produced on 10 April 1945, the 
day following the Division's assault across the Senio. Cox was G III (I) once more, and 
his Summaries are masterly in their detail. Cox was evaluating the success of the attack, 
which had busted the enemy's front wide open, with a rapidly changing situation. 
Excellent use of tactical airpower plus artillery and flamethrowers had permitted the rapid 
crossing of the embankments. 
PW and captured documents have today proved conclusively that on the 
SENIO we fought the enemy on ground of his own choosing, where he was still 
holding with the available strength of 98 Division, and where he hoped to be able 
to check us if not on the river itself, at least on the two defensive belts of casas 
linked by fi~ldworks, from 1000 to 2000 yards behind. The enemy cornman.defs 
had clearly appreciated the great importance of the South .... bank of the rIver. 
Their files are full of documents ordering its preparation for defence .... 
Even with the South bank gone, the policy was to hold the North bank and 
fight us there .... 
Beyond the North bank were two switch-lines, C~S~R and NERO, on 
which it was again hoped the battle might have been stabIhsed If part of t~e bank 
was lost but other parts were held. But the main defences in ?epth consIsted. of 
two lines of diggings and wiring, already known to us from ~lf photos. BehInd 
these were grouped the reserve companies and stationed over In front of 289 and 
290 Regts were six Tigers in support. They and SP guns were to form the 
spearheads of the counter-attacks .... 
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The b~m~ardment and the flame-throwers, though not apparently causing 
heavy casualtIes In wounded and dead on most of the line .... reduced the garrison 
of the North stopbank to a fit state for surrendering in great numbers. The 
barrage, and the advance in depth, carried us through the remaining lines before 
any counter-attacks could be mounted .... 
The result was that at first light today the enemy found himself not only 
off the SENIO, but with a considerable gap in his front, with I and II Bns of 289 
Regt virtually out of action (we have 337 OR and 4 officers from them), and 
II/290 badly mauled .... 
In our sector, therefore, the enemy undoubtedly has no alternative but to 
get back behind the SANTERNO as quickly as possible .... 43 
A breakdown of enemy prisoners by regiment and battalion followed, with a total 
of POWs noted as 581 men, 10 officers and 36 wounded. Three captured and translated 
documents were appended, one being a sketch of enemy positions between the Senio and 
the next river line, the Santemo. Much could be learned after a battle which might be of 
use in further operations. The mention of air photos is interesting, for in Italy the Division 
had an officer attached to Divisional Headquarters who was an expert in interpreting 
aerial photographs. This was Captain Fred Kersh, whose title of Mediterranean Air 
Interpretation Unit (West) was shortened to 'Mae West'. He became part of the 
intelligence set-up for obvious reasons.44 
A cycle of practice had been built up between the Divisional commander and his 
G III (I). Consulted by the General for all manner of intelligence matters, producing a 
daily intelligence summary to be promulgated to the senior officers and the Brigades, 
providing appreciations for pre-battle conferences, obtaining and collating intelligence 
from a wide variety of sources, the Divisional intelligence officers were kept busy. 
Intelligence was collected from prisoners, from captured equipment and documents, from 
patrols and other reports upwards from the Battalions and the Brigades, while other 
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intelligence was passed down from higher headquarters (from Corps or Army). On 
occasion, this included Ultra material, suitably disguised. 
The Brigade Intelligence Sections were more of a clearing house for intelligence 
passing down from Divisional Headquarters to the Brigades and Battalions, and upwards 
from the Battalions to Brigade and also to Division when appropriate. There were at least 
three Brigade Intelligence Sections, and four in 1945. The Brigade Intelligence Officer 
who ran the Brigade Intelligence Section was responsible to the Brigade Major. The 
Brigade 10 was to identify enemy units, pass on news and deductions about enemy 
intentions, distribute intelligence upwards and downwards, issue ciphers and codes, write 
up the Brigade War Diary, prepare the intelligence paragraphs in Brigade operation 
orders and check map co-ordinates mentioned in orders. The Brigade 10 was to keep in 
close touch liaison officers, Battalion lOs, flanking Brigade lOs, and the G III (I) at 
Divisional HQ. The Brigade Intelligence Section could be employed to give warning of 
enemy movement, to watch the progress of own troops, to provide observation reports 
from particular positions on the battlefield, to sort out obscure situations by personal 
reconnaissance, and to collect and collate incoming information from Brigade units.45 
If the Brigade was the clearing house for intelligence within the 2nd New Zealand 
Division. the infantry battalions were the grass-roots level of intelligence. The Battalion 
Intelligence Officer was the Battalion Commander's right-hand man in intelligence 
matters, being responsible for the provision of up to date operational intelligence on the 
basis of which the Battalion Commander conducted his operations. 
The duties of a Battalion 10 both in action and out consisted of liaison 
between the CO, '0' Group conferences and the Section. Out of the line he was 
mainly occupied with arranging training courses for aspiring recruits 
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and .... various leave arrangments. The courses were run by the I Sergeant, with 
the assistance of some of the experienced members of his Section.46 
As well, the Battalion 10 and the Intelligence Section Sergeant had regular 
contact with the Brigade intelligence section, and to a lesser extent with Division. There 
was also routine liaison with Field Security.47 The size of the Battalion Intelligence 
Section varied slightly from time to time, in part because of personnel leaving and new 
recruits coming in, and also depending on casualties suffered. Thus, 26th Battalion'S 
Intelligence Section is described as consisting of one officer, one sergeant, eleven 'ORs' 
and two drivers, one of the latter for the section's jeep and the other for the stores' pickup 
truck.48 In 1944, the same Section was under a second lieutenant, a sergeant, a corporal 
and five 'ORs' plus two drivers with a jeep and a 30 cwt truck.49 
Training consisted, in the case of Ted Ross who joined the 26th Battalion early in 
1942, of a short intelligence course at the British Army's Middle East School of 
Intelligence, another course at 26th Battalion headquarters, and a course on Aerial 
Photograph Interpretation. For Warwick Anderson and W.D. Dawson of 23rd Battalion 
reinforcements, there was a three week intelligence course at the same place from 18 
January 1943.50 
The work of the Battalion Intelligence Section was varied. 
General infonnation mainly came to us from Div. Intelligence via Brigade, 
and was passed to the CO and Company Officers by the 10 at pre-battle 
conferences. At times we briefed and de-briefed fighting or information patrols 
and the resulting information was immediately passed to the CO by word of 
mouth and to Brigade and Division by coded messages ... 51 
Practical skills came to the fore. Geoff Duff, who joined 26th Battalion's 
Intelligence Section in January 1944 in Italy noted: 
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All personnel were required to be specially skilled in all respects of map 
reading, to be able to locate and mark on a map any ground position, .... to be 
skilled in accurately enlarging any portion of a map, and to be able to interpret 
aerial photos. They had to be able to take compass bearings, both day and night, 
convert them to grid bearings and transfer them to maps and generally have a 
good sense of direction and ability to memorize landmarks and features.52 
This could sometimes involve a much closer view of the enemy than one might 
prefer. One night in April 1944, Duff recounted: 
By midnight the following night I had completed a trace of all our 
companies' dispositions which I then had to take down to Battalion HQ ... .I had to 
report to the Colonel who questioned me closely on many aspects of OUf new 
positions. One cause for concern was the lack of knowledge of the enemy's 
positions and the layout of the country beyond our forward positions. I was given 
the job of remedying this and wrote about it in a letter saying, 'At 4am before 
daylight, loaded with compass, map, protractor, binoculars, field telephone and a 
long length of telephone cable, I climbed the hill to our most forward position. 
Here I made liaison with the platoon sergeant, plugged in the cable to their 
telephone and then proceeded cautiously forward to crawl into an empty sangar 
situated on a razor back some two or three chains forward in No Man's Land. I 
had a mate, Jim Cummings, to keep me company. After testing the telephone I 
waited for daylight and then took up my watch at a peep-hole in the side of the 
sangar. I could see a lot of the enemy positions and got these plotted on my map. 
As the day wore on I saw lots of J erries and from their movements was able to 
judge their dugout positions and get these plotted. I also made a number of field 
sketches showing all these things and altogether had a busy day.' At one stage I 
directed mortar fire by means of the telephone .... on to a suspected enemy lookout 
on the crown of the hill opposite.53 
While the Battalion Intelligence Section worked on its various tasks as a unit, 
detaching personnel when necessary, on operations the Section dispersed. Ted Ross in 
26th Battalion reflected: 
... .in 1942 shortly before I was recruited into '1' work, Sgt. Ray Street. ... of 26th 
Battalion began a system of deploying members of the Section during an action. 
What happened was just prior to an action one member of the Section was sent to 
each of the rifle companies as a staff man for the Company Commander. His job 
was to assist with navigation (particularly at night), generally to assist with map 
reading, record the Company positions when their objectives had been reached, 
put this information into code and see that it was dispatched by radio or runner to 
Battalion HQ without delay. Each of these men stayed with the particular 
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Company until the action was totally completed, or when he was relieved by 
another Section member. 
Another function of these members at the various Companies was to take 
compass readings on the flashes of any gun which was annoying our particular 
area at night. These readings taken from say 3 or 4 Company positions were 
relayed to Battalion and immediately passed to the artillery for harassing fire to be 
brought down on the area indicated.54 
Each member of the Section was equipped similarly. This equipment included 
.... a prismatic compass with luminous markings for night work, a map case, small 
sheets of talc [used for map overlays], a supply of chinagraph pencils and of 
course his rifle which he was required to use when the occasion demanded. 55 
Codes were used for communication from the companies back to the Intelligence Section 
at Battalion HQ. 
With relation to codes they also changed a great deal. For instance, when 
I first joined [in 1942] the main code used was a double transposition cipher 
followed by a Codex system and ultimately replaced by Slidex, which was a much 
simpler and [more] secure code.56 
Geoff Duff recalled Section personnel 
.... had to be able to operate the simple system of codes used at battalion level, 
which were taught to them only after joining the Section. This was a precaution 
against a possible leakage of the code system. The simplest code we used, called 
Codex, consisted of a large card containing a long list of common five or six letter 
words, each of which stood for words likely to be used in messages. For 
example: DONKEY - midnight, WIGWAM - headquarters, COWBOY - shelled, 
and so on. Thus if the 'I' Sergeant at Battalion Headquarters received the 
message WIGWAM, COWBOY, DONKEY he would at once translate it from his 
card as 'HQ shelled midnight' and pass it to the duty officer. It was rather a 
clumsy method and was later superseded by a much simpler, flexible and speedier 
system called Slidex, in which the key was on separate strips which were changed 
every few days. 57 
The Battalion War Diary was another matter that concerned the Intelligence 
Section. Although the 10 was responsible for it ultimately, keeping the War Diary rested 
with the Section Sergeant, and as soon as the Battalion came out of operations the 
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Sergeant had to compile the War Diary entries which were a resume of events over the 
last few days.58 
So what was this like on operations? W.D. Dawson was a member of the 23 rd 
Battalion's Intelligence Section, joining the Battalion in early 1943. Three diary entries 
give something of the flavour of the experience, from the mundane to the risky. On the 
day of the attack by the New Zealand Division through Tebaga Gap, 26 March 1943, 
Dawson recorded: 
Spent whole day out of sight in trench, reading and listening to 
intermittent artillery, with a sinking feeling that increased as time went on, but 
seemed to disappear when attack started. Got shelled just before starting, when 
tanks came up from behind and passes [ sic] right through us. Set off at 4pm sharp 
and advanced three miles behind tanks. I had the job of counting paces (5000). 
Had my first taste of machine gun fire, and didn't like it. Struck trench full of 
Jerries on a hill, but the tanks going ahead scared them so much that they got up 
and ran downhill with their hands up ... , Reached objective before dark, occupied 
Jerry slit trench, and I had to talk to some prisoners .... 59 
A year later, Dawson's battalion was committed to the bloody March battle in 
Cassino town. Nothing could move by day in the open, and Dawson and another I 
Section member were sent in to relieve two others at Battalion HQ inside the rubble on 
24 March 1944: 
Left soon after 1 O[pm] on 2 mile walk into Cassino, in the middle of a 
barrage by our guns, and had uneventful if uncomfortable walk, with occasional 
shells landing on Montecassino above us, and a few Jerry mortars coming back on 
our left. Bn HQ was in cellar of a ruined church. On arrival I took over ciphers 
and codes from Warwick. 
Sat Mar 25. Unable to move much in daylight, as Jerry mortared our church 
regularly, and a sniper had the entrance covered .... Place a sort of catacomb, low, 
dusty, and crowded with our own and Maori Bn HQ .... 60 
In April 1945, 23 rd Battalion was in the offensive across the Senio. On the day 
the attack went in, 9 April, Dawson wrote in his diary: 
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.Busy all day getting map boards fixed up with all the details of big attack across 
Senio which was taking place that night. In early afternoon swanns of bombers 
came over and did over Jerry's positions thoroughly, and all afternoon a 
tremendous artillery barrage interspersed with air attacks went on, making things 
very noisy. Attack went in 7pm, and news of its success came drifting in, as well 
as a lot of prisoners on their way back. Questioned a few of them without 
learning much. 
Tue Apr 10. Called forward 4 am, as bridge across Senio was now firmly 
established ... My job was to guide companies across river, a 3-mile 
walk .... Evidence of effectiveness of our barrage everywhere across river ... Called 
forward [ again] in early afternoon, went forward in jeep, and had to find a place 
for Bn HQ .... had to dig in .... with fighting going on 200 yards ahead. Stayed 
there all a long weary afternoon, while 23 Bn went through and did an attack. 
Held up by Jerry tanks, which had a nasty habit of firing fast shells low over our 
heads .... [at night] I had to question some prisoners .... 
Wed Apr 11. . ... Busy afternoon preparing for another advance across Santerno in 
evening ... .I had to go up .... with a few of Bn HQ and make a tactical HQ just 
short of Santerno. Went up with Sandy Thomas [the Battalion Commander] in his 
jeep .... were fired on by a Spandau from Santerno bank on the way. Got settled in 
a house by the road leading straight up to the river, and had to make out traces of 
artillery tasks while Sandy issued orders to company commanders for immediate 
attack across Santemo .... 
Thu Apr 12. Logged progress of attack in small hours. 61 
The intelligence section shared the same risks on the battlefield as other Battalion 
personnel. Their work was of practical importance, building a picture for the Battalion 
commander and providing tactical intelligence for Brigade and Division. It was the 
lowest level of intelligence collection in the Division. 
The 2nd New Zealand Division developed an extensive net of intelligence 
sections, around seventeen in all when support units were counted. Under one divisional 
commander for most of the war, it is not surprising that by April 1945, in spite of the ups 
and downs of campaigning, the intelligence collection system had become a well-drilled 
scheme. The lOs at each level, from the G III (1) down to the Battalion 10) and their 
Intelligence Sections, existed to support the commanders at each level, Division, Brigade 
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and Battalion. Their intelligence activities focussed on tactical intelligence, although 
there were slightly wider interests by the General at the top of the tree. 
Similar arrangements applied in the under-strength 3rd New Zealand Division, a 
two-brigade group formation committed to the Solomons on Vella Lavella, the Treasuries 
and the Green Islands. The Division only committed its brigades one at a time on 
operations in its island-hopping campaign, each of the landings being a one-off operation~ 
intended to clear the islands of the Japanese. The Intelligence Sections at Division, 
Brigade and Battalion did not operate in quite the same way as those in the Middle East, 
. but this was only because of the nature of each Brigades' operations. These were 
amphibious operations and once ashore the troops were largely engaged in quite small 
actions in the jungle. There was not the same need for a constant flow of intelligence 
upwards and downwards as only part of the Division was used at anyone time. There 
was also quite close co-operation with the US forces as well. The emphasis was on 
intelligence required for particular operations, and compared with the 2nd Division in the 
Middle East, those for the 3 rd Division were few and far between. 
Reconnaissance parties were put ashore for the direct collection of intelligence at 
times. For example, Sergeant W.A. Cowan of 8th Brigade's Intelligence Section was put 
ashore on Mono Island on 22 October 1943 with an Australian coastwatcher and two 
NCOs of the Solomon Islands Defence Force to collect intelligence on the Japanese 
dispositions. He produced a valuable report assessing the Japanese strength on the island, 
and returned on the night of 26/27 October to cut Japanese telephone communications on 
the morning of the landing.6~ 
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At home, the Army's intelligence effort was somewhat different. In tenns of total 
aggregate manpower, the Home Guard on paper had a large number of intelligence 
personnel, there being nominally 137 Home Guard Battalions spread throughout the 
country.63 If there were intelligence sections for each battalion and similar sections for 
each Home Guard Group and senior command levels, there should have been over 1,000 
intelligence personnel. However, such an estimate is doubtful, as no record has been 
found of the number of extant intelligence sections. Even if each battalion had an 
intelligence section, it was unlikely to be fully staffed. 
According the War History Narrative of the Home Guard,64 each Home Guard 
Battalion theoretically had an Intelligence Officer and an Intelligence Section made up of 
one Intelligence NCO and six other ranks.65 While there were 26 Home Guard Groups 
listed, each with an Intelligence Officer slot, not all of these may have been filled. 
Numbered 1-12, some Groups were numbered, for example, as Group 7, Group 7A, 
Group 7B etc. Each Group was a locality, thus, Group 2 was Morrinsville, with Captain 
B.H. Horner as the Intelligence Officer; while Group 4 was based on Hamilton, with 
Lieutenant C.V. Vennell as IO.66 An example of how the intelligence side of a Home 
Guard Battalion operated can be seen from the Hawera Battalion, in Group area SA. The 
Battalion had three companies, with Headquarters Company based in Hawera and the 
other two in Patea and Manaia. There was an Intelligence Platoon consisting of the 10, 
Captain Rod Syme and 18 men. Training for Home Guard las was given at two courses 
• 
run by the Army in Palmerston North. Part of this included cartography of a defensive 
area for company defence.67 Home Guard intelligence centred on ensuring close 
familiarity with the local terrain. As only a small part of New Zealand had been covered 
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by the mapping section of the Lands and Survey Department at this time, Home Guard 
units were encouraged to produce detailed hand-made maps for Company areas. These 
were often of a very high standard, as the one overleaf shows.68 
A brief word may be said about some odd formations known as Home Guard 
'Guides' units, These were the Special Companies that Mawhood's Military Mission 
proposed to operate as counter-fifth column units in conjunction with the security service. 
They did not, however, cooperate with the SIB to any great extent. The 'Guides Platoons' 
according to a directive of 19 January 1942 were to be around twelve to seventeen strong. 
They appear to have been made up 'hard-bitten farmers, musterers, deer cullers and 
bushmen' . The Guide Platoons were to establish concealed hideouts and caches of 
weapons, rations, explosive and wireless sets. The Home Guard Narrative notes that 
about 100 of these units were developed. Night operations were to be a speciality, They 
had an intelligence function in that they were to obtain information on enemy intentions, 
69 h b . '}' movements and strengths for more regular units. They seem to ave een a ,CIVI Ian 
cross between commando units and straight out sabotage teams, designed to be used 
when the enemy landed in New Zealand. 
The operational intelligence focus of the Army applied equally when it came to 
security matters. During the course of the war a number of field security sections were 
raised. Two field security sections undertook security duties in the Middle East with 
regard to the main New Zealand operational formation, the 2nd New Zealand Division, 
and the base elements of 2NZEF at Maadi Camp in Egypt. 
The 2nd New Zealand Divisional Field Security Section was established in 1941 in 
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centre of attention for this Section, and its security concerns altered as the Division 
moved from place to place. The Division's great odyssey went from Greece, to Crete, to 
Egypt, into Palestine and Syria, back to Egypt, across Libya to Tunisia, and back to 
Egypt. Then it crossed to Italy, moving from Taranto to Trieste via Cassino and other 
places en route. The Divisional Field Security Section had to be adaptable, and learn to 
fit in depending on the current location. 
The 2nd New Zealand Divisional Field Security Section was formed on 20 
February 1941 at Helwan in Egypt consisting of one officer, Lieutenant N. Bancks, three 
Sergeants: H. Hyrons, G. Parker, R. Coury, and six other ranks: R. Allum, L.H. Annett, 
R.W. Cairns, N.N. Bryant, D.C. Wood and A.S Parker. The personnel came from a 
variety of backgrounds: electrical engineer, agriculturist, Wanganui Collegiate, journalist, 
bank clerk, fanner, civil servant in the East Indies, and a soldier of fortune from the 
French Foreign Legion. After a course in field security at the British Army's Field 
Security Wing and five days instructional duty at Abbassia Barracks, the personnel came 
together to fonn the Field Security Section to be attached to Divisional Headquarters.7o 
The Divisional FS Section was tossed straight into the thick of operations, moving 
with the Division to Greece. During this period, any corners were rapidly knocked off. 
Owen Wood recalled that they apprehended a peasant building fires some distance behind 
some gun positions which, by the fires' location, gave the placement of the artillery away 
to the enemy. A Greek Army intelligence officer was present while this was being dealt 
with, and simply took the peasant out the door and shot him.71 The evacuation to Crete 
brought little respite and the Field Security Section was dispersed variously around 
Galatos, and NCOs were detached to units. Owen Wood and another were sent to 22nd 
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Battalion defending Hill 107 and the airfield at Maleme. Wood was with the airfield 
company when the invasion opened on 20 May, was engaged with the paratroopers, shot 
a paratroop officer in the course of the day, and was on the end of the line of the last 
section off the perimeter of the airfield during the night. 72 Crete was a shambles, and it 
was impossible to do effective field security work. The return to Egypt was welcome, as 
it allowed a lengthy period in which routines could be properly established. 
The Divisional FS Section had particular roles which are outlined in a document 
entitled 'Employment of the Field Security Section in the Western Desert', dated 8 
October 1941. The duties of the Section in the field were concerned with the civilian 
population in the area in which the Division was operating. However, in the desert 
forward areas the lack of civilians allowed the Section to be used in support of the 
intelligence sections, such as by recovering documents.73 Captured documents were very 
important (and indeed there had been a great haul on Crete), and it was suggested that 
two FS NCOs be attached to each Brigade HQ with instructions to look for enemy 
documents when headquarters were overrun. They were also to be of assistance to the 
various lOs and Intelligence Sections. They could also look after security in the Brigade 
. h k f . 74 area and do regular securIty c ec S 0 umts. 
Moving around in the forward area dealing with enemy documents and prisoners 
could have its moments, as one FS NCO found out during Operation 'Crusader'. Having 
dropped off some enemy prisoners, a number of New Zealand troops piled into an enemy 
truck and, escorted by the FS NCO on his Matchless motorcycle, set out to find 6th 
Brigade. The Brigade had moved, but they soon the caught up with a convoy in the 
gathering gloom. The realisation dawned that these were Gennan vehicles. They slowed 
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down and eased their way out of the line of traffic, the enemy not noticing their 
presence.75 
By October 1942 there were further refinements to the activities of FS personnel 
detached to Brigades. The security duties of the FS personnel remained paramount, and 
assistance in document collection was a core task. Identification of troops needed 
checking where troops were directing traffic. There was a whole list of instructions to be 
carried out when entering a town or village. The telephone system was to be 
disconnected, and signal sections should assist the FS in locating civilians operating 
transmitting sets. A list of inhabitants needed to be obtained from the local authority. A 
proclamation was to be issued forbidding all movement in or out of the area, and any 
persons apprehended who were blacklisted were to be sent to 308 POW cage. It was 
noted that while Arabs would inform on Italians and Italians on Arabs, little advantage 
could be taken of this because of the lack of time spent in anyone locality. The FS 
d 76 personnel were also to look out for enemy eserters. 
As the Division mounted its 1942 -1943 offensive against the Axis forces in the 
desert, the Divisional FS Section found itself from time to time doing different things. In 
Tripoli from 24 to 30 January they were given port security duties, to check entry and 
passes to the port area. This was punctuated by the CO, Lieutenant Nathan, being 
severely wounded 'by a bomb presumably thrown through his bedroom window.,77 
The security of information, the security of material, relations between troops and 
civilians, the problem of rumours, enemy prisoners and security in towns remained the 
focus of the FS Section. An FS report on 4 April 1943 noted that on 28 March a sheet of 
paper which had fallen from a 2nd NZ Division vehicle contained full details in 
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handwriting of the present operation, including its objective, method of attack, the units 
taking part, the air cover, artillery support, supporting troops and the time of the attack. 78 
This referred to the Tebaga Gap battle that had just taken place. The same report noted a 
list of stolen material recovered, rumours (all relatively positive), the wandering of Arabs 
into the New Zealand lines, enemy documents recovered, the handling of POWs, and 
problems encountered in the villages of Gabes and EI Hamma. The move of the New 
Zealand Division to Italy involved the FS Section in more of the same work, although 
clearly the larger population and access to alcohol posed different problems. 
The New Zealand Base Field Security Section was located in Maadi Camp, and 
its role was to secure the base area of 2NZEF in the Middle East. The usual aspects of 
field security in a static location applied: security of information, security of personnel, 
security of material, security of operations, the morale of troops and the relations between 
civilians and military personnel. The Base FS Section had a strength of around 11 or 12 
personnel. Made up of an officer, a Warrant Officer, seven other NCOs and three 
privates in July 1942, the Section covered Maadi Camp, with a detachment out at Tura 
Caves. Weekly Reports were produced on the security work. On 4 July 1942, for 
instance the range of matters included the following. 79 Troops still failed to appreciate the 
importance of not talking about military matters in front of civilians, particularly in the 
'recent crisis' - it was thought Rommel was going to break through to Cairo. Military 
movements with the front so close were difficult to conceal from the civilian population. 
There were rumours that the British and the Americans had landed in the Germans' rear, 
and also that 2NZEF was returning to New Zealand. Pass checks of military and civilians 
continued; telephone security was very poor, and there were worries about labour unrest 
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among the local population with enemy propaganda in circulation. It was noted In 
general that 
Events during the past week produced an immediate state of restrained 
panic among certain sections of the civilian population. This section could be 
classed as ex-GERMAN refugees, members of the local JEWISH population and 
others who have been giving active support to the British cause, all of whom 
would certainly have found themselves in danger in the event of an AXIS 
occupation ... 
The beginning of the crisis was marked by an increased antipathy towards 
the BRITISH, but at the most critical stage when an AXIS occupation loomed up 
as a possible reality there was a definite swing back in favour of the BRITISH 
even by many who were regarded as pro-AXIS. 
On the night of 2/3 July AXIS propaganda leaflets were distributed in 
many areas including CAIRO, MAADI, HAW AMDIYA and other nearby 
'II 80 VI ages '" 
A year later things had settled down considerably and base security was relatively 
quiet. The name of the FS Section at Maadi had changed for deception purposes to 6th 
New Zealand Divisional Field Security Section.81 The Weekly Security Report for 4 June 
1943 divided into Military Security, Morale, and four Zones covered by the Section: 
Maadi Camp, Mena Garrison, Sigla Garrison and TUfa Garrison. Under Military Security 
concern was raised about the leakage of information, in particular foreknowledge of the 
arrival of New Zealand reinforcements, careless talk about equipment, and insecure 
phone calls. Fires had been frequent around Tura, a pistOl had been stolen, and a certain 
cargo had been landed at Port Said 'under proper supervision.' Morale among the troops 
remained high although the behaviour of New Zealand troops towards women in the 
street and other complaints of assault left a lot to be desired. The administration of 
security measures at the different Zones was adequate, although there were problems at 
Tura with illegal entry, and it was noted that in future intruders would be summarily shot. 
The FS Section's strength remained at ten with an officer in command, eight being based 
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at Maadi and one each at Mena and Tura. A number personnel had been serving with the 
Section for quite some time.82 
The FS Sections in the Middle East had a more active time than those sections 
established in New Zealand in 1942. The initial titles for the latter sections were the 
Northern Divisional Field Security Section, the Central Divisional FS Section and the 
Southern Divisional FS Section. These were subsequently altered to 1 Field Security 
Section, 2 FS Section and 3 FS Section. Not a great deal went on with the first two 
sections, but the South Island unit recorded a considerable amount of activity in the 3 
FSS War Diary. There was a fair amount of co-operation with the Police and the SIB on 
occasion. 
Nothing much happened to 1 FS Section in Northland. In July 1942, for instance, 
a number of lights were reported out to sea at different times, an investigation on 6 July 
was made into a submarine sighting report between Pakiri River and Goat Island by a 
farmer at Leigh, a missing file return was looked into, and a course was run for a sub-
section.s3 The theft of petrol and the security of documents were among the activities 
recorded in November; and petrol was stolen by the FSS from 1 Brigade Headquarters at 
night to test security, which was indeed wanting. In the following months, activity 
wound down. In July 1943 1 FS Section was involved in looking into a fire at Albany 
Hall and giving two security talks to 10th Reinforcements at Papakura. The Section was 
disbanded on 31 July 1943.84 
4 FS Section had a more interesting time. Raised in Hamilton for service with 3rd 
New Zealand Division, the unit went to New Caledonia in late November 1942, where it 
was engaged in routine security duties. When the Division moved up into the Solomons, 
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4 FS Section deployed from time to time as an infantry patrol under the Section 
commander, Lieutenant D. Lawford, on an island off Vella LaveIla, and later on Sirot 
Island.8s 
The FS Sections had a necessary but unglamorous role, for much security work 
was preventive and therefore negative. Even non-involvement could have its moments. 
A detachment from the New Zealand Base FS Section under WO Nat Cohen was detailed 
for protection duties for Lord Mayne. His Lordship decided he did not need the New 
Zealand FS detail and dispensed with their services. He was assassinated that day by 
. Jewish terrorists. 86 That aside, the FS Sections served an important purpose for the units 
deployed overseas. They worked in well with the Intelligence Sections to the benefit of 
both sides of the intelligence coin. 
One further activity deserves a brief mention. An Interrogation unit served with 
the 2nd New Zealand Division in the Middle East and in Italy under Captain Heywood, a 
British officer. Quite a good deal of useful intelligence was collected from enemy 
prisoners, and the Field Security and Intelligence Sections were also involved in this task. 
In New Zealand, the interrogation of enemy prisoners took a couple of interesting 
turns. The first was that at the end of July 1942 the RAN DNI brought up the topic of a 
Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre (or CSDIC) for Brisbane in a letter to 
the DNI in Wellington.B7 A New Zealand Chiefs of Staff paper in July put forward the 
idea that a CSDIC should be established in New Zealand.88 The Army was against this 
move, pointing out that such a Centre would be expensive to run, and that there was a 
lack of skilled interpreters who would be essential to make it work. The Anny argued 
solidly against the CSDIC again in October, just after the POW camp at Featherston had 
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been set up in September.89 On 29 October, the Chiefs of Staff made a decision that a 
CSDIC should not be established in New Zealand on the grounds of lack of interpreters 
and the feeling that such an organisation would not do any good against Japanese 
prisoners.9o Although a CSDIC was not set up, the function was carried out for a time. 
A quite sizeable number of Japanese prisoners were captured in the Solomons, 
passed through American hands in New Caledonia and were sent on to Featherston. A 
proportion of these were Japanese marines. One of the naval officers from the COlC in 
Wellington visited Featherston in November. The Japanese prisoners interrogated there 
proved willing to talk fairly openly. This was in part because they had no training in how 
to behave when captured, as it was not envisaged that they would find themselves in that 
position. The other factor may have been that by quietly encouraging them to brag about 
their forces, a certain amount could be learned. At least this was how it appeared to 
Lieutenant V. Jaynes of the COIC. 91 
Much earlier a Special Intelligence signal of 12 February 1942 had come from the 
Captain on the Staff, Colombo. It concerned the C.in C. Combined Fleet. 
IMPORTANT 
Naval Special Intelligence dated lih February. C. in C. Combined Fleet 
transfers his flag to Y AMATO at OIOOZ/lth• Comment. No record of 
Y AMATO. May be new battleship. 
0707Z/13 92 
The Yamato had turned up repeatedly sInce then. However, when Jaynes was 
interrogating Japanese prisoners at Featherston with the help of the Camp interpreter, he 
unearthed the following small item. According to him, 
The most significant thing that came out of these [interrogations] was that 
we interrogated a Chief Petty Officer who had seen the battleship Yamato, and he 
told us she was armed with I8-inch guns .... He drew a silhouette of the battleship 
and told us of its armament. ... 93 
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The gun size was significant, for it was not known she mounted such guns, larger than 
those on any Allied battleship. There was a little contretemps as a result of this 
interrogation. The Americans expressed concern that something new could be found. 
According to a memorandum from the Deputy Chief of Naval Staff to the Secretary ONS 
on 1 December, it was observed that 
Recently the first Japanese Naval prisoners of war have arrived in New 
Zealand and were interrogated by a New Zealand Naval Officer at the Prisoners 
of War Camp, Featherston. In this connection one or two points have arisen 
which seem to need clarification particularly as regards the previous interrogation 
carried out by United States Authorities, and what infonnation, if any, is required 
by the U.S. Authorities from the interrogation carried out in New Zealand.94 
There was quite a bit of huffing and puffing about all this, and it does seem that later on 
after the riot at Featherston the Navy was excluded from interrogating prisoners, at least 
for a time.95 There were in fact some quite useful interrogations of POWs conducted at 
Featherston. 
The Army's efforts in intelligence were most effective where they were connected 
with operational units. It is obvious that the great bulk of Army intelligence collection 
went on in the 2nd New Zealand Division in the Mediterranean theatre. After 
concentrating in Greece in 1941, the Division remained in theatre until the end of 
hostilities, operating in the Greece and Crete, the Western Desert campaign and the 
Italian campaign. A great deal of cohesion in intelligence collection was developed in the 
2nd Division over the course of the war. The Division's intelligence set-up was an 
example of good practice in the collection, analysis and dissemination of operational 
intelligence. The movement of information up and down between the different levels in 
the Division was very important for the effective execution of operational plans based on 
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good intelligence. It is also a commentary on the professional application of the 
intelligence personnel. 
While the security intelligence of the Field Security Sections by its very nature 
doomed them to a less spectacular war, nevertheless they functioned usefully in the 
Middle East. The Section deployed with 3rd New Zealand Division was not so useful on 
the surface, but then the nature of island-hopping operations, and the fact that it was 
always deployed on islands, made its work much easier. That it could take on infantry 
tasks suggests that once operations were underway in the islands, there was little role for 
the usual business of the Field Security Section. 
The Field Security Sections in New Zealand did not have a great deal to do, apart 
from co-operating with the police and the SIB on internal security from time to time. 
Once the war moved north, they were wound up quickly. The Home Guard had 
potentially the largest intelligence organisation in New Zealand, but the intelligence 
sections were locally focussed, and their usefulness was never put to the operational test. 
The preparation of detailed local maps filled a gap for contingency planning. 
Intelligence and security for the Army had an operational focus with most effort 
expended in support of the largest Army fonnations in the field. The Army adopted a 
practical approach to intelligence and security that paid off in the operational and tactical 
context. 
Chapter Fourteen 
Air Force Intelligence 
As the most junior of the three services, the Royal New Zealand Air Force was 
very small to begin with, and it is perhaps not unexpected that intelligence was not 
regarded as a priority area. A substantial amount of time passed before any progress was 
made in the area of air intelligence, and that was quite rudimentary to begin with. Yet by 
August 1945, the RNZAF's air intelligence organisation was well enough regarded for 
the Allies to contemplate a significant role for it in the coming final offensive against 
Japan. This was quite a shift for a service intelligence organisation that began the war 
with just one intelligence officer. 
RNZAF intelligence falls into two periods of development. The first ran from the 
outbreak of the war in 1939 through to the end of 1942, which might be tenned the slow 
period. There were changes that took place towards the end of that time that led into the 
more hectic second period of growth. From 1943 to the end of hostilities, air intelligence 
had an increasingly important operational role in support of the New Zealand fighter, 
dive bomber and light bomber squadrons in the Solomons. In contrast to the RNZN's 
intelligence effort which declined towards the end of the war, RNZAF intelligence 
reached its peak in the same span. Air intelligence had become an important integral 
component for this small air force operating inside the large Allied air umbrella in the 
Pacific islands. 
The period 1939 to the end of 1942 is considered first: the early development of 
RNZAF intelligence and the signposted directions leading into an increasing commitment 
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from 1943 onwards. Thirty months of continuous change from 1943 to August 1945 is 
dealt with subsequently, completing the contribution of the RNZAF to the New Zealand 
intelligence scene. Finally, an assessment is made of the effectiveness and utility of 
RNZAF air intelligence. 
There was only a nod in the direction of intelligence when the Royal New 
Zealand Air Force was established on 1 April 1937. That day, Flight Lieutenant A. deT. 
Nevill became 'Staff Officer Air Staff and Intelligence', the RNZAF's sole intelligence 
officer. This modest beginning for RNZAF intelligence was to be cut short as Nevill's 
intelligence duties were to lapse after five months.1 In September 1937, an Anny officer, 
Major C.W. Free, MC, was seconded to the Air Department for a year. During this time 
he represented the Air Department on the Combined Intelligence Committee and other 
ONS committees.2 He was replaced by Squadron Leader E.M.F. Grundy in late 1938. 
Grundy, as seen earlier, was associated with the moves towards forming a combined 
intelligence organisation. He was appointed to the Air Staff as Air I, responsible for 
operations and operational training in 1939.3 
After the outbreak of war in 1939, Flight Lieutenant J.D. Canning became the first 
wartime Air Force intelligence officer, rather by accident. Appointed to the Air Staff as 
Air II, he was responsible for intelligence and security.4 At this time, those duties 
included the collection and reading of intelligence reports, keeping intelligence records, 
the preparation and issuing of intelligence summaries, a range of security matters 
(sabotage, subversion, vital point security, internal Air Force measures), liaison with 
Army and Naval Intelligence, the SIB, and RNZAF stations, and the Police Department, 
as well as writing up the War Diary.5 He was given the title of Air Intelligence 1 or A.I.1 
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for his position in the Combined Intelligence Bureau. As the only RNZAF intelligence 
officer extant, he represented the Air Force in the Combined Intelligence Bureau. His 
main role was to collect information on flying-boat landing areas and aerodromes in the 
Pacific Islands. 6 The Air Force contribution to the combined intelligence organisation 
was slight to begin with. 
It was not until 22 August 1941 that a second Air Force intelligence officer was 
appointed to the Combined Intelligence Bureau. This was Pilot Officer T.G. Tyrer, a 
journalist, who was now designated Air Intelligence l(a). Initially his tasks involved 
mainly reading intelligence publications, mostly from the Navy, and getting familiar with 
geography in the Pacific.7 He also had security duties, which entailed liaison with the 
newly created SIB. It has been observed that the Chief of Air Staff, Air Commodore 
H.W.L. Saunders, had his doubts about the Director of the SIB, Major Folkes. Saunders 
told Tyrer to report to him direct if there was any trouble. As it turned out, no problems 
arose in liaison with the SIB.s A third officer, Flying Officer R.S. Grant, posted to the 
RNZAF headquarters in Fiji, was to liaise with naval and army intelligence officers in 
Suva to form a small Combined Intelligence Bureau in 1941. Just two air intelligence 
officers in Wellington and another one in Suva were, however, not going to amount to 
much. 
In October 1941 Air Commodore R.V. Goddard replaced Saunders as the Chief of 
Air Staff. Goddard had been involved in air intelligence at the Air Ministry in London 
from 1937 to 1939, and took an interest in the fledgling RNZAF intelligence. On 20 
March 1942 Goddard wrote to the Minister of Defence outlining his plans for the 
development of the RNZAF Air Staff. On the subject of intelligence, he wrote: 
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The function of Intelligence is, in cooperation with other Services, to 
represent, as far as possible, the Air Staff of the enemy. That is to say, the head of 
Intelligence should view the war from the stand-point of the head of enemy air 
operations, basing his opinions on the knowledge of enemy organization, 
personnel, tactics and equipment. From a study of these and past actions in 
relation to enemy national policy, he should deduce the future actions of the 
enemy, his strength and weakness. Intelligence Branch is also responsible for 
security matters.9 
This was a fairly clear statement of the objects of air intelligence. Only by 
familiarity with the enemy could headway be made. This was easier said than done. 
More intelligence personnel were obviously required. 
In mid-1942 Pilot Officer Tyrer was able to concentrate on intelligence duties full 
time with the arrival of three New Zealand officers recently returned from Singapore. 
These were Flight Lieutenant W.M. Brown, Pilot Officer C. Zimmerman and Pilot 
Officer L.A. Amodeo. Zimmerman and Brown took over the security duties, while 
Amodeo joined Tyrer with intelligence. lO Other officers followed, including Flying 
Officer P.T.Curran and Pilot Officer H.W. Brady, who had been a bank official in 
Singapore. Born in Japan, Brady had also worked for the Hong Kong Shanghai Bank in 
Japan. As he spoke Japanese he became the RNZAF intelligence expert for Japan.l1 
Flight Lieutenant Canning was now the Staff Officer (Intelligence) for the RNZAF, with 
a staff of six intelligence officers and two security officers who worked in the Combined 
Operational Intelligence Centre and the Air Staff. 12 
The intelligence duties of the Air Force officers in the COlC were redistributed in 
the following way. The senior intelligence officer, Air Intelligence I (A.I. - Canning), 
looked after the direction and administration of air intelligence in the COIC, and liaised 
with his Army and Navy counterparts, along with Censorship and the SIB. He was 
responsible for the War Diary and for operational intelligence. A.I.1 (Curran) was to 
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produce weekly air intelligence summaries, look at foreign aircraft performance and 
bomb and gas intelligence, the Japanese Order of Battle and air tactics. A.I.2 (Porter) 
was to keep records of all aircraft passing in and out of New Zealand airspace, amend 
maps and circulate current operational 'hot' intelligence, and keep updated infromation 
on airfields in New Zealand and Fiji. A.I.3 (Tyrer) was responsible for silhouettes of 
aircraft and ships, intelligence from photographs, and keeping the War Diary. A.1.4 was 
to compile operational information on the Pacific Islands and Australasia, and distribute 
operational intelligence. A.LID (Morton) focussed on security precautions, censorship 
control, police liaison and the issuing ofpasses.13 
The RNZAF itself was expanding rapidly. Three new Group Headquarters, 
Northern Group, Central and Southern were established in mid-1942, and an air 
intelligence officer was appointed to each. Flying Officer Curran went to Northern 
Group; Flight Lieutenant P.E Laughton-Bramley, an experience RAP intelligence officer 
on loan, went to Central Group; and Squadron Leader Tony Lester to Southern Group. 
Central Group was disbanded in October 1943.14 
To begin with, there was no formal training of air intelligence officers. The 
appointment of Intelligence Officer in the squadrons before 1942 simply fell to an 
aircrew member, who just added it to his normal duties. I5 The first RNZAF intelligence 
course seems to have been conducted over a twenty day period in July 1942. Two 
'Operations' courses were held in September-October and October-November 1942, 
attended by intelligence officers. Another intelligence course, the Photographic 
Interpretation and Intelligence Course, was held in January 1943.
16 
In spite of a slow 
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start, there was a steady stream of intelligence officers recruited by the RNZAF from 
1943 to the end of the war. 
The first two RNZAF Squadron Intelligence Officers appointed to squadrons from 
outside were sent in November 1942 to No.3 Bomber Reconnaissance Squadron at 
Guadalcanal and No.9 BR Squadron on New Caledonia. They were Pilot Officer R.O. 
Lund, editor of the Southland Times, and Pilot Officer J.E.L. Baldwin, a patent attorney. 
Lund made an impression on Guadalcanal on the morning of 8 February 1943. The US 
intelligence interpretation of the presence of a number of abandoned Japanese barges 
found floating was that more Japanese reinforcements had arrived on Guadalcanal. Lund 
argued instead that an evacuation had taken place, or otherwise the barges would have 
been up on the beaches. He was able, in spite of being a very junior officer, to convince 
COMAIRSOLS (Commander Air Forces Solomons) that he was correct at the morning 
briefing. This appears to have been the first intelligence assessment that the Japanese had 
been evacuating troops, and events over the next days proved Lund to be correct. The US 
commanders were impressed with Lund. 17 
The first period from 1939 to the end of 1942 had been marked by a distinct lack 
of progress in the area of air intelligence, until Goddard became CAS in October 1941. 
In one sense this is somewhat surprising in view of the difficulties encountered with the 
searches for raiders in New Zealand waters, a large number of which were conducted by 
aircraft. Indeed, as has already been seen, the coastwatching system was shored up by air 
patrols. It might have been thought that air intelligence was a little more important than 
the attention accorded it up to October 1941. The new CAS, the onset of the war with 
Japan and the great underlining of New Zealand and Australia's absolute vulnerability 
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proved to be powerful stimuli for action. During 1942 the seeds were sown for a more 
substantial thrust in air intelligence. As more RNZAF squadrons were committed in 
1943 and 1944 to operations in the forward area, so the requirement for good operational 
intelligence had its effect in the expansion of air intelligence. 
This second period of the expansion of air intelligence from 1943 to 1945 was 
littered with changes as the circumstances and requirements altered. It is during this time 
that the RNZAF intelligence organisation reached its peak in numbers of personnel and 
importance. 
On 22 February 1943, a memorandum entitled 'AIR DEPARTMENT 
REORGANISATION' signified changes to the RNZAF's contribution to the COIC. At 
this time, it was decided that the Air Force intelligence section of the COle would 
function separately from the Navy and the Army, although liaison would continue. The 
COIC would cease to figure in Air Force intelligence products as such, and a COle (Air) 
Operational Intelligence Bulletin would henceforth be called the RNZAF Intelligence 
IH Bulletin. 
Much later in 1943, Flight Lieutenant Amodeo suggested to the Deputy Chief of 
Air Staff (DCAS) that the efficiency of air intelligence would be improved if the position 
of Staff Officer (Intelligence) at the Air Department in Wellington and that of Staff 
Officer (Intelligence) in No.1 (Islands) Group were rotated between the two officers 
every four months. After the first rotation both officers would be fully familiar with the 
situation in both the Air Department and in the forward area. Amodeo recommended that 
he should replace Flight Lieutenant Tyrer at No.1 (Islands) Group, and Tyrer become 
h . d 19 Staff Officer (Intelligence) at the Air Department for the four mont peno . 
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On 24 April 1944 a major report on the state and functions of RNZAF intelligence 
was promulgated?O By this time air intelligence had grown substantially. The strength of 
the RNZAF Intelligence organisation was now thirty-eight officers. At least ten 
intelligence officers were based in New Zealand: five at the Air Department and one at 
each of the RNZAF Stations of Ohakea, New Plymouth, Ardmore and Whenuapai. In 
No.1 (Islands) Group there were three at Headquarters, an intelligence staff officer at 
COMAIRSOLS Headquarters, one officer at RNZAF Headquarters in Suva, one at the 
Base Depot on Espiritu Santo and one at the RNZAF Station at Guadalcanal. There was 
one intelligence officer on the strength of each of seventeen RNZAF squadrons. The 
average age of the intelligence officers was 33 years, and their selection had been largely 
based on their civilian occupations, quite a few from law and journalism?1 
Amodeo's rotation scheme had expanded with pairing between intelligence posts 
on a six monthly rotation. Thus, the three intelligence officers from the Air Department 
(the Staff Officer (Intelligence) and his two assistants) changed with the equivalent three 
officers at No.1 (Islands) Group Headquarters. The intelligence officer at Northern 
Group Headquarters exchanged with the intelligence officer from the RNZAF Fighter 
Wing in the islands. The Station Intelligence Officer at RNZAF Ardmore rotated with 
the Headquarters Intelligence Officer, RNZAF Fighter Wing. And so on.22 This ensured 
that all RNZAF Intelligence Officers had recent overseas operational experience no 
matter where they were posted. 
The RNZAF Air Intelligence Section at the Air Department was an intelligence 
organisation for the Air Staff. As such it was responsible for the collation and 
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distribution of intelligence from No.1 (Islands) Group, the US Navy, the US Marine 
Corps, and the US Army, and from American and British intelligence organisations.23 
There were five intelligence publications produced by the Air Intelligence 
Section. These were an Intelligence Digest, an Intelligence Summary, Intelligence 
Memoranda, Japanese Pamphlets and 'RNZAF Readiness'. The RNZAF Intelligence 
Digest was a secret weekJy review of operations over the last week in the South Pacific , 
along with some background intelligence. It was designed to be used for briefing 
purposes for aircrew being sent to the forward area.24 The fortnightly RNZAF 
. Intelligence Summary, graded' Secret' was limited to officers and aircrew. Divided into 
three sections, it covered a review of South Pacific operations, the modifications and 
changes in enemy equipment, and general intelligence.25 RNZAF Intelligence 
Memoranda were published from time to time, either as secret or confidential documents. 
They were for operational aircrew but were too long for either the Intelligence Summary 
or the Intelligence Bulletin.26 A fortnightly series of RNZAF Japanese Pamphlets graded 
'Secret' were limited in distribution to operational aircrew. They were compiled from 
POW reports and captured enemy documents and covered background intelligence not 
dealt with in the other summaries and bulletins.27 The monthly (RNZAF Readiness' was 
published with the widest circulation among all ranks for general 'informative spare time 
reading,.28 Aircraft and ship recognition training for operational units also became a 
responsibility of the Air Intelligence Section of the Air Department. 
On all the operational RNZAF Stations in New Zealand there was a Station 
Intelligence Officer, and each Squadron had its own Intelligence Officer (as did the 
Operational Training Units). Apart from lectures on intelligence at the OTUs, each 
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Squadron or Station Intelligence Section had an Intelligence Library containing large-
scale maps of South Pacific areas, plus target maps and air photographs of main bases. 
The Intelligence Section at Northern Group Headquarters kept an eye on and supported 
the work of the Intelligence Officers on all Stations in New Zealand.29 
In the forward area, the air intelligence set-up was more comprehensive. The 
Intelligence Section at No.1 (Islands) Group Headquarters, now located at Guadalcanal, 
looked over and directed the work of all RNZAF Intelligence Officers in the South 
Pacific. In addition to distributing intelligence from the Air Department in Wellington 
. and Allied intelligence organisations, No.1 Group Intelligence produced the RNZAF 
Intelligence Bulletin. This publication consisted of tactical intelligence of immediate 
operational use as it came to hand, and was produced usually twice a week. It was 
distributed to all RNZAF operational units in the South Pacific, graded either secret or 
confidential depending on its contents. It provided the latest intelligence on Japanese 
aircraft types, equipment and performance, along with relevant extracts from RNZAF and 
Allied combat and mission reports, with details of enemy tactics.3D 
Liaison with Commander Air Forces South Pacific (COMAIRSOPAC), 
Commander Air Forces Solomons (COMAIRSOLS) Intelligence, the RAN 
coastwatching organisation, and the intelligence arm of the US 13th Anny Air Force was 
carried out by No.1 Group Intelligence. To this end a RNZAF Intelligence Officer was 
attached to the COMAIRSOLS staff.3J There was considerable contact with USAAF, US 
Marine Corps and US Naval intelligence organisations in the Solomons. 
The RNZAF Fighter Wing based at Torokina airfield on Bougainville 
commanded four squadrons of fighters. Aircraft numbers operating off Torokina varied at 
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times. When another airstrip at Piva was evacuated because of Japanese artillery fire, 
there were aircraft from sixteen squadrons operating from Torokina for abaut a week in 
March. Later in June there would be three RNZAF squadrons and one USAAF squadron. 
In April 1944 the Fighter Wing consisted of two RNZAF squadrons, a US Navy 
squadron and a USAAF squadron. The Combined Fighter Intelligence, Torokina, was 
run by the senior RNZAF Intelligence Officer, Flight Lieutenant Curran, with the 
assistance of three US intelligence officers. Briefings for combined strikes was carried 
out by Combined Fighter Intelligence, which also collated and distributed Combat and 
Strike Reports received from the Squadron Intelligence Officers (these were then passed 
on ta COMAlRSOLS intelligence). An RNZAF Fighter Wing Intelligence Section was 
also run to coordinate intelligence far RNZAF squadrons operating through Torokina, 
and maintain the Library with displayed up-to-date target iniormation.32 
Curran's outline of the role of the intelligence sections of the fighter wing on 
Torokina in 1944 summarises their duties. The squadron intelligence section had the dual 
role of briefing pilots prior to sorties, and passing the results of air operations to higher 
authority. Intelligence provided adequate information for operations, and guided the 
squadron intelligence officers when debriefing returned aircrew. Both oral and written 
evaluations were passed to Air Command. Reports requiring urgent action were phoned 
through to Fighter Command, and from June 1944 by phone and teletype links to 
COMAIRSOLs. The scope of these concerned operations reports, downed aircrew 
locations, enemy sightings and other emergencies. The intelligence sections also sent 
weekly reports on squadron operations to Fighter Command and COMAIRSOLs. These 
detailed flying hours and daily averages for a variety of missions, from routine patrols to 
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direct offensive operations. They gave weekly squadron statistics on pilot and aircraft 
availability, loss returns, aircrew lost, missing or rescued, plus monthly assessments of 
squadron losses. The intelligence section was responsible for delivering a series of 
publications, from intelligence summaries to maps. Command orders and other material 
received by teletype were mounted on a dispatch board under headings, including enemy 
sightings, shipping, rescues, and weather. Target and flying briefs were prepared by the 
Torokina Intelligence Officers, who kept close touch with other intelligence units. Oral 
and written briefings, maps, photographs passed intelligence to aircrew, while current 
daily plots were maintained on the location of shipping, enemy sightings, NA batteries 
and the state of targets.33 
The two RNZAF Squadron Intelligence Officers at Torokina acted as Operations 
Officers as well as running small intelligence sections. They worked very long hours 
based in the Squadron Readiness Huts during the two months' tour of duty on 
B "11 14 ougamvl e: The pilots of each Squadron were briefed and interrogated by the 
Squadron Intelligence Officer in the normal way with each operation. 
The duties of Squadron Intelligence Officers varied, as did their routine. A 
Summary of Duties of the Intelligence Officer of No.1 Squadron for December 1944 on 
Green Island noted that daily hours were not easy to establish. Operating Ventura light 
bombers, the hours on duty might be just four or twenty, depending on the operations in 
progress. The Intelligence Officer at No.1 Squadron was to maintain the crew room and 
keep the intelligence material from all sources up-to-date. Information needed to be 
collated for future operations. All crews for routine flights had to be briefed, and a 
supply of maps and route manuals kept ready. The Intelligence Officer was to help 
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decide targets and obtain information on them. Material had to be prepared for 
operations briefings, and the Intelligence Officer briefed the crews. Constant liaison with 
Allied squadrons needed to be preserved especially when combined strikes were made. 
Crews returning from routine and bombing operations had to be debriefed. The results of 
those interrogations had to be sent immediately to Air Intelligence. The Intelligence 
Officer had to be there at take-off for all strike and important operations, ready to assist 
with any detail. The Squadron Operations Book (Form 541) and the Squadron History 
(Form 540) was kept by the Intelligence Officer, and the Squadron's Weekly Operational 
Summary was prepared by him. The Intelligence Officer was also the Photographic 
Officer. On every third morning he was to take over the Squadron Operations Watch at 
0130 hours in return for assistance given by the Operations Officer.35 
A routine day at Emirau in December 1944 for the Intelligence Officer of an 
RNZAF fighter squadron began with him being woken at 0400 hours. At 0430 the 
Intelligence Officer would go by jeep with the Met Officer to the Army Weather post 
some two and a half miles away, then call at Air Intelligence Command to find out where 
the fighter patrols would drop their bombs etc. He then headed to the New Zealand 
Signals Office to collect copies of signals received in the night, and returned to the Army 
Weather post to collect the Met Officer. By just after 0500 hours, the Intelligence Officer 
would be in his office reading and filing signals for use in briefing the early sortie. At 
0530, the dawn patrol was briefed, and from 0615 to 0700 briefings were carried out for 
the search patrols. At 0830, a briefing for the strike operation took place. At 0930, the 
returning dawn patrol would be interrogated, and an hour later the strike mission also 
debriefed. From 1145 to around 1215 the search patrols were debriefed. Shipping and 
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truck spotting operations were briefed at 1300, and they were interrogated on their return 
at around 1515. The briefing for the dusk patrol was done at 1545. At 1815, the 
Intelligence Officer went to the New Zealand Signals Office, collected signals and 
awaited the return of the dusk patrol. The dusk patrol debriefed, one copy of their 
intelligence and any others not already sent were despatched to Air Operations. The 
"Daisy" signal was prepared, and briefing notes checked and readied for next morning. 
At around 2015, the Intelligence Officer went to Air Operations with a copy of the last 
report, and called at the Signals Office to send the "Daisy" signa1.36 The Squadron 
Intelligence Officer's lot was quite demanding in the forward area. It was an important 
role on which the aircrew depended to successfully prosecute operations. 
There were two RNZAF squadrons operating Grumman Avengers from 
Bougainville under the operational command of COMAIRSOLS Strike Command. 
There were two groups of three squadrons, one RNZAF, one US Navy and one US 
Marines in each group. The Intelligence Officers were pooled to carry out their duties. 
All briefings were done by Strike Command officers, while interrogation of pilots 
returning and the compilation of Strike Reports were carried out by the Duty Intelligence 
Officers who dealt with crews from any squadron as they came in.37 
There were three RNZAF Bomber Reconnaissance Squadrons in the forward area. 
One operated from Fiji. Another was based at Espiritu Santo in the New Hebrides for 
shipping escort and anti-submarine patrols under US operational control. The Squadron's 
own Intelligence Section did all briefing and interrogation of aircrew. The third 
Squadron was at Munda where it operated with seven US squadrons, sharing a Combined 
Intelligence Section, although most briefings and interrogations were done by the 
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Squadron Intelligence Officers?8 The RNZAF Catalina Squadron at Halavo on Florida 
Island had an advanced flight of four aircraft at Treasury Island. The US forces handled 
intelligence for the Treasury flight, while the Squadron Intelligence Section operated as 
normal at Halavo.39 
In addition to the wide liaison with the US forces in the Solomons, eight US 
intelligence publications were routinely circulated to all operational RNZAF units, while 
terrain studies, air photographs and target maps were provided by US intelligence 
organisations.40 Unsurprisingly, information on survival was another important feature of 
air intelligence in the South Pacific, and the RNZAF produced its own manual on the 
subject and a variety of other bulletins and pamphlets as well. Apart from 'Survival Hints 
for Aircrew', these included 'Pidgin English Statement for Natives', 'Notes for Aircrew 
Down in Jungle', 'The Raft Book' and 'Food is Where You Find it.' 41 
The emphasis for RNZAF intelligence in 1944 centred on the requirements of the 
operational squadrons. On 30 May 1944 a reshuffle of tasks among the Intelligence 
Officers of the Air Intelligence Section at the Air Department in Wellington reflected 
this core focus. 4:: The Staff Officer (Intelligence) still had the same role, that of 
supervision and oversight of the RNZAF Intelligence Section, the recording, co-
ordination, appreciation and distribution of enemy intelligence, and liaison with the other 
Services. A.1.1 was concerned with the distribution of intelligence to operational units 
and Groups and to the Air Staff, as well as looking after the Air Intelligence filing system 
and the sorting of inward correspondence. A.I.2 was the Narrative Officer for the 
briefings in the Central War Room. He looked after the enemy order of battle, enemy 
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airfields, target maps and charts, and liaised with the Navy's 'Y' Intelligence 
organisation.43 
A.I.3 deputized as Narrative Officer for the Central War Room, but his prime 
responsibility was the production of the RNZAF Intelligence Digest, the RNZAF 
Japanese Pamphlets, the RNZAF Intelligence Memoranda and the RNZAF 'Readiness' 
bulletins. A.I.4 was concerned with aircraft and ship recognition training, the collation of 
performance data on Japanese aircraft and weapons, and the compilation of lecture notes 
on those subjects. Each of the Intelligence Officers spent part of each day keeping 
abreast of current trends and developments in air intelligence publications. A.I.S and 
A.I.6 were a filing clerk and typist respectively.44 The Section was also responsible for 
the production of the Air Intelligence section of the COIC Daily Summary produced each 
day for the Chiefs of Staff, the Prime Minister and the Governor-Genera1.45 It will be 
recalled that by 1944 most of the COIC Daily Summaries were taken up with air 
intelligence material.46 
In January 1945 further changes were made. The Staff Officer (Intelligence), 
Squadron Leader Amodeo, had his usual role. A.I.l, Flight Lieutenant Muir, was now 
the Narrative Officer for the Central War Room. He looked after enemy order of battle, 
target maps and charts, and distributed intelligence to the Air Staff and units. A.I.2 was 
to produce the four RNZAF intelligence publications, be stand in Narrative Officer and 
look after 'Survival Intelligence'. A.1.3, Flying Officer R.F. Meadows was concerned 
with ship and aircraft recognition, data on Japanese types and weapons. An Air 
Intelligence Security Section under a Staff Officer Intelligence (Security) was instituted. 
Flight Lieutenant G. Meyers was appointed to the post, his role being to advise on 
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security policy, look after security matters, and liaise with the SIB and the Police 
Department. 47 
A.I.4 was restored in yet another reorganisation, this one in June 1945. The Staff 
Officer (Intelligence), Squadron Leader Tyrer remained in command with the same 
oversight duties. The A.I.l, Flying Officer l.A. McBride (fonnerly of the SIB), was now 
known as the Deputy Staff Officer (Intelligence), and was the Narrative Officer for the 
CWR. He was to look after the RNZAF Intelligence Bulletin, Part II of the RNZAF 
Intelligence Digest and the RNZAF Japanese Pamphlet. He also was to send a daily 
intelligence signal to the Air Ministry in London and a weekly signal to the Royal 
Canadian Air Force War Room in Ottawa. A.I.2 was now known as the Operations Staff 
Narrative Officer; he was to prepare Part I of the RNZAF Intelligence Digest (Norsols 
[northern Solomons] Intelligence), assist with the Japanese Pamphlet and look after 
escape and evasion and survival intelligence. A.I.3, Flying Officer Brady, was to 
maintain the Section's filing and record system. There were clearly operations further 
northwards in mind, for Brady was to collate terrain and target data on Japan, China, the 
Netherlands East Indies and South East Asia Command's area. He was also to coHect 
and collate reports on Japan, including its remaining war potential, national psychology, 
morale and other intelligence for the Secretary of the War Cabinet. Flying Officer 
Meadows as A.I.4 would look after the ship and aircraft recognition business, and the 
data on Japanese aircraft and so forth. 48 The Air Intelligence Security Section's Staff 
Officer Intelligence (Security) - Meyers - still had the same duties as before.49 
There was one last interesting flicker at the end of hostilities. In 1945, the final 
offensive against Japan was to include a Commonwealth Air Task Force, to comprise 
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squadrons from the RAP, the RCAF, the RAAF and the RNZAF. They would be 
working in conjunction with the United States air forces. The base for this Air Task 
Force was to be Okinawa. Mountbattern's South East Asia Command (SEAC) was 
contemplating the formation of an Intelligence Directorate to support the CommoD,wealth 
Air Task Force. On 6 August, the RNZAF's CAS, Air Vice Marshal Isitt, received a 
signal from SEAC infonning him that the provision of an Intelligence Directorate had 
been given to the RNZAF. The Director of this Directorate was to join the Advance 
Headquarters forming at Labaun in Borneo.5o 
The CAS sent for his Staff Officer (Intelligence), Squadron Leader Tyrer, and 
infonned him of SEAC's decision. The CAS concurred with SEAC's signal. Tyrer was 
instructed that as he was only a substantive Flight Lieutenant with acting Squadron 
Leader rank, he was to prepare a paper for the CAS to pass to the Air Member for 
Personnel confinning Tyrer as substantive Squadron Leader, granting him acting Wing 
Commander rank and posting him to Labaun. Tyrer went back to his office to hear the 
news which had just been broadcast on the BBe of the dropping of the atomic bomb on 
Hiroshima. With the end of hostilities in the days that followed, no futher action was 
taken with respect to the RNZAF Intelligence Directorate for Labaun.51 
There were two other small areas connected with intelligence that only got off the 
ground late in the war. Photographic Intelligence or PI did not begin until late 1944. 
This was because the RNZAF had relied on somebody else to provide Photographic 
Intelligence, viz. the Americans. The US PI units were withdrawn for redeployment 
further north, so the RNZAF had to do something or go without.52 After a minor 
bureaucratic hassle, Flying Officer] .S.Barraud established the first RNZAF PI unit on 
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Bougainville in 1944. This unit produced a complete re-assessment of the location and 
strength of enemy air defences in the Bismarcks and the North Solomons and provided 
important target infonnation. This usefulness was duly acknowledged by the Allied 
commands. 53 
The Missing Persons Investigating Unit (MPIU) was supposed to have been set up 
in 1943, but it was not established until August 1945. Apart from searching for missing 
personnel, the MPIU had an intelligence function, in that one of its tasks was to assess the 
effectiveness of RNZAF bombing of certain targets, and to collect any other intelligence 
of interest on enemy equipment. Three sections were formed, No.1 Section on 
Bougainville, No.2 Section on New Britain and No.3 Section on New Ireland. The MPIU 
sections collected a substantial amount of intelligence material on a large variety of 
sUbjects.54 
The RNZAF's foray into air intelligence demonstrated that a fair amount could be 
achieved in spi te of the most inauspicious beginnings. The long period from the end of 
the 1930s through to October 1941 may just as well have been a blank as far as useful air 
intelligence was concerned. This was in part the fault of the then CAS, who clearly did 
not understand the implications of his own lack of interest: an air force without eyes. 
Such lack of interest amounted to incompetence. The advent of Goddard as CAS was 
critical for air intelligence, and it is fair to say that the commitment of No.1 (Islands) 
Group to the Solomons would have been totally dependent on the Americans without an 
RNZAF intelligence organisation. 
The continual changes and adjustment of tasks within the Air Intelligence Section 
in Wellington and the leadership provided by Tyrer and Amodeo in particular enabled the 
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RNZAF's intelligence effort to flourish rather than wither. The rotational scheme 
between the forward area and New Zealand kept the focus on what was most important 
for the Air Force, the provision of useful timely operational intelligence. 
The RNZAF did not get into the signals intelligence field. Given the late start in 
intelligence per se, it is hardly surprising that this was so. The need for operational 
intelligence precluded any ideas of moving in that direction, in any event the Air Force 
would have been far too far behind to catch up. 
The RNZAF's achievements in air intelligence were limited for the most part to 
useful tactical information for operational purposes. The amount of detail in the various 
intelligence publications, and the rapidity with which they were compiled on a regular 
basis and promulgated to operational units testified to a quite prodigious effort by a 
relatively small number of personnel. In mid-1944, there were still less than forty 
RNZAF intelligence personnel in the entire Air Force. By limiting themselves to that 
practical end, the RNZAF Air Intelligence organisation proved their utility and honed 
their skills, working within a self-imposed orbit. That SEAC contemplated entrusting a 
large slice of air intelligence for a projected final assault on Japan to the RNZAF, and not 
the RAAF or the RCAF, says much about the Air Department's Air Intelligence 
organisation's established track record. The RNZAF's air intelligence was a case of very 
late, but well done. 
Intelligence collection for field units and operational squadrons made the pursuit 
of single service interests inevitable in the Army and the Air Force, particularly as those 
units for the most part were deployed within larger formations distant from New Zealand. 
Resources were only put into intelligence when considered necessary, and it was a matter 
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of judgement as to when the intelligence function was no longer needed. For the Army 
and the Air Force, the dictates of campaigns and operational necessity meant intelligence 
collection continued beyond the conclusion of hostilities in Europe in the case of the 
Army, and up to the end of the war with Japan for the Air Force. 
Conclusion 
Could a small country like New Zealand be expected to achieve more in the 
intelligence field? How important was New Zealand in the intelligence efforts against the 
Axis powers? Were there any lessons to be learned about the difficulties of operating an 
intelligence organisation in a small country? Can a small country like New Zealand 
compensate for its limited military strength with a focussed intelligence effort? 
Given the range and diversity of the intelligence organisations and their 
application to collection activity, it is in quality and sharpness of focus that there could 
have been useful improvements during the war. Although New Zealand had manpower 
problems, the numbers of personnel involved in intelligence work were very small. What 
was lacking was recognition of the usefulness of timely intelligence, with certain notable 
exceptions in the signals intelligence area. It led to lethargy in the case of setting up the 
combined intelligence organisation, the security service, and an effective local 
coastwatching set-up. Had there been better efforts made to get organised more quickly, 
the collection and flow of intelligence may have increased. This contrasted sharply with 
'Y', H/F DfF (and REB) and the Army and Air Force intelligence elements, all of which 
were driven by clear operational imperatives. It is, then, less about widening the range of 
New Zealand's intelligence activities and more to do with increasing the quality of both 
collection and production of intelligence. New Zealand could have made more effective 
efforts in coastwatching, internal security and combined intelligence. 
The importance of New Zealand's intelligence contribution within an Allied 
context is more difficult to gauge. Tactical intelligence for deployed Army and Air Force 
units served those formations well. As the units were operating as part of larger Allied 
427 
formations, and were often cooperating directly with other Allied units, intelligence 
collection and dissemination was an essential and integral part of standard operational 
practice. Signals intelligence was even more valuable and indeed only made sense within 
an Allied context. Its very nature and the size of effort mounted meant it could not stand 
alone. Its usefulness and strength came from its practical application in cooperation with 
Anglo-American signals intelligence. New Zealand daily played a small but valued role 
in interception and interpretation of traffic, the taking of bearings and the supply of 
special intelligence. Here the cooperation ran very deep and had a long history that went 
back to the First World War. From the late 1930s to the end of 1941, New Zealand 
signals intelligence carried out useful work for the Admiralty. From 1942 onwards the 
United States became a larger part of this picture. Australian-New Zealand naval 
intelligence liaison was a constant sub-theme. 
If more could have been achieved in certain areas of intelligence, there were a 
number of difficulties in operating intelligence organisations in a small, remote country. 
There had to be a clear recognition of what the organisation was required to do. Turf 
wars between different departments were to be avoided, and the dangers of small 
numbers of persons and powerful personalities needed to be appreciated. Interservice 
rivalry had to be restricted if tri-service intelligence initiatives were to make headway. 
Poor allocation of resources, poor support and limited staffing led not only to poor 
intelligence: it meant wasted effort. There was always the temptation to assume 
(repeatedly in this war) that the apparent absence of the enemy signified the decline of 
threats. Although this was not the case, the assumption remained a particular New 
Zealand weakness. 
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Could a focussed intelligence effort have compensated for New Zealand's lack of 
military strength? It might have assisted in shoring up some of the holes in New 
Zealand's threadbare defence posture, but in this war the fundamental military weakness 
would have remained. A focussed intelligence drive required far more support than the 
appropriate authorities demonstrated they were willing to give. Further high level 
thinking about intelligence would have been necessary, and there is no evidence to 
suggest this sort of analysis was available in cabinet, at chiefs of staff level or at the 
intelligence committee level. Given the lethargic and rudimentary deliberations of the 
latter, this is not s,-!-rprising. Implementation of measures to ensure a focussed effort was 
for the most part too high a hurdle. 
The intelligence collection organisations of the New Zealand armed forces during 
the Second World War were small and relatively fragile in terms of their duration. The 
organisations existed as a result of requirements for certain kinds of intelligence by the 
servants of the government, whether uniformed or not. Those servants were persuaded 
by intelligence authorities outside New Zealand to contribute to a particular effort in the 
interests of the wartime Allies - signals intelligence falls into this category. They were 
not convinced as to the efficacy of certain types of intelligence, or were ambivalent to it -
as in the case of the security service. There were divisions between services, and 
between departments as to whether one kind of intelligence was useful or not. The 
relationship between the Services, other departments of state and the Prime Minister and 
the War Cabinet fluctuated with regard to intelligence gathering. Sometimes there was 
quite close direction, for example with combined intelligence and internal security. There 
were also areas of intelligence that by their nature or remoteness were exclusive of close 
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direction from the top of the intelligence tree. This was either for technical reasons, as 
with 'Y' intelligence, or to do with deployed formations overseas, like the army's field 
intelligence and security sections with the 2nd and 3rd New Zealand Divisions, and air 
intelligence with No.1 (Islands) Group in the Solomons. 
Intelligence collection organisations were closed down or reduced in size once it 
was perceived that there was no longer a requirement for a particular kind of intelligence 
to be collected (for technical reasons, radio fingerprinting) or for maintaining such 
extensive coverage (coastwatching). The size, shape and composition of the intelligence 
collection organisations varied enonnously. There were single service organisations (for 
example the Army's field security sections), multi-service bodies (the Combined 
Operational Intelligence Centre), and multi-service and multi-departmental ramshackle 
constructions (the coastwatching organisation). 
More by circumstances than deliberate design, the over-arching co-ordinating 
function of the Organization for National Security made it a junction point for New 
Zealand's intrusions into intelligence. Service intelligence came under the ONS umbrella 
through the influential Chiefs of Staff Committee. All service intelligence collection 
ultimately went back to the service chiefs. Moreover, service interests were represented 
on many of the other committees. The Secretary ONS welded the linkage between the 
Prime Minister'S Department and the Chiefs of Staff Committee, and the connection to 
both Prime Minister and the War Cabinet. The Secretary ONS was very much a linch-pin 
post. for he represented the Prime Minister's and the Prime Minister's Department's 
interests to the service chiefs, though Shanahan was not averse to working against the 
Prime Minister if the need arose. 
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Under the ONS, there was multiple departmental representation on a number of 
committees overlooking intelligence collection activity. The number of government 
departments involved in anyone area of intelligence was laudable from the point of view 
of interest, and a source of weakness for possible friction and division. If the services 
were well represented on committees, so were other departments like the P&T 
Department, the Police, the Marine Department, Customs, Public Works, Censorship and 
Publicity and so on. This multi-departmental layering effect produced much paper and 
many resolutions, and in the case of coastwatching, much practical action. Yet the more 
parties involved, the greater the chance of the collection of appropriate and sufficient 
intelligence going astray. 
The Chiefs of Staff lay at the heart of any consideration of service intelligence 
matters. On intelligence in the ONS committees, the Chiefs of Staff gave direction on 
intelligence policy. The Prime Minister and the War Cabinet approved, blocked or 
deferred the service chiefs' decisions in many areas during the war, and intelligence 
collection was no different. Thus the deliberations on combined intelligence, on signals 
intelligence, on coastwatching and on internal security, the decisions to convene sub-
committees to look at these matters, and the outcomes in those areas, hinged on decisions 
made by the Chiefs of Staff, approved by the War Cabinet. 
In 1943, the ONS was regarded as having outlived its usefulness as a co-
ordinating body. The reorganisation established the War Cabinet Secretariat in its place, 
which for intelligence meant a re~jigging of oversight of collection. The Mclntosh-
Shanahan linkage strengthened, with Mclntosh as Secretary to the War Cabinet, de facto 
head of the Prime Minister's Department and inaugural Permanent Head of the new 
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Department of External Affairs. It is a notable coincidence that the reorganisation took 
place at the same time as a major security intelligence shake-up, the police takeover of 
the security service. As the war was perceived to move far away to the north, there was a 
reduction in intelligence collection and oversight co-ordination. And as requirements for 
certain intelligence activities were seen to be less important, so the Chiefs of Staff, with 
War Cabinet approval, had the executive role in the reduction and redeployment of 
resources. 
Prewar preparations in the direction of combined intelligence amounted to the 
. deliberations of an intelligence committee, little more than a declaration of intent to form 
a combined intelligence centre in wartime. Nothing substantial resulted. The Navy's long 
established practice of the collection of operational intelligence through the SO (O&I)'s 
reporting officer system and signals intelligence through its local and overseas 
connections was the only means of collecting useful operational intelligence. The army 
intelligence and field security sections were not effective until the 2nd New Zealand 
Division fully deployed in the Middle East in 1941. Low-level internal security collection 
was carried out by the police. Air intelligence, as a one-man band, was almost non-
existent. Even the response to the shock of June 1940 was simply to set up yet another 
committee to consider an intelligence centre, and the decision by the Chiefs of Staff to set 
up the Combined Intelligence Bureau was not taken until September 1940. The service 
chiefs were tardy in putting in place resources and personnel, having postponed resource 
allocation decisions repeatedly since 1937. 
The CIB was too small and got off to a bad start with the hiatus over intelligence 
summary production though disagreements between the Chiefs of Staff, the Prime 
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Minister and the Police Commissioner. The result of this was to weaken the already frail 
CIB, reduce its production of summaries, and limit its focus to merchant shipping 
movements in the face of raider activity. Increasing nervousness about the possibility of 
war with Japan, uninterrupted commerce raider operations, and the unsatisfactory 
intelligence collection situation led the eNS to request a fulltime SO(I) from the 
Admiralty in early 1941, and to drive the reorganisation of tbe CIB. The decisions made 
in August led to a larger combined body, the Combined Operational Intelligence Centre, 
but the transition was still under way when hostilities began with Japan. 
There was a scramble to cope with the rapidly deteriorating situation. The COIC 
commenced issuing Daily Intelligence Summaries in late December 1941, based on the 
collection of current operational intelligence, the first of a variety of intelligence 
publications. Operational connections with the FECB were disrupted by the fall of 
Singapore, the DNI departed overseas, and the COIC moved into a new building with a 
rapidly expanding staff. The shock of the expanded conflict produced the daily briefing 
meeting for the Chiefs of Staff on the latest intelligence collected. A 24-hour watch was 
instituted in the COlC, a remarkably late measure at this point in the war. Much of the 
useful operational intelligence came from the 'Y' organisation, and the British, 
Australian, American and Canadian signals intelligence authorities. If 1942 was a year of 
expansion for the COIC, 1943 was the year in which single service interest reasserted 
itself in the combined organisation. The growing RNZAF air intelligence organisation 
deliberately tip-toed away from the COlC, its attention focussed on operational 
intelligence collection for the squadrons in the forward area. The army role in the COIC 
remained insignificant. The combined intelligence organisation reverted to a naval 
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intelligence organisation by default. The increasing operational effectiveness of H/F D/F 
and REB led to efforts to set up a daily enemy submarine plot in the COIC. The 
following year saw a reduction of activity in the COIC, the progressive cessation of 
intelligence publications, and the end of daily briefings and the 24-hour watch. The rump 
naval intelligence body left in its place wound up in 1945. 
The New Zealand venture in combined intelligence synthesis during the war was 
a tri-service failure, largely because of different intelligence collection priorities on the 
part of the anny and the air force. The CIB and the COIC were irrelevant to those two 
services. Combined tri-service intelligence was an illusion that never materialised. The 
unwillingness of the air force to commit itself early enough and army's slender 
participation reflected a short-sightedness on the part of the senior officers of those 
services. 
The COIC was an extension of naval intelligence modelled in miniature on the 
Admiralty'S Operational Intelligence Centre run by the Naval Intelligence Division. This 
fusion model was useful in bringing together in one place a variety of collected 
operational intelligence, available for use by the service chiefs. The COIC did produce 
intelligence for the War Cabinet and the Chiefs of Staff, and exchanged intelligence with 
overseas Allied intelligence authorities. 
Combined intelligence only got off the ground in New Zealand with the assistance 
of the Kriegsmarine and the Imperial Japanese Navy. Strategic and operational necessity 
compelled action. The great northern focus subsequently reversed this trend. The Chiefs 
of Staff collectively were careless about external security, in that they preferred not to 
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draw conclusions about the incursions of the enemy inside the New Zealand three-mile 
limit. 
The war in the ether, the procurement of over-the-horizon intelligence was naval 
driven, with a small and symbiotic army contribution. This was the high technology end 
of the intelligence war with cross-departmental and interservice co-operation that 
worked. It was built on a low-key foundation of co-operative practice between the Navy 
and the P&T Department going back to 1914, with development work on direction-
finding in the twenties and thirties - the return of hostilities meant that the habits and 
skills of interception were up-graded and refined. The introduction of H/F D/F from 1936 
and its operational test in the Munich crisis meant that Awarua was well prepared for war 
in 1939. This immediately paid off with the tracking of the Admiral Graf Spee. The 
reliance on P&T Department personnel for a pool of operators and the Department's 
technical equipment says a great deal about the relationship with the Navy in an area of 
real, if discreet, operational importance. The four HIP D/F stations of Awarua, Musick 
Point, Waipapakauri and Suva were joined by the REB station at Blenheim at the start of 
1943. 
Operationally, the H/F DfF network worked for the FECB up to 1942. In the 
transition that following FEeB's withdrawal to Colombo and Kilindini, there was a 
switch to greater operational co-operation with the US Navy's FRUPAC in Honolulu and 
FRUMEL in Melbourne. The British connection remained significant, as the periodic 
visits by British naval intelligence officers attest, and the collaboration with Australia 
strengthened in certain respects. 
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Philpott's 'Y' organisation was established and expanded to exploit and co-
ordinate the collection of intercepted enemy cable and wireless traffic. The addition of 
radio-fingerprinting provided a further dimension to the collection of location and 
identification intelligence on enemy vessels at sea. The introduction of a Special 
Intelligence section led into work on low grade naval codes and diplomatic traffic. The 
Army's Special Section at Naimville Park fed into this effort and dealt directly with 
overseas recipients as well. The Special Intelligence section and the Army's Special 
Section analysis cell collaborated effectively in the attack on intercepted traffic. 
While it is important not to exaggerate the New Zealand role in the war in the 
ether, nonetheless it was a considerable effort for a country lean in intelligence collection 
resources. Perhaps because it was technical and so discreet, there was good case for 
interservice co-operation, and partly because it was run by junior staff. The range of 
activity was relatively extensive and clearly valued by the British, the Americans and the 
Australians. The quality of the intelligence personnel was reflected on a number of them 
being seconded to intelligence posts overseas: MacKenzie to the AlB, Bennett to the 
Central Bureau, Carter to FRUMEL, and Jaynes and Studholme to HMS Anderson in 
Ceylon. 
New Zealand's signals intelligence war was the foundation for this country's 
postwar development in signals intelligence, including participation with wartime allies, 
from the Holden and BRUSA agreements leading to the UKUSA umbrella of the USA, 
UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Signals intelligence was the most significant, if 
not the most important, intelligence collection activity of New Zealand in the intelligence 
war. 
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By contrast, coastwatching was a fundamental requirement and a great failure. 
Distance and demography set parameters that needed careful handling if progress was to 
be made in this relatively simple area. Yet there was an early attempt to wind down the 
fledgling organisation, only to have to reverse the process in late June 1940. While some 
progress in the setting up of stations was made, it was not long before the guard dropped 
again. The interweaving of line-of-sight posts with radar stations was heading in the 
right direction, if a trifle late. This was the area of intelligence collection with the largest 
cross-departmental and interservice involvement and proved to be the most ineffective. 
Enemy naval units repeatedly visited the New Zealand coast, and for the most part went 
unnoticed and untroubled, even off the main ports. The coastwatching organisation failed 
to fufill its main task on the New Zealand coast, which is to condemn the watch but not 
the function. 
Coastwatching in the islands was by contrast quite well executed with limited 
resources, and good operational intelligence was collected. The range of off-shore 
stations manned was impressive, stretching from the sub-Antarctic islands to the tropics. 
The rush to set up posts spoke of a lack of foresight and preparedness, even of 
desperation to have a trip-wire. Leaving coastwatchers to die in the Gilberts was not 
unavoidable. 
The prospects for an independent security service were bleak from the start, 
al though if the Police Department had carried out its internal security tasks properly, the 
perceived need to fill a hole might never have arisen. Significantly, the limits of the 
relationship between the Chiefs of Staff and the Prime Minister sharpened with regard to 
internal security and the Police Commissioner, firstly with certain CIB intelligence 
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summaries, and then far more spectacularly with the SIB. The combination of a hostile 
Police Department and a security service headed by an ambitious Director made for 
trouble. The SIB was too small, had too few resources, took on too many tasks quickly, 
and proceeded rapidly to lose friends in high places, the last and most significant being 
the Prime Minister himself. The Ross affair handed the SIB over to the Police and 
severely embarrassed the Prime Minister, whose sensitivity to the very concept of a 
security service persisted ever after. Internal security intelligence became off limits for 
the service chiefs, by general agreement all round. The police, having decried the need 
for such a service, ran it themselves. This concedes the point of the requirement for such 
a service, albeit with a close collaborative relationship with the police. The vexed 
question of port security was never properly sorted out, and the Port Security organisation 
established was far too small. Throughout the war, the police declined to properly 
undertake their responsibilities in this area, through a general lack of concern for the 
safety of shipping. 
Just as interesting was the question of the penetration of the government 
administration by enemy agents. Clearly the Germans and the Japanese had no success in 
this, but the Soviet Union did, to an extent yet to be finally measured. The Police 
Commissioner's obsession with the Communists was ironic, for he clearly failed to 
consider the possibilities in the top levels of government departments. The two suspected 
cases were in overseas posts., but it seems that the usual assumption of trustworthiness 
applied to those at home. Just how far the Soviet Union's intelligence services succeeded 
in their New Zealand penetrations remains to be seen, with Costello identified and other 
possibilities quite likely. 
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For the duration of the war, New Zealand did not have an effective security 
service. Aside from the problem of penetration and shipping se~urity, this probably did 
not matter. However, prevention of penetration and port security were basic security 
tasks. The legacy of the SIB's debacle was the postponement of any effort to establish 
another such organisation for more than a decade after the cessation of hostilities. 
The Navy's operational intelligence spread across the combined intelligence 
organisation, the signals intelligence organisation and coastwatching. The combined 
organisation was a partial success for a time in 1942 and 1943, signals intelligence was 
'operationally effective, and coastwatching a local failure while useful offshore. What of 
the other two services' operational intelligence? 
The Anny' s intelligence sections were effective in the field under operational 
formations. The main effort was in the Middle East, where the system for intelligence 
gathering within the 2nd New Zealand Division became finely honed after a hesitant start. 
The intelligence arrangements permitted the smooth passage of collected intelligence 
from division through brigade to battalions and vice versa. This said a good deal for the 
management of intelligence at the top by talented officers like Bell, Costello, Davin and 
Cox. Field security was competently managed both with operational units and in the base 
area in Egypt. Similar remarks can be made about the same efforts in the 3rd New 
Zealand Division, albeit on a far smaller scale. The Army's intelligence collection focus 
was tactical, as most of its energies and resources went into the overseas units. 
At home, the field security sections fairly rapidly became redundant. The 
intelligence activities in the Home Guard were what might have been expected, though ,it 
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is fair to say that efforts were made to get to grips with the local area. The map-making 
activity within the Home Guard was most competent and filled in gaps. 
Air intelligence hardly existed when New Zealand was most under threat during 
the war, then prospered with the burgeoning requirements of the fonnations committed to 
the forward area. While the move away from the COIC was inevitable given the direction 
air intelligence took, its organisation continued to expand. RNZAF intelligence ended the 
war with a core of highly experienced air intelligence officers, regarded well enough to 
be eannarked for greater responsibilities under South East Asia Command had not peace 
intervened. Although the RNZAF had no signals intelligence capability) it is interesting 
to observe the postwar thrust engaging in this area. 
New Zealand's service intelligence organisations ran right across the intelligence 
spectrum, although there was no equivalent to an espionage body like MI6, and the 
security service might as well not have existed. The growth, performance and duration of 
the organisations varied. The most useful collectors were the signals intelligence units, 
the Army's intelligence sections with the 2nd Division, and RNZAF air intelligence from 
1943 onwards. They were, by distance or by technology, detached from close control by 
the service chiefs. Least successful for particular reasons were the SIB and the 
coastwatching organisation, both subject to higher order interference. Where the 
services' operational focus was the detenninant for intelligence requirements, the 
intelligence collection organisations were at their most effective. The strongest collectors 
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FECB Far East Combined Bureau 
FRUMEL Fleet Radio Unit, Melbourne 
FRUPAC Fleet Radio Unit, Pacific Fleet 
FS Field Security 
FSS Field Securi~ Section 
GBMS Great Britain Merchant Shipping 
GC&CS Government Code & Cypher School: 
Bletchley Park 
GCB Government Communications 
Bure~ Berkeley Street 
GCHQ Government Code Headquarters : 
Bletchley_ Park 
GHQ General Headquarters 
GRU Soviet Military Intelligence 
GSO} or G1 General Staff Officer, Grade 1 
GS01 (0&1) General Staff Officer, Grade I, 
Operations and Intelligence 
GS03 (1), or GSOIII (1), or GIll (n General Staff Officer, Grade 3, 
(Intelligence) 
GS03 (0&1) General Staff Officer, Grade 3, 
Operations and Intelligence 
GVP Guards Vital Points 
HlFDIF High Frequency Direction-Finding 
HYPO US Navy codebreaking centre, 14th 
N aval District~ Pearl Harbor 
10 Intelligence Officer 
ISK Intelligence Service Knox: Abwehr 
machine cipher 
ISOS Intelligence Service Oliver Strachey: 
Abwehr hand cipher 
JNI0, JNI5, JN20, JN40 etc Japanese naval ciphers 
JN25 Main Japanese naval cipher 
KGB Committee of State Securi~ 
LRDG Long Range Desert Grou~ 
LST Landing Ship Tank 
MFIDIF Medium Frequency DIF 
MI(R) Military Intelligence (Research) 
MIS British Security Service 
MI6 British Secret Intelligence Service 
MPIU Missing Persons Investigation Unit 
N1D Naval Intelligence Division, 
Admiralty 
NIT Control Statio~ Pearl Harbor 
NKVD People's Commissariat for Internal 
Affairs 
NOIC Naval Officer in Charge 
NSA National Security Agency 
NZCID New Zealand Committee of Imperial 
Defence 
NZEF New Zealand Expeditionary Force 
NZNB New Zealand Naval Board 
'"0 'Group Orders group 
ONS Organisation for National Security 
OP .. 20-G US Naval Intelligence 
OTP One time pad 
P&T Post and Telegraph 
PI Photographic Intelli~ence 
POW,PW Prisoner of War 
RAAF Royal Australian Air Force 
RAF Royal Air Force 
RAN Royal Australian Navy 
RDF Radio Direction ... Finding 
REB Radio Fingerprinting: covername 
RFP Radio Fingerprinting 
RHSA Reichssicherheitshaupamt: Reichs 
Security Main Office 
RN Royal Navy 
RNZAF Royal New Zealand Air Force 
RNZN Royal New Zealand Navy 
RSS Radio Security Service 
SD Sicherheitsdienst: Nazi Security 
Service 
SEAC South East Asia Command 
SlA Secret Intelligence Australia: Section 
B of Allied Intelligence Bureau 
SIB Security Intelligence Bureau 
SOE Special Operations Executive 
SO(1) Staff Officer (Intelligence) 
SO(O) Staff Officer (Operations) 
SO(0&1) Staff Officer (Operations & 
Intelligence) 
SOJYl Staff Officer (Y) 
SSO Station Signals Officer 
Station X Bletchley Park 
TA Traffic Analysis 
TEAL Tasman Empire Airways 
TINA A fonn of radio fmgerprinting using 
tape recordings of transmissions 
UKUSA United Kingdom, United States:1 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand 
(Agreement) 
ULTRA Intelligence summarIes compiled 
from enemy signal traffic through 
codebreaking: frrst used by British in 
June 1941, and used later by 
Americans 
USAAF United States Army Air Force 
USASIS United States Army Signal 
Intelligence Service 
USN United States Navy 
y Y intelligence: derived from enemy 
signal traffic 
Z Z intelligence: radio fmgerprinting 
ZYMOTIC Similar classification to UL TRA, 
although not all ZYM material was 
derived from codebreaking 
Appendices 
Appendix One 
Handling instructions for Ultra and Zymotic 
[N 2 16/12/30] 
APPENDIX ONE 
MOST SECRET 




16 July 1942 
"ULTRA" AND IlZYMOTIC" MESSAGES 
Mes sages containing information from Special 
Intelligence from the Admiralty, are prefixed "Ultra" 
and are sent in SP 02405 series. Messages containing 
similar information from other authorities are 
pref ixed "Zymotic" and are sent in the most secret 
cypher available. 
The following instructions are to be followed 
as regards these messages: 
1. They are to be decyphered (and in the case 




Paymaster Lieutenant eLP Matheson, 
R.N.V.R. (Principal Cypher Officer) 
Paymaster Lieutenant BS Cave-Chinn, 
R.N.V.R. 
(b)Ashore Staff 
Paymaster Lieutenant TO Tatlow, 
R.N.V.R. (Principal Cypher Officer) 
Paymaster C Hunter, R.N.V.R. 
2.SP02403 series are to be kept separate from 
ordinary series. 
3.Two logs are to be kept. 
( a) By the Secretary for afloat staff. 
(b) By the Secretary to Deputy Commander-
in Chief for the ashore staff. 
4. Copies are only to be made and distributed 
as follows:-
(a)Afloat and Ashore 
One to Secretary (for the Commander-
in-Chief and log.) 
One to Staff Officer (Intelligence). 
(b)Ashore 
One to Secretary to Deputy Commander-
in-Chief and log. 
One to the Chief of the Intelligence 
Staff (C.O.I .. S.) 
One to the Officer in Charge, Ambi tion 
House, Mombasa.(ie Paymaster Captain Shaw, Royal 
Navy.). 
5.Messages are only to be passed by hand of 
officer or in double sealed envelope. 
6. Messages are to be marked "MOST SECRET" TO 
BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY. 
7.All groups and rough working are to be kept 
separate from those of other messages and are to be 
burnt when no longer required for reference. This 
should normally be immediately and in any case not 
longer than a week from date of receipt or despatch. 
8. The log copies are to be numpered serially 
by Secretary and Secretary to Deputy Commander-
in-Chief and are to be burnt when no longer required. 
This will normally be not longer than one month from 
date of receipt or despatch. Other recipients are to 
burn their copies when no longer required which 
should be as early as possible. 
9.Knowledge of these messages is to be 
restricted to as few officers as possible. The 
Commander-in-Chief and Deputy Commander-in-Chief will 
decide as to whom their copies are to be shown. Other 
recipients are to keep their copies to themselves. 
10.If it is necessary to 
information contained in these summaries 
pass on 
(other than 
to normal recipients of the messages, ie to holders 
of SP02403 series and addresses of Zymotics) this is 
to be done in the form of an operational order so 
worded that if it is captured or intercepted by the 
enemy it cannot be traced back to Special 
Intelligence. 
11.In the case of paragraph 10 above, 
reference to actual names of enemy ships should be 
avoided; positions should be expressed in a form 
different from tl)at given in the Ultra or Zymotic 
messages. 
12.No reference to information in these 
messages is to be made in war diaries, reports of 
proceedings etc., however limited the circulation. 
13. Bulletins and Digests from the Commander-
in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet and the 
Australian Commonwealth Naval Board need no longer be 
treated as Zymotic but are to be given A.I.D.A.C. 
distr ibution wi th a copy to the United States Naval 
Liaison Officer. 
RALPH EDWARDS 
CHIEF OF STAFF 
Distribution:-
The Principal Cypher Officer, Afloat. 
The Principal Cypher Officer, Ashore. 
Chief of the Naval Intelligence Staff. 
Paymaster Captain H.L.Shaw, R.N. (Retired). 
Staff Officer Plans. 
Staff Officer Intelligence - Afloat. 
(Copies to: - The Deputy Commander in Chief, Eastern 
Fleet. 
The secretary to the Commander in Chief, 
Eastern Fleet. 
The Secretary to the Deputy Commander in 
Chief, Eastern Fleet. 
******************** 
A slip is attached to this document. It reads: 
EF4964/l7 dated 15 June 1942. 
Addressed to: The Flag Officer, Delhi. 
The Flag Officer, Ceylon. 
(Copy to each and to: 
Australian Commonwealth Naval 
Board 
New Zealand Naval Board) . 
The attached copy of a memorandum 
I have issued containing instructions for the 
handling of Ultra and Zymotic messages, is forwarded 
to you for your information. 
2. I shall be glad if you will 
forward to me a copy of the instructions you have 
issued. 
(annotated as seen by:) 
eNS 
SSO 
SOY - I do not think 
we are called 
upon to answer 
Agree 3/10) 










Entry to Combined Operational Intelligence 
Centre, 19 May 1942 
[N 2 08/1/18] 
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR PLAYFAIR CODE·~_'. '. _ 
( SHORT TITLE lip. C. II ) . 
The following is on explanat10n of the code to be used tor 
trD.llsmitting commercial messages, by Radio. Key\iords are Qontained in 
the sealed env.elopes supplied, 
2.- Precautions when coding messagee.- In ~ssagos to be coded 
by this coda stereotype wording, parti~uldrly in the beginning or 
end, ~t be avoide~ •. 
3.- 'Key words arc 'to be changed c.o ~la~ca in "C.U.I! pB.I'n. 4.' 
Mcthod·o~ Coding.-
" 
4.- Construct a square oontaining '25 spaces and in'sert from 
lett to right the letters of the key word, one in each spac'e, and 
then 'che remainder. of the alphabet, commencing at the f1rs'c letter 
. of the alphabet which does. not occur in the key word. Should' the 
s~e lette~ occur more than once in the key word, al~ repetitions of 
tha.t lett~r must .be omi·~ted when filling in the sq,uare., The letter 
uI" is to be treated as' "Ju (sec diagram below) and always written ' ' 
as such. thus rcducllig thQ alphabet to .25 letters. ' 
. 5.- The following diagram shows a sQ.uare filled in, . using 
It EXHA.USTIVELY tI as the !ray word:.-
(0) 
E X H A U 
S T J V L 
Y B C D F 
G K M 
, 
O· If' 
.' .. . , 
? Q R 'W Z 
,. 
_. 
Substitute tor each pair ot letters the equivalent pair 
obta.ined from tho souare, except in the case of: a sinsle 
letter remainil1g over at the end which remainS uncoded. 
~ letters ~re to be similarly coded. . 
Substitution. to be carried outaafollows ;-
( ) '- h i It the ,pair is in the same vertical oolumn eac 
letter is coded by th~ one next below it. 
A letter occurring at the bottom ot. the column 1a 
coded at the top letter of the same column • 
. . e.g. .8P becomes YE. 










. , .. 
, .' 
I 
•• 1 ••. 
:.\' .... 
. '-.\:. . 
.... . ,
( ii) It the pair is in, the same horizont.:ll line, each letter 
is codod by the one next on its right 1n the surne line. 
A letter on the extreme' right of the line is coded by a 
letter on the oxtreme left at the samo line, 
e.g. OM becomes GN. 
(iii) If the pair is neither as ~t (i) nor as at (11), tho 
letters must form opposite corners ot a rectangle. The 
pair is. then COded by the pair at the other corner of 
the same rectangle, each letter being coded by the one 
in the same horizontal line. 
e.g. TO beoomes LX. 
Cd) Write the message out in 5 letter groups before dea~atch. 
• ',/hen dummy letters are inserted as directed in paragraph 
6, (~) and (b) ~bove they must be chosen so that they will become 
obvious on deCOding, but will not be conspicuous othcrrr1se. It ia 
therefore ess~ntial to var,y,th~~, the letters Q, X, Y and Zbeing 
~refero.bly avoided. 
7. - Example. 
ICey word "EXRAUSTIVELytt. 
Message - Commence tiring 1645. 
Divided into pairs and 1 
cOillpleted to 35 letters 
becomes:- . 
The letters underlined arc) 
dt1l'ilrll1 e s • ) 
CO ME ME NC EF ,JR. 
IN G8 JX TEEN FO 
RTYFJV~~~ 
. Coded veraiQn!~, 
~\;:,D E C LF\~ ~ J , PM KC GH LID uy eH VM PY TH SX' AG OZ QJ' BY n XG 
JaR .:'., '~ 
. . .. ~ ..... : . ':~.~. ~ 
FMKCG HMDUY OHVMJ? ' ",:.: . '.' .~ ~ 
YTHSX AGOZQ -JliY\TL . ' .: : •. _ 
.'. :'Aa de epa tched: ~ 
XGJSF . '; ,' .• 1' • 
. :' ;·,:Ll"J 
'.' : .. ". . .':. ~ :~ ': '~ ~~t~~T~-::"·~ ~:;;,;::~, :: ::.:~.~ 8. - . How to decode. - The Bame prooess applies tor decoding as ..... : ',1.~ ~:!2~~J~~'j: ;E' ftOl' coding; except that the decoder must take ~th.e letters above . , .. :., 11 ! 
.:r:: ; .... :: .. when the pair if? in the same vertical line (aee paragraph 6 (0) (1) , :.~;: 
·.l :~:.;. above) end the onea on the lett when on the same horizontal line. . ... : .. ~: ,~:~~:;~. -:' (See paragraph 6 (0) (11) above). . 
- . '! 
.. 
Navy Of'f'ice I Wellingtdn. 









Orion's Chart from S.D.Waters 
German Raiders in the Pacific p.13 
~_ ... _ .. _Jl ... _ • .... 
.. - .. -.- .... ~ 
• 4'.,/.... ~ 
- . i 
..... ' ! 
.. ~ 
'..J ' 
~~ .. . , 
~ 
" ~'
.4 ~ 1 ~' 
\ ... " . 
! ,,' \. 
-,;,~U !tLLtL~"'''''J~ .:" \. • 
---------()~.--~i~P--I~l,,~~~~~: ~------~--~--~---~~!-~.,-.. ~.!---.~\-., 
_______________ ~li-B-~-t-~~~~T-~~~~~-~~---___ . __ ~_~,~~~ 
-=.,-=-~.:~,.\~~k~,~ .. ~?_.~~ .. Jj_O.~ ... \ ,,»r"i~' . I· 
! ..... ·=~ .. ~3!jJ;' ". ~._tl~ .. _';~ .. .. 
• 
"' ... , 'f'" • 
'- •• ; .. 4w\ ~~ ..... - ....... J' • 
, ~': ).t\ _ .. -= 
Till's rrprod/lctivlI of tire Orion's ellart of Ira co({rsc across the approaclu!s to the Htwraki Gtllj ShOIl'S also 
tlll' positillll vf sIt ips sighted while Ira lIlillc/ayillg IVas ill progress, The numbers added in black givc a 
key to translations of the notes on the map: 
(I) vessel in sight; (2) steamer in sight; (3) steamer in sight; (4) position 
of sinking of Niagara; (5) steamer in sight; (6) Moko Hinau light; 
(7) blacked-out vessel; (R) vessel; (9) moon bearing at 2IOO hours. 
The main heading at the botconl of the map scates thlt it is to be super-
im.posed on British 254-3-, enclosure No.2 to Report No, 201 of 7 August 
I 9.+':). The thin line sllO\vS the raider's course, the thickcr linc_ S110\V5 mines 




RNZN Museum: Map on U-862's track 
Based on passage data. 






lORD ~ I\SV.HO 
1 J.ln.~ 
,9 • 
AOEU!OE Q~ Y 
I l' 6L ~ 'j .... ~ .. Vl!lO:)/c...:A.4 
1 MEL!lQURNE :J.' ~ ~L __ so_LIT1-I ____ --; _________ ~'-.:.~ _____ ._-7' ______________ ~~ ___ .J'~ __ ~_"';-__ ---iil-___ ~_a_;:r_I_;:_AU<Ei'!_..c-
I" ~ "~ \:} 
... _--- ~ ~ 
---
U 862 
OPERATIONS 2.5 DECEMBER 1944 ··15 FEBRUARY 1 945 
so 
U8S2 PASSAGE DATA 
2S. 27 Oec.s..; tZ(JNM 64'31 .. hr • 1.9 kt 
'2.1 Dec • 1 J.s.n':5 2BClNM 10111t - 2.7kt 
":1 
01 ·05 Jan.45 74ClNM 96ilr - 7.S Id 
05 • 12 Jan .LS 24ClNM 7 day - 1.41d 
12.15 Jan-45 27SNM nhr • :3.5 kt 
Hi· 19 Jan..lS 24ClNM 72hr .. :12 ld: 
19·21 Jan 45 42SNM .c.sht .. S.O Id 
21 • Z6 Jan .LS 10s0NM S day .. a.s 1.1 
25 Jan -5 Fab oI.S 2410NM 10 day .. 10.0 I:I 
OS· 15 Feb..lS 1S7tlNM 225 hr a pp«:lX .. B.J k1 
.. NOTE: By lh4 naIU(1l cd tOe CtilJinal data lMe maiority cI the rIiiU(~ 
&l1J appro.xJmala but I ... O3tlmalod 10 be aCCUlilta 10 will'IitI to'%. 



















U862 in New Zealand Waters 
In late 1944 the presence of the Gennan Navy in the Far East had not gone 
unnoticed. In August, for instance, the RCN's diary of German W rr traffic intercepted 
noted: 
Six incoming enigma messages were recorded on the Indian Ocean service (Series 
7) originated complete with a serial number in the range Xl-X100. This traffic was 
deemed to have been sent to control by a shore station at the German naval base at 
Penang. 1 
This was also intercepted at Colombo, and on 26 September a signal from C.-in-C. 
Eastern Fleet to the Staff Officer (Y) Wellington read: 
A shore station fixed in the PENANG AREA has been heard handling German naval 
traffic as follows:- Time GMT; 0000 to 1000 on 31700 and 7365 kilocycles/second, 
1000 to 1630 on 11470 and 4265 kilocycles/second .... 
Control used call sign 6K8 but other stations are also active. Traffic consists of five letter 
code and naval engims [ sic] bearing serial number X 001 to 100. 
Frequencies in paragraph 1 have been heard being used by U-boats east of about 88 east 
to 6Kt), probably when direct touch with GERMANY cannot be used. Normal U-boat 
procedure is used .... 2 
An annotation by Lieutenant Philpott, the SO(Y) and head of the New Zealand naval 'Y' 
organisation, instructed the matter be referred to the high-frequency direction-finding 
(H/F DfF) station at Awarua, requesting these frequencies be monitored, and Awarua was 
to 'report any resul ts with bearings.'] 
The German U-boat U862 arrived in Penang in September 1944 on her first war 
patrol all the way from Germany. A long-range Type IX D 2, she was commanded by 
Korvetten-Kapitan Heinrich Timm. U862 had enjoyed an eventful cruise, having sunk 
five merchantmen en route, four of these in the Mozambique Channel between 13-19 
August and shooting down a 265 Squadron Catalina on 20 August when it attacked the 
2 
submarine on the surface. Timm made his report to Germany which appears in the 
B.d.U. War Log on 14 September 1944, by which time U862 had reached Singapore. 
Apart from the details of the sinkings, he also put in a request for a new patrol. 
.... U862 requested permission for subsidiary operation of SW-Australia, pointing 
out time which had been saved at sea, good conditions of the crew, boat and batteries. In 
spite of a low battery capacity U168 has made the same request before base overhaul in 
Japan. Commander in Chief Submarines concurs with suggestion (Commander of U862 
has sailed this route before as a Merchant Navy Officer).4 
U168 proceeded on this patrol on 5 October, but was ambushed by a Dutch 
submarine the following day. The survivors were picked up, and an assessment of 
German submarine operations in the Far East and U168 would appear in the Royal New 
Zealand Navy's Weekly Intelligence Summary no.22 of 28 February 1945.5 U168 had 
been caught because the Japanese warned their own shipping as to the German U-boat's 
course in the initial part of its patrol, and the Japanese signals were intercepted and read 
by Colombo. U862 did not suffer a similar fate, possibly because of a delay in 
decryption, and probably also as she took a more direct route from Batavia through 
Sunda Strait. and headed safely south. 
U862 appeared in the daily ULTRA U-boat disposition signal as 'ST' from 2 
October 1944 onwards. From as early as 4 October it was noted that ST was going to sail 
for a patrol in Australian waters. Her presence was deduced by 11 December from the 
action (below) two days earlier. Similarly, action on 25 December would lead to an 
estimated relocation 'Off Sidney' [ sic]. On 19 January, being last fixed off Sydney, her 
recall to Batavia was noted. Her estimated position was wildly out. It was not until 11 
February that the daily signal noted that ST may have sank another Liberty ship five days 
before. ULTRA summaries were based on traffic read, including obviously, SKL. By 
3 
keeping silence, U862 kept the daily ULTRA signal making estimates, only revised as 
other physical evidence of presence (surface action, torpedo attacks) came to light. The 
detail of most of U862's cruise need not concern us here. The U-boat proceeded south in 
the Indian Ocean and turned east along the southern coast of Australia. On 9 December 
she attacked the Greek ship Ilissos with gunfire southeast of Adelaide, but the 
merchantman managed to get away. On the night of 24/25 December U862 attacked and 
eventually sunk the Liberty ship Robert 1. Walker (7176 tons) about 160 miles southeast 
of Sydney. On 6 February 1945, the submarine attacked another Liberty ship, the Peter 
Silvester, sinking her several hundred miles off Freemantle.6 What was not appreciated at 
the time, and remained unknown for decades after 1945, was that in the interval between 
the two sinkings, U862 had sailed around New Zealand.? 
On New Year's Day 1945 U862 was on course for Cape Maria van Dieman, 
rounded on 5 January.8 She patrolled out to sea from Cape Brett, and navigation being 
assisted by the aid of the Cape Brett lighthouse. Timm failed to intercept a steamer 
which his IWO (or First Officer of the Watch) Oberleutenant zur See Gunther 
Reiffenstuhl, surmised went into a harbour north of Cape Brett, in reality the Bays of 
Islands harbour at Opua. They cruised south past Great Barrier Island, down the 
Coromandel into the Bay of Plenty, and rounded the East Cape lighthouse close in on 13 
January. On 15 January U862 layoff Gisborne, Reiffenstuhl recording in his journal: 
Close to the land running along by the coast. We are wanting to have a look 
during the day submerged in the roads by Gisborne to see whether any ships are anchored 
there or at the docks. But navigating is, one has to say, a pretty nerve-wracking touch 
and go because we've got very little water below our keel. During the day you can see 
through the periscope people walking along the street. On the beach one man lights a 
fire. In the evening we are off the entrance to the harbour, nothing to be seen, the night is 
again very dark. At the entrance to the harbour we surface and charge our batteries. A 
bright light lifts from the horizon, which is actually coming from the 12,000 inhabitants 
4 
who haven't blacked out their town. We go into the harbour. The docks are brightly 
illuminated, behind them a big factory. You can see cars with their lights driving along 
the streets. The street lighting is also very bright, we are absolutely dazzled by it. The 
houses are all brightly illuminated ... Our hopes however, are not fulfilled, because there's 
no worthwhile ship at anchor or at the docks, which we could have sunk. The people 
here are all so magnificently unsuspecting. We go about carefully, slip out of the harbour 
and later are taken up into the open sea without being noticed ... 9 
At midday on 15 January the US registered Liberty ship Stepas Darius (7176 
tons), sailed from Napier, the next port down the coast, bound for Los Angeles. This was 
just the kind of target U862 was searching for. 10 The following day U862 rounded 
Portland Island and checked out the coaling pier at Waikokopu, but nothing was there. 
The U-boat headed across Hawkes Bay for Napier. 11 
Tied up alongside at Napier was the M.V Pukeko a small 742-ton vessel 
unloading a cargo of cement. Built by Goole Shipbuilding in 1928 and owned by the 
Richardson Company, she had just undergone a check that day on three new cylinders 
installed on the main engines, conducted by the local Surveyor of Ships of the Marine 
Department. 12 The Pukeko was due to sail at 11.45 p.m. that night.13 
U862 made a careful approach to the Napier harbour entrance after dark and 
quietly sat off at a distance of around 300-400metres. Timm used the occasion to let 
most of the crew, in groups of four, come up the conning tower to look at Napier at night. 
Reiffenstuhl 's journal observed: 
We .... go on the surface at night into the roads of Napier (15,000 inhabitants). As 
everywhere, no blackout. You can see the beach cafe with bright red lights, and the 
dance music is playing old tunes, to which the couples are moving. The town on its hill 
is glittering with thousands of lights. We don't quite get into the roads, because the 
lighthouse for inexplicable reasons is not on and a very heavy unpleasant 
phosphorescence is prevalent. We lay still and just want to have a look around the joint 
first of all. 14 
5 
It was nearly midnight as Pukeko slipped her moorings. As she moved away from the 
wharf, she was being watched. Reiffenstuhl recorded, 
After a short while a little steamerling comes out of the harbour, it has even got its 
running lights set according to peacetime regulations. Everybody in New Zealand seems 
to feel very safe. Ah well! What is easier than following a steamer with burning lights. 
We go out of the harbour with it, come very close to another little steamer which just 
didn't see us because it didn't expect us to be there. In the dawn we dive for the attack-
the Kommandant missed! Presumably the steamer at this short distance had seen our 
very very cautiously raised periscope (the aiming periscope with which you can see 
better, but which is bigger) or it had seen the track of the torpedo as it turned away. It 
was 1,000 BRT. Immediately it began sending off Morse signals to the signal station on 
Portland Island. Now they know about us here and we must push off ... 15 
The U-boat positioned itself ahead of the Pukeko for the attack and fired the torpedo from 
around 200 metres off the port bow. 16 It may also be the case that the torpedo donged the 
side of the ship without exploding as a 'defective plate' on the port side was replaced 
many months later. If Captain Stan Petley of the Pukeko did use his Hamilton Wilson 
Type TL3 transmitter to signal Portland Island that morning, the message was not 
received. 17 While the ship's logs have been burnt, the log of the Marine Department 
Lighthouse on Portland Island does not mention any signal received. I8 Things were not 
perfect at the lighthouse that day. The tower in the lighthouse was not manned between 
0450 hours and 1940 hours. The Principal Keeper, H.R.Young went off ill from 0900. 
the r 1 Assistant Keeper,.L.G.Brennan, was to look after charging the radio batteries, the 
meteorological report, keep a lookout, assist in cleaning out the Benzine tank, and do 
some gardening. ].G. Puflett, the 2nd Assistant Keeper was to keep lookout, help with the 
Benzine tank, the met duty, and deal with a 44 gallon oil drum. Brennan was lookout 
from 0450 to 0800 hours, Young from 0800 to 0900 hours, and Puflett from 0900 to 1500 
hours. The radio does not appear to have been manned, as the 'Wireless Watch' section 
of the log is empty, whereas up to 13 January 1945 this had been consistently filled in as 
6 
'Skeds' .19 It appears quite likely that if the Pukeko radioed, it went unnoticed. It would 
also seem to be the case that the crew of the ship, if they had been aware of something 
amiss, were not in the long run concerned about it, for nothing was reported. A metallic 
clang on the side may have been simply dismissed, after a while. All of this is 
speculation, but the U-boat slipped away to the south. The 17 and 18 January was spent 
heading south towards Wellington. On 19 January the U862 was off Cook Strait, waiting 
for shipping?O A Cook Strait ferry would have made a nice target. Unfortunately, the U-
boat was abruptl y ordered by a signal from SKL in Berlin to return immediately to 
Batavia. Timm kept wireless silence. U862 ventured south to round the bottom of the 
South Island on 21 January,21 and after a long unpleasant passage in the face of the 
Roaring 'Forties, she found the Liberty ship Peter Silvester in the Indian Ocean on 6 
February, and sank her. On her passage back, U862 kept wireless silence until she was 
not far from Batavia. On 9 and 14 February Timm signalled a short breakdown of his 
patrol and his imminent arrival at the rendezvous point.22 It was V862's last war patrol. 
What then can be concluded about U862 in New Zealand waters in January 
1945? Firstly, it indicated that in spite of Awarua being careful to watch for signal traffic 
from the Indian Ocean V-boats and their bases, if a submarine kept wireless silence, its 
location was secure until an attack was mounted or a sighting made. Even then, the 
attack would have to be recognised as such. Secondly, getting a D/F fix was in any case 
not a guarantee the submarine would be located by hunting forces. Thirdly, it is clear 
from the impressions of the crew of U862 that New Zealand had fallen back into a full 
peacetime environment, as loose as that which prevailed when the Orion mined the 
approaches to Auckland in 1940. Kapitan Timm with a little more luck could have made 
7 
a modest killing on his cruise down the east coast of the North Island, as an analysis of 
shipping movements discloses. Some thirty-one ships sailed from New Zealand ports in 
January 1945, not counting local coasters, fishing vessels or miscellaneous small craft. 
Of those larger vessels, only a small proportion were at sea in the general area of U862.23 
There were a number of ships shuttling back and forth between the main New 
Zealand supply ports of Auckland and Napier and the Allied forward area in the Pacific 
Islands. The US Naval auxiliary AF19 Roamer sailed from Napier for Noumea on 9 
January, presumably passing U862 in the Cape Brett area. On 9 January the AF20 
Taurus left Auckland at 0700 hours for Espiritu Santos, passing through the waters off 
Cape Brett. Another US Naval auxiliary, the AK71 Adhan departed Auckland the same 
day for Noumea, but does not appear to have been sighted by the U-boat. Another US 
Naval auxiliary, AF24 the Delphinus departed Napier for Noumea on 10 January. This 
illustrates the difficulties of sighting vessels in uncrowded waters. That said, U862 had 
sunk four ships in four days in the far wider Mozambique Channel in August 1944?4 
A tempting naval target was to hover unseen in front of U862 over a few days. 
At 0640 hours on 10 January, HMNZS Matai set off towing the minesweeper HMNZS 
Arbutus, heading out through Colville Channel past Cuvier lighthouse bound for 
Lyttelton. The submarine was still off Cape Brett, but she would head south following 
the two New Zealand warships over the next few days. Having dropped off Arbutus, the 
Malai steamed back to Wellington, arriving as the submarine headed down the Wairarapa 
"')<; 
coast. -. 
As U862 passed the Great Barrier Island, the Greek registered George M. 
Ebiricos departed Auckland on 12 January for Sydney. Heading directly towards U862 
8 
the same day was the US Naval auxiliary AK96 Sterope from Wellington, steaming in 
through Colville Channel at 1628 hours. A little later, and she would have run into the 
U-Boat. On 14 January, the AK91 Corcaroli left Auckland at 0747 hours for Wellington, 
arriving there on the afternoon of 16 January. She must have passed the submarine en 
route. We have already noted the good fortune of the Stepas Darius sailing from Napier 
on 15 January, and the even better luck of the Pukeko.26 AK76 Celeno left Wellington on 
15 January and arrived in Auckland on 17 January. AK75 Cassiopeia arrived in 
Wellington from Torokina on 18 January. 
There was one other long shot. The alternative of returning north via New 
Caledonia to Yokohama or to Batavia through the Southern and Indian Oceans were 
discussed by the officers as U862 headed down the Wairarapa coast in the direction of 
Wellington and the approaches to Cook Strait. If they had decided to proceed north and 
taken a leisurely pace, they may have run into the battleship HMS Howe in company with 
HMNZS Achilles and the destroyers Queensborough, Quality and Quadrant en route to 
Auckland from Sydney between 2 and 5 February.27 There were clearly targets around for 
the U-boat, and it was simply good luck that nothing was sunk. To compound matters, 
the RNZAF Catalina Squadron was deployed in the Pacific Islands, and the small number 
of Sunderlands that had just arrived were not equipped with depth charge racks, so a swift 
and effective response to an attack may not have been forthcoming.28 
I German Atlantic wrr Organisation. Traffic and Procedure, Royal Canadian Navy, S-1440-18 OIC3. 
2 Signal C.inC. Eastern Fleet to SO(Y), 26 September 1944, wrr Intelligence - Foreign Broadcasts, 
April1940-September 1945. New Zealand National Archives N 208/36/10. 
; Ihid . 
.. B.d.U.War Log. 14 Septemher 1944. Translation of PG/30361, University of Canterbury Microfilm 
Lihrary. 
s WIS no.22. 28 February 1945, Weekly Intelligence Summary NZNA N 11 no.8. 
9 
6 U-boat Dispositions, 2 October 1944-17 Feburary 1945, ULTRA PRO HW 4/2; S.D.Waters Royal New 
Zealand Navy War History Branch 1956 p.222; David Stevens U-Boat Far From Home Allen & Unwin 
1997 Chapters 12 & 14; David Jenkins Battle Surface! Japan's Submarine War Against Australia 1942-44 
Random House 1992 pp.286-287. 
7 Stevens Chapter 13; Reiffenstuhl Journal, December 1944-February 1945 U-Boat Archives, Cuxhaven. 
Gunther Reiffenstuhl was IWO on U-862. 
8 Reiffenstuhl Journal, translated by Dr.Stan Jones, German Department, University ofWaikato May 1992; 
entry for 5 January 1945. 
(j Reiffenstuhl Journal 15 January 1945. 
10 Letter from A.J.de Landes, Port of Napier, to author, 23 July 1992, reference shipping movements 15-16 
January 1945 in and out of Napier; 15-16 January 1945, Navy Office War Diary 1939-1945 NZNA N 14/2. 
11 Reiffenstuhl Journal 15-16 January 1945. 
12 J.G.Shackie, Surveyor of Ships to Chief Surveyor of Ships, Wellington, 16 January 1945, M.V Pukeko 
Box 146, Marine Department Ship File, NZNA M 22; Pukeko NZNA BAAD A 195/42e. 
13 Letter de Landes to author, 23 July 1992. 
14 Reiffenstuhl Journal 16 January 1945; maps show three wharves, dredged channel to 30' to 35', and 
outer mole, Defence of Minor Ports - Napier, March1942-June 1944, NZNA N 2 020nll. 
15 Reiffenstuhl Journal 16 January 1945. 
16 Letter from Gerald Shone, 9 December 1997, and June questions to crew of U-862 by Gerald Shone at 
reunion in Germany. 
17 Pukeko NZNA BAAD A 195/42e. 
III Enquiry to Union Steamship Company elicited that the deck logs of the Richardson Company ships were 
destroyed when Union Steamship Company took over Richardsons; Daily Journal, 16 January 1945, 
Marine Lighthouse Portland Island NZNA ML 1 no.12. 
J<) Daily JournaL 16 January 1945, Marine Lighthouse Portland Island NZNA ML 1 no.12. 
2() Reiffenstuhl Journal 17-19 January 1945. 
21 Reiffenstuhl Journal 21 January 1945. 
22 Signals from U.862 on 9,14 February 1945 noted in Stevens op.cit. footnote 25, p.260. 
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TOP SECRE~ AND PERSONAL. 
U-Boat Dispositions. 
~U-Boats in Indian Ocean underlined). 
Dat~: 21;..th November, 1944. 
Location. Remarks. 
JAPAN. Fitting nerf battery. 
Either b'6ttveen s.AB.~G and. PENANG or approaching BATAVIA. 
PEN.A.NG. 




1~1 d;,:ds So 
2l: dcgs' E. 
BAXAVJ.A. 
SOUR8B.AY.A.. 
:l<;'~ -::~I·:X' 'e 3' degs S. 
3Sdegs E. 
JAPAN. 
Will probably sail shortJ...y to opera.te in AUST:,:.ALI.AN 
area, possibly off South West or Sou th Coastt 
If not sunk, will rpaoeed throu[1h the. lft.OZAMBIQUE 
~1annel to operate West bf OSCOTRA • 
Refitting. 
IJossibly in SIiTG-APORE. 
May shortly arrive to join 8th Sugnarine Squrulron. 
PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE I Ins I 1 j I 2 
HW4-!2.. I 
Please note that ttUs copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and axlditions and 1hat your use of it may be subject to 
copyright restriCtions. Further infonnation is given in the rr anns and Conditions of supply of Public R(l()()(ds' leaflat displayed at and awllable 




1 UL ~ ~. 
la .. !" .:.,) . <. '"' s .'''::aac' ....... 
TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL. 
U-Boat Dispositions. 




Date: 7th J~muery, 1945. 
Remarks. 
Fitting new battery ... Completes 5th Feb. 
May then operate err LEYTE. 
Docked on arrival Xrom Jepan @n 23rd. 














To sail for Europe e~rly J8nuary fuelling 
from "SS" .. 
Proceeding te Bergen. Has enly two. 
torpec'l.Qes. 
TG seil for Eur~pe before 15th January, 
possibly fuelling !tEIt. 
Wi 11 sa11 tG fuel "N" f'Ol~ pSl888ge te 
EurQpe. Net clear whether she will 
c~ntinue er return te Betev1a, possibly 
csrrying out pstrol on w~y back. 
Last fixed ~n 24th December off' SiQney, 
Leaves for JBpSln 15th JElnuary. 
Completes. repairs, docking ancl a1 tel"'atiens 
1 Oth Feb. To be used. as Su-pply U-boat 
in East Asie. 
TOP SECRET "AND PERSONAL •. 
u-Boat Dispositions, 
(U-Boats in Indian Ocean W1derlined). 
Date: 19th J9nusrY,1945. 
U-Boat. LocatiGn. Remarks. 
A Jilpan. Completes fitting new bsttery 5th Februar,y, 
after which eperstes in Philippines ares. 
Ssiled trom ~Iilt~vi. 13th Jlilnu~r7 tel'" Eurepe. 
Te be fue lled by "FB". 
Bat.vi", .1'" msy hj£lve n6lW 8 ailed to overtske "Eft and fuel her. 
Decking, preb&bljl in 81 ngepere. Preceeis tm Seurabsye en 
Penlilng. 
complett on. 
S~ilea from Betevilil 11 th Jlilnlill:)PY ter Europe. 
To be fuelle' by "SS". 
Proeeedin&; t. ~l"gen. 
Rep~iring.· ¥iY procee~ to eperste in 
Philippines sre~ on cempletien. 
Svi led BI;1tllVilii 14th Jetnu~ry te Glvertake "Nil 
IiInd :rue 1 hep. 
Possibly in vicirity 
or 36· S, 1 31 0 E. 
Ordered en 17th te return t. Bliltlilv1s 
forthwi tho 
WE J .. plln or MsllilYIil. Completes refi t 10th Pebrumry. To be use .. J 
RO-113 
RO-115 
S in"liiIpere •. 
as supply U-bc~t in Elilst Aei,. 
Proceeding te J~pan en 23rd, presumsbly te 
:fit l1ew battery. 
)Silil i"r0m Pen51n~ todey t .. S1ngipGre. These are believed. te 
)be the U-bolilts,lreviausly theuiht to be leaving on 1~tht who 
are to fuel [:It E ingapore lind proceed til operSilte in Philippine 
arelil. 
Appendix Six 
Reporting Officer's Report to Staff Officer (Intelligence) 
On von Luckner. 
[RNZN Museum] 







24~' Y~bnQ~rr, 1938. No. P. 38/8/2918 
The Commodore Commandl~ Dew Zealand 5t&'\102' 
(OOW'.o sta.!! ot'rloer(lntelllgenoe), 1I,l11naton.) 
o'~'/uiJ ................................... 
...........,. .................................. ..... 
Coun' P'elb 1'on Luckner aocOMpft.Dled ~ ,be caun'eee ~d 1h$ fallfn'iDi orow .. ur1.e4 In Auoklud fnR Apia OIl 20th 








HM. O .. tfl"reio 
1.' Ottlo.r 







£. Tho 7t\Qht hu be-en berthed D"1" \be .11""87 in st. Mar.r' •. 
Be.1 &.nd it 18 an-tlo1pa'od.thf1t the charatlm 01 thl! "lel' will 
be 2 t.o 3 man UuJ • ..
3" 'The Count expr888" • 1.81 ... deaire \0 o4Jll. GD 
myself and the Comm!U14ing Offioer of U.J.t,s. -ft~1.:·J.;IJlrmTO!r', 
I-.OClOMpMl.4 b7 '-Jut Cou.nt ••• , h. o~ .. onboard ItrmLOHr~:t". 011 
23rd lfefb-n1er.Y. during "be toreoOAII 11. W88 ","remoli trlOD4l.r, 
thtatrlool fttld ..,ex-hate, h1k1nc :oon~lm1oua17tor nevlT 1ft .hour 
on Jutlant, hi. ,Priloner otltv·. t1M 1ft If_ tetl.huld end prftl#\ 
day Oerme.ny-'s atmt. fhen .... DO Moetu,l", at atq' tlae '0 Uk 
h 11ft qua.11on. or upre.B . Mop1nlan p 'th. COWl' 'h.ld the floor' 
and well' :lr0a2 en •. oubJoC' ,. eno'Uler. !he "&0\ tha, ht had 
been oou.ri-m~lal.led in ., _biD den the "mILO.-rJ." ftB Ill. 
·~·.111ns"on was o! In'erfu~t \0 h.la an4 'PftL8 'he '"&88 of atan1.q 
h1.m talk1!lB nhout his t1m. u prtuonu 0", w-ar. 
4. It YtafJ nG~lc.d that th- SountHIt. who .pake r.ngl1.h 
• er:y "ell 1thlo.ttd, wna thoroughlJ' ootth'nlen\ w1 til 0.11 'hi count 
be:d to \al~ aD~\1t~ ahe baa n.u4en'~ heard. it mQq 'ba. 'tMJt,r. 
a.net one Wq 1af\ 'fr 1 th the lapJiNtllon that abe WU li8\8D1_, 
rcadT '0 ohant,te 'he Bubjea' 1f bi* Mlthuela. oa:rried hira -87 
and. lead bis '0 eubJec'llJ wb.lCJh .lsh' han Men lndleond. 
5. ~. COWl' Tolunt&rllt aptmDdW Hiller' .. poll.., .blob 
"a.e M tolloft1l t.... tflla\ QemaDl baa no intention of :tlptlft1. 
.F.ngland or Franoe bu' 1n·ten4ri to .'.PO'Ilt _lab .. 1_, 1 ••• 
RuBia.. OctrrAt'ltl1' wan 11&4 '\!la'\ Mr .. An'h~ M_ 1\64 rpip" 
as be ,,&.8 aga1na' tb.lr upanelO1l \0 'hi HUt an4 it .... :f1l1' 
'hat 'Ul1.na"8 "'«)\lid be be"." wl\b· V18~' lIol1tu u far.lea 
s eara"aJ"'1t Tba control .,r oonfltS!. \$ rae.i8il .,. lIuS._ of 
Aua\r1ft. aoumanla artd O_eabeelOYakla ... $11 ,.rt of BItler'. 
plan '0 ensure that "bel be a.t\e.oke4 awHIla. all oowstrlM 
\0 \he F..u' ot Uerm&n7 wou14 be OIl Qe~'. a1d.e. Japaa,_ at'.r 
her oGmpslcn 1n Chllla."ou1d thin .'taok' 01" at 1 ..... ho14 Rd-l. 
111 the ElLs'\. COUfit TOft .J.;QokDer ,aY. 1\ .. h18' o'pblo~ that 
nal:' AU6U8t er September, when the b&M'. u" was tn, "oul4 aM 
'he atart ot Germany •• exJ«n81~ to the JaU~Jln o.her word., 
G e l"I\!\t17 et.nd J 8 pan' . aga 1na" RuBel ... 
6. ~~ 'he ~~unt •••••• 
-1-
I. Why 'h~ c~~ should baye aMd. thetil r~or~e 18 
dlt~loult \0 undentcnd 'bu' 1t. 18 a~rtaln 1hat hiG ~n-u1.o 
-hlob h. 8878 le be1ns aad. for })leasure, 1nolu4" Ph8Clbtns 
'he 81m3 of' Q.-rm8n1 or the goa~l of ftar. am wb • ...,.r he pH .. 
Sinde btl errlTal, in I\\lolded. he hU been IJHlt1ns Oft the 
wireless dal17 fl.nd In'enda Sll'1nc a leoture in the !own Hall 
on \he 24\1\ )'ebruaJ7, 
, " fhtt 11., of persona 1'orm1ng thfJ orew G~ tfSEm'EUPELtt 
.hac ken Checked M4 qreea 1!f1tb ~ liBt 111'e lit the 
&iatf O.tfloer (llr\.U1ienot)f. ~.ll1nc\oft'. Ro. If.A. 1&/8/' 
of 24\h 3anusl'71,. 19M, wl\h 1the exoe",t_ the, e 1Mq n~ 
Frederlek Kurt HU.hag.l.Dlt.~ whoa. fath.r 1& a ~ber o~ 
th. t1emOM a{\mini.tnt-lon Waft etTen .. pus8le tr_ .-.:plf1' '" 
AucklMd. 
e. F,.oho-aoW1d1n6 s*ar 18 iftet.allecl. 
t • lAng met11ld1l and abon-_a.,. wi "le88 8.,,,, 8re la..aan.e4 
and 1 •. 18 "iined that a 1)/" Bn 1. a.1eo :tl 'tN. 
10. l't has net 7et be~.~B :po.Dible \0 find ou' If '-he tt5E.P.:?~JTBL" 
ottl.led ., .M;f 'tmU8ual t porta In tho aou\h A\lan'S.o or Indian 
Ooesna • 
, 
11. ~o mtmtlon has haen m648 regard1ng ahawlnc ot films" 
12, .r&rt!ou1a.ro 01 "£Hlf~EUFm,," are f-
7onnage. e4 lOn •• 
oil tired. v.1~A81 engine deTel,)pins 150 h.p. 
ComU .. li.tmR IR COO~D. 
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(To be distributed to Coast Watching 
Stations) • 




Copy No. ___ t_) 
ORGANIZATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY. 
COAST Y/ATCHING ORGANIZATION. 
Notes: 1. The Coast VJatching Organization 
explained herein will not be brought 
into force unti~ a definite instruction 
to that effect is received o 
(a) 
20 Your attention is directed to the 
necessity of keeping these instructions 
and all other Coast Y/a. tching Papers in a 
safe place, and of tl-eating all corres-
pondence as SECRET 0 
OBJECT OF THE ORGANIZATION. 
To maintain a watch on ships and aircraft which can 
be seen from the ooast of New Zealandj 
(b) To report any abnormality in the movements of or 
appearance of the shi~8 or aircraft Sighted to a 
responsible Naval Office~~ 
List of Coast Watching Stations: 
2. The list of stations to be established in an emergency is 
gi ven in Appendix A to this memorandumo The 1 i st is divided into 
four Districts for convenience of administration. 
Communications: 
3. It is essential that a suitable means of communication be 
provided without delay between each of the stations enumerated in 
Appendix A and the office of the Naval Intelligence Officer of the 
District in which the station is situated. To this end the Post 
and Telegraph Department will provido whatever extension lines are 
necessary between the actual Coast v-latching points and the nearest 
telephone or Public Telephone Officen Some details of these 
requirements are given in Appendix An 
4. It is not considered necessary to extend the telephone lines 
or to instal VIIT equipment prior to an emergency taking place. 
Pe r§onnel : 
5. Each Station should have sufficient personnel to maintain a 
wa tch continuously throughout the full 2~. hours each day.. Hands 
additional to peace-time requirements are not to be engaged for 




6. Attached also to this Pa~er is a Guide (O,N.S.91) for issue 
to the watchers, gIVIng detailed instructions about the reports and 
information that are required~ 
Eauipment: 
7. The equipment of a Coast V/atching Station should comprise 
the following:-
A suitably sheltered pcsition in which to keep watch; 
Means of communication wi th the Naval District 
Intelligence Officer; 
B~noculars or telescope; 





SEC RET. PAPER O~N.S. 91. 
G Copy No. 
14th Sep~te-m~b-e-r-,~1~938 
GUIDE TO PERSONNEL ENGAGED IN COAST VIATCHING DUTIES. 




Officer to whom reports should be sent: "District Naval 
Intelligence Officer -
Telephone Noo of D.N.I.O. (To be supplied when available) 
Telegraphic code address of D.N.I.O: "NAVYTEL1 lf 
Introduction. 
Coas t Via tching Stations are established in time of war or 
proclaimed imminence of war to ensure that any information of normal 
or unusual movements off the coast of vessels or aircraft, of landings, 
activities of what may be suspected to be enemy parties on the coast 
and of activities of enemy agents, are reported immediately to the 
proper authorities~ 
Reporting. 
2. All reports are to be made by urgent telegram (or 
telephoned immediately) to the District Naval Intelligence Officer 
(D.N.I.O.) as abovea All messages are to be numbered consecutively 
and carbon copies kept for reference~ 
3. It is most important that information is passes to 
your D.N.I.O. as soon as possible after it becomes available, so that 
immediate action can be taken by the authorities concerned if neeessary. 
The initial report can always and shouJd El"lways when possible be supple-
mented by a further message giving a more detailed description of the 
sighting or incident (see paragraph 5)0 
INFORMATION REQUIRED. 
Ships and Aircrafto 
4~ As soon as a ship of war, aircraft, merchant vessel 
or fishing craft of any nationality has been Sighted, a message is to 
be written out on a telegram form in the following form and despatched 
immediatel~ by telegraph or telephone to your D.N.I.O. (see paragraphs 
1, 2 and 3). 
Number of message (in figures). 
':lime sighted. 
Direction and distance in miles from your Station or 
from a well defined position~ 
Number of vessels or aircraft sighted (in wordS). 
Nationality (if unknown, fact to be reported)~ 
-2-
Name(s) or distinguishing mark(s) (when practic-
able) or type(s). (rf name or distinguishing 
number cannot be ascertained, fact to be stated). 
Direction in which'proceeding. 
EstiLnated speed. 
Date and time message is written out. 
P.DD IT IO!7AL Ir-i'FORMAT ION REQUmED. 
5. Any additional information, if attainable, should 
be repo rted later in a further message. 'lhe following w ill give 
you a guide as to the infonuation required. 
r..rerchant vessels or fishing craft on their normal routes. 
6. Unless a considerable alteration in course is made, 
it is not necessary to report the further movements of a friendly 
or neutral ship which has already been reported. 
Warships or susiJicious craft .. 
7. In reporting the sighting of warships or suspicious 
craft, however,the following additional details should subsequently 








( j ) 
Aircraft. 
Number and position of n~sts and funnels, whether 
upright or sloping and, in the case of funnels, 
whether squat or high. 
Colou~ of hull, upper works and funnel(s). 
Shape of bow and stern. 
Estima ted length and tonnage. 
NUli1ber J posi tion cond size of guns" 
Number of torpedo tubes. 
Particulars of construction or painting; whether 
well-·declced or flush declced; conspicuous derriclcs 
or ventilators. 
Whethe r fitted with WiT. 
Reasons for which considered suspicious in the case 
of suspicious craft. 
Date and time 0 f previous message (if any) to which 
this information refers. 
8. In the case of aircraft v"{hen the distinguishing 
marks cannot be given, as full details a~ possible as to type are 
re Quired, especially whether biplane, or iilonoplane, number of 
engines, and whether fitted with boat-sllaped hull, floats or wheels. 
Submarine s • 
9. In reporting the sighting of submarines the follow-




V/hether submerged (i. e., whether the periscope only 
was see.n) or on the surface. 
Description of subiaarine, stating estimated dimensions, 
number and -006i tiol1 of guns. 
l~ame of ship - 8.ttacl:ec1 (if any). 
\°v'hether ship sunlc, sinldng, damaged or escaped. 
Dc:t"ce and time of previous message (if any) to which 
this information refers. 
10. In reporting information about or the sighting of 






Number of message (in figures). 
Date, time and exact pOSition sighted. 
'Nl1.ether moored mine, moored mine awash or drifting 
mine. 
Note: ~rhe nornencla ture given in 6( 3) is invariably 
to be used:-
1100red !.Cine A submerged mine attached 
to its moorings. 
Hoored mine awash A moored mine showing on 
the surface. 
Drifting mine - .1.\ mine detached from its 
moorings, but which is 
floating on the surface, 
at the will of the wind 
and tide. 
Type, if recognized, othej,. ... wise a brief description 
gi ving full particulars as to horns visible. 
Appearance (i. e,,; old J fairly new or new. 'rhis 
can be estim.a. tecl by the amount of marine growth 
or its absence)" 
Colour 'Painted. 
Date) and time message is written out. 
1 i. In reporting s O1ll1ds of gun fire endeavour is to be 
made to give some indjcation of its character, the message talcing 







Number of.' message (in figures). 
Nature of gun (i.e., sounds are sharp or resembling 
thunder) • 
Whether continuous or intermittent. 
Near or distant. 
Direction from which sound comes. 
Direction and fOr'ce of wind. 
Visibility in direction from which sound comes. 
Date and time i'ilessage is writt.en out. 
LANDINGS AND ENEMY A9_~~VITIES. 
12. Information regarding the landings, activities and 
movements of enemy parties should be reported in a message written 
out in the following form:-
~ 1j Number of message (in figures). 2 Date and time landings or enemy activities were noticed. 3 Exac t, or npl')j:'o;cilila te, locality landing party was Sighted 
or activity of enemy agent took place. 
(4) Details of landings , activities and iilovements of enemy 
parties (ap~roximate nmnber of troops, vehicles, how 
l811ded etc.). 
(5) V/hether landings, activities etc. were observed by you; 
if not, source of infonnation should be indicated. 
(6) Date and time message is written out. 
r ...rINOR ORDBRS :R.TI: lIESS.il.GE~ .. 
13. All messages sent b~T' a 'iVar Watching Station are 
to be signed by the name of the Viar Wa"cching Station only. This 
name is to be vvritten at the foot of the :torm" 
-4-
14. 'rhe originals of all messages received and carbon 
copies of all messages sent are to be lcept for reference until 
orders for their destruction are received from your D.r.O. 
,15. The information contained in this guide is not to 
be communicated to unauthorised persons. 
Appendix Eight 
Map showing Post Office Radio September 1942 
[NI10/19/1] 
MUJICK POI NT: 
COMMl/I"--:A110/,/J 6 P/.IUCT/(}N· 
FI#/JIN" ':.E~IIICEf TO TA.fMAN 
fMNIlE "A-TJtWA 'ff, PAN -ANfllcAN 
, AII.WA"'.1" (,.. .fIMILAR J'E.R. VIC£. 
To ~N.,].AI 6. AU/EO FORCEf 
AltCJl.A~T j 80TII INT~.t.NAJ., 
£.. TRANf· OC£AN. 
CtJMMtA.CIAi .f(JlfPfl~J WITN l(JA .(R.C.~ 
If /. 't {//(lTl§ .flHCtIol( 
MtTeOll.oLOClCAJ. .feR v ICE.s . 
. POINT TO 10lNT fERYIC£.r MrJl SuVA J 
. f/ovlrl£A, JYPAlE., .l re.. 
CONT/NI.IOU.f WAre" ON SOOKC/.J 
,FOR. JIIIPI IN PIJrJl.£fS: AIJO 
, 2012 KGjJ f'MAJ..J. .fIlIPf WA TeH. 
NAVAr... 5f.A..V'(.t.J' :-
I P/~f:C,7ION' fIND/Nt;; ON H.F &M.F. 
HI~H FR.f()VENcy b MtC.'UM FifO. 
DllleT/ON !/N~/N tJ JfR vICL(' 
.roO KC/J CONTINUOllJ WATCH 
fO~ J HIP.f IN ~'J7n.f..f.J. 
,P/l.tCT/ON IINf)INcJ ").CI/./TIf~( 
PR.Ov'IOlD . TO P',N.Z.A. f. 
WAIOUIlU :-
:'S~ . fflJ.,u·: .,..' 
Ir-----..;..;."-......... ...,~ .......... __ ------I-t'1J " 14~ . ,>- :: !l.OIOJU COM8JAJ£D . 





,.; .JtPT. {942 • 
..... ' .. 
~f' f::::~il-~ :'z~': ~i:::.J. ~;;.;J;.~ .::-:' , '. 
'.,'i~.. M A K A ~ A: ~.l.PIO if.Cf/VINe CfNr.u I 
.0(':, '~I TO cell!}.. AU. IICIJV/;.t(f UQfJ/~EMENr.r I 
,.~ ,,~ .;' f 0;: A/EJ.J.JNCrON, /NCL{/~/}Ja T)lOfl 
~(~~;qu~ .1 Or JlATIONAL JJWADCAITlNtJ fliYICI. I F 0 H ~ J 0 t.J V Il U.: TRA}/JirlITilN t1 (.l}(TR.l. I 
, , 
AT f.l A P !E ~ , 5l E N H tIM, T A I E. Rl 
Af.J<AO/o IT N -S A 24- HOUR 
WA rc,H ON 500 KC/S IS 
j,{AJ).JTAj)JEJ) fOP. 511"1 IN PISTRerf; 
t:. D.F. 8i..4R.INC.5 rAKcN OAi 
SUCH Vf..5JE.i.J J ON BEJlA!f OF 
~ NAvAL AUTHOR-IT/e...!. 
). U X fL/).~' TO Wfl.llN erOA; ~ '1= f R.).DIO FOR PW[R.l;ry PuJ<POJf.J'. I 
~AD10 JUVICEJ:-
\. 4\'AL JER\'r.:.~5 
ME r!O~ol.otJICAL ffRYICE.s 
COMIrfU,CI),L Ju.rICH U'SA (MACkAY RADIO). 
UNiTlO *'1f./600.M. 
IAC.lfIC /JlAAlD5~ 
Juv)., 4"),. ro,vGA,}//UE,TAHJTI, fTC 
2~ HOUR. WATCH ()N SOO KC!.S 
(MERCHANT VEHELO/JTRE55 WATCH). 
2012 XC/J 'sMALL SHIP JiRVIC.E-
AERADIO JE!(J-/c'E...s 
SEli.VJCE.5 -L~ LlCHTHCJU.f£ JTATION.J 
AWAR..UA R.ADIO S£~VICt..5:- NAVAL 5PlC' . ..{f. w.!i(llf..s: 
M.f'. t.... )I.!- PIR..ECT/ON FINOIN G : P,;C:;;;;ON f,xITIJIi CHIC/AL PR.Ef.!: 
.roo KC/S CONT/NUQIJ{ MERCHANT ItIfEl. t!.fTetfJ }f)TC/I : 
2011, KC/S WAre H fOt<. fMALL SHIP;", ),f[,U()1l.0U::6ICAJ JeRV/CL: 
JUVICEf TO OLlT.l.YINC frATIONI' J.i.CKJONf BAT, .JriILfOR.f) SP. €.. TO 
MARIN£. PEPTJ. L 1611T flOUJ€ J T.~ iICA.lJ, E Te. 
Appendix Nine 
Coastwatchers in trouble: Controller of Pacific Communications 
On the situation in the Gilberts 3 October 1942. 
[Vaughan Papers] 
~ 
COLONY OF FIJI. 
CONTROLLER OF PACIFIC COMiliIUNICATIONS, 
SUVA. 
MEMORAl'JDUM for: SECRET 
3rd October, 1942. 
The Naval Secretary, 
Navy Office, 
WELLINGTON, C.1. 
(Through the Director-General, .a,.A 
Post ::nd Telegraph De~artA'<f:· 
NELLINGTON, C .1. ) 
(~h h "JA.)_ h, ;(: o. I'--------J 
N.A. 030/33/17, 24.8.42. N.Z.C.B. 017 Par~ II, monthly 
reports by parent stations. 
I aLtach for your information further reports 
PLEASE NOTE 3ubmitted by Mr. D.L. Vaughan, Operator in Charge, Radio 
k . ~S ~unafut1, covering the operation of coast-watching stations . rt"-PEr\ I-n the Ellice Group for the months of July and August. e I\CUU\TED . . 
HEREYVITH The following'extracts from a further communication 
. . 'eceived from Mr. Vaughan are submitted. for your information:-
pleo.:;.;;. 
/\.i : . ." i 




,;{{. (1 C T 1~)I!~) 
"i. The gear for BYC, Niutao, has been ready 
for some time DOW although the receiver is not 
very good. We can hear very 'little on it in 
the daytime but of course it 1s only a T~'. I 
found that the inter-stage. transformer was open-
circuited recently and have now changed the plate 
circuit of the detector to.Impedance-Coupling. 
This eq,uipment for' Bye has "again been erected in 
the bush almost at t he northern-most end of the 
main islet here. The transmitter can be operated 
anywhere be~ween about 24 and 45 metres. 
2. All of the equipment· is working very well 
at present although I have been ala~ed at the 
number of things which have become open-circuited, 
possibly owing to the humidity. 
3. Mr. Taylor is, as you know, doing a great 
job up there and both he and Murray are resigned 
to their fate. The suspense over the last year 
has been considerable and you can imagine their 
feelings when each of their stations is taken without 
an LL11 call being heard. We are indeed fortunate 
to be so far south - not far enough for me!~ 
Personally I shall be very pleased when the 
opportunity to return to ciVilization occurs. 
4. I anticipate that our present SU2Ply of fuel 
will (if necessary) last until about the middle of 
March of next year. Three drums have been set aside 
for Bye but it appears that the installation of that 
station will not now take place. -
5. I wa~ very- sorry to hear the LLLL signal 
from zee, Beru, at 7.6 a.m.'. this morning. Falavi, 
the native boy, was on duty at zec and he sent the 
call several times on both substation fre~uencies 
followed by the VlOrds -' II· 3 Jap warships II, also 
sent several times. Mr. Ta~lor advised me last 
2 -
night that he expected it any day and I under-
stand tha t he has equipment hidden in the bush. 
We have for a consid~rable time had codes and 
ca~l-signs decided upon in the event of an attack 
on either parent station. If the ~aps leave Beru 
Mr. Taylor may be able to get on the air on a 
frequency of 6520 kc/s on which frequency we will 
listen hence~orth, at suitable times. We have a 
crystal for that frequency while he 'IIi 11 have a 
small self-excited rig. 
6. I shall now assume control of the remaining 
three substations and I understand that BYL, Ku;ia, 
(Mr. Hearn) will come in only if he has trai'fic. 
At 9.30 a.m. this morning we contacted BYM, Tamana, 
(qsa 3) who then contacted BYX, Nonouti, and both 
stations gave us qru. BYX, Nonouti, is still 
experienc~ng receiver trouble and ~ gave BYM 
only qsa 1. We are of course only able to copy 
these stations when the channel on 7 mcs is clear. 
7. Beru is a very hard place to get on to and 
as the warships approached:'iD daylight there is 
DO' doubt that the operators were abSe to completely 
demolish their e~uipment.' zoe ke~t his usual 
schedule with us at 5 a .. m-. but did not call his 
subs at 6.30 a.m. He commenced calling LLLL at 
7.6 a.m. on 3.7 mea but could not hear our replies. 
He then called several times on 7,mcs and received 
our 'lsI ok. He was last heard at 7.15 a. m." . 
There ha~been no reports of signals from Beru 
on 6520 kc/s and it· would appear that Mr. Taylor was not 
able to bl"'ing the emergency station into operation. It 
is also assumed that daring :the period that the native 
operator was transmitting the LLLL Signals on the Teleradio 
set, Messrs Taylor and Murray may have been engaged on 
the desti.'uction 0'£ documents and the 100 watt transmitter. 
Controller o:f.Pacific Communications. 
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r'f 'f-T r ("J.1 -~ ';'j ~~ r:'-'\ ~I ~\ ~ .' 11 , 
COAST WA~S~~- PACIFIC lSLAlIDS. 
~MI~1AL ROLL PERSONNEL WITH SERVICE ON OW S~1.'.ATIONS WHO HAVE NOW BEEN 
-. . TRANSFERRED TO FIJI OR RETURNED TO N.Z. 
Date Date of return to N.Z. or Poet: IUty No: Rank: Name: embar~ Tra.nsfer:,: .. ~ to Fiji: 
ed: 
Nanumea se 64911 Pte. Rayner, . C.w. 19.7~41* Tr.to Fiji 8.8.43. 
se 64920 11 Walker, F.H. 19.7,41* Tr.to Fiji 8.8.43. 
P&T 012799 tt Hopkins, M.H. 13.7.41 . Tr.to Fiji 31.5.43. II 250993 tI Goodman, R.O. 13.7.41B Tr.to Fiji Jan 1943. 
Nui se 64030 n Beaton, D.R. 19.7.41· Tr • to Fi j i 11. 1 0 .41 • 
se 64343 11 Corin, e.E. 19.7.41~ Tr.to Fiji 8.8.43 
Nukefetau se 64425 It Love, A .. 19.7.41* To NZ 1.5.43. 
se 64411 " Hall, A.R. 19.7.41* To NZ 29.11.42. 
N1ulakita sa 64333 n Burns, R.C. 19.7.41* Tr.to Fiji 8.8.43. 
se 63922 II Cooper, J.T. 19. 7 ~41 * Tr.to Fiji 8.8.43. 
P&T 805264 It Anderson, N.I. 13. 7 .4ff~ Tr.to Fiji 25.5.43. 
* 
Embarked J rom Fiji. 
Nomuka se 69405 ~. Lock, J.J. 2.1.42 To NZ· 26.2.43. 
se 69407 Gnr Henderson, H.E. 2.1.42 To NZ 26.2.43. Re-embarked 
for Kerroadecs 16.7.43. 
Fiji se 801096 L/epl Thorpe, G.W. 17.10.42 T 6 . N. Z .• 25,. 2 .4.3 . 
Fata se 61178 L/Bdr Hutchinson, G. 2.1.42 10.4.43. To NZ. 
se 69408 Gnr Barnsdall, H. 2.1 f' '~2 1i9.8.42, It 
Kermadecs se 47914 Pte Drylie, D. 16.8.41 31 .12.41 
" se 47862 rt Baker, W.N. 16.8.41 5.5.42 11 
se 47915 tt Jacobsen, W.J. 16.8.41 5.5.42 it 
se 74839 It Lusk, R.W. \ 25.~.42 24.10.42 II 
se 47869 Sgt Hatton, G. 16. .41: 24.10.42 It 
'se 74836 Pte Collis, R.W. 25.4.42 9.4.43 " se 72387 II Lewes, E. 22.1.42 9.4.43 " +se 76507 Cpl Goodwin, F.E. 9.6.42 9 .. 4.43 " 
+Re-embarke ~ for Rakahanga 1.9.43 
590698 Pte Spooner, B.G. 13.10.42 8.7.43 " se 
se 70880 It Sharpe~ B. 24.3.43 21 .8.43 It 
47868 ft· Hatherly, G.E. 16.8.41 6.7.42 " Rakahanga se 
47867 L/Cpl Murray, J.J. 16.8.41 6.7.42 " SC 
4786} 
" 
Blanchfield, A.G. 16.8.41 6.7.42 II Nassau se 
16.8.41 6.7.42 11 se 47864 Pte Clarke, W.H. 
Suwarrow se 74838 L/epl McAngus, A.D. 14.5.42 28.8.42 " 
Bloomfield, W. 24.8.42. 16.2.43- " Chatham ew 175405 Pte 24.8.42 5.4.43 It Is. cw 580645 " Wright, F. L/Cpl 24 • .'3.42 5.4.43 If ew 8743 Tinmins, C.W. 
" CW 491428 Pte Neit~, J. 23.9.42 5.4.43 It 
ew 497943 " Gens1 , J.F.G. 23.9.42 5.4.43 11.9.42 9.3.43 II ew 809126 L/epl M.cDavitt, e.M. 
" cw 454636 Pte Miller, A. 11.1.42 9.3.43 It CTN 375387 tt Bareham, W.G. 19.1.43 15.3.43 
A 'I) 1 "52..31 5 to 
Co osrJ-.,.,.J Cl +c ~ ~ l' ?~ c:. 'j ,f.: c.. :Is 1 c.. f\...J.s Nom; >'\P-1 R ~ t J 
I J 
Post: Duty: No.: 
·Rank: Name: 
Kermad.ecs se 417480 Cpl Miller, D.E. 
se 590361 Pte Moffat, J. 24.3.43 
se 81345 Sgnn Wilton, R.A. 25.6.43 
se 69407 GnI' Henderson, H. 16.7.43 
se 251038 Pte Me dland, A.J. 24.3.43 
P&T 085660 Sgt Gardner, A.L. 16.7.43 
P&T 644222 Pte Ingram, A .. W.W. 1 .9.43 ~.,,_ ,.!z.... 
(a). Rakahanga SC 67887 1IQ:>1 Henderson, J. "- Returning to N .. Z • :Flnbkd,ll 1 4. 5 • 42 
SC 67899 Pte Fa terson, E.J." II 14.5.42 
SC 76507 Cpl Goodwin, F.R. I Replacement. tI 1.9.43 
Pd:T 001143 Cpl Pi ttaway, H.E.' Returning to N .Z. n 19.8.41] 
P&T 641031 C:pl Littlel', J.W. Replacement. It 1.9.43 
(a) Nassau SO 6442 IvC:Pl Bryant, L.J. Returning to N.Z. rt 14.5.42 
SO 74837 Pte Mail', A.W. " If " 14.5.42 SO 506619 e:pl McCarty, W.R. Replacement. It 1.9.43 
SO 525714 Pte Hickey, L.F. I' H 1.9.43 
P&T 441953 O:pl Williams, T.E. Returning. to N.Z. u 14.5.42 
Pd:T 459726 Opl Gordon, D.L. . Replacement. If 1 .9.43. 
t 
(8) Suwarow se 521461 Pte Bourke, S.W. Returning to N.Z. tI 27.9.42 
SC 74849 Pte Tither, J. " U tf 14.5.42 SO 545920 Opl Muir, A. Replacement. tt 1 .9.43 
SC 623691 Pte Lupton, D.R. tt 11 1.9.43 
P&T 252391 Cpl smart, H. Returning to N.Z. " 14.5.42 
P&T 622767 Opl Heron, A.J. Replacement. " 1.9.43 
Pukapuka se 507551 Cpl Willcock, H.E.J. 1.9.43 
se 499857 Pte Hair, H.G. 1.9.43 
Pd:T 639282 Cpl Davis, L.J. 1.9.43 
Tonga P&T 461564 Cpl Wasley, J.E. 2.1.42 
P&T 30576 II Burt, T. 2.1 .42 
P&T 299506 IF Reading, G.A. 28.9.41 B 
Fiji Group se 804797 Pte Shine, J.E. 17 .. 10.42 
SC 465825 IICpl Dalrymple, w. 17.10.42 
se 804796 Pte Harman, H. 17.10.42 
SC 558067 L/Cpl Bowler, J. 17,10.42 
0'';-''·; - ., 
se 509063 Pte Wil ton, A. 17.10.42 
se 300427 ~ Shone, W.H. 17.10.42 
se 491605 Pte Thurlow, A.C. 17.10 .. 42 
se 307097 IrCPl McCausland, G.I. 17.10.42 
se 407887 Pte Brown, J. 17.10.42 
se 578637 rvCpl Thomas, G.A.J. 17.10.42 
se 462517 Pte Coombe, H. 17.10.42 
Ono-i-Lau P&T 294713 Opl Young, F.R .. i 10.11.42 
P&T 437532 Pte S irnmons, I. T. 10.11.42. 
Chatham Is. ~~y 198448 2/Lt Ramwell, J .B. 24.8.42. 
OW 613581 I.vbPl Chetharn, A.B. 24.8.42 
ew 162958 Pte Edey, A.G. 24.8.42 
OW 103652 II Barnes, P. 24.8.42 
CW 532821 II Campbell, E.E. 24.8.42 
OW 414661 It Ellis, A.O. 24.8.42 
cw 491456 Cpl Shepherd, D .A •. 11.9.42 
cw 506104 ItbPl Hannan J D. 11.9.42 
CW 171102 Pte Bartle, S.T. 11.9.42 
CV'I 547804 It Evans, F.J. 11.9.42 
ow 2/4/1380 If Leith, J.F. 11.9.42 
ew 417052 II McLees J H. 11.9.42 
cw 129183 II MCLoughlin, E.J. 11.9.42 
OW 516718 " Webb, S.G .. 11.9.42 
cw 092604 It Betridge, A.R. 19.1 .43 
OW 247161 II McNab, G.I. 19.1 .43 
OW 298971 " Robertson, R.A. 19.1 .43 
ew 417298 II McGregor, H. 6.4.43. 
a) Relief now in process. Replacements embarked 1.9.43. 
Post: Duty: No. : Rank: Name: 
Date of 
Embarkn: 
Chatham Is. CW 427361 Pte QuartJ.eYf D.D. ,6.4.43 
CW 587941 " Weaver, S.J. '6.4.43 cw 603530 tt Roberts, A.W. 6.4.43 
Cape Expe d1 t- FWD 431803 t1 Lindsay J G.E. 21.6.43 
ion: PWD 614264' t1 Lindsay, L.B. 9.1 .43 (Auckland d: PWD 423367 tt Mitchell, E.W. 9.1 .43 
Campbell Is.) FWD 262256 It Sorenson, J.E. 9.1.42 
PWD 573544 tt Falla., R.A. 23.12.42 
PWD 416388 tI Daley, R.F. 23.12.42 
PWD 140317 It DawbiD, W.H.9. 23.12.42 
FWD 269094 tt Balham, R.W.' 23.12.42 
FWD 805237 If BlOW, R.G. 9.1 .43 
PWD 428424 tt McNa.bb, D.P. I 9.1.43 
PWD .395911 " Pollock, L.R. 9.1.43 PWD 232633 tt Pa.ine, D.E. 9.1 .43 
PWD ~36038 t1 Knowles, J.D. 23.12.42 
FWD 23593 t1 Duthie, A.S. 23.12.42 
PWD 467888 tt Trigger, J.R. 23.12.42 
Pd:T 475692 tf Ineson, w. 23.12.4& 
P&T 472857 tf Hancox, S.G. 9.1.43 
P&T 621288 II Jones, J.S. 23.12.42 
SUMMARY. 
PRESUMED P .O.'R. RELIEFS AT POSTS: TOT A L: j} D ETA I L: EN ROUTE:. 
o:t:r aiR Ttl. Off O/R Ttl orr OIR Ttl Ofr O/l?_ Ttl. -
Soldier Companions 
& Coast Watchers 
- 14 14 - 5 5 1 51 52 1 70 71 
P. & T. Operators 1 10 11 
- .3 .3 2 20 22 3 33 36 
P.W.D. Personnel 
- - - - - - -
15 15 - 15 15 
~: 1 24 25 
-
8 8 3 86 89 4 118 122 
'-EeRET. 
COAST WATC~ - PACIFIC ISLANDS. 
',. 
NOMINAL ROLL. 
so = Soldier Companion. 
QW = Coast Watcher. 
,.B = . T. 'Personnel at Post indicated or other post in Paci fic on or pric. 
P&T = Wireless Operator. 
"II P & to 7.12.41~ 
Post: ~ No. : Rank: Name: ~ate Em· tarked: 
Li ttle Makin SC 64694 Pte. Were, B.L. 19.7.41 
se 65006 
" 
Muller, L.E .H. 19.7.·41 
P&:T 126569 C1'l McQuinn, M.F. 19.7.41 B 
Pikati SC 36495 Pte Menzies, J.M. 19.7.41 
SC 63994 " Menzies, M. 19.7.41 
P&:T 180724 01'1 Jones, J.M. 19.7.41 B 
Aba.iang P&T 424382 01'1 Wallace, S.R. 19.7.41 B 
Maiana SC 64653 Pte Speedy, L.B. 19.7.41 
SC 64606 " Owen, C.J. 19.7.41 P&T 148324 01'1 Heenan, A.C. 19.7.41 B 
Kuria SC 64485 Pte Jones, R. 19.7.41 
SC 64382 II Ellis, R.A. 19.7.41 
P&:T 297286 01'1 Hearn, H.R.C. 19.7.41 B 
Abemama SC 64056 Pte Howe, D.H. 19.7.41 
SC 63882 " Hi tehan, R.I. 19.7.41-P&T 406897 01'1 McCarthy, J. J. ~I' • 19.7.41 B 
Nonouti SC 64057 Pte Kilpin, C.A. 19.7.41 
SC 64062 
" 
Nicholl, J.H. 19.7.41 
P&T 408026 Cpl McKenna, A.E. 19.7.LJ,1 B 
Eeru P&:T 297352 Lt. Taylor, A.L. 28.10.40 B 
Pd::T 260451 Cpl Murray, T.O. 28.10.40 B 
Tarnana SO 64005 Pte Parker, W.R. 19.7.41 
SC 64022 " McKenzie, R.~i. 19.7.41 P&:T 084237 C:pl Pearsall, C.A. 28.10.40 B 
Ocean Is. P&T 022152 Sgt Third, R. 12.10.40 B 
ALL ABOVE PRESUMED PRISONERS OF WAR. 
" " SOLDIER eOr,IPANIONS EMBARKED mOM FI'JI. 
Nanumea P&:T 233896 Cpl B.ruce, J.S. 28.10.40 B 
Nui P&T 238961 C'pl Wilson, J.S. 13.7.41 B 
Nuke fe tau P&T 100050 Cpl Davia, c.s. 13.7.41 B 
, .... / I tJ ) ~. ' .. ' : 
Nuilakita P&T 268950 Cpl Harris, R.M. 18.12.41 
SC 062663 Cpl Paton, W.B. ~ 1 each for Nanumea, 1ill:!, All embarked! SC 43396 Cpl Barton, C.D. Nukefetau, Nu11ak1ta. 25.3.43. SC 489973 Cpl Kendall, A.W.H. Allocation to poats not SC 72847 Cpl Morrison, W .R.C. ye t advisedt 
Funafuti Pd:T 805359 Lt. Shepherd, D.A.C. 19.8.41 B 
P&T 296063 Lt. Vaughan, D.L. 1 &.9.40 B 
Pd:T 408139 01'1 Lee, J.M. 20.3.42 
P&T 457884 Pte. Child, P. 20.3.42 
Namuka se 552664 I,Cpl Bell, F. 23.12.42 
sc 532983 Pte Callaghan, G.E. 23.12.42 
Pd::T 30576 Cp1 Burt, T. 2.1 .42 
Fata se 598596 Pte Gillam, H.R. 27.9.42 
Pd:T 377211 01'1 Sweetman, W.M. 2.1.42 
I 
.... --- , 
..... )~ .... ~....:. .... 
-T . 




Examples of Intercepts of Japanese Naval Traffic: 
From JN4F3, JN20F, JN25D, JN40 
(PRO HW 23/10) 
TO: 0ID'Ar0 ~ Dotenoe ~ 
F/l: 1m.., )I) 




1tu <HINAm Area. J)efenoo 
:Pone 
~am~Am W.1'. 
[~groupa] ([ ~ ~alJ) y~ If.uu [~ Ck'oupB] 
left ~ at 1 WX> em the 28th ... will anive at PJU.lt\'MUmIRO 
29th 1.440 4.1tFaat 42!' 19t~ 
3ot;h 14-~ f4·~ 4Y sot .. t4l .. 
31st 1/d 21'lih.at ~ 5.5' 1b'th. 
Fe'bru.o17 
1st 151· 31tEast qae 0' ~th 









K1J HA YO South East Operationa lPorce 
'de WI m fA mJK Radio 
F/l: 
Fzum:-
I SA. stJ l 
HI ItA. 1 
m: wo 5 




rI WlfA. 3 
!I,HA50 
so mr 9 
o. o. HIKA.WA MJmJ 
hoond. Fleet 
Combined Fleet 
Inner South Seas Porco 
0.0. Fort:,y Second ~ Division 
-0.0.' Sixty' Second' a..a. Divi.aion 
J'0Qrth Fleet ' 
(SUggest OU:ol:1ne's Area Defence Fo~) 
Lea .... .JAJl1I! at mOO on JanUary 24th; tUrn North 
from ~ at Q9OO. 'Iou will, e%Feot' to arri-veat 
the fol~OfVing p:>ints:-
• I,' 
(unrea, .d) '4Q'1forth, *: 57' East at 1. 7.'0 on 26th (~d) ;sot Borth" 1610 }O' East at 1530 on 21th 
6 2;' ~h, 169 25' East at 0600 on 30th 
!be Oommander ot No.80 S11bmarine Ohaser will assume 
tm 'rank of Captain, 'and is applinted to dire()t c::ontml from 






TOl SUb t:rn1 t 
F.I.GU.ADALC.ANAL Ops.. Farce 
Froms Sub. Force 
30061.5 
1£ they hltve not siWl.ted the e rs:AY) sub~..rinss will take 
u;p the following stations at dawn on the 30th.. 
B line of deplo~ (in on1.er fran the mrth). 
~ L.--- L.----' 
I 176,. I 17,. ! 26, I 25. 
b 11De or (leployment (in order f' .... ~ the llOri;h) 
v ~ ~ v'.~ 
I 1: I I 1", ! 35t I ~O.t I .32 .. I 1'1:. 
T~~"'lSLA.'T.'OR • s :t~0'l'E 
:a is OTSU :1n the Japanese series. KOO, O:tb1T, HEI, TEI etc 
and has aJ.'1\1Qys been ·tra.nslAted~s B. e-.g.:B sub force 
"b. 1.8 in Rcman series 1;. B O. 
1'.0.0. 
J.4.4D 
To: TA NI A. 
WE OQ'I:)E 
TIl A 
NO liE 80 
YU so l{ft 
KEU lIA 
It'll: KOW~ 












NUle WX Cmdr. 
.. 
-Cmd. W(1lJE WI'X. 
.. 
~, 'Lu. 
To t 0 RU TO l£[1..L'E OOD~llASE 
rctromt]: i3E TO J'ALTJJ:.f i/'t. 
~;.... itS from Feb.lst you are to use the secor.Ld month part of 
HE A 1 in tr~ion of moteorological telegraM. I:t 
this oode book has. not ree.ched you. yet you are to use . the 
first month part of .HE RI 1. 
Appendix Eleven 
Pamphlet circulated in Wellington August 1941 
'This Fair Country Now Has Its Himmler and its S.S.Men.' 
(Roth Papers, MS Papers 6218-05, Alexander Turnbull Library) 
THIS I!'iI.IR COUl.\!'r}~y· :NOi:/ . HAS ",' ::,;::";} .. ;; ":";":~. '~." .. ,~: 
_ ~ w11.o is the' sec9hd ,best paid soldier in New··iealand?·iiAJo·~':· ,::.. . '. ) 
KE:NN~TH FOL~S,. '£~100-a-:year head' of the Dominion' s Ges't~p6, "~: L:::.~I.,... ' ,:,;~ 
assortment of m~dloc~~. Journalists, rcle~ks .a~d 'even : "counter~.junip~·.- . '.~. 
era. Folkes himseltt :wae··gazetted, e.n aet~n('f lleutenant ·in ~the' ~:: ' •. :. ..'~ 
Imperial.Army.·little::·'more .. than a' year ago(July, 1940) •. .'.This '~Uo.~r~'~?,;:·.. . ·;t~ 
not in a fighting .. ~or,ce.b~t·in~he Br.itish. security polic'ej~:in·', .. " .. :, .. ·: .. i.:,:.i:,:~ 
:fact, v.rh8;t Folke~,.~oes:}not .. knowabout' sold1erinr.r was indicated 
by a recent ,t~ppearance·.a t·':.:.Army )~!3adquar.ter~ ·vlea~ing a. field '::" 
service. cap."~ wi th':ba t·t1:edress I .. :" .. :.' .. ,. ": ....... .'. . " ~:~, ;',':.::;.J ': . .'.: .••.. :. 
Folkes :.1s. a'·; Ml:dif:¢4;~~;':soi :Lei t6r ; .. at:.'a ·.pinch)1e raight(j~'~t:'" .~\J':') 
. m.ake vihat ;16\ cornrno~1~::jr~own~S:·~hem1~d.le!,cl~ss·. i~·. England.- :::P~~e,:':i': 
thin, weaklY:i,~.:look,:1:t1g~,r::r:l i.tl1~;s~m~-th1ckspect~c~es ,he· has·:·allt':i::;:'·>'··'" 
the app earancea·::.~f:)an~~'Ul1fortuna te.'·clerk J1hoh~sneVcI'. seen:.~~th;e:~.:·:·~?~~~>. ~ . 
sunshine.~ ,;··~rri~ .. t;;L;igh~'.\':pam~'l:~:':hri:in.groatc·oat·, in.d1stihciti,oh. .... to<';tb.e-· .. >~·,.· :".,r. ... 
< :.9ro:per khEl~1 ,.,' ~ak~s ,~~i~§~riJ~··,C?;~pSPic::uo~~~::'.~.th?: .. Mi.d~an:~Hotel~~priT~~e:·:;.:. ~_~r .'ahere.p-:not;r,SO l~r;g,:;.~o.;.:· p.91~ce .. o:tflCe:i;'s· founc~ l1im.:after hours~;.·'. 
, 1'1 ~ th commendable 'pr.esence: of': n:tind l~e.:;flourished hisH.Secut'i:tyll .' . 
card that· bo.th-,'pOli.c#:.aI).cT:-al1i~the·:'·semi.~intoxicated'.a:f:ter-'s'fx" '''::' :':. 
hangers ·on might. 10lOW::who· .. he was... And··;:th1s is:. theorio-iilato:r- of 
the Don f t Talk.'~campa:~in~·.:::;:):nUigine.a man. recei Ying' "his first .... 
a:Jpo~ntment to a': commiss'ion, and then in.: .. a IIpimpi.ngll job, being 
appolnted' }fe~T'Z'ealand 's Himmler .. Perhaps, it 's.not strange.' No '. 
S oldi er, no Man, 'would take on the job. . . ~ 
In pay, he' is next ·~o Major-General. puttick •.. , 
The .Ai-rny·(loes riot. o\m Folk'es~ : He' is . clire'ctly responsible 'to 
the Prime Minister. ;, .• In fact," the name af Folkes and al his . 
croViG. s't'inlcs in :Army: circles. It. is not to be Y!onderec1 at when 
t.he PI' i va_tel:lt.~ . of everx.. .. Army: ot:fice:r t Volh!;. t he spends.) whether 
£le bets, pla:ys billiards' or cal"'c1s for money,. is the subje·ct. of 
at tent ion from Folkes I s snoopel".s· in clubs, hotels and ·clsevThere. '. 
Fal. kes' 6 .pimpS t.u)'.conyersationsove:c-telephones into anG. out of . 
ArTIlY Headquarters.Pri vacyis nov v impossible.Ever~r Array officer 
v/ho opens his mouth thcsedays has to look olJQut first.to see· if' 
any of' Folkes's pimps Rreabout. . .' . . 
Folkes was brought· to New Zealand by ~Colonel.hlawhood~ 
lie was an acting lieutenant vlhen he left Engl~nd a~c1 beea~le a 
major while flying across: to'·NsVl Zee.lanc1.· nt;r1:rl1o."brclinary inajor's 
pay for the Gestapo:;chief;·.~insteac1,·£llOO a year,. and a'ca:r- for' 
all oocas ions, business, ane":. '50ci13-1... ~::. ': ' . .' .:.;.-~., .. 
. i£his outfit. of·Foll;:es·' s'; 'knornl officially ~~ . Security 
Intelligence ,£.9_E?J.§..;~tJl§ ... .£.,01Llftry l11a~Gl18n ,£50 ,oob a ;~ear. ~ 
Its offices are 'inthe 11.:P·A ~Buil(:il1g, eo:-cner ot Grey enG. 
Fea·the:r'ston Streets,:riellingtoilQ ',dthc1ravm blinrls and a sentry 
a t the door, it is the essence ·of secrecy_ In fact, so blatantly 
secret that i.t is the laugh of the t01;~m ani specially the· tennants 
of the builc~~~g. :/. ., 
.irH~ PiiOFL2. ·.JIO CIJ;C{Y ·.H-Ej TJ...LlZS 
Second in c'on1ltie~(l of the GestapoisLi~utenant OUTFIELD, 
an ex-harclv:rarc1 shop' assistant from Stre,tford: O~vio1fsl~ ,') Iil~n.&. 
:At~telligence. .sel1. ing ha~c1\yard giVes_ a supe~~lo~ lnslght ln~o 
. :. no. turG and l'llskes;recognl tlon af a spy a ce:rtaln~~:r. . _ 
,!, • .," Another hange7c-oli in';;jel1in~tol1 is Lieutenant S'.i,',:\.VELE:C E.LLIS, 
'~Te' of the :!I.Yonnzer Set tl , "v1ho 01!-ce ~old the "wor~cl 11; ,:\'01.11c1 not. :.' 
,1jti11st 'but· has secured:' safety Yfl th 1:'01kes, clespl te o3110t call-uJ) .. 
. Then there is Secone: Lieutenant *J:::;nLHClJ. McL2Al~', once an 
ornartlent of' that influent ia1 l1ighoroy!journn1, the "Sports ~ast. fI 
E1r.cLea:n r,larr1ec:·, too ~ate to be' "Ii1ar~"~ec." \2ithin .. ~l1e re~ul~tlon8, f' i< .. ~aughter of ki."'. Percy Coy~.~, secre'Cfl.ry OJ: the Ltcensect Vletuallers 
~1_ I'{~< 
! I 




















A§§06iaiion, an( got shovecL into ~amp Tli th early ballotees. But not 
for long.. He reappearec~ in civilian clothes as. a member. of Folkes t s 
staff. AXle.. this ·vihen his father-in;..law? 'as a member of· the· 
No.4 Armed Forces·Al?peal Board is packing the lads off to war' as 
fast as he can. This commissioned lJimp . Folkes . considers 
.:- to be one of his brightest boys. He is a. brotp.er of the publicity· 
. :-. officer of the l'Ta,tional p~~ty, .Hho VI8S. once "Ne~7 Zea~and, ObE?er.veru . 
editor.·.. . .·f . .... .: '. .:. '" ·.',;i..1 ' ... < ~'I .::..:' ,.,:;:. :·:-:~:f·:;:i~::<"";~:.:,~:·;;,.·: .. 
. Also' at·~/el11ngtonCthel",_e····are .no pr~v.E:\tes ~in",Folkea" s,,·a.rrny.:·~,:·:-r .. :.:~·.,;< 
nothinno ... lesa ·than;~'·a· sergeant) .... ~.'.., ",:", ... ::.;.. .::... .... : ... ~;; .. ".,:~:.x;.:~~:'.:: :'. . . ..• :, 
0·, ',/" . ,.~ .. , .. , .. ,'; •. .. r!'~1 .. 1 ..... •• ", ; ......... ~.~~.; .-'./~ 
.. -:: ~l"::'::'; Sergeant. DOSSER, ex-stud ··::stock 'sale6n:t:an:,~;;\~'right Stephenson's ..... :. ' 
." '.," . Sergeant ETHEl1INGTON,. .fp~erly.:. in ~ha::r·ge:i:·9.fi~;.adverti~ing·~.f.o~:.~C:~~: .. ·::·"~ ~ .. ' 
. W.D •... · and' H 0 .. ~Villis': ..... :··: ' ..... -.: .; .. ; . .-' ..... '. -,'. '\:.. . ...... ; '.,' ...... " ..... . ... ::.~ ... ;~:., .. ~ .. ::.: ·::~·serge~nt NICHOLLS:,:: ejc~Ja.mes ·smith 1 .. s .·pierc~pY·.'·cI~:p'artment •. : : : .: ' ... 
Sergeant RINK, .··ex~passenger· agent 'at Panama.. ..-: .,., .' . ";" 
Sergeant NOBLE(now commissioned)', once Parliamentary· reporter 
for 1I0tago! Da ily::"Times .. " Enl is ted. for ·overs·eas._s ervice.,:'Re-. 
·.comrllended~: by M; lf~ster'· o;f:Defen~e ~or ~fficers·.'~~:;:,aining_,SchQol :bU~: -;... ..\ 
Army ::took>no .. not-i,ce. ·~''':Then got',~'leave o'f· absence .. for ,domest1c:4", .':.:." .~ 
·.re~sou.s:· a:iid4treapi~a.red :·:as·:.on~·of,:·Folke~r a :f~rst::snoope~rs;' '.' .Did /: :~,' 
' ..... gr~a t· .. work·!"1Z: .. ~ f~~~ng ::.t e.l~.~I:. .. 9~ ..f;.;~-9l}y ... ~.r.§~~tpnS;..:.Jlllo.~?-.e ..~",:;O:f"~~h:~~.~' ... ;:;~ ... ~ .'-···'~··"~ap±r1.tect-tru~o· &"EZ:-E"rr· - ... : . .. .. ···,.1 . ........ . 
.. ,. ." , .... ; ~ .... ' ) :~: '....:.;. '. t. • :Jl~'~ ',;': ,<:c:·;;.·3:., ;'.;.~' ... '" '. It' T' •..• :':~. Ii : . . .. ,'. ." 
.', .. ?~1t . Sergeant~;, D. H .. :.S. TAj'LOJ:t.,.. f.~red.f.l. om. i li. Z .. Truth . ancl· turn~d nlS ... 
·training·;:;t.o~"·good·: .. ~:ccount 'by', joi~ingFolke·s •. '.' Hard to· keep .:track '.' 
.'. of. ._. in.:ba<~:tl'edres~: one.7day "'and ~ufti. t~l~. ne~t ;.·;1ooksI'e~~ly·. 
mys te1:' ious~ .. ·;;~~~~~'.· .. ':9.3;: .. ':: :.':'.- . '. . ".' .> ~". . ' >';: .. ... . ..... .' '. 
Sergean·';:':·.~·p··"'ornt.-n:"'~O· .~.. . r~":-Nati:onal' Broadcasting. Service. .. . \#" J..... .L.' ~J;:a~ ~, -'" . ..' .• 
. Sergeant··':: VIHlTE," prominent:','Wellesley elub"m~mber' and .;;ielling--
ton "'sociali te".' Marri ed daughter of.. P::cofessor.,'~Hunter. Snoops 
at club on*Army Headquarters heads. 
Sergeant DOUGLAS, a ';fe.llington importer and agent. 
Sergeant MEAKIN;· eX-General I·:lotors. , 
MISS'MOLLY BISHOP, daughter of secretary of N~ z. Uineo'wners t 
Federation.' The h~ad of the female section. Snoops at social 
gatherings 'and poses .. aa memberoi' .Navy qrf;ice. staff. . 
I-iiISSJOAN YOUNG, Public Service Queen in this. year" s . queen 
carnival, 'daughter c.f Director General· of' Post and Telegraph ' .. ': 
Department.· Did those who shov'eq.· 'in their. :pennies fbI'. her in the' 
carnival know they 'Were polling .yo~es for a ski:r_t.~.c1' pimp? 
These young "ladies If try· to.J.Jut····tt across . unfortunate ... 
gallant guards at defence' headquarters l?y stating they want to 
go 'in to see girl friel}.ds· or r.elativea •.. Obliging a lady, the 
guards get it. in the:neck when .Folkes complains.' 
At Christchurch: '. . . . 
Captain D. LIHDSAY, ex-s.choolmaster . .'andN. Z;Ci1ampion sw1m:-;'ler. 
Lient enaritMAX ·,.~frATr,~AlI[, ex-"star-Su.n" rep·oJ;'ter. ·.lent to. 
islands to bring baclc party of invalic1ecl sol!diers:bllt real pui"pose 
Vias to spy on mili t2,rye.c1ministration for Folkes.] He struck an 
ex~journalist .. in the re.nks at Fiji who tole:. him wl1el"e .to get off. 
On return, pimped on·those vrho~el1tertainecl 'him as 8upp.osed rep-
l"'esente.ti ve of' N ZP'.J:.by.·~.·· '.' .. . . '.~ .. .. .. ,.. '. 
Sergeant ~;IcDOhALD, ex':"stock a[;cnt.· . 
Serge~.nt . Tl'IOMAS ,ex-Union steartlship Co. c~erk. 
At Palmerston North; ., 
. Lieutenanr J.J3.if±CHOLL J ex-secl"ctar-y 'of Ashburton 2acing Clb. 
Given tlu'ee presentntions. in hOlile tm!n 'befoJ:'e :proceecling( as the 
people thought) overseas.!. . 
Second Li eut enant . C. GAI~t, e:;.:··b3.nk clork, of .iellington. 
Lived at Ee.stbou:cne. Ane: Sergeants L:j:;I(ex~'rar;:~nal;:i), SI~ITE(e:;c­
Taranaki) all(: T. : LO·,'I"l.::i( ex-'·'Evening Post Ii cadet i"s:g'orte'r), also 
female to attend sOQial gatherings. . 
:Rowe has 110H been 111£1.de a' c1ri ver . at Al-'irilY Heac1CJ.uCtrtcl~s I· pre-
6uma'bly to listen in to conversations of rn~litc.l'Y .chiefs al:'ld cOll.yey 
\. the-.. ini'onna tion t.o Folll:es and in turn to the PrilHc' Ninister. 
At Auckland! . . 
captaL'L 1 ~:·:f:·.I':· ~, formerly Maj or Leikle. 0);' . nifle Bl"'igade. 
Four sergeants and one typist.· . 
This office stinks less 'than thc"others, possibly because 
~·Leikle, being an ex-serviceman ~ \'li~l not stoop as 10\,1 ·~s Folkes 
e.nd his a tay-a t-hofhes. . .. 
, .:::~ 





. '~l~'" .• ;3. 
- t~ oft, 
. :,t, t LltS, TRICKERY, THEFT·· 
. ." It, . ~! The duties ofth~ s .. r.. are. tq test security measures,. uncl'!'~"'l 
..... : .... this involves tryi'ii.g to get access' to wharves., guard posts' etc • 
. . . by pitching'.tales to police or sentries •. Also theft of' keys., 
. documents etc hast;en reso.rted tOa,ilitnesethe. occasion Who en 
one pimp used 'his ~i:form ·to get into Trentham 98,mp 8..r:d. 'then·' 
stole a bag of pape·rs. Smart work:' :-, " .' .'<: ... ~:. 
. . . There was the, .. famous attempt to trap a suspected spy at 
the Hotel. st·. George':: . Four sergeant~ were installed in the· .<,:, ." 
ne;ct room a·nd., two by tV/O, stayed. thene five ,~ays.. .An. . otago . '.' ~'; 
~arsi ty student"-:~B'radley, was imported to help .. '. A very ·"secret· . 
I 
. Job, excep.t~ .. to the·,fnnocent suspect, the hotel srtaff and half .' 
r the to\1m~:':>.<And .~then~lthere was' the . stealthy pursui:t of II,'ir. Braun, ' 
an American in New-'.Zealand . drilling for an oil :company.· 
. . .' One·.·of:. the-big!~;iobs is "compiling dossiers, Viri tten bv the . .1 
... :.staff ,anc1 :·their 's$sociates, concerning all sortSJ.,'.ofinclivic1uals_. 
, :':;' Any ~f t~eir .. opi~~ons .. are fa~ th:ful~~.recorc:l~d ,i~~)?-e.se ,.Gestapo}" :'", ........ ;' . 
. :,,'; ~~.~i'~~~.a a:.,+.::1V].1a ~~Slli.t:ap;L"~ ,.~en...' they·:are_~~o-_'l?ass :"IJ.\ld~11~+L~t., o~,,~~ec.e:q.t:~~.':,' ';·::w:·" ",~, <. •• :~ 
..... c~t1zens •. In." ad.r...1 ~tion to .. their .. o. rd~na. ry lacko.f ....~ qua~:l~:lc~.:t. Jans ~,*'. . ... 1 i. 
they are misf"J1 ts, j}l!lfi tG, . sll-irl:::.ers .·Some 'of th~n1:l pi t'ch the:" .: ' I 
';',: tale· that .. ·,they· we~e: forced'. into the jo'b "by' the A""r!nlY.. Nothing. ~ 
, is further from;· tne.': truth.,~· The tr,ro or three ·whol'rrere. balloted ft. ~. 
and found '. unfit' took tne . job because"':lthey pI-efer'red pililping 
to doing a man's; j:ob . on ,coast defence or sim.iIar c":.uties.. . " 
l'hey are 'all in the'. job'!because they sought it.,.:' 
. . . 
. :'\.~'-:' 
':",' Nef DI~F'Elml\:T F20IvI' GERHANY. 
Folkes's viife.:. and family arri veeL this yeal":·.from England,' 
so he evidently.th,inks·the Gestapo is here'to stay.' They live 
at 51 Sefton street,' \fadestown. . .~ 
All the offiGers. have cars wi tli privEt te nUlilbej." plates, 
p~ovided by the S~~te, ~ith unlimite~ petrol. Home to lunch 
is th'e rule.. Al1c1'v/hen Himmler travels far Air Force :plane is 
the transport. , '. . ,. "-
Take this officialdescriution of the Naz~Secr~t st~te 
. Pol i c ~lQ§h~i.B!.~_J3_t.?j:t_~~_qJ.i z.e .;i.--L.?}~d-:._~.f..eu·Jla t_c1 i ff e I'enc e tIle re is 
between it and Folkes s outfit: '. . . 
Tllfs-organisation is responsible for, combating flny 
movement· subvers ive to the present regime, and YJi th this 
object in view keeps constant watch on forriler' members of 
tr~e Socialist: un.t: COl1Jrc:..mist. parties ane:. ether polit::'cclJ. 
suspects, as ~ well as: the cons tabulal"'Y, ['.nrl the rank and 
file of the Nationai~ : Socialist Party and indeed the 
whole population., "All its meTiibers bero;ng to the ·Scli.ut? 
Staffel( S. S .. ·.} , consti tutec1 prir,mrily to" en..sure inter'nal 
.security, ~nevent strikes and any movement. against the 
reg ime. ", .:....\.::: ': .. .' /: . :' ::\;'~, .. -... ~:- ' 
. ::- .... 1,.' . 
==:::=====::::===::::::::=~ 
;',. . 
i:t ~' . 












, .. J 
Bibliograpby 
Bibliography 
Official files, archival collections 
New Zealand National Archives 
NA AD 1 291/4/1 Radar Experimental Station 
NA AD 1 300/1/42 Special Companies Training 
NA AD 1 300/1/50 Field Security Sections, Establishment 
NA AD 1 319/1/92 Staff - Security Intelligence Organisation, Personnel, Nominal Roll 
NA AD 1 339/1/64 Atrocities Committed by Japanese, Tarawa 
NA AD 1 340/1/1 Coastwatching Services 
NA AD 1 353/1/11 Establishment of Port Security Control 
NA AD 1 336/3/59 POW Interrogations Held in New Zealand 
NA AD 11 16/11 Formations & Functions of Intelligence Branch GHQ 
NA AD 1116/18 Japanese Propaganda Activities Among Maoris 
NA AIR 1 1/1/5 Organisation RNZAF 
NA AIR 1 1/1/30 Air Intelligence Organisation 
NA AIR 1 109/6/17 Intelligence, Operational, Gilbert & Ellice Group 
NA AIR 1 109/14/8 Lectures: Duties of Intelligence Officers ... 
NA AIR 1 120 1 Air Department Intelligence Summaries 
NA AIR 1 120 2 Weekly Intelligence Digest 
NA AIR 1 120 3 Intelligence Information Memoranda 
NA AIR 11204 Air Department, Japanese Pamphlets 
NA AIR 1 120 5 Registered Intelligence Files 
NA AIR 1 120 6 RNZAF 'Readiness' memoranda 
NA AIR 1 120 7 No.1 Islands Group Intelligence Bulletins 
NA AIR 1 120 8 No.1 Islands Group Intelligence Summaries 
NA AIR 1 127/4/h Report on Strength, Organisation and Functions of RNZAF 
Intelligence, 24 April 1944 
NA AIR 1 130/25/1 Security Intelligence Organisation: Policy & Organisation 
NA AIR 1131/1/1 Organisation, Air Headquarters 
NA AIR 1 131/1/14 Organisation Policy, PIU 
NA AIR 1 132/13/1 Intelligence, Operational, Suvarov Group 
NA AIR 106 7 Air Department 
NA BAAD A 195/42e Pukeko 
NA C 141/6/11 Port Security Control 1941-1944 
NA EA 1 59/2/16 Superintendent J. Cummings Visit to US & UK 1944 
NA EA 1 81/4/2a Chiefs of Staff Committee Minutes 
NA EA 1 81/4/3 Chiefs of Staff Committee, COS Meetings 
NA EA 1 81/5/3 Deputy Chiefs of Staff Committee Minutes 
NA EA 1 81/6/1 Organization for National Security, General 
NA EA 1 81/6/2 ONS Papers 
NA EA 1 81/6/2 ONS, Coastwatching Papers, Coastwatching Committee 
NA EA 1 81/7/1 War Cabinet Secretariat, General 
NA EA 1 82/22/4 War, Defence of Pacific, Chatham Is. Coastwatching 
NA EA 1 84/1/18 Security of Shipping 1941-1945 
NA EA 1 84/1/16 Combined Intelligence Committee 
NA EA 1 84/3/8 Police Intelligence Summaries, Police Department 1939-1944 
NA EA 1 84/3/11 Combined Operational Intelligence Centre, Daily Summaries 
NA EA 1 84/3/19 Japanese Espionage 
NA EA 1 84/3/37 New Zealand-Australian War Intelligence Liaison 198-1940 
NA EA 1 85/1/11 Central War Room and Combined Operational Intelligence Centre 
NA EA 1 86/1/14 Controller of Pacific Communications 
NA EA 1 86/2/1 War, Defence of Pacific, Gilbert & Ellice Is. 
NA EA 1 86/8/1 War, Defence of Pacific, Auckland Is. 
NA EA 1 86/26/1 Defence of Pacific, Coastwatching 
NA EA 1 86/26/2 Defence of Pacific, Coastwatching Personnel 
NA EA 1 94/1/3 Air Observer Corps 
NA EA 1 94/2/3 Coastwatching Committee, Minutes 
NA G 46/1 Naval Intelligence Reports & Telegrams 1914-1915 
NA M Series 22 Marine Department Ship File, Box 146, M.V. Pukeko 
NA ML Series 1 No.12 Marine Lighthouse Portland Island, Daily Journal 
NA N 1 8/1/1 Intelligence, Intelligence Centres, Wellington 
NA N 1 8/1/8 Intelligence, Intelligence Organisation, Intelligence of Ships 
NA N 1 8/1/9 Intelligence Centres, Visits by SO(1) to Reporting Officers 1923-37 
NA N 1 8/7 Prisoners of War 1918-1943 
NA N 1 8/10 Intelligence, Pacific Islands, General 
NA N 1 10/6/14 Accommodation in New Government Building Stout Street 
NA N 1 10/7/5 Direction-Finding Stations, General 
NA N 110/7/9 Radio Stations on Shore in New Zealand 
NA N 110/7/10 Wellington Naval Radio Station 
NA N 110/7/17 Blenheim wrr Station 
NA N 110/9/9 War Signals Station, Stephens Is. 
NA N 1 10/19/1 Waiouru W rr Station, Policy and Establishment 
NA N 113/25/46 Courses in Australia - Officers 1941-1955 
NA N 116/12/1 wrr General 1938-1944 
NA N 116/8/37 Submarine Activities in Cook Strait 
NA N 116/8/44 Report of Submarine in Cook Strait 
NA N 1 16/8/46 Submarine Attack on Rangitira 
NA N 1 16/12/21 Operations, W rr & Communications, Ocean Is. 
NAN 117/5 Port Security, General 1941-1944 
NA N 118/42/8 Collectors War Instructions 
NA N 1 20/8 Coastwatching, Pacific 
NA N 1 20/8/3 Coastwatching, Pacific Islands, Coastwatching Stations Chatham Is. 
NA N 1 20/9 Defence of New Zealand & Pacific Islands, Coastwatching (NZ), General 
NA N 1 22/4/48 Communications Conference Batavia, June 1941 
NA N 1 22/5/7 SOO's Visit to Melbourne January 1940 
NA N 1 22/5/58 Commission of Enquiry into Losses of Merchant Ships May 1942 
NA N 208/1/1 Intelligence Centres, Wellington 1921-1939 
NA N 208/1/18 Combined Operational Intelligence Centre 
NA N 2 08/1/22 Intelligence from Masters of Overseas Vessels 
NA N 2 08/1/25 Intelligence Centres, Security Intelligence Organisation, New Zealand 
1940-1948 
NA N 208/1/26 Intelligence Centres, Central War Room 
NA N 208/1/27 Intelligence Centres, Army Report Centre, Blenheim 
NA N 208/6/14 Intelligence Reports: New Zealand Naval Intelligence Summaries 
NA N 208/6/15 Intelligence Reports: Reports from Admiralty 
NA N 2 08/6/18 Intelligence Reports: Infonnation Bulletins from ... US Pacific Fleet 
NA N 208/6/19 Intelligence Reports: Reports from US Naval Intelligence 1943-49 
NA N 208/6/20 Intelligence Reports: Fiji Periodical Intelligence Reports 
NA N 2 08/6/23 Intelligence Reports: Reports from NZLO COMSOPAC Staff 
NA N 2 08/10 Pacific Islands, General 1935-1957 
NA N 2 08/10/6 Intelligence, Pacific Islands, Tonga 
NA N 2 08/10/7 Intelligence, Pacific Islands, Canton & Hull Is. 
NA N 2 08/10/10 Intelligence, Pacific Islands, Northern Cooks 
NA N 208/10/11 Intelligence, Pacific Islands, Southern Cooks 
NA N 2 08/10/19 Intelligence, Pacific Islands, Chatham Is. 
NA N 2 08/10/20 Intelligence, Pacific Islands, Japanese Mandated Islands 
NA N 2 08/18 Operational Intelligence, General 
NA N 2 08/18/1 Operational Intelligence, 'WASHOPS' 
NA N 2 08/18/2 Operational Intelligence, 'DIGESTS' 
NA N 2 08/18/3 Operational Intelligence, 'COMBATS' 
NA N 2 08/18/4 Operational Intelligence, 'MAORIS' 
NA N 2 08/18/6 Operational Intelligence, 'GENSITS' 
NA N 2 08/18/8 Operational Intelligence, 'ARCTIC' 
NA N 2 08/18/12 Operational Intelligence, 'NATELS' 
NA N 2 08/18/15 Operational Intelligence, 'OPTELS' 
NA N 2 08/18/16 Operational Intelligence, 'KIWIS' 
NA N 2 08/19/1 Intelligence re aircraft: Reports of Suspicious Sightings 
NA N 2 08/20/21 Movements of H.M.Ships HMNZS Achilles 
NA N 2 08/31/3 Suspicious Vessels, Reports of Sightings 
NA N 2 08/36/10 W rr Intelligence, Foreign Broadcasts 
NA N 2 016/12/30 wrr & Communications, Codes & Cyphers 
NA N 2 016/22/15 Suspicious Vessels and Signalling 
NA N 2 020/7/1 Defence of Minor Ports 
NA N 2 020/14/10 Defence of Pacific, Suvarov 
NA N 2 030/16/8 War 1939-1942, Defence of Fanning Is. 
NA N 2 030/19/1 War 1939-1940, Coastwatching Organisation 
NA N 2 030/33/13 War 1939-1941, Codes & Cyphers 
NA N 2 030/33/17 War 1939-1941, wrr & Communications 
NA N 2 030/33/18 Suva wrr Station 
NA N 2 030/38/17 Control of W rr & Coastwatching 
NA N 2 030/68/3 War 1939-1945, Exchange of Intelligence 
NA N 2 030/68/15 War 1939-1941, Plans, Outbreak of War with Japan 
NA N 2 030/72/5 RDF Organisation 
NA N 111 New Zealand Naval Board, Weekly Report and Intelligence Summary 1940 
NA N 11 2 New Zealand Combined Intelligence Bureau, Weekly Intelligence Summary 
nosl-28 1940-1941, and Combined Operational Intelligence Centre, Intelligence 
Summaries nos29-30 1941-1942, and New Zealand Station, General Intelligence 
Summary no 311941 
NA N 11 3 New Zealand Station, General Intelligence Summary nos 32-74 1942-1944 
NA N 11 4 New Zealand Station, General Intelligence Summary nos.75-77 1944 
NA N 11 5 Combined Operational Intelligence Centre, Intelligence Summary nos 1-25 
1941-June 1942 
NA N 11 6 Combined Operational Intelligence Centre, Intelligence Summary nos 92-102 
1944 
NA N 11 7 Weekly Intelligence Summary October-December 1944 
NA N 11 8 Weekly Intelligence Summary January-August 1945 
NA N 14/2 War Diary of the Navy Office 1939-1945 
NA N 14/3 War Diary, New Zealand Division 1939-1942 
NA N 14/4 War Diary, New Zealand Division 1942-1943 
NA N 14/5 War Diary, Proceedings of Ships 1943-1944 
NA N 14/8 War Diary, 1944-1945 
NA N 14/9 War Diary, 1944-1945 
NA PM 84/1/3 New Zealand Security Intelligence Bulletins 
NA W 1 23/434/14 Pacific Islands, Suvarov 
NA W 1 23/434/20 Pacific Islands Cape Expedition 
NA W 1 23/434/27 Pacific Islands, Pan Expedition 
NA WAll 1 DA 85/1/2 New Zealand Divisional Intelligence Section 
NA WAIl 1 DA 89/1/1-56 2 New Zealand Divisional Field Security Section 
NA WAIl 1 DA 152/1/1-15 NZ Base Field Security Section 
NA WAll 1 DA 152/1/16-44 6 New Zealand Divisional Field Security Section 
NA WAIl 1 DA 152/1/45-58 NZ Maadi Companies Field Security Section 
NA WAIl 1 DA 371/9/FAI/l Coastwatching Fanning Is. 
NA WAIl 1 DA 401.364/1 Narrative of Coastwatching Service, & Hall MSS 
NA WAIl 1 Z49/1/l-11 Army Signals Company, Special Section Notes 
NA WAIl 1 Z77.7/1/1-111 Field Security Section 
NA WAIl 1 Z121.7/1/1-10 4 Field Security Section 
NA WAIl 1 21/43d Police Department Narrative 
NA WAIl 1 21/70a Home Guard Narrative 
NA WAIl 8/6 Freyberg Papers: BGS File 1941 
NA WAIl 8/31 Freyberg Papers: Akarit to Enfidaville 
NA WAIl 8/49 Freyberg Papers: Historical Operational January 1944 
NA WAIl 8/50 Freyberg Papers: Historical Operational February 1944 
Alexander Turnbull Library 
ATL Acc.84-86 W.G.Stevens 'Recall Without Repining.' Unpublished MSS 
ATL MS Papers 6218-05 H.O.Roth Papers 
University of Canterbury Library, Microfilm Collection, Translation of PG/30361 B.d.V. 
War Logs 1944-1945 
QEII Army Museum 
Cox Papers 91002230/1-25 
University of California at Irvine, Library MSS Collection, Lieutenant-Commander 
S.W.Francis 'History of the Special Intelligence Organisation in the Far East.' May 1979 
Public Record Office, Kew, London 
PRO ADM 223/463 
PRO ADM 223/285 
PRO ADM 223/494 
PRO ADM 223/496 
PRO DEFE 3/686 
PRO DEFE 3/687 
PRO DEFE 3/891 
PRO DEFE 3/894 
PRO HW 3/102 
PRO HW 3/149 
PRO HW 4/1 
PRO HW 4/2 
PRO HW 4/24 
PRO HW 4/27 
PRO HW 4/28 
PRO HW 4/29 
PRO HW 14/3 
PRO HW23/10 
PRO KV 1/15 
PRO KV 1/16 
Australian Archives, Melbourne 
A 169/100/Z 
A 816 43/302/18 
B5553/1 
B5554 
MP 1185 2021/5/529 
MP 1185/8 1937/2/159 
Naval Historical Section, RA-G-20, Department of Defence, Canberra 
Paper On Royal New Zealand Navy and Naval Facilities in New Zealand, 30 April 1944 
Royal Canadian Navy, S-1440-18 'Notes on the History of Operational Intelligence in 
Canada.' 
Unfiled document: Memorandum from Assistant-Director of Naval Communications, 
OP-20-G to FRUPAC, FRUMEL, COIS Colombo etc 20 March 1944 on 'Japanese 
Intercept Coordination, Outline of Trans-Pacific Coverage Plan, OP-20-G.' 
Canada JAC RG 24 vo1.3806 1008-75-20 Reports on Canadian 'Y' Organisations by 
Capt.H.R.Sandwith RN 
Canada NAC RG 24 vo1.3806 1008-75-20 Canadian Report on United States - British 
Radio Intelligence Conference 6-16 April 1942 at US Navy Department, Washington DC 
- Reports on Discussion Sessions, and Agenda for Sessions 
US National Archives, Washington DC 
RG 457, NSA: 
Acc. no.3109N Box 10 CX.CMG 1150 German Naval Operations in Australasia 
RG 457 Box 187 














Admiralty C.B.3205 Technical Staff Monographs 1939-45 'Naval WIT Organisation' 
Signal Division, Admiralty 1948 
u -Boat Archives, Cuxhaven 




Waters, S.D. 'History of Naval Intelligence Organisation in New Zealand 1921-1945.' 
Draft history prepared by S.D.Waters for DNI (Brackenridge) 
Interviews & Correspondence 
Mr. Warwick Anderson 
Mr. Les Annett 
Mr. Frank Barlow 
Mr. Neville Barnaby 
Mrs. Molly Buckleton 
Mr. Ken Coates 
Mr. Nat Cohen 
Mrs. Nell Collie 
Mrs. Phillipa Corkill 
Sir Geoffrey Cox 
Mr. Dick Crosby 
Mr. R.S. Cutfield 
Group Captain Colin Hanson aBE 
Mr .Charles Holland-Goodwin 
Mr. Ray Hurle 
Mr. Vic Jaynes 
Mr. Brian Layne 
Mr. Gilbert Lennox-King 
Mrs. Bunty Longuet 
Mrs. Marion Murdoch 
Mr. Ted Ross 
Mr Ray Starr 
Mr Malcolm Templeton 
Mr. Don Vaughan 
Mr. Nigel West 
Mr. Owen Wood 
Mrs Marguerite Scott 
Secondary sources 
Allason, Rupert The Branch: A History of the Metropolitan Police Special Branch 1883-
1983 Secker & Warburg 1983 
Aldrich, Richard J. 'British intelligence and the Anglo-American 'Special Relationship' 
during the Cold War.' in Review of International Studies vo1.24 no.3 1998 
Aldrich, Richard J. Intelligence and the War Against Japan: Britain, America and the 
Politics of Secret Service Cambridge University Press 2000 
Aldrich, Richard 1. 'The Waldegrave Initiative and Secret Service Archives: New 
Materials and Policies.' in Intelligence and National Security vol. 10 no.1 January 1995 
Aldrich, Richard 1. 'Soviet Intelligence, British Security and the End of the Red 
Orchestra: the Fate of Alexander Rado.' in Intelligence and National Security vo1.6 no.l 
January 1991 
Alvarez, David 'Axis Sigint Collaboration: A Limited Partnership.' in Intelligence and 
National Security vol.14 no.l Spring 1999 
Alvarez, David 'No Immunity: Signals Intelligence and the European Neutrals, 1939-
45.' in Intelligence and National Security vol.12 no.2 April 1997 
Andrew, Christopher 'Churchill and Intelligence.' in Intelligence and National Security 
vo1.3 no.3 July 1988 
Andrew, Christopher 'The Growth of the Australian Intelligence Community and the 
Anglo-American Connection.' in Intelligence and National Security vol.4 no.2 April 
1989 
Andrew, Christopher 'Intelligence and international relations in the early Cold War.' in 
Review of International Studies vo1.24 no.3 1998 
Andrew, Christopher Secret Service Heinemann 1985 
Andrew, Christopher & Dilks, David (eds.) The Missing Dimension: Governments and 
Intelligence Communities in the Twentieth Century Macmillan 1984 
Andrew, Christopher & Gordievsky, Oleg KGB Hodder & Stoughton 1990 
Andrew, Christopher & Mitrokhin, Vasili The Mitrokhin Archive Allen Lane The 
Penguin Press 1999 
Ball, Desmond (Over and Out: Signals Intelligence (Sigint) in Hong Kong.' in 
Intelligence and National Security vol.11 no.3 July 1996 
Ball, Desmond and Horner, David Breaking the Codes: Australia'S KGB Network Allen 
& Unwin 1998 
Ballard, Geoffrey On ULTRA Active Service Spectrum 1991 
Bar-Joseph, Uri 'Methodological Magic.' in Intelligence and National Security vol.3 
no.4 October 1988 
Barber, Laurie & Lord, Cliff Swift and Sure NZ Signals Inc 1996 
Barber, Laurie & Tonkin-Covell, John Freyberg: Churchill's Salamander Century 
Hutchinson 1989 
Barlow, Frank 'Awarua Radio (ZLB) 1930-45.' Part II in Break-In March 1995 
Barlow, Frank 'Awarua Radio (ZLB) - Sequel.' in Break In March 1995 
Barron, John KGB Hodder & Stoughton 1974 
Bath, Alan H. Tracking the Axis Enemy: the Triumph of Anglo-American Naval 
Intelligence University Press of Kansas 1998 
Bekker, Cajus Hitler's Naval War Corgi Books 1976 
Beesly, Patrick Room 40: British Naval Intelligence 1914-18 Hamish Hamilton 1982 
Beesly, Patrick Very Special Intelligence Hamish Hamilton 1977 
Beevor, Anthony Crete John Murray 1991 
Bennett, Ralph Behind the Battle: Intelligence and the War with Germany, 1939-45 
Sinclair Stevenson 1994 
Bennett, Ralph Intelligence Investigations: How Ultra Changed History Frank Cass 1996 
Bennett, Ralph 'Ultra and Some Command Decisions.' in Journal of Contemporary 
History vo1.16 no.1 January 1981 
Bennett, Ralph Ultra in the Mediterranean Strategy Hamish Hamilton 1989 
Benton, Kenneth 'The IS0S Years: Madrid 1941-3.' in Journal of Contemporary History 
vo1.30 no.3 1995 
Best, Anthony 'Constructing an Image: British Intelligence and Whitehall's Perception of 
Japan, 1931-1939.' in Intelligence and National Security vol.11 no.3 July 1996 
Best, Anthony 'This Probably Over-Valued Military Power: British Intelligence and 
Whitehall's Perception of Japan 1939-41.' in Intelligence and National Security vol.12 
no.3 July 1997 
Bialoguski, Michael The Petrov Story Mandarin 1989 
Blair, Clay Hitler's U-Boat War: the Hunter 1939-1942 Weidenfeld & Nicolson 1997 
Blair, Clay Hitler's U-Boat War: the Hunted 1942-1945 Weidenfeld & Nicolson 1999 
Bleakley, Jack The Eavesdroppers Australian Government Publishing Service 1992 
Borovik, Genrikh The Philby Files Little, Brown & Co 1994 
Bower, Tom The Perfect English Spy: Sir Dick White and the Secret War 1935-90 
Heinemann 1995 
Boyd, C. & Yoshida, A. The Japanese Submarine Force and World War II Airlife 1995 
Boyle, Andrew Climate of Treason Hutchinson 1979 
Brissaud, Andre The Nazi Secret Service Bodley Head 1972 
Bristow, Desmond A Game of Moles: The Deceptions of an MI6 Officer Little, Brown 
& Co. 1993 
Brown, Anthony Cave Bodyguard of Lies Jonathan Cape 1978 
Brown, Anthony Cave The Secret Servant, the Life of Sir Stewart Menzies Michael 
Joseph 1988 
Brown, Anthony Cave Treason in the Blood Robert Hale 1995 
Brown, Kathryn 'Intelligence and the Decision to Collect It: Churchill's Wartime 
American Diplomatic Signals Intelligence.' in Intelligence and National Security vol.lO 
no.3 July 1995 
Bruce-Biggs, B. 'Another Ride on Tricycle.' in Intelligence and National Security vo1.7 
no.2 1992 
Bryden, John Best Kept Secret Lester Publishing 1993 
Cain, Frank 'Intelligence Writings in Australia.' in Intelligence and National Security 
vo1.6 no.1 January 1991 
Cain, Frank 'Signals Intelligence in Australia during the Pacific War.' in Intelligence 
and National Security vol.14 no.l Spring 1999 
Cain, Frank The Origins of Political Surveillance in Australia Angus & Robertson 1983 
Calvocoressi, Peter Top Secret Ultra Sphere 1981 
Carruthers, Steven L. Australia Under Siege Solus Books 1992 
Cecil, Robert 'C's War.' in Intelligence and National Security vol.l no.2 1986 
Cecil, Robert 'Five of Six at War: Section V of MI6.' in Intelligence and National 
Security vo1.9 no.2 April 1994 
Cecil, Robert 'Philby's Spurious War.' in Intelligence and National Security vo1.9 noA 
October 1994 
Chapman, F.Spencer The Jungle is Neutral Chatto & Windus 1949 
Chapman, John W. 'Pearl Harbor: The Anglo-Australian Dimension.' in Intelligence and 
National Security vo1.4 no.3 July 1989 
Chapman, John W. The Price of Admiralty vols I-IV Saltire Press 1982-1989 
Clayton, Anthony Foreanned: A History of the Intelligence Corps Brasseys 1993 
Coales, J.F. 'Recollections of a Naval Scientific Gentleman Concerning Radio Direction-
Finding in Men-of-War.' in Journal of Naval Science vol.10 no.3 1984 
Costello, John Mask of Treachery William Morrow 1988 
Costello, John & Tsarev, Oleg Deadly Illusions Century 1993 
Croft, John 'Reminiscences of GCHQ and GCB, 1942-45.' in Intelligence and National 
Security vol.13 noA Winter 1998 
Cruickshank, Charles SOE in the Far East Oxford University Press 1986 
Davin, D.M. Crete War History Branch 1953 
Defty, Andrew 'The Future of the British Intelligence Memoir.' in Intelligence and 
National Security vol.IO no.l January 1995 
Denniston, A.G. 'The GC&CS Between the Wars.' in Intelligence and National Security 
vol.1 no.1 1986 
Denniston, Robin Churchill's Secret War: Diplomatic Decrypts, the Foreign Office and 
Turkey 1942-44 Sutton Publishing 1997 
Denniston, Robin 'Diplomatic Eavesdropping, 1922-44: A New Source Discovered.' in 
Intelligence and National Security vol.10 no.3 July 1995 
Denniston, Robin 'Three Kinds of Hero: Publishing the Memoirs of Secret Intelligence 
People.' in Intelligence and National Security vol.7 no.2 1992 
Deutsch, Harold C. 'Commanding Generals and the Uses of Intelligence.' in Intelligence 
and National Security vol.3 no.3 July 1988 
Dovey, H.O. 'Cheese.' in Intelligence and National Security vo1.5 no.3 July 1990 
Dovey, H.O. 'The Eighth Assignment 1943-1945.' in Intelligence and National Security 
vol.12 no.2 April 1997 
Dovey, H.O. 'The False Going Map at Alam HaIfa.' in Intelligence and National Security 
volA no.1 January 1989 
Dovey, H.O. 'Maunsell and Mure.' in Intelligence and National Security vol.8 no.1 
January 1993 
Dovey, H.O. 'The Middle East Intelligence Centre.' in Intelligence and National 
Security vol.4 noA October 1989 
Dovey, H.O. 'Operation Condor.' in Intelligence and National Security volA no.2 April 
1989 
Dovey, H.O. 'Security in Syria, 1941-45.' in Intelligence and National Security vo1.6 
no.2 April 1991 
Drea, Edward J. & Richard, Joseph E. 'New Evidence on Breaking the Japanese Army 
Codes.' in Intelligence and National Security vol. 14 no.1 Spring 1999 
Drea, Edward J. 'Reading Each Other's Mail: Japanese Communication Intelligence, 
1920-1941.' in Journal of Military History vo1.55 no.2 April 1991 
Elphick, Peter Far Eastern File: the Intelligence War in the Far East 1930-1945 Hodder 
& Stoughton 1997 
Elphick, Peter & Smith, Michael Odd Man Out: the Story of the Singapore Traitor 
Hodder & Stoughton 1993 
Erskine, Ralph 'Eavesdropping on 'Bodden'; IS0S v. the Abwehr in the Straits of 
Gibraltar.' in Intelligence and National Security vol. 12 no.3 July 1997 
Erskine, Ralph 'The Holden Agreement on Naval Sigint: The First BRUSA?' in 
Intelligence and National Security vol.14 no.2 Summer 1999 
Erskine, Ralph 'When a Purple Machine went Missing: How Japan nearly Discovered 
America's Greatest Secret.' in Intelligence and National Security vol.12 no.3 July 1997 
Erskine, Ralph 'Naval Enigma: An Astonishing Blunder.' in Intelligence and National 
Security vol.11 no.2 July 1996 
Erskine, Ralph 'The Soviets and Naval Enigma.' in Intelligence and National Security 
volA no.3 July 1989 
Evatts, Bruce 'Coastwatching in the Auckland Islands.' in Historical Review (Bay of 
Plenty Journal of History) vo1.40 no.2 November 1992 
Farago Ladislas The Game of the Foxes Hodder & Stoughton 1972 
Feldt, Eric The Coast Watchers Oxford University Press 1946 
Ferris, John 'The British Army and Signals Intelligence in the Field During the First 
World War.' in Intelligence and National Security vo1.3 00.4 October 1988 
John Ferris 'The British Army, Signals and Security in the Desert Campaign, 1940-42.' 
in Michael Handel Intelligence and Military Operations Frank Cass 1990 
Ferris, John 'The 'Usual Source': Signals Intelligence and Planning for the Eighth Army 
'Crusader' Offensive, 1941.' in Intelligence and National Security vol.14 no.1 Spring 
1999 
Filby, P.W. 'Floradora and a Unique Break into One-Time Pad Ciphers.' in Intelligence 
and National Security vo1.10 no.3 July 1995 
Foot, M.R.D. SOE in France HMSO 1966 
Freyberg, Paul Freyberg VC Hodder & Stoughton 1993 
Gazit, Shlomo 'Intelligence Estimates and the Decision-Maker.' in Intelligence and 
National Security vol.3 no.3 July 1988 
Gillespie,O.A. The Pacific War History Branch 1952 
Gladman, Brad 'Air Power and Intelligence in the Western Desert Campaign, 1940-43.' 
in Intelligence and National Security vo1.13 no.4 Winter 1998 
Gladwin, Lee A. 'Cautious Collaborators: The Struggle for Anglo-American 
Cryptanalytic Co-operation, 1940-43.' in Intelligence and National Security vo1.14 no.1 
Spring 1999 
Glees, Anthony The Secrets of the Service Jonathan Cape 1987 
Gordievsky, Oleg 'The KGB Archives.' in Intelligence and National Security vo1.6 no.1 
January 1991 
Goren, Dina 'Communications Intelligence and the Freedom of the Press: the Chicago 
Tribune's Battle of Midway Dispatch and the Breaking of the Japanese Naval Code.' in 
Journal of Contemporary History vol.16 no.4 October 1981 
Hager, Nicky 'The Origins of Signals Intelligence in New Zealand.' University of 
Auckland Centre for Peace Studies Working Paper no.5 1995 
Hager, Nicky Secret Power Craig Cotton Publishing 1996 
Hall, D.O.W. Coastwatchers War History Branch 1951 
Hall, Richard The Rhodes Scholar Spy Random House 1991 
Handel, Michael 'Intelligence and Military Operations.' in Intelligence and National 
Security vol.5 no.2 April 1990 
Harker, Jasper HMNZS Achilles Hodder & Stoughton 1976 
Harrison, E.D.R. 'More Thoughts on Kim Philby's My Silent War.' in Intelligence and 
National Security vol.l0 no.3 July 1995 
Headrick The Invisible Weapon: Telecommunications and International Politics 1851-
1945 Oxford UP 1991 
Herman, Michael 'Diplomacy and Intelligence.' in Diplomacy & Statecraft vol.9 no.2 
July 1998 
Hesketh, Roger Fortitude: the D-Day Deception Campaign St.Ennin's Press 1999 
Hinsley, F.H., Thomas, E.E., Ransom, C.F.G., Knight, R.C. British Intelligence in the 
Second World War HMSO 1979 vol.l 
Hinsley, F.H. et aI, British Intelligence in the Second World War HMSO 1981 vol.1I 
Hinsley, F.H. et aI, British Intelligence in the Second World War HMSO 1984 vol.III 
Part I 
Hinsley, F.H. et aI, British Intelligence in the Second World War HMSO 1988 vol.III 
Part II 
Hinsley, F.H. & Simkins, C.A.O. British Intelligence in the Second World War HMSO 
1990 vol.IV 
Hinsley, F.H. & Stripp, Alan Code Breakers - the Inside Story of Bletchley Park Oxford 
University Press 1993 
Hohne, Heinz Codeword Direktor: the Story of the Red Orchestra Seeker & Warburg 
1971 
Holmes, W.J. Double-Edged Secrets Naval Institute Press 1979 
Horner, D.M. Crisis of Command: Australian Generalship and the Japanese Threat, 
1941-1943 Australian National University Press 1978 
Horner, D.M. High Command, Australia and Allied Strategy, 1939-1945 Allen & 
Unwin 1982 
Horner, D.M. 'Special Intelligence in the South-West Pacific Area in World War 11.' In 
Australian Outlook vo1.32 no.3 December 1978 
Howard, Grant Happy in the Service Word Publishers 1985 
Howard, Michael British Intelligence in the Second World War HMSO 1990 vol.V 
Jenkins, David Battle Surface! Japan's Submarine War Against Australia 1942-44 
Random House 1992 
Jones, R. V. 'A Sidelight on Bletchley, 1942.' in Intelligence and National Security vo1.9 
no.1 January 1994 
Jones, R.Y. Most Secret War: British Scientific Intelligence, 1939-1945 Hamish 
Hamil ton 1978 
Jukes, Geoff 'More on the Soviets and Ultra.' in Intelligence and National Security volA 
no.2 April 1989 
Judd, Alan The Quest for C: Mansfield Cumming and the Founding of the Secret Service 
Harper Collins 1999 
Kahn, David The Codebreakers Sphere 1977 
Kahn, David Hitler's Spies Hodder & Stoughton 1978 
Kahn, David Seizing the Enigma: The Race to Break the German U-boat Codes 1939-
1943 Houghton Mifflin 1991 
Kennedy, Ludovic Pursuit Collins 1974 
Kerr, Sheila 'Familiar Fiction, not Untold Story?' in Intelligence and National Security 
vo1.9 no.1 January 1994 
~err, S~eila 'KGB Sources on the Cambridge Network of Soviet Agents: True or False?' 
In I.ntelhgence and National Security vol.11 nO.3 July 1996 
Knlghtley, Philip Philby: KGB Master Spy Andre Deutsch 1988 
Latham, Iris The WAACs Story priv. publ. 
Lewin, Ronald 'A Signal-Intelligence War.' in Journal of Contemporary History vol.16 
no.3 July 1981 
Lewin, Ronald Ultra Goes to War Hutchinson 1978 
Lewin, Ronald The Other Ultra Hutchinson 1982 
McGibbon, Ian Blue Water Rationale Government Printer 1981 
McGibbon, Ian (ed.) Undiplomatic Dialogue: Letters between Carl Berendsen & Alister 
McIntosh 1943-1952 Auckland University Press 1993 
McIntyre, W.David New Zealand Prepares for War University of Canterbury Press 1988 
MacKenzie, W.J.M. The Secret History of SOE: The Special Operations Executive 
1940-1945 [compiled 1948] St.Ennin's Press 2000 
McKnight, David Australia's Spies and Their Secrets Allen & Unwin 1994 
Maffeo, Steven E. Most Secret and Confidential: Intelligence in the Age of Nelson 
Naval Institute Press 2000 
Mahnken, Thomas 'Gazing at the Sun: the Office of Naval Intelligence and Japanese 
Naval Innovation 1918-1941.' in Intelligence and National Security vol.ll no.3 July 
1996 
Manne, Robert The Petrov Affair: Politics and Espionage Pergamon Press 1987 
Marder, Arthur Old Friends, New Enemies vol.I Oxford University Press 1981 
Marder, Arthur & Jacobson, Mark & Horsfield, John Old Friends, New Enemies vol.Il 
Oxford University Press 1990 
Mark, Eduard 'Venona's Source 19 and the 'Trident' Conference of May 1943: 
Diplomacy or Espionage?' in Intelligence and National Security vol.13 no.2 Summer 
1998 
Mason, W.W. Prisoners of War War History Branch 1954 
Masterman, John The Double Cross System Yale University Press 1972 
Modin, Yuri My Five Cambridge Friends Headline 1994 
Muggenthaler, A.K. German Raiders of World War II Robert Hale 1978 
Ovenden, Keith A Fighting Withdrawal Oxford University Press 1996 
Parker Michael The SIS Dunmore Press 1979 
Penro;e, Barrie & Freeman, Simon Conspiracy of Silence Grafton Books 1986 
Petrov, Vladimir & Evdokia Empire of Fear Frederick A.Praeger 1956 
Philby, Kim My Silent War Coronet 1967 
Philby, Rufina The Private Life of Kim Philby St.Ermin's Press 1999 
Pincher, Harry Chapman Too Secret Too Long Sidgwick & Jackson 1984 
Prados John Combined Fleet Decoded Random House 1995 
Prange: Gordon W. with Goldstein, Donald M. and Dillon, Katherine V. Target Tokyo: 
The Story of the Sorge Spy Ring McGraw-Hi111984 
Public Record Office, Secret History Files Series Camp 020: MIS and the Nazi Spies -
the Official History of MIS's Wartime Interrogation Centre Public Record Office 2000 
Public Record Office, Secret History Files Series GARBO: the Spy Who Saved D-Day 
[report of Tomas Harris, GARBO's case officer, 1945] Public Record Office 2000 
Public Record Office OPERATION FOXLEY: The British Plan to Kill Hitler Public 
Record Office 1998 
Public Record Office, Secret History Files Series The Security Service 1908-1945 
[report of John Curry, 1946] Public Record Office 1999 
Radcliff, R.A. 'Searching for Security: The German Investigations into Enigma's 
Security.' in Intelligence and National Security vol.14 no.1 Spring 1999 
Read, Anthony & Fisher, David Operation Lucy: Most Secret Spy Ring of the Second 
World War Hodder and Stoughton 1980 
Redgment, P.G. 'High-Frequency Direction-Finding in the Royal Navy, Development of 
Equipment for Use Against V-Boats.' Part I in Journal of Naval Science vol.S no.l 1982 
& Part II in Journal of Naval Science vo1.8 no.2 1982 
Richelson, Jeffrey T. & Ball, Desmond The Ties That Bind: Intelligence Cooperation 
Between the UKUSA Countries - the United Kingdom, the United States of America, 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand Unwin Hyman 1990 
Ridlington, A.D.V. 'D/F Plotting.' in Journal of the Royal Naval Scientific Service vol.23 
no.s 1968 
Rigden, Denis Kill the Fuhrer: Section X and Operation FOXLEY Sutton Publishing 
1999 
Rositzke, Harry The KGB Doubleday 1981 
Ross, J.M.S. Royal New Zealand Air Force War History Branch 1955 
Rowehr, Jurgen 'The Wireless War.' in (ed.) S. Howarth & D.Law The Battle of the 
Atlantic Naval Institute Press 1994 
Rusbridger, James 'The Sinking of the Automedon and the Capture of the Nankin.' in 
Encounter vo1.6 no.5 May 1985 
Rusbridger, James & Nave, Eric Betrayal At Pearl Harbor O'Mara Books 1991 
'Spotlight' 'Mr. Fraser and Intelligence.' in New Zealand Observer 11 October 1944 
Sarty, Roger 'The Limits of Ultra: The Schnorkel U-boat Offensive Against North 
Amercia, November 1944-January 1945.' in Intelligence and National Security vol.IZ 
no.2 April 1997 
Ruud, Charles A. & Stepanov, Sergei A. Fontanka 16: the Tsar's Secret Police Sutton 
Publishing 1999 
Sarty, Roger 'The Limits of Ultra: The Schnorkel V-Boat Offensive Against North 
America, November 1944 - January 1945.' in Intelligence and National Security voL1Z 
no.2 April 1997 
Schellenberg, Walter Invasion 1940: the Nazi Invasion Plan for Britain [Gestapo 
handbook, 1940] SLErmin's Press 2000 
Sexton,I.M. Radar Stories Air Force Radar 1993 
Shukman, Harold (ed.) Agents for Change: Intelligence Services in the 21st Century 
S t.Ermin' s Press 2000 
Singh, Simon The Code Book: The Science of Secrecy from Ancient Egypt to Quantum 
Cryptography Fouth Estate 1999 
Skillen, Hugh Spies of the Airwaves: A History of the Y Sections During the Second 
World War Hugh Skillen, Pinner 1989 
Smith, Bradley F. 'New Intelligence Releases: A British Side to the Story.' in 
Intelligence and National Security vol. 14 no.1 Spring 1999 
Smith, Bradley F. The Ultra-Magic Deals Airlife 1993 
Smith, Michael The Emperor's Codes: Bletchley Park and the Breaking of Japan's 
Secret Ciphers Bantam Press 2000 
Smith, Michael New Cloak, Old Dagger: How Britain's Spies Came In From the Cold 
Gollanz 1996 
Sparrow, Elizabeth Secret Service: British Agents in France 1792-1815 Boydell Press 
1999 
Stevens, David U-Boat Far From Home Allen & Unwin 1997 
Stevenson, William A Man Called Intrepid: The Secret War 1939-1945 Sphere Books 
1977 
Stripp, Alan Codebreaker in the Far East Oxford University Press 1995 
Syrett, David 'Communications Intelligence and the Sinking of the U-1062: 30 
September 1944.' in Journal of Military History vo1.58 October 1994 
Taylor, Nancy The Home Front Historical Publications Branch 1986 
Templeton, Malcolm (ed.) An Eye An Ear And A Voice: 50 Years in New Zealand's 
External Relations 1943-1993 Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade 1993 
Templeton, Malcolm Top Hats Are Note Being Taken New Zealand Institute of 
International Affairs 1988 
Thomas, Andy 'British Signals Intelligence after the Second World War.' in Intelligence 
and National Security vo1.3 noA October 1988 
Thurlow, Richard C. "A Very Clever Capitalist Class'. British Communism and State 
Surveillance.' in Intelligence and National Security vol. 12 no.2 April 1997 
Trepper, Leopold The Great Game: The Story of the Red Orchestra Michael Joseph 1977 
Trotter, Ann 'The Dominions and Imperial Defence: Hankey's Tour in 1934.' In Journal 
of Imperial and Commonwealth History vo1.2 no.3 May 1974 
Vaughan, Don Report on Coastwatching Radio Stations in the Gilbert & Ellice Islands 
1941-1945 DV 1992 
Vincent, Lincoln 'Enemy Overhead.' in NZ Aviation Historical Society Journal August 
1991 
Wark, Wesley K. 'Cryptographic Innocence: The Origins of Signals Intelligence in 
Canada in the Second World War.' in Journal of Contemporary History vo1.22 no.4 
October 1987 
Warner, Michael & Benson, Robert Louis 'Venona and Beyond: Thoughts on Work 
Undone.' in Intelligence and National Security vol.12 no.3 July 1997 
Waters, S.D. Royal New Zealand Navy War History Branch 1956 
Welchman, Gordon The Hut Six Story: Breaking the Enigma Codes McGraw-Hill 1982 
West, Nigel A Matter of Trust: MIS 1945-72 Weidenfeld & Nicolson 1982 
West, Nigel (ed.) British Security Coordination: The Secret History of British 
Intelligence in the Americas 1940-45 SLErmin's Press1998 
West, Nigel GCHQ: The Secret Wirless War Weidenfeld & Nicolson 1986 
West, Nigel MIS: British Security Service Operations 1909-45 Bodley Head 1981 
West, Nigel MI6: British Secret Intelligence Service Operations 1909~45 Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson 1983 
West, Nigel Molehunt Weidenfeld & Nicolson 1987 
West, Nigel Secret War: the Story of SOE Hodder & Stoughton 1992 
West, Nigel Venona: The Greatest Secret of the Cold War Harper Collins 1999 
West, Nigel, with Pujol, Juan Garbo Weidenfeld & Nicolson 1985 
West, Nigel & Tsarev, Oleg The Crown Jewels: the British Secrets at the Heart of the 
KGB Archives Harper Collins 1998 
Whitlock, Duane L. 'The Silent War Against the Japanese Navy.' in Naval War College 
Review voI.48 noA Autumn 1995 
Williams, Katherine Broome Secret Weapon Airlife 1996 
Winter, Barbara The Intrigue Master Boolarong Press 1995 
Winterbotham, F.W. The Ultra Secret Dell 1974 
Winton, John ULTRA in the Pacific Naval Institute Press 1993 
Wolfe, Robert 'Still Lying Abroad? On the Institution of the Resident Ambassador.' in 
Diplomacy & Statecraft vo1.9 no.2 July 1998 
Wood, F.L.W. The People At War War History Branch 1958 
Wright, Peter Spy catcher Heinemann 1987 
Yu, Maochun 'Chinese Codebreakers, 1927-45.' in Intelligence and National Security 
vol.14 no.1 Spring 1999 
